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1. INTRODUCTION 
A. GENERAL 
Prior s tudies  have indicated that the Space Transportat ion Sys tem 
(Shuttle plus Tug) should produce a la rge  reduction in  overa l l  payload cost6 
as a resul t  of improved payload design and operat ional  techniques. This 
study was conducted to provide data  and insight into the methods of achieving 
these economic gains. 
The study treats only payloads that will  be launched on the Shuttle/ 
Tug/Sortie Lab combinations. These  payloads are of four types: 
Expendable 
Ground Refurbishable 
On - Orbi t  Maintainable 
Sortie 
The expendable payloads addressed  in this study are designed specifically 
for the Shuttle/Tug and not  for expendable launch vehicles. Economic com- 
par i sons  are made only between these four  types of Shuttle payloads, and 
not between these  payloads and cu r ren t  expendable launch vehicle payloads. 
The FY 1972 study that preceded this study identified a series of 
design guidelines that w e r e  documented in a Reusable Payload Specification 
r epor t  (Ref. 1). The FY 1973 study attempted to quantify s e v e r a l  of these 
guidelines that w e r e  identified to be cost effective. 
lines were  a l so  developed in this study by analyzing two payloads paramet r ica l ly  
and demonstrating the r e su l t s  on an example satellite. In addition to analyz- 
ing the selected guidelines, emphas is  was  placed OD providing economic 
tradeoff da ta  and identifying payload p a r a m e t e r s  influencing the low cost 
approaches.  Thus,  in no way should this study be considered to r ep resen t  
a point design effort. The economic analyses  repor ted  in these  volumes 
should be viewed as providing t rend data  rather than absolute cost data. 
Additional sys t em guide- 
This  volume documents the analyses  that w e r e  per formed in 
developing the design guidelines prsented in Volume 11, Payload Design 
Guidelines. The analytical  techniques and design ana lyses  that are p re -  
sented in this volume provide t raceabi l i ty  in the approach, data generation, 
and data flow for the design guidelines on low-cost-type payloads. 
analyses  on the other guidelines such as reliability, modularity,  ground 
operations,  and subsyateme are presented in the appendixes s ince they were 
performed independently. 
The  
The common hardware and Sortie payload operat ions t a sks  w e r e  
special emphasis  t a sks  in this  study. The common hardware  concept has 
a potential for l a rge  cost reductions and was  therefore examined in detai l  
to determine i t s  technical feasibility. 
Shuttle payloads and resul ted in a design guideline. 
operations task  was  conducted to investigate the  integration of two scient i f ic  
disciplines into a mult iexperiment  Sort ie  payload. When the two discipl ines  
selected for integration w e r e  found to be incompatible, the miss ion  capa-  
bility was expanded in  one of the disciplines to update the Sor t ie  miss ion  
by incorporating additional experiments. 
This analys is  was  favorable f o r  
The  Sortie payload 
B. BACKGitOUND 
During Fiscal Year 1972, a payload analysis  for Space Shuttle appli-  
cations was  conducted by The Aerospace Corpsrat ion to identify design guide- 
lines f o r  reusable  payloads (Ref. 1). The F Y  1972 payload design guidelines 
resulted principally from an overal l  review by spec ia l i s t s  experienced in  the 
design of satellites of Shuttle payload s tudies  performed to  that time. 
In continuing this work during FY 1973, The Aerospace Corporation 
was able to  u s e  more definitive data on the Shuttle, Tug, Sort ie  Lab, and 
payloads f r o m  NASA and DOD studies  to develop additional guidelines and 
to quantify the FY 1972 guidelines. 
guidelines could be examined in depth within the scope of the F Y  1973 effort, 
Since only a portion of the F Y  1972 
2 
it was  decided to analyze otily one guideline pertaining to each  subsys tem 
along with a number of sys t em guidelines. Each subsys tem special is t  
analyzed his guideline from the viewpoint of technical feasibil i ty o r  cost .  
The  sys t em guideline analysia on low-cost-type payloads was  per formed in  
terms of cost. Other guidelines w e r e  pr imar i ly  analyzed f o r  technical 
feasibil i ty with some supporting quali tative cos t  information. 
It was  the intent to analyze as many of the guidelines as possible 
to see how they mould apply to a Shuttle payload, what t radeoffs  would arise, 
and what guidelines would prove prac t ica l  for a serv iceable  payload. 
3 

2. ANALYTICAL TECHNIQUE 
A. GENERAL 
This effort w a s  per formed to develop analysis  techniques for d e t e r -  
mining total payload p rogram cos t  as a function of payload p a r a m e t e r s .  
These cost relationships w e r e  found by developing a mathematical model  to 
pe r fo rm the pa rame t r i c  t radeoffs  on the computer.  
to identify specific tradeoffs that should be c a r r i e d  out because of the i r  s ens i -  
tivity t o  p rogram cos t s .  
two sa te l l i t es  were  selected to r ep resen t  a low altitude miss ion  and a high 
altitude mission.  This section desc r ibes  the mathematical  model,  computa- 
tional flow, and p a r a m e t e r s  involved in the t rade studies.  
and the sensit ivity of the parameters are presented in  Section 3. 
This t a sk  was also used  
To relate the pa rame t r i c  analysis  to actual  cases, 
The cos t  t rend  da ta  
The computational flow of the  mathematical model  is shown in  
F igure  2- 1. The rel iabi l i ty  model  and module simulation p rogram are 
descr ibed  in the SAMS Sys tems Optimization P r o g r a m  later i n  this sect ion 
as are the Spacecraf t  Synthesis P r o g r a m  and the Payload Cost  P r o g r a m .  
Because  of the l a r g e  quantity of data  that is produced, a data  analysis  and 
sum? iisrization p rogram was  developed to  s e a r c h  the s to red  cos t  da ta  in the 
Payload Cost  P r o g r a m  to identify the lowest cost  concepts for a given set 
of conditions. 
Also shown in the computational flow d iagrams are the p a r a m e t e r s  
that  were  var ied  in each of the computer programe.  
systematical ly  var ied  t o  de te rmine  the i r  cos t  sensi t ivi t ies  for a given mission 
descrA;4ion. The remote t e rmina l  computer  facility was used to provide corn- 
r w  Ltional flexibility during the development of S A M S .  The payload cos t  
p rog ram was converted from CDC/FORTRAN to the r emote  terminal /advanced 
programming language (APL) to  also provide development flexibility. Output 
of each  p rogram was  printed,  and the input into the next computer  p rogram 
These  p a r a m e t e r s  w e r e  
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was automatic except for those p rograms  where there was not sufficient 
workspace in the remote t e rmina l  to s to re  the data .  In those cases where 
the data  exceeded the workspace,  the inputting was performed manually. 
Within each program in the mathematical  model,  analysis  was  
required to develop appropriate  factors or coefficients for  the computation 
to p rocess  the data. In the c a s e  of the reliability model,  data  on the relia- 
bility d iagrams,  fa i lure  rates, type of redundancy, and p a r t s  weights w e r e  
required to develop the payload subsys tem redundancy and reliabil i t ies.  
The Spacecraft  Synthesis P r o g r a m  required design fac tors  to convert  from 
expendable to  ground- refurbishable  and on-orbi t  maintainable payloads. 
The Payload Cost P r o g r a m  required redundancy cos t  f ac to r s  to account for 
changes in mean miss ion  duration (MMD) from the baseline payload. The 
development of these  f ac to r s  and equations are descr ibed in this section. 
B. SPACECRAFT SYNTHESIS PROGRAM 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This computer program was developed to  provide the necessa ry  
payload data  t o  calculate payload cos t s  which can be related to  cer ta in  
p a r a m e t e r s  of Shuttle payloads. The pa rame te r s  of i n t e re s t  to the study 
include the effect of ground refurbishabili ty,  var ia t ion of MMD, and the 
number of modules  in spacecraf t  designed for on-orbi t  maintenance. Some 
pre l iminary  ana lyses  were  also conducted to  de te rmine  f ac to r s  for Sor t ie  
miss ions .  The Spacecraft  Synthesis P r o g r a m  a l s o  had the capability t o  vary  
basic  pa rame te r s  such as electrical power, pointing accuracy ,  propellant 
type, velocity increment ,  e tc .  
be modified to be compatible with the Orbi te r  ca rgo  bay. The spacecraf t  
data result ing f r o m  the variation of these  pa rame te r s  would be used as p r i -  
m a r y  inputs to  cos t  analysis  routines.  
The Spacecraft  Synthesis P r o g r a m  was developed jointly with sup- 
Where necessary ,  the spacecraf t  shape could 
port  f r o m  Study 2.4 and is thus more extensive than if i t  had been developed 
fo r  e i ther  study alone. 
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The Spacecraft  Synthesis P r o g r a m  can be used to develop subsystem 
data for most satel l i tes .  
Launched Defense Support P r o g r a m  (SLDSP) and the NASA Large  Space 
Telescope ( U T )  and E a r t h  Observatory Satellite (EOS) Program* This 
section of the repor t  descr ibes  the development and operation of the Space- 
craf t  Synthesis P r o g r a m  and the equations. 
In this  study, these satel l i tes  include the Shuttle- 
2. SYNTHESIS PROGRAM DESCRIPTION 
The Spacecraft  Synthesis P r o g r a m  has been prepared  in both 
For t r an  I V  and A P L  format and can be used on both the CDC 7600 and the 
IBM 370 at The Aerospace Corporation. English r a the r  than metric units 
are used to facilitate interface with other  computer routines.  Where con- 
venient, actual values for pa rame te r s  of lesser influence have been incorpo- 
rated as fixed values.  Where the influence of the var iable  is a complex 
function, the equation fo r  the influence is included in the p rogram and is 
automatically t reated.  For example, the modularity var iable  is defined by 
an exponential equation. 
the number of modules to  be studied. 
errors in  the p rogram operation and expedite the computations. 
In using the program,  the operator  need only input 
These automatic fea tures  reduce 
The computer develops subsys tem weight and other payload data  
as functions of the input parameter values. 
computed first. 
are partially dependent on the equipment subsys tem data,  are produced next 
by i teration subroutines.  
adapter weight and length. 
Equipment subsys tems are 
The s t ruc tu re  and thermal  protection subsystems,  which 
The final s tep  is the development of the  payload 
A simplified flow d iagram for the Synthesis Computer P r o g r a m  
The equations developed for the p rogram are 
The completed p ro -  
is depicted in F igure  2-2 .  
delineated and descr ibed i n  the ensuing paragraphs.  
g r a m  is, of course ,  tes ted against  existing satel l i tes  periodically. 
Two types of subsys tem weight estimating equations w e r e  developc d 
for  u se  in the synthesis  p rogram.  The f i r s t  type includes basic equations 
8 
9 
for  estimating the weights of subsystems of cu r ren t  expendable satell i tes.  
Actual satel l i te  data were  collected from NASA and DOD programs  to p e r -  
mi t  generation of these basic equations. 
in essence ,  factors  for modifying the subsystem weights for Shuttle 
payloads. 
The second type of equations offers, 
The basic  subsystem weight estimating equations were  developed 
by establishing an analytical model  and correlat ing data  f r o m  existing satel- 
l i t es  with the model  to  produce the equations. 
using a regress ion  analysis  computer routine. Parameters having a low, 
or constant,  influence were  incorporated as fixed values fo r  simplication. 
The basic weight equations for the subsystems are delineated in  Table 2-1.  
The symbols a r e  descr ibed a s  they f i r s t  appear .  The correlat ion of actual 
satel l i te  data with the developed equation is shown in F igure  2-3 for the 
s t ruc ture  subsystem. 
expanded as data become available. For this  study, the equations that were  
available on 28 February  1973 w e r e  used and w e r e  not updated. 
The data  were  cor re la ted  
These equati.ons are continually being refined and 
The  u s e  of the basic  equations will permi t  computation of data  for 
satellites of the expendable type that are now being fabricated for launch 
on expendable vehicles.  
Shuttle application f ac to r s ,  in equation or coefficient f o r m ,  w e r e  developed 
for the subsystem equations within the program,  
To modify these designs for  Shuttle applications, 
Ground-refurbishat le  payloads are designed to permi t  on-orbit  
The synthesis  p rogram re t r ieva l  and r epa i r  or updating on the ground. 
provides f o r  these fea tures  by adding a docking s t ruc ture  to the expendable 
satellite 45.4 kg (100 lb),  adding a targeting component 4 .5  kg (10 lb), and 
increasing the s t ruc ture  by a factor  of 1.10 to provide increased  access  to 
in te r ior  components. 
Mean Mission Duration (MMD) and design life of payloads were  
varied fo r  Shuttle applications. To incorporate  this  fea ture ,  studies were  
conducted which determined the inc rease  i n  the number of components 
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Table 2 -1. Basic  Weight Equations 
1. 
!. 
3. 
where: 
= Density Coefficient 
= 0.219 for satellites with body-mounted so la r  ce l l s  
(ENDO) 
= 0.128 for satellites with extendable so l a r  panels  
(EXO) 
= Weight of Satellite contents, pounds 
KP 
wC 
L/D = Satellite length-to-diameter ra t io  
Thermal  Control (Passive)  
= 0.025 Wsc Wtc 
where: 
W = Satell i te weight, pounds s c  
Elec t r ica l  - Bat te r ies  
(IOC-1960) = 0.167 (Pbat) (T,) (1  t R) (0.98) What 
where: 
= Bat te ry  power required during ecl ipse,  watts 
Pbat 
= Time  in eclipse,  hours  p e r  orb i t  
e T 
R 
IOC = Year of initial operational capability 
= Redundancy factor (e. g. R = 0.5 = 50%) 
1 1  
Table 2 - 1 .  Basic Weight Equations (Cont’d) 
Solar Arrays (Synchronous Orbits Only) 
Body mountcxd: 
0 . 2 6 4  Psla ] [ *- f 0 . 3 5 1  [ 0 . 9 9  (IOC- 1960) 
W s / a  = [  0.86 - 0.0314 Life 
Oricnted Pirddlcs - Rigid Substrate: 
0 . 1 2 0  P s / a  (JOC- 1960) 
s l a  = [  0 . 8 6  - 0.0313 Lift. w 
I 
Orit-nted Pant-Is - Flcxiblc Substrat(.: 
%/a = 
where: 
- 
ps /a 
Life = 
PI- - - 
Electrical  Harness 
1 0 . 1 0 9  Ps/a (IOC- 1970) 0 . 8 6  - 0 . 3 1 4  Life ] [g- + 0.351 [ 0.99 
Total sola r array power rcquirement,  watts 
Dcsign lifc of spacecraft ,  yc’ars 
R a t i o  of solar ce l l - to -  substrate arc-as 
I .  357 0.073 
W,, = 0 . 0 1 4 9  (Wt,s) ( V S C )  
where: 
M’ = Weight o f  pawl-r cons1 9iiing cquipmcnt , pouticls 
V = Velum(* of spactlcraft,  cubic fcet 
cq 
S C  
Table 2 - 1. Basic  Weight Equations (Cont'd) 
6.  
7. 
h. 
3.  
Electrical  - Power Conditioning 
Guidance. Navigation and Stabilization 
Three axis control: 
Spin stabilization: 
0.20 
= 0 558 (W )' (PA)-  glls S(' w 
Reaction Control Subsystem Hardware - N2H 
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Table 2 -L Basic Weight Equations (Cont'd) - ..- 
LO. 
11. 
Communication, Data Process ing ,  Instrumentation 
= 50 t 5(H)Oo1 (Ndl-1)  + 15 Ntr t D + ENC 
"'cdpi P 
where: 
H 
Ndl 
- ' t r  
DP 
= Orbi t  altitude, nautical  mi les  
= Number of down lifiks 
= Number of tape r eco rde r s  
= Data processing equipment weight, pounds 
ENC = Encryption aquipment weight, pounds 
Adapter Weight 0 . 5  
0.6 1.3 2t 0.3 
2nE t 9 ($) t u.16 ($) (75) 
Wadapt = KadnDfatp 
W = Load on adapter ,  pounds 
D = Adapter d iameter  (average) ,  feet  
'a 
g 
= Adapter length, feet 
= Centroid of adapter  load to centroid bi dapter ,  :set 
6 I 
t = Adapter shel l  thickness,  feet  
E = Modulus of elast ic i ty  
P = Material  density, pounds p e r  cubic foot 
Kad 
t = Automatically i te ra ted  within p rogram 
= Ratio of real is t ic- to- theoret ical  weight; 1 .5  
14 
kg 
8 
lo3  
lo2 
10 
(lb) 
0.24 1.096 
) 
0 .9  - L'D - Structure Weight, kg !lb) = ' KplWc - 0 Kp = 0.216 for body-mounted solar arrays 
- Kp = 0.129 for paddle-type solar arrays 
'(lo4) - 
. a Not included in correlation analysis 
h but shown for refe rence 
- 
. 
c 
c . - - 
- - - 
c 
Defense Support Program 
INTELSAT IV 
NIMBUS - B 
I 1 L I 1 1 1  B I I I I I ' L  
(104 
0.24 
L'D 
Figure 7 ?. Structure Weight Correlation 
required in a sys t em as a function of the increase  in reliability. 
these studies,  which are presented in Section 3, were  converted to weight 
factors for u s e  i n  the synthesis  program. 
weights w e r e  also increased  as design Lrte increased.  
life was  s e t  to equal 1.8 X MMD, 
Data f r o m  
Propel lants  and associated tankage 
Fol this study, design 
On-orbit  maintenance of payloads was  accomplished by incorporating 
replaceable modules  in  the payload design. 
within the synthesis  program by applying fac tors  to the appropriate  subsys-  
tems. These fac to r s  w e r e  developed from design analysis  conducted during 
the study as follows: 
This fea ture  is accomplished 
Subs y st em Factor 
St ruc ture  
with fewer  than 8 modules  = 0.1143 Nm t 0.8857 
with more than 8 modules  = 0.0875 N, + 1.10 
Electrical Dist. and Conditioning = 19.7 Nm 
Thermal Protect ion = 1.10 Wtc 
where: 
Nm = Number of modules  
W, = Therma l  protection subsystem weight, pounds 
A graph  of the s t ruc tura l  modularity factor is shown in  F igu re  2-4 
which shows the correlat ion of data  supplied in  Reference 2 and the design 
studies performed at The Aerospace Corporation. 
These  weight equations are only applicable ove r  a limited range. 
These limits are: 
Weight < 1000 kg (2205 lb )  
Elec t r ica l  P o w e r  < 5000 watts  
Design Life < 10 y e a r s  
Pointing Accuracy t 1.7 X radians (0.01 deg)  
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3. SYNTHESIS  PROGRAM OPERATION 
The synthesis  p rogram pr in ts  d i t a  in tabular  form. The f i r s t  
column lists the  r e fe rence  weights for a current-technology, expendable 
launch vehicle satellite. Weights are l is ted by subsystem. The second 
column shows the subsys tem weights as the payload shape is modified to 
f i t  the Shuttle ca rgo  bay. 
of a Shuttle -launched payload with r e t r i eva l  and ground-refurbishabili ty 
fea tures .  The fourth column p resen t s  the subsys tem weights of a Shuttle- 
launched payload with on-orbit  maintenance capability. The  da ta  are based 
upon the number of modules specified. 
included in these three columns. 
typical computer run would include weights for a l a r g e  var ie ty  of pa rame t r i c  
value s . 
The th i rd  column del ineates  the Subsystem weights 
The MMD variation effects are 
Adapter weights are a l so  provided. A 
C. S A M s  SYSTEM OPTIMIZATION 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The p r i m e  objective of the Steady State Availability of a Modularized 
System (SAMs) optimization analysis  is to de termine  the frequency of Shuttle 
launches required to es tab l i sh  the maintain the payload complement in orbi t .  
It is des i r ed  a l s o  to de termine  module usage rates and to assess the payload 
operat ional  availability. 
to the  c losed- form approach because of the complexities involved in  the 
analysis .  
u les ,  launch strategies based on warnings as wel l  as on fa i lures ,  and r e p a i r s  
o r  renewals  based on var ious deg rees  of predict ive information are all 
readi ly  analyzed by the eimulation technique but are ex t remely  difficult i n  
the c losed- form approach. 
The  technique of simulation was selected as opposed 
Complexities such as non-homogeneous and non-exponential mod - 
The simulation is Monte Car lo  in that repeated trials of Shuttle 
operat ions are simulated in o r d e r  to  obtain the ensemble ave rages  o r  o ther  
propertierr of the simulation. Briefly,  the payload module fa i lure  t imes  are 
generated at random according to t h e i r  individual re l iabi l i ty  functions, and, 
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depending on the launch and renewal s t r a t eg ie s  used,  the failed modules 
together with other possibly degraded modules are repa i red  by geni ra t ing  
new failure times for these modules.  The  simulation also cons iders  whe- 
ther the satellite is the expendable type, re t r ievable  type, or on-orbi t  
maintainable type. 
The ma jo r  inputs to the SAMs simulation are the module rel iabi l i ty  
Each  module has associated with it a Weibull reliabilii,  f a . .  ion functions. 
of the  form: 
R( t )  = e , O < t c T  
where: 
u is a scale parameter having units of time 
is a non-dimensional shape pa rame te r  
T is the module truncation time. 
The module reliability functions are obtained by first optimizing the payload 
redundancy using the Sys tem Optimization (SYSOPT) computer  program,  
then assigning the var ious components to specific modules,  and, finally, 
computing the Weibull re l iabi l i ty  function for each  module. Also considered 
are warning functions which are modelled by Weibull functions. The warn-  
ings are used  p r imar i ly  in  the selection of non-failed modules  to be loaded 
on the Shuttle for on-orbi t  r epa i r .  
Thres methods of generating the  pair  of warning and fa i lure  times 
can be simulated.  
section on P r o g r a m  Inputs and Life Simulation Methods. The methods 
depend on the definition of a warning and its relation t o  a fa i lure .  The 
simulation can, however, be used without considering the concept of warning. 
These  methods are descr ibed in detail in the following 
The method of select ing the o r d e r  of modules to be loaded on the 
Shuttle is an important  concept in the simulation. The replacement  o r d e r  
a s sumes  fa i lures  first, then warnings,  and, finally, if additional loading is 
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possible, selection of the additional modules based on using one of s eve ra l  
predictive modes.  In the predictive mode, a p r i o r i  tagged modules are 
selected first, but untagged modules are never selected. In the random 
predictive mode, all remaining modules have an equal chance of being 
selected.  In the perfect-failure-prediction (PFP) mode, the selection is 
made  in increasing o r d e r  of generated future  fa i lure  times. I n  the  condi- 
tional life mode, the selection is made  according to the median value of 
their remainng lives.  
how much te lemet ry  information is available,  but these  tend to b e  a compro- 
mise between the PFP and the  conditional l ife modes.  
The re  are a l so  other modes  possible,  depending on 
The simulation as developed is descr ibed in  Reference 3 and pro-  
vides an efficient bas i s  for performing complex replensihment analysis  
(involving the  design as well  as operational pa rame te r s )  of both the Shuttle/ 
Tug and payloads. The following sect ions provide general  information on 
the S A M  program. 
2. GENERAL SIMULATION CONCEPT 
The p r imary  purpose of the simulation is to obtain the following 
output pa rame te r s .  
a. Payload availability 
b. Payload module usage 
c .  Shuttle launch ra te  
These output pa rame te r s  are descr ibed l a t e r  i n  this  section. 
A typical Shuttle se rv ice  simulation is shown in  F igure  2-5. Two 
serv ice  actions are i l lustrated in the figure: the f i r s t  can be a del ivery-  
re t r ieva l  operation, and the second an on-orbit  repa i r  operation. In this 
case ,  the on-orbit  repa i r  operation can include both the repa i r  of a failed 
module and the r epa i r  of degraded modules.  
The simulation involves the establishment and maintenance of a 
four-payload sys tem on orb i t ,  The simulation assumes that the payloads 
20 
P/L 3 
Figure 2- 5. Simplified Illuetration of Shuttle Service Simulation 
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a.re established i n  specified orbi t  positions at fixed launch times (the 
establishment mode)  and that the maintenance mode begins after all the 
payloads have been placed on orbit .  
launch fai lure  or  an e a r l y  payload fa i lure  calls for servicing in  the maic te -  
nance mode on a f i r s t  fa i led-f i rs t  se rved  basis.  
An es:ablit:hment fa i lure  due to  a 
Each payload is assumed to be module .,zed with associated weight 
and reliabil i ty pa rame te r s .  In addition to payload acd module weights, SAMs 
cons iders  the Tug performance parameters and the payload orb i t  pa rame te r s  
in o rde r  to a r r i v e  at "best" s r r v i c e  loads for each launch. A "best" s e rv i ce  
load is the maximum total payload and module weight that the Tug can c a r r y  
for  each launch, consistent with the .enewal s t ra tegy  v.sed.* 
The "heart" of the simulation involves the module reliabil i ty 
functions which de termine  the life values of the modules.  The module 
reliabil i ty functions are established using the SYSOPT computer  program,  
and are discussed in  -he next paragraph. The method of simulating life 
values is descr ibed later in the section. 
3. SYSOPT COMPUTER PROGRAM** 
System Optimization (SYSOPT) is a For t r an  computer  p rogram 
which takes any satellite reliabil i ty configuration and adds  redundancies a t  
the component (or black box level)  to inc rease  the MMD of the total system. 
The computer p rogram systematical ly  adds a redundant component, includ- 
ing expendables, one a t  a time for the grea tes t  increase  in  MMD p e r  unit 
weight. 
for the additional redundancy. 
of selecting redundancies until: 
The candidate giving the grea tes t  MMD/A weight ra t io  is selected 
The computer  p rogram repea ts  the process  
a. 
b. 
A maximum weight is reached. 
The grea tes t  MMD/A weight is l e s s  than l o e 6  
hour  s /ki logram. 
200 i terat ions have been completed,  c. 
* In this study, only a single payload serv ice  was assumed.  
** This  program was not developed in this study and is descr ibed  in this 
report for completeness only. 
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At present ,  the types of redundancies in the computer p rogram a r e :  
are: a. 
b. 
C. 
d. 
Active Redundancy 
All components are act ive,  and only one operational 
component is necessary .  
made active redundant. 
Standby Redundancy 
Only one component is active,  and the remainder  are in 
a standby mode. Thus,  the fai lure  rates of the standby 
components are reduced t o  reflect the passive state. 
A sensing and switching device is necessa ry  to  detect  
fa i lures  of the p r imary  mode. T r a n s m i t t e r s  are standby 
redundant . 
Binomial Redundancy 
All n components remain active,  and rn components are 
required for nominal performance (m s n). Bat te r ies  in 
the power subsystem are usually redundant in this manner .  
Normal Redundancy 
One component is active with fa i lure  descr ibed by normal  
density function. The fa i lure  rate of redundant components 
in the standby mode is modeled as z e r o  in this study. 
Expendables are generally t rea ted  in th i s  manner .  
Rece ivers  are generally 
The information required to use  the computer p rogram is a l i s t  
For of corqponents by subsys tems which compr ise  the satel l i te  sys tem.  
each component, the data  needed are: 
a. 
b. 
C .  
d. 
e. 
f .  
g. 
The components in the initial configuration 
The maximum number of redundancies permiss ib le  
The type of redundancy and the minimum required 
in the c a s e  of the binomial redundancy 
The duty cycle of the active component 
The weight oL each component 
The added weight when the first redundancy is added 
The act ive and standby fa i lure  r a t e s  ( F o r  the normal  
Redundancy model,  these are the mean and s tandard 
deviation.) 
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The SYSOPT output identifies the subsystem and component and 
shows the quantity of components in the initial and final configuration as 
selected by the computer program.  The output a l so  identifies at each s ta te  
(or i t e ra t ion)  the component selected for redundancy. 
data are: 
Included in the output 
a. The s ta te  (or i terat ion)  
b. The identification of the redundant component by number 
(The components are numbered consecutively.) 
The total number of redundancies of that par t icular  
component 
The total weight of the satell i te s y s t e m  
The t ime  t used to calculate MMD (which is a function 
of the expendables aboard)  
The MMD of the total s y s t e m  
The reliability of the total system a t  the t ime t 
c. 
d .  
e. 
f .  
g.' 
4. PAYLOAD STATE CONCEPT AND AVAILABILITY 
A payload is i n  an  'Iup'I s ta te  i f  all i t s  modules ,  including its house-  
keeping modules  and experiment  modules ,  a r e  operat ional  or in non-failed 
s t a t e s .  
s ta te .  
payload are s to red  f o r  each Monte Car lo  t r ia l .  A Monte Car lo  trial is a 
typical miss ion  Simulation s ta r t ing  at  t ime z e r o  and ending a t  some p r e -  
sc r ibed  t ime.  
change t ime  points and s u m s  the individual up t imes  f r o m  a p resc r ibed  
"availability s t a r t  time'' (TA) to  the simulation end t i m e  (TM). F o r  each  
Monte Car lo  t r i a l  we have P / L  I: 
A payload is in a "down" s t a t e  i f  any  of i t s  modules  is in a failed 
In  the S A M s  cQmputer program,  the s t a t e  change t ime points of each  
For each  Monte Car lo  t r ia l ,  SAMs keeps t r a c k  of the s t a t e  
0 = mean up t ime  in t r i a l  i f o r  P /L  I i 
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where  
U .  .(I) = jth up t ime in t r i a l  i for P /L  I 'J 
NUi(I)  = number of up t imes  in t r i a l  i for P/L I 
Ai(I) = availability of P/L  I in  t r ia l  i 
It should be understood that the up t ime o r  availability of P /L  I is 
the up t ime or availability of the  function associated with P /L  1. 
ment and re t r ieva l  of P/L I is assumed to take place in the same orbital 
poa ition. 
A deploy- 
The above s ta t i s t ics  apply to  a single Monte Car lo  t r ia l .  In o r d e r  
to obtain s ta t is t ical  confidence, a number of trials m u s t  be made  to obtain 
the ensemble outputs. 
Comparable m e a s u r e s  can also be defined for total system avai l -  
ability where  the total number of payloads is considered, and the availability 
can be general ly  defined in t e r m s  of a subset  of payloads. 
system, the quantities analogous to equations (1)  and (2) can be a n  out- 
put. 
For the total  
5 .  LAUNCH AND MODULE USAGE RATES 
The previous subsection was concerned with the availability p e r -  
formance pa rame te r s  A (availability) and U (mean up t ime) .  Equally or 
more important are the cos t  impact pa rame te r s  of launch and module usage 
rates. For each  Monte Carlo trip1 i, SAMS accumulates  the number of 
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fa i lures  over  the simulation interval  TM result ing from anomalous events in 
module J of P / L  I. The ensemble s ta t is t ics  for the Monte Car lo  t r i a l s  are: 
NF(1,  J) = Number of fa i lures  resulting 
from anomidous events in 
module J of P / L  I 
NFl(I ,  J) = Number of fa i lures  result ing 
from anomalous events in 
module J of P /L  I for i th trial. 
SF(1, J )  = Standard deviation of N F i ( I ,  J) 
A typical Shuttle launch can involve the replacement  and r e t r i eva l  
of an en t i r e  payload and also the servicing of multiple modules within a pay- 
load o r  payloads. 
be r  of launches result ing from anomalous events of any module.  The total  
number of launches result ing from anomalous events is summar ized  by the 
ensemble s ta t is t ics .  
For each Monte Car io  trial i, SAMs accumulates  the num- 
6 .  PROGRAM INPUTS AND LIFE SIMULATION METHODS 
These  paragraphs  desc r ibe  the reliabil i ty inputs t o  the simulation 
and the m 
general  inputs to  the simulation: 
hods of simulating module life. Also descr ibed are the following 
NS = Number of payloads to  be established and maintained 
on -orbi t  
TM = Simulation t ime of miss ion  interval  
NF = Number of fa i lures  reqiAired for a Shuttle launch 
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MC = Monte Car lo  sample s i ze  
RSTRT = Random number s t a r t  value 
tL i  
' ~ 2  
= Launch reaction t ime for on-orbit  repa i r  launch 
= Launch reaction t ime for ground- refurbishment  launch 
t, = Repair  t ime on-orbit  fo r  each  payload 
RL = Launch reliability (Fa i lure  means  = second attempt is 
RD 
made  
= Docking reliability p e r  payiosd (Docking fa i lure  abor t s  the 
r epa i r  miss ion  for subsequent payloads but does not 
requi re  an  immediate  new launch if there are no unre-  
paired fa i lures  .) 
repa i i  r equ i r e s  an immediate  new launch.) 
Rr  = Repai r  reliabil i ty on-orbit  p e r  payload (Unsuccessful 
The  payload module re l ia 'd i t ies  are the p r imary  input to  the s imula-  
tion because they de termine  the launch r a t e  of the Shuttle, The mgdule relia- 
bil l t ies are modeled by Weibull functions, because the Weibull is the s imples t  
generalization of the  cxponential and has the  flexibility of considering dec reas  - 
ing as well  as increasing hazards .  
as Weibull. In the sirnu:-tion, any fai lure  t r i gge r s  a launch, and i t  is 
assumed that warnings are not involved in the launch decision; however, 
warnings which have occur red  a t  the launch decision point have pr ior i ty  in 
determining the orb i t  service load. The o r d e r  of module selection for  serv-  
ice of occur red  warnings is ordinar i ly  based on a f i r s t  event - f i r s t  se rved  
basis ,  but i t  is possible to  modify this o r d e r  by some weighting scheme.  
A weighting scheme is the rec iproca l  mean life of the module where  a module 
with a la rge  mean  life can be pushed back in the pr ior i ty  o rde r .  
is that a module pushed back in  the o r d e r  m a y  not be loaded until the next 
Shuttle launch. The  simulation cur ren t ly  a s s u m e s  that the f i r s t  pay!oad 
visited is the failed payload, and subsequent payload se rv ice  order ing is 
based on the o r d e r  prescr ibed  by the separat ion angle; i.e., the exact warn -  
ing order ing o r  predictive order ing scheme used in determining the Shuttle/ 
Tug load is generally overr idden by orbi t  geometry consideration in Qrde r  
The  warning functions are also modeled 
The resul t  
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for the flight to c a r r y  as much load as possible. Accumulated fa i lures ,  
however,  are serviced f i r s t .  
o rdered  loading for  a partic-i lar payload (failed and warned modules)  are 
serv iced  in one visit.  
* ALSO, al l  se rv ice  called Cor by the pr ior i ty  
7. MODULE LOADING (SERVICE) ORDER 
The previous subsection descr ibed the methods of simulating o r  
generating warning and fa i lure  times for a selected module. 
descr ibes  the methods of selecting the o r d e r  of modules  to  be loaded c/n ihe 
Shuttle/Tug. As mentioned previously, a launch is based on a fa i lure  .rnd this 
fa i lure  (first fai lure  first if  t he re  is an accumulation) is to  be serv iced  first 
before o ther  modules selected f o r  servicing. Assuming additional modules 
can be loaded, servicing of occur red  warnings is usually the next c o r s i d e r a -  
tion on a first event - f i r s t  se rved  basis .  After h a d i n g  the Shuttle with these  
modules,  aEsuming that additional modules  can be loaded, the selection is 
next based OR a predictive mode ,  
This subsectin- 
The pr ior i ty  o r d e r  m a y  be summar ized  as follows: 
a. Load failed module replacement  first. If t he re  a t e  
accumulated fa i lures ,  load the modules on a f i r s t  failed - 
first se rved  bas is .  
se lec t  fu r the r  modules  from occurred  wari:ings m a first  
event - f i rs t  se rved  bas i s  or on sollie modified order ing  of 
occurred  warnings.  
C .  If s t i l l  fu r ther  loading is possible,  se icc t  s e i v i c e  modules 
based on a predictive mode. 
The logic implemented to se lec t  the module loading o r d e r  for p r e -  
b. After completing the loading of faA,.. ->ie replacements ,  
dicted failure replacements  is that cer ta in  modules can  be tagged to be 
selected first (in o r d e r  of tagging) in  the predictive modc. Other modules  
can be untagged and never  selected in the predictive mode. After select ing 
r(r 
The assumption of servicing fa i lures  f i r s t  may  be ch.anged a t  a l a t e r  date.  
This  assumption is m a d e  in view of the fact that outage o c c u r s  only f o r  
fa i lures  and not for warning and also because the relaxation of this a s sump-  
tion opens the door to a t remendous range of order ing methods.  
thc tagged modules and ;issunling that s t i l l  further modules can be selected 
for service,  SAMs selects  the modules according to the following options: 
a. Random o r  no failure information mode. Order  unwarned 
and unfailed modules on the basis  of a random ordering 
where a l l  possible o r d e r h g s  a r e  equally likely. 
b. Per fec t  failure prediction or PFP mode. Other modules 
in increasing order  of actual generated fa i lure  t imes.  The 
failure t ime of each module i s  accurate!.; predicted. 
c. Conditional life mode. Order  modules in increasing order  
according to their 50 percentile conditional life value 
the computatior, the operational t ime of the module taken 
into account. 
In 
The PFP mode considers  the accurately generated failure t imes 
whereas the conditional life mode considers the failure distribution function. 
None of the three predictive modes considered i s  concerned with warning; 
thus, warnings only enter into the simulation a s  events which have occurred 
pr ior  to a launch-triggering failure. This i s  appropriate,  because prediL - 
tion of h wsrning is of less concern than the honoring of a warning that has  
occurTed and thus, when a prediction is necessary ,  the prediction should 
be for the failure event ra ther  than for the warning event. 
D. LAUNCH AND PAYLOAD SERVICE RATES 
The expected number of launches that were  computed in the p r e -  
vious subsection is used to determine the Shuttle launch and payload serv ice  
rates .  
r e fur bis hm e nt and on -orbit m aintenanc e char g e s. 
This data is required to evaluate the t r i p  charges  and the ground- 
The Shuttle launch cos t  can be shared with other miss ions  on the 
flight since the Orbiter and Tug can perform other operations such a s  deploy- 
ment,  servicing, and re t r ieva l  and r e tu rn  of payloads. 
will depend on the performance capability. 
the performance is limited. 
The amount of sharing 
In the case  of the Shuttle/Tug, 
Performance was not considered in the case  of 
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the Shuttle only, because the re w a s  adequate deploynient and re t r ieva l  
pe rforniance capability for the payloads considered in the study. 
Fo r  the Shuttlc/Tug, the performance capability was based on the 
values provided i n  Reference 4 which are listed as  follows for payload place- 
ment into synchronous orbit: 
Round T r i p  = 1360 kg (3000 lb) 
Retr ieve and Return = 1910 kg (4210 lb) 
Deployment = 3620 kg (7980 lb) 
These  performance limits were  used to determine the t r i p  shar ing based on 
payload weights. 
expendable payloads were  assumed to  s h a r e  the t r i p  with another  payload, 
but a ground-refurbishable payload was  not shared  because the Tug is p e r -  
forming a round-trip operation by deploying a Payload and retrieving and 
returning another payload. 
(3000 lb)  < W I 3620 kg (??BO lb), the expendable payloads w e r e  assumed 
to be a dedicated flight. For ground-relurbishable payloads, the payload 
weight range was limited to 1360 kg (3000 lb)  < W I 1910 k g  (4210 lb). 
dedicated t r ip s  are involved, because one t r ip  is required for deployment 
and a second t r i p  is required to re t r ieve  the ground-refurbishable payload. 
The ground- refurbishable payload weight cannot exceed this  l imit  i n  o rde r  
fo i  the payload to be returned for refurbishment.  
For the payload weight range of W 5 1360 kg (3000 lb), the 
For payloads in the weight range of 1360 kg 
Two 
F o r  on -orbit  maintenance payloads , the Shuttle/Tug mus t  be capa- 
ble of servicing non - space-  replaceable components and on-orbi t  replaceable 
modules. The  repa i r  of non - space-replaceable  components must be accom- 
plished by returning the payload to ground. 
o n e  t r i p  charge  must  be limited to W 5 1360 kg (3000 lb).  
o n  -orbit  replaceable modules was  assumed to be accomplished by a se rv ic -  
ing  unit adapted to  the Tug to house the modules and to remotely changeout 
modules.  This  servicing unit a r d  maneuvering impulse to se rv i ce  the second 
payload were  assumed to weigh 454 kg (1000 lb)  which leaves 908 kg (2030 lb )  
Thus,  the payload weights for 
The repa i r  oi 
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for modules.  The  module loading capability, if two payloads are  serviced,  
is Wm 5 454 kg (1000 lb). 
maintenance miss ion  would service only one payload and the added maneuver-  
ing impulse would not be required.  
case is then 454 kg (1000 lb )  < Wm 5 1130 kg (2500 lb).  
exceeds th i s  limit, the maintenance miss ion  will requi re  two t r i p  changes.  
If the module weight exceeds this l imit ,  the 
The  module loading capability for this  
If the module weight 
With these  performance constraints ,  the equations t o  determine the 
launch rates for the Shuttle/Tug and payload including the servicing w e r e  
then formulated.  
summar ized  in  Table  2-2 for th ree  payload types. 
it was assumed that the las t  payload in  the rep lacement / serv ice  series 
remains  on-orbi t  a f te r  the mission has  been completed and that the las t  
ground- refurbishment pay load o r  modules  are returned to avoid deb r i s  in 
space  but a r e  not refurbished on the ground. 
included for the ground- refurbishable payload, one s e t  of replacement 
modules w a s  included for a n  on-orbi t  maintenance payload, and no s p a r e  
hardware was  included for expendable payloads. These  equations are  limited 
t o  a one-payload sys t em;  i.e., they do not apply t o  a multiple-payload sys t em 
on-orbit .  
p rog ram cos t  model to  provide equivalent launch r a t e s  for t r i p  cha rges  and 
payload se rv ice  r a t e s  for ground- refurbishment and on-orbi t  maintenance 
charges .  
E. PAYLOAD PROGRAM COST ESTIMATING 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
These  launch r a t e s  and payload service r a t e  equations are 
For a l l  of these  cases, 
Also, one s p a r e  payload was  
The equations were  programmed as a subroutine in the payload 
From past payload studies,  a comprehensive payload progrPrn cos t  
model h a s  evolved for analyzing a total  space  p rogram composed of numerous 
individual payload (satell i te)  p rograms.  
simplified and reprogrammed for a remote  te rmina l  computer  sys t em that 
allows individual payload p rograms  to  be modified and analyzed quickly and 
This  basic cost model has  been 
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efficiently. 
total  p rog ram cost  can be automatically identified f r o m  among a la rge  n u n -  
b e r  of al ternat ive design and p rogram s t ra teg ies .  The  purpose of this sub-  
section is to: 
Subroutines have been added to  the  program so that the lowest 
a. 
b. 
c. 
Provide a description of the basic cost  model  
Define the inputs it requi res  
Discuss  the output of the  model 
2. PAY LOAD PROGRAM COST MODEL 
, The model is composed of two m a j o r  sections;  one computes sa te l -  
For the Shuttle/Tug, l i te cos t s  and the other  computes  launch vehicle cost .  
launch vehicle cos t  is defined as d i rec t  cos t  per  ilight and includes such  items 
as expendable drop  tanks,  p r o -  r a t a  solid motor  hardware,  propellants (solid 
and liquid), recovery,  refurbishment ,  spa res ,  and launch site vehicle mainte-  
nance and flight support. 
Payload cost  is defined as a l l  effort required to design, develop, 
and manufacture satel l i tes  and support  them during launch and orbi ta l  ope ra -  
tion. Typically, a satell i te p rogram is divided into RDT&E (nonrecurr ing) ,  
investment ( recur r ing) ,  and operat ions ( r ecu r r ing )  cos t  categories ,  and the  
model t r ea t s  each  cos t  es t imate  accordingly. 
development, investment includes procurement  of satel l i te  hardware ,  and 
operat ions covers  support  during and af te r  launch. In cases where  reuse  
through ground refurbishment  o r  on-orbi t  servicing is considered, the ope ra -  
tions category also includes repa i r  and refurbishment.  
RDT&E cove r s  design and 
The  basic payload model  calculated RDT&E and unit cost  from pay- 
load data  that are automatically applied to  cost  -estimating relationships 
(CERs)  s tored  in  the p rogram.  
input. 
p rog ram total cos t s  a re  calculated and printed for each  al ternat ive.  
Launch vehicle cost  information is a d i r ec t  
Based on payload and launch vehicle quantit ies,  satell i te unit and 
The  payload computer  model has  been modified to aid in selecting 
lowest-cost  a l ternat ives  f r o m  a wide range of performance and p rogram 
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variables .  
(expendable, ground refurbishable,  on-orbit maintainable,  or Sort ie) ,  num- 
ber of replaceable  modules  p e r  payload, MMD (which is ref lected in  weight 
differences f r o m  the baseline payload), number of modules  replaced p e r  
visit,  numerous cos t  sensit ivity candidates (such as launch cos ts ,  ground 
refurbishment rates, or on-orbi t  servicing ra tes ) ,  and  p r o g r a m  lifetimes. 
The  ca tegor ies  of var iables  that affect cost  are type of satell i te 
Inputs are obtained from the Spacecraft  Synthesis and the SAMs 
p rograms ,  which provide payload and schedule (quantity) data.  
were  manually inputted to the payload model;  however,  the model  is 
organized so that all estimates covering all of the var iable  mentioned above 
are calculated,  a3d the lowest-cost  a l ternat ive is identified for each 
category. 
3 .  
These data 
COST MODEL I N P U T S  AND ASSUMPTIONS 
The  performance data  and the payload descr ipt ive and schedule 
(quantity) information required for operating the cost model  are set for th  
in Table  2-3. 
relate t o  the i r  u s e  are presented in  this  section. 
basic  assumptions apply to the cos t  estimates generated for this  study: 
Descriptions of all inputs and the necessa ry  assumptions that 
In addition, the following 
a. 
b. 
C .  
d.  
e. 
f .  
Constant 1973 dol la rs  used 
No low-cost designs considered; i. e., those based on 
relaxed weight and volume constraints  
Standardized modules  not considered; therefore ,  no savings 
accrue f r o m  sha red  developments or  quantity production 
Complete RDTClrE cos t s  included for e a c h  satel l i te  a l te rna-  
t ive,  except that ,  for  reusable  satel l i tes ,  one equivalent 
s e t  of payload p a r t s  and 75  percent  of miss ion  equipment 
RDT&E are used to es t imate  effects of shortened R&D time 
and cost when the Shuttle sys t em is used 
Sor t ie  mode user charge  is $0.7 million p e r  flight based 
on MSFC data;  no Sort ie  RDT&E is charged.  
of mission equipment is used 
N o  payload infant mortal i ty  is included; however, all o ther  
reliability effects are included in year ly  expected fl ights 
Only one s e t  
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Table 2-3. Satellite Cost Est imate  - Basic  Input Information 
Input I tem Description 
Title 
Satellite type 
Struc ture  weight 
E lec t r i ca l  power weight 
Communications weight 
Stability and control  weight, d r y  
Stability and control  weight, consum. 
Propuls ion weight, iner t s  
Propulsion weight, propellants 
Mission equipment weight 
Mission equipment type 
Initial e lec t r ica l  power 
Propulsion, type 
Propulsion, to ta l  implse, lb / sec  
Orbi t  altitude 
Number of satellites in sys t em 
Constant yea r  dol lars  
Launch vehicle type 
Schedules (quantity) 
S t ruc ture  type 
Stability type 
Refurbish rate 
(for ground refurbishment)  
Repair r a t e  
No. of replaceable  modules/  
payload 
No. of modules rep laced/v is i t  
Launch vehicle cos t  ($ million) 
Examples  (or  Remarks)  
(Six-digit number for  identification) 
Expendable, on- orbi t  maintainable, 
ground reusable ,  and Sortie 
(Basel ine expendable weights by 
subsystem- -when satellite is 
different f r o m  baseline,  then 
non-baseline weights mus t  a l s o  
be an  input. ) 
Communication, ea r th  r e sources ,  
etc. 
Watts 
Solid or liquid, if subsystem needec 
If subsystem needed 
Low, sync.,  planetary 
(Required in  orbi t  for  sys t em 
operation) 
1973 
Shuttle o r  Shu t t l enug  
(Quantity based on yearly expected 
flight requi rements  
Exos t ruc ture  o r  endostructure  
3-axis  o r  spin 
39 percent  
25 percent  for one equivalent 
sa te l l i t e ' s  worth of modules 
2 to 19 i n  a sateltile 
One to a l l  per  flight 
Shuttle is 10. 3; with Tug, 11.2 
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g.  Ground refurbishment  based on replacing non-repairables ,  
e. g., ba t te r ies  and  propellants;  repa i r  of failed i t ems ;  and  
complete production acceptance tes t  of al l  replaced pa r t s  
and modules 
One RDT&E for  program duration 
Total  p rogram cost based on s l ice  of continuing program,  
i.e., res idual  value i s  not included 
h. 
i. 
a. Title and Satellite Type 
For identification purposes ,  a six-digit  number is  used as a t i t le  
for  each satell i te program al ternat ive.  
category of a l ternat ives:  
Each digit r ep resen t s  a different 
1. The f i r s t  digit r ep resen t s  the type of satell i te;  i.e., 
expendable, ground refurbishable,  on-orbi t  maintainable,  
o r  Sort ie .  
that assume expendable satell i tes.  Ground refurbishable 
means that cu r ren t  technology and design procedures  a r e  
used but that they a r e  modified to allow for reuse.  
maintainable payloads have space-replaceable  modules and 
non-space-replaceable components Sort ie  payloads assume 
that miss ion  equipment is flown in a Sor t ie  Lab a t  low o rb i t s  
for shor t  per iods of t ime and then re turned  to ear th .  
digit will be 1, 2 ,  3, o r  4 depending on type. 
the digits below will vary  from 1 to 9 depending on 
ber  of a l ternat ives  in each category.)  
The second digit defines the number of replaceable  modules 
in a par t icular  reusable  satell i te design. The number of 
modules will vary from 2 to m o r e  than 20. 
The third digit defines the MMD, which va r i e s  f rom 1 to 
4.5 y e a r s  for the cases considered in this study. 
The fourth digit defines the number of modules replaced 
pe r  visit,  depending on the number of modules in a par t icular  
design. The modules replaced will vary from one to all. 
The fifth digit defines repa i r  r a t e s  for ground o r  on-orbit  
se rv iced  al ternat ives  . 
The sixth digit defines launch vehicle cos t  ( t r ip  charges) .  
Expendable refers t o  typical cu r ren t  designs 
On-orbit 
The 
(Similarly,  
the num- 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5 .  
6 .  
P r o g r a m  lifetimes are var ied for all of the above al ternat ives  but are not 
identified by a separa te  digit. 
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b. Subsystem Weights 
Expendable weights are an input, because the cost-est imat ing 
relationships (CERs)  are based on typical expendable satell i tes.  
are applied to the baseline cost  es t imates  to  provide for  ground-refurbishable 
or on-orbit  maintainable designs.  
weight from baseline subsys tems and thus requi re  additional weight input 
data. 
F a c t o r s  
The f ac to r s  are based on differences in 
c .  Mission Equipment Type 
Ten types of miss ion  equipment are identified in the cost model: 
1. 
2. 
3 .  
4. 
5 .  
6 .  
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
Communications 
Navigation 
E a r t h  Resources  
Meteorology 
Sur  vei 1 lanc e 
Technology Applications 
As  t 1: onomy 
P l a s m a  Phys ics  
Solar Observation 
P lane tary  
For a par t icu lar  estimate, the most appropriate  category m u s t  be selected 
from the list. 
d. Initial E lec t r ica l  Power 
Input r equ i r e s  initial output of the e lec t r ica l  subsystem to b e  given 
in watts. 
e. Propuls ion Type and Total  Impulse 
A propulsion sys t em i 6  not normally required by mos t  satel l i tes ;  
however, such a requirement  should not be confused with the attitude control 
propulsion, which is pa r t  of stability and control.  The Type refers to  the 
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propellant used,  e i the r  solid o r  liquid. 
also a required input when a propulsion subsystem is needed. 
Total  Impulse in kg / sec  ( lb / sec)  is 
f .  Orbi t  Altitude 
The orb i ta l  altitude a t  which the satell i te opera tes  is a requi red  
input. Three categories  are considered: low, synchronous,  and escape  
(planetary). 
g. Number of Satel l i tes  in Sys tem 
Many p rograms  requi re  more than one satel l i te  to be in orb i t  d u r -  
ing operations;  quant:ty required i s  a needed input. 
h. Constant Year Dollars  
Cost e s t ima tes  ref lect  constant do l la rs ,  as  des i red  by a par t icular  
analysis ,  and provision is made  for  such  an  input. 
i. Launch Vehicle Type 
The cost of launch vehicles is s e t  in the program;  however,  the 
Shuttle o r  the Shuttle/Tug mus t  be  identified by an  input. 
j. Schedules (Quactity) 
The  SAMS program genera tes  year ly  expected launches for each  type 
of satel l i te  and for each strategy.  
with the p rogram l i ie t imes which are  used in the computer to calculate 
quantities of payloads launched and number of launch vehicle flights required,  
w e r e  descr ibed previously.  
These  year ly  expected values,  together 
k. Struc ture  Type 
Type of s t ruc tu re  refers e i ther  to  endo s t ruc ture  (associated with 
compact ,  spin-stabil ized satel l i tes)  or exostructure  (associated with less 
compact  , t h ree  - aui s - stabil ized sa t e  1 lit  e s ) . 
1. Stability Type 
The stabil i ty sys t ems  m a y  be e i ther  spin or  three-axis  controlled.  
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m. Refurbishment Rate 
The refurbishment r a t e  does not apply unless  the satel l i te  is  ground 
The ra te ,  when applied to the average unit cost ,  gives a cos t  refurbishable.  
pe r  flight of repairing and refurbishing a satell i te that has  been returned 
f r o m  orbi t .  
and 3 0  percent are used. 
equipment only. 
Nominal r a t e  is 39 percent ;  for sensitivity analyses ,  50 percent  
Sort ie  is three  percent p e r  tlight applied to miss ion  
n. Repair Rate 
Repai r  ra te  applies only when a satell i te is designed for on-orbit 
maintenance. 
the number of replaceable modules c a r r i e d  to orbi t ,  the number of modules 
that make  up the satel l i te ,  and the average  repa i r  rate. 
is 25 percent;  for sensitivity calculations,  30 percent  and 20 percent  are 
used. 
The comp-.ber p rogram calculates  servicing cost  based on 
The nominal r a t e  
0 .  Number of Replaceable Modules Per Satellite (and Per V i s i t )  
Depending on the servicing s t ra tegy,  one or m o r e  modules will be 
ca r r i ed  to an orbiting satellite when a fai lure  occurs  or a warning sys tem 
demands a repa i r  flight. 
p. Launch Vehicle Cost 
Any launch vehicle can be considered; however, this study u s e s  the 
Shuttle, Shuttle/Tug, o r  Shuttle/Sortie Lab; costs are $10.3 million based on 
NASA/MSFC inputs, $1 1.2 mill ion,  or $1 1 .0  mill ion,  respectively.  The Tug 
r a t e  is $0.9 million, and the Sort ie  Lab r a t e  is $0.7 mill ion.  
4. REDUNDANCY AND MODULARITY 
Previous  satell i te studies on extended sign life ( A i r  Force Pro- 
g r a m s  191 and 777)  have examined the effect on subsystem weight and cost  
3 9  
of extending satell i te l ifetimes through redundancy. 
developed that equated subsys tem weight i nc reases  with cost  i nc reases  
ior redundant equipment. As par t  of the cur ren t  study, additional work 
has  been done on the DSP satel l i te ,  and the resu l t s  have oeen integrated 
with the previous s tudies .  
the communications and miss ion  equipment subsystems;  hcwever,  110 
change to  e lectr ical  o r  stability and control subsys tems occurred .  
Fac to r s  w e r e  
As a consequence, adjustments  w e r e  made  to  
The actual calculation is based on comparing a par t icular  design 
with the baseline,  establishing a weight change factor ,  determining the cost  
change factor  from the weight fac tor ,  and applying the cos t  factor  to the 
baseline cost  es t imate .  
putes the required fac tors  and applies thr .n to the RDT&E and unit cost  
es t imates .  
The  Payload P r o g r a m  Model automatically com- 
Similar methods are used by the model to give effect to  modularity 
for  on-orbit  serviced designs;  however,  s t ruc ture  cost  is based solely on 
cost  estimating relationships (CERs) .  
in a par t icular  design influences the cost  of stabi!ity and control.  
the computer  model m a k e s  all of the required calculations based on the 
inputs d i scussed  earlier. 
In addition, the number of modules  
Again, 
5. CER ANALYSIS 
Over  the p - d  seve ra l  y e a r s ,  satell i te cost  data  have been collected 
in  an effort  to  verify the accuracy  of cost-est imat ing relationships used in 
var ious payload- related studies.  These data  w e r e  assembled  and compared 
with CER es t imates ;  the conclusion was reached that the CERs gave reason-  
ably acceptable es t imates .  F o r  this study, a more detailed analysis  was  
conducted t o  gauge the effect on cost  es t imates  of possible changes in the 
CERs.  
change in es t imates  of cost  f o r  a typical satel l i te .  
sample  data  fo r  each  subsystem w a s  used as proxy for  weight and per for -  
mance  inputs. 
The  method used fo r  this  analysis was  to measure the approximate 
An average  f r o m  the 
Cos ts  w e r e  then calculated f rom the original CERs and f r o m  
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possible  revised CERSP and a comparison of the r e su l t s  was  made as 
shown below 
I
Subs y s te r n  
S t ruc ture  
Elec t r ica l  
TT&C 
Stab, and 
Control 
TOTAL 
Weight 
102 kg (225 lb)  
300  (U,att)'"': 
57 kg (125 lb)  
68 kg  (150 Ib )  
I 
Total Cos t  in $$ Millions 1 
0 rig inal 
CERs  
10.2 
1 1 . 2  
26.5  
2 7 . 1  
R e  vis ed :: 
CERs 
16.3 
I - - - .  - -  - r c  ~~ ...a ---I ---- -- ~~- --_-_. - -- _ _  _ _ _  _ _ - _ _  
revision in  payload CERs (including the substantial  amount of effort  such  a n  
undertaking would r equ i r e )  is not c r i t i ca l  f o r  this  study. 
.a. e,. 
The CERs have not actually been revised;  an approxirnation was used based 
on a best-fi t  representat ion of the actual subsys tem cost  data collected for 
a l l  satel l i tes  in the sample .  
:> ;*; 
The e lec t r ica l  CER is based on power r a the r  than weight. 
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3 .  1 ) E S I G N  ANA1,YSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Design analysis  was performed on the Large  Space Telescope (LST) 
and the Shuttle- Launch- d Defense Support P rogram (SLDSP) to  develop 
quantitative cost  data.  
reliabil i ty,  r e p a i r  s t ra tegy,  and payload type. This type of payload dzta 
required the pa r t s  counts of each subsystem, the overa l l  design cc;ncept, and 
weight estimates. 
Thasc ce; ts  were  developed to  ref lect  the effects of 
F o r  both payload programs studied, the reliabil i ty ana lys i s  and 
conceptual design, w e r e  performed simultaneously beccluse of the  study 
schzdule. 
me t r i c  cost-trend data and not a point-design analysis .  
ana lyses  examined payload configurations ranging f rom single s t r ing  t o  maxi- 
mum MMD. 
modules in  the payloads and different payload types.  
s ized on- orbi t  maintenance concepts for both low- alt i tude and high-altitude 
operations. The low- and high-altitude servicing is performed by the Orbi te r  
and Tug, respect ively,  where  each has  different servicing approaches.  F r o m  
these  independent effor ts ,  the design fac tors  re la ted t o  reliabil i ty,  modularity, 
and payload type were  developed as input to  the mathematical  model. 
This approach was sat isfactory s ince the study is to  provide para- 
‘l’he relikbil i ly 
The conceptual design task  investigated varying numbers  of 
The design effort  empha- 
The costing effort  in the ma,hematIcal moilel computed sys temat i -  
ca l ly  the total  p rogram cos t  for a range of pa,rloa, dafa and expected launch 
rates that were  provided from the design tzsk  and reliabil i ty analysis .  
data  dependent on the various p a r a m e t e r s  were  then var iec  determined i s a 
function of var ia t ions in program duration, repa i r  cos t ,  and t r i p  cha rges  to  
evaluate the i r  sensit ivity to  the various payload pa rame te r s .  
earlier, the  effort was not aimed at a point design but r a the r  t o  find payload 
cost  t r ends  . 
Cost 
As indicated 
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B. LARGE SPACE TELESCOPE DESIGN ANALYSIS 
The Large Space Telescope (LST) was selected a s  the low-altitude 
payload for the design analysis.  
is illustrated in Figure 3 - 1  and described in Reference 5. 
is man-tended and non-mDdularized. 
elements entitled optical telescope assembly (OTA), scientific instrument  
package The OTA includes the 
optics, forward s t ruc ture ,  sunshade, baffles, and sys tems for telescope 
thermal  control 
instruments,  supportir., optics,  sensors ,  e lectronics ,  positioning mechanisms,  
and the s t ructure  located at the telescope focal region. 
are field cameras ,  UV and IR spectrographs,  and polar imeters .  The SSM 
includes the aft s t ruc ture  and the subsystems required to support the OTAI 
SIP. 
re t r ieval  by the Space Shuttle. 
provide a shirt-  sleeve environment for en  astronaut during equipment servic-  
ing. 
The baseline vers ion of the LST spacecraf t  
The baseline LST 
It is composed of th ree  functional 
-PI, and support sys tems module (SSM\. 
alignment, and focus. The SIP consis ts  of the scientific 
Typical instruments  
The SSM also provides a docking s t ruc ture  for on-orbit servicing or 
The SSM is designed to be  pressur izable  to 
1. RELIABILITY MODEL 
The reliability block d iagrams were  constructed for the  scientific 
instrument package, optical telescope assembly,  and support sys t ems  mod- 
ules from the data supplied in Reference 5. Fa i lure  rates, duty cycles ,  and 
weights of individual cornponcnts were  determined from the LST prel iminary 
and Phase A technical reports .  
mation was not available but a reliability number was shown for some t ime 
t, equivalent failure r a t e s  were determined for the equipment using the 
exponential assumption. 
ful operations were deleted in the optimization study. 
3-6 shows the reliability block diagram of the LST. 
were  made: 
In some instances where fai lure  r a t e  infor- 
Equipment considered to be unessential  to success-  
F igures  3-2 through 
Tht  lollowing assumptions 
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a. Al l  components were  assumed not to  reach the i r  wearout 
points. Fai lure  r a t e s  for standby units were  assumed to  be 
equal t o  one tenth the active fai lure  ra tes .  
mechanisms are accounted for in the standby redundancies. 
The control moment gyros (CMG) in the att i tude control sub- 
sys t em of the  SSM a r e  binomial redundant requiring a minimum 
of three .  
act ive and standby redundancies. 
generated for a single CMG and was  approximated by an expo- 
nential curve with an  equivalent fa i lure  ra te .  
due t o  the  l imitations of SYSOPT. 
The digital  p rocessor  assembly  in the att i tude control  sub- 
sys tem of the SSM contains the power supply, the control 
p rocesso r  unit, and the memory  modules in standby redun- 
dancies .  
p rocessor  assembly  was t rea ted  as a single component with 
internal  redundancies. 
the  component, and a normal  curve (p = 61,320 h r ,  o = 24,528 
h r )  was used to  approximate the reliabil i ty.  
component descr ibed by the no rma l  fa i lure  distribution implies  
a standby fai lure  rate equal t o  zero.  
The switching 
b. 
Each gyro i s  composed of severa l  components in  
A reliabil i ty curve  was 
This  was required 
c .  
Due t o  lack of detailed weight data ,  the  digital  
A reliabil i ty curve  was generated for  
Redundancy of a 
d. The ERTS and Apollo t ransponders  on the communications and 
data  handling subsystem of the  SSM have a backup mode of 
operation for the t r ansmi t t e r s .  Using a 30-percent duty cycle  
for  the  t r ansmi t t e r s ,  a reliabil i ty curve  was generated for  the  
two t ransponders  combined. An exponentail re l iabi l i ty  curve 
was  fitted to  the original curve  and the equivalent fa i lure  rate 
used for the failure r a t e  of the  combined t ransponders .  
F o r  the optimization, no redundancies were  added t o  the SIP 
and the  OTA. 
e.  
The block d iagrams with expendables for  ir year ' s  mission t ime and 
stripped of unnecessary redundancies were  used as the s tar t ing sys tem 
configuration. 
in te rva ls  with the weight of 10.4 kg (22.93 lb)  being divided equally between 
the propellant and the  accumpanying hardware.  
Expendables were added in amounts equal t o  three-month 
The SYSOPT program that was  descr ibed previously was used t o  
The sys t em weight de te rmine  the pa r t s  count as the  MMD was  extended. 
dependency on the MMD as the MMD was var ied f rom the single s t r ing  c a s e  
to  a maximum of 1.7  yea r s  is shown in Figure 3,'. F r o m  th is  data ,  0.5, 
1 .0 ,  and 1 . 5  year  MMDs were  selected for  detailed tradeoff analysis.  At 
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t hese  MMDa, the p a r t s  count and weight are shown in Tables 3-1, 3-2, and 
3-3 for  the  housekeeping subsystems.  The component fa i lure  rates and the 
MSFC basel ine configuration p a r t s  count are a l so  included. 
line MMD was est imated to be I .  25 years .  
equipment is shown i n  Tables 3-4 and 3-5; this equipment was not made re- 
dundant in th i s  study. 
The MSFC base-  
The p a r t s  l is t  for  the mission 
2. CONCEPTUAL MODULARIZED DESIGN 
Conceptual design was performed to  identify and evaluate feasible 
modularized configurations of a Shuttle-launched La rge  Space Telescope (LST). 
The study provided conceptual configurations of the LST that w e r e  suitable 
for module replacement by means of the Orbi ter-based remote  manipulator 
and /o r  a hard-docked servicing module. The principal design ground ru l e s  
w e r e  as follows: 
a. The modular LST design should be amenable to  equipment 
replacement by means of the  Orbi te r  operator-controlled 
remote  manipulator (Ref. 6). 
In addition to the spacecraf t  subsys tems complement,  the LST 
instrumentation (Scientific Instrument Package)  is to be 
replaceable in orbit. 
Al l  modular LST configurations are to be unmanned and unpres-  
sur ized.  
Telescope energy may be t ime-shared by the scientific instru-  
ment 8 .  
Subsystems and/or  components of long-life expectancy: e. g. 
spacecraf t  s t ruc tu re  and so la r  a r r a y s  should not r equ i r e  
replacement . 
b. 
c. 
d. 
e. 
A number of modularized LST concepts w e r e  identified. These are 
i l lustrated in F igures  3-8 through 3-12. 
for  use  with a DSP-type servicing module, and the remainder  are specifically 
configured for  equipment servicing by the Orbi te r  remote  manipulator. 
Examination of the m a s t e r  equipment l is t  (Tables  3-4 and 3-5) indicates that 
the  LST subsystems and instrumentation can be contained in the volume 
provided by a vehicle 4 . 4 2  m (14.5 ft) in d iameter  and approximately 2.44 m 
Several  of the  concepts are suitable 
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Table 3-4. LFT Scientific Instrument Package Subsystem 
Failure Rate, Parts  List ,  and Weight 
r Failurr T d t  P w t r  
(1 0 - 7  kp lb B/ L 
Componw.c Rat. 0:'. irht count 
I 
Firld Selrct Mirror 
Arrrmbly 3.114 . 0.50 1.0 1 
High Resollition Spec- 
trograph 333. 648 km 1100 63 137.6 1 
(180-350 nmi) 
Faint Object Spectro- 
roph 204-407 km 
1 1 0 - ' ~ 0  nrni) 
Cunrra Solect 
'Mechanirm 
4000 64 ld1.5 1 
Slit Jaw Camera 
A8 rembly 
Slit Mec hanir m 5 10.5 1 
Spa c t ro g r aph 
Selector 
I I 1 1  
F .Ant Object Spectro- 
( 2  0-660 nrni) 
graph 407-:222 ki I 3125 
aint Object Spectro- 
I 
I 
49 108.3 1 
- 
48 104.8 I 
- 
50 110.5 1 
71 157 I 
Miicellaneour 
(Including Structure) 
TOTAL 
650.3 
1005 
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Table 3 - 5 .  LST Optical T e l e s c o p e  Assembly  Subsystem 
Failure Rate ,  Parts List,  and Weight 
Component 
Structure 
Parte 
Count 
4589 
Secondary Mirror 
Tracking Actuators 
Focus Sensor8 
Angle Sensor 
- 
Dece..ter Sensor 
Diagnostics 
cc ndary Mirror 
lignment Actuators 
I 102.8 1 103 I 226 11 1 I 
Figure Scnror 
Primary Mirror 
Force Transducers 
Light Shield 
10 ,500  
DC=. 02 
3 , 5 0 5  
DC=. 02 
I 66 I 145 1 1  6 I 1 .  
Ihfeteoroid Shield 
I 
t 
' I  1 
1 
I :  
I 
.- t ..I 
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( 8  f t )  in length. 
tation and subsystems are contained in two separate  decks I. 22 m (4 ft) in 
length. This concept could be u t i l i z 4  with either a SLDSP-type servicing 
vehicle o r  the Orbiter manipulator. 
aftmost deck would have to be removed f i rs t  in order  to  gain access  to  the 
instruments in the forward deck. 
vehicle to be designed with a two-position translation probe ir. o rder  t o  change- 
out the spacecraft equipment and would also necessitate the use  of two rotating 
elements or decks on the servicing vehicle in order  to accommodate equipment 
and service the spacecraft. For these reasons,  the concept of Figure 3-8 was 
rejected. 
Figure 3-8  i l lustrates a concept wherein the LST instrumen- 
In this concept, the equipment in the 
This procedure would require  the servicing 
The concept of Figure 3-9 utilizes one long deck and installs  the 
equipment in  the axial (parallel  to the vehicle longitudinal axis) direction. 
this design, the equipment modules are located tangentially around the peri- 
phery of the spacecraft .  
refurbishment by a hard-docked service vehicle. 
with the remote manipulator. 
In 
The design of Figure 3-9 is directly applicable to  
This concept could be used 
Figure 3-10 i l lustrates another concept that does not require  a two- 
position translation probe i f  used with a hard-docked servicing vehicle and 
which is adaptable to use with the manipulator. 
strong candidate concept due to i ts  apparent weight disadvantage compared 
with the concept of Figure 3- I I and lack of noticeable design improvement. 
Figure 3-11 depicts a concept that could be used with the manipu- 
It was not considered to  be a 
lator but which is incompatible with the equipment replacement mode of the 
hard-docked service vehicle. 
concept resul ts  in some wasted cargo bay volume. 
objectionable in the case  of a spacecraft such as the LST wherein some of the 
instrumentation is on the order  of I. 83 m (6 ft) in length. For th t ae  reasons,  
the ccacept of Figure 3- I 1  was not considered further. 
The basic (square)  shape exhibited by this 
This is particularly 
Figure 3-12 i l lustrates a concept that is well adapted for use with the 
A detailed discussion of this configura- manipulator as shown in Figure 3-13. 
tion and a comparison of this concept and the design of Figure 3-9 are presented 
in the following sections. 
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a. Comparison of Modular Concepts 
The two most promising modular LST payload concepts identified 
above are shown in Figures 3-9 and 3-12. The concept of Figure 3-9 illus- 
t r a t e s  a configuration that is amenable to  equipment replacement by means 
of a hard-docked service module. 
would be removed and replaced in a (longitudinal) direction parallel  to the 
spacecraft axis. 
ment modules) could be carr ied in the aft end of the Orbiter cargo bay and 
elevated to  a suitable position for docking with the LST af ter  opening of the 
cargo bay doors. 
In this mode, the equipment modules 
The service module o r  compartment (containing the replace- 
Although the Orbiter-borne manipulator has the kinematic capability 
(travel and degrees of freedom) to replace equipment modules by movement 
ir. the payload axial direction, the length of a module that can be replaced in 
the axial direction by means of the manipulator is a t  present severely limited 
by the proximity of a payload to  the Orbiter fuselage when the payload is 
docked to the cargo bay extensible docking port [O.  762-m(30-in. ) clearance] 
(Ref. 7). 
either t o  future revision of the extensible docking port/Orbiter geometry o r  
t o  incorporation of a more versat i le  serviceable- payload docking arrangement),  
the configuration of Figure 3-9 can be considered to be a candidate concept 
suitable for ser ricing by either a hard-docked ser rice module or by the 
manipulator. 
If it is assumed that this limitation may not ultimately exist (due 
The concept of Figure 3- 9 s tores  the scientific instruments longi- 
tudinally around the periphery of the payload structure.  
be a t  least I. 83 m \6 f t )  in length to accommodate the instrumentation. 
this  case,  the module support s t ructure  would basically be in the fo rm of a 
ring or  shell approximately 2.44 o r  2 . 7 4  m (8 or 9 ft) in diameter with the 
subsystems and instrumentation mounted external to the shell. 
are designed to  be removed in the axial (longitudinal) direction. 
The modules would 
In 
The modules 
The concept of Figure 3-12 is  designed to  permit radially outboard 
removal of the modules by means of the Orbiter manipulator. 
mentation length is accommodated in the radial direction. 
The instru- 
In this concept, 
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the module support s t ructure  would occupy the full 4.42  m (14.5 f t )  diameter 
of the allowable payload envelope. 1 
The design of Figure 3-9 probably reflects a payload weight that is 
lower than that of the "radial" concept (Figure 3- 12) due to  the smaller  
diameter of the payload support structure.  This weight advantage may not, 
however, represent a cri t ical  selection cri terion for a low-earth orbit  pay- 
load due to the large low-altitude pa) load launch weight capability of the 
Orbiter. 
the LST telescope via auxiliary folding m i r r o r s  which, together with the 
instrument complement, are external to  t'-e spacecraft structure.  This 
design therefore exhibits some potential light- sealing and contamination 
problems that are not present with the concept of Figure 3-12 wherein the 
instrumentation and subsystems are totally contained within the external 
structure.  A second set of fold m i r r o r s  is required for the design of Figure 
3-9 in order  to reflect the (already reflected) light energy from the telescope 
into the longitudinally- oriented external scientific instrument modules. This 
requirement would result  in additional alignment problems and in  additional 
losses  due to  light scattering that are not inherent with the design of Figure 
3- 12. 
In this design, the instrumentation receives i t s  input energy from 
The concept of Figure 3-12 also provides a more  efficient thermal  
design, since the internal modules are arranged in a configuration that more 
closely approximates a "conventional" satellite ra ther  than an  arrangement 
that exposes the mission equipment directly to the space environment. 
resul ts  in i t s  thermal  provisions being more amenable to normal  thermal  
analysis techniques and will result  i n  lower weight penalties attributable to  
the thermal  design. 
This 
If a hard-docked service module were used to effect the module 
change-out for the concept of Figure 3-9, it would be necessary that a rotat- 
able s t ructural  ring approximately 2.74 m (9 ft) in diameter be provided in 
order  to furnish the capability of module indexing and effect module extraction 
and replacement, Potential bearing design problems and problems adeociatc 1 
with module indexing and replacement tolerances that may a r i se  due to 
differential thermal  loads have not yet been fully explored. 
indexing would not be required if this configuration were  used for module 
replacement by the manipulator, the other potential disadvantages noted 
-hove (light sealing, contamination, thermal ,  additional fold m i r r o r s ,  
nec-ssity for revision of the Orbiter docking provisions, e tc . )  would still 
apply. 
f rom the viewpoint of space utilization, since the internal volume provided by 
the la t ter  concept is essentially wasted. The concept of Figure 3-12 provides 
approximately 30 percent more volume for mission equipment per unit length 
of module than that of Figure 3-9. 
Even though 
Finally, the design of Figure 3- 12 is superior t o  that of Figure 3-9 
Consideration of the various geometric and subsystems aspects 
involved in the comparison of the subject concepts therefore indicates that 
the concept of Figure 3-12 exhibits most ,  i f  not a l l ,  of the advantages for use 
with the Orbiter-based manipulator. While the design of Figure 3-9 can be, 
as explained, amenable to  use  with either the manipulator or a hard-docked 
service module, it does not result  in a "preferred" design when considered 
fo r  use pr imari ly  with the Orbiter-based manipulator. 
the concept of Figure 3-9 is well adapted to module replacement of high- 
altitude satell i tes by means of a servicing vehicle in circumstances where 
the manipulator is unavailable. 
b. Payload Module Geometry 
On the other hand, 
Module replacement of low- earth- orbit maintainable payloads may 
be  effected by the Orbiter manipulator system. 
tolerance range on the exact location to which the manipulator can rapidly 
and efficaciously move a module due to the inherent limitations of the (human) 
ope:-*ator, the fits and clearances at the various joints of the manipulator, 
and end effector deflections and tip-off. 
all possible module design features that can accommodate these circumstances 
and simplify the function of module withdrawal and insertion. 
There will be a dimensional 
It is desirable therefore to provide 
A layout drawing (Figure 3- 14) was made to a s s i s t  in the identification 
of basic design features and equipment that should characterize ii typical 
6 8  
T I  
-: 
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module designed tor  replacement by the manipulator. 
moduleistructure clearance provisions indicated by the manipulator handling 
requirements suggests a design that provides the basic character is t ics  and 
generous engagement tolerances of a probe and drogue. 
Consideration of 
This characterist ic can be suitably approximated by a module base 
A or equipment mounting plate whose sides are machined to  a slight taper. 
module baseplate with sides tapering only one or two degrees  will (depending 
on the module lenqth) provide a minimum clearance of several  inches between 
tke leading edge of a module and the spacecraft s t ructure  when a module is in 
the process of being inserted into the structure.  
to accommodate module handling tolerances and ease the task of module 
replacemeqt. 
with structurb- can be proLided with rub s t r ips  of teflon or other suitable 
material  or . ,d. External protuberances (for example, rollers) that 
could be damaged by inadvertent or  premature contact with s t ructure  should 
b e  avoided. 
This feature can be expected 
Zies  of the module that would ultimately be in sliding contact 
After the module has been partially inserted into the s t ructure ,  a 
tapered pin centrally located in the leading (forward) face of the module can 
be  caused to engage a tapered hole in the payload. 
t o  provide a pawer and ground connection for the equipment located on the 
mounting plate. 
handling damage after the leading page of the module is initially inserted into 
the payload. A chamfer or "countersunk" surface can be provided at  the 
entrance of the (pin) receptacle so that the pin avd receptacle will always 
beLome engaged, eve? if  the modde  is off to  one side of the (receiving) 
structure during insertion. Suitable timeiisioning (yedxt ion  in o r  removal 
of taper)  at  the trailing edge of the module can  make the module essentially 
self-guiding in this a r e a  and provide a close fitting "seat" between the module 
and spaceframe when the module is fully inserted. 
The pin WOL Jso  serve  
The central  location of the pin will serve to  protect it from 
3 .  MASS PROPERTIES 
Tale LST mass  propetcies were primarily '5aaed on par t  counts from 
the SYSL' .aq program. Tho SYSOPI' provided part counts to determine weight 
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growth with h1MD for the  subsys t rn is  that are  represented  in the  reliabil i ty 
model. These consis ted of the  stabil ization and  control ;  communication, da ta  
process ing ,  and instrumentation; and e l ec t r i ca l  power subsys tems.  
s t r u c t u r e s  and environmental  control subsys tems w e r e  not inclcded in  the 
rel iabi l i ty  model. 
The 
Sinzo the s t ruc tu re  was  not included in the SYSOPT p rogram,  it was  
The expendable payload s t ruc tu re  weight was es t imaLed from design studies.  
based  on Reference 5 ( s t r u c t u r e  weight = 0.1!8 x equipment weight). 
ground- refurbishable  s t ruc tu ra l  weight was es t imated  by increas ing  the  
s t ruc tu ra l  weight for access ib i l i ty  by factoring the  expendable s t ruc tu re  by 
1.10. 
on design s tudies  which are shown in Table 3-6 .  
bas ic  spacef rame with 24 slots t o  accommodate  space- rep laceable  modules; 
however ,  only 22 modules w e r e  required to package the  par t s .  
The 
The s t r u c t u r e  weight for the on-orbit  maintainable payload was  based 
The payload cons i s t s  of a 
The total  LST weights for the expendable, ground-refurbishable ,  
and on-orbit maintainable payloads are shown in T a t l e s  3-7, 3-8, and 3-9, 
respect ively.  
descr ibed  in  Reference 5 .  
The r e fe rence  weight is the man-tended vers ion  that  is 
The spacecraf t  synthesis  p rogram was  not used ,  because  the  LST is 
The a special  type of payload that  is not represented  by the  weight equation. 
LST miss ion  equipment weight is over  50 percent of the  total weight, whereas  
the  sa te l l i t es  used in the weight equations w e r e  genera l ly  around 15 to 20 
percent  o i  the  total satellite weight. 
4. MODULE SIMULATION PROCtRAM 
The p a r t s  for the t h r e e  MMD copfigurations that w e r e  descr ibed  in 
the  Reliabil i ty Mode! section were  allocated to  22 of 24 avai lable  modules 
provided by conceptual design. 
a s s e m b l i e s ,  or components so that  each module will contain equipments based  
on function c r i t e r i a .  
decision-rr.aking p rocess  in  the  amount of pa r t s  in each  modulc. 
approach ,  the  p a r t s  were  assigned to  th.e mod t l e s  as shown in  Table  3-10. 
The p a r t s  were  o rde red  by subsys t ems ,  
The s i z e  and weights were  the  l imiting f ac to r s  in the  
Using th i s  
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Table 3-6. LST Structural Weights for 
On-Orbit Maintainable Payload 
Basic Structure 
Module Tracks 
Base Plates 
Mechanism 
Equipment Supports 
Miscellaneous 
Total Structure 
0.5 yr 
kg 
182 
26 2 
39 1 
136 
68 
386 
1,422 
l b  
400 
576 
860 
300 
150 
E50 
3,136 
M M D  
1.0 yr 
185 
262 
39 1 
136 
68 
388 
lb 
406 
576 
860 
300 
150 
8 54 I 1,427 3,146 
1 . 5  yr 
192 
262 
39 1 
136 
68 
392 
860 
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The space-replaceable modules number i s  schematically shown in r ' igart  
3-15.  
modules 13 through 24. 
example case  but are available to accommodate future r,;odifications. 
The a f t  deck has  modules 1 through 12, and the forward deck has 
Module nitmbers 13 and i 9  are without parte in this 
With the par t s  assigned to the modules, the reliability character-  
is t ics  of each module were computed. 
determined for each module arid are shown in Table 3 - 1 0  for the three  MMD 
configurations. 
modules with low reliability which are the thrus te rs  and solar  power in the 
housekeeping subsystems and in a pseudo fashion, the expendables. 
The Weibull functions were  then 
The MMD of each module is also included to indicate the 
Since the Weibull function i s  a best-fit of the predicted module 
reliability, i t  is of interest  to examine the comparison. 
made in Figure 3- f 6  for space-replaceable module No. I .  
the fit is relatively close to  the module predicted failure. 
level,  when all oi the modules are included, the fit i s  better.  
seen in Figure 3 -  I T ,  where the one-year MhID configuration is a near  dupli- 
cation of the predicted reliability; however, a departure is noted beyond the 
design MMD. 
This comparison is 
It indicates that 
At the system 
This can be 
With the Weibull functions determined for each module, the expected 
numbers were then determined using the SAMs program. 
computation is shown in Figure 3 - 1 8  for the three MMDs and repair  strategies.  
The number of modules replaced per  visit can be observed to have a strong 
influence on the expected number of launches per  year. By replacing more  
than the failed module, the expected number reduces substantially for condi- 
tional and perfect-failure prediction cases  and reaches ail apparent maximum 
effect at about 30 percent module replacement. 
supplied to the payload program cost program. 
The result  of this 
These expected numbers qkere: 
5 .  PAYLOAD PROGRAM COST 
The LST costs  were determined as described in Fayload P rogram 
Cost Estimating. 
MMDs,  program durations, repair  cost factors,  t r ip  charges,  and repair  
These were computed using the remote terminal for various 
7 9  
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s t r a k g i e s .  
applicable for  a multi- satel l i te  on-orbit  sys tem.  
These cos t s  were  bascd on a siiigle satel l i te  orl-orbit and a r e  ilot 
? h  : payload unit cost  and total  progratn roc t  a r e  shown in F igure  
3 - i 0  a5 re lated t o  M M D  for  the th ree  ty r - s  of payloads (expcqdable,  ground- 
refurbishable ,  and on-orbit maintainable).  
recurrinK c.ost, a d  the  total  progrdni cost  includes unit c o s t ,  RDT&E, and 
operat iovs cos t s .  
i nc rease  in  p a r t s  redundancv. 
payload over  the expendable and ground-refurbished t > p e s  ri lcc t s  the effect 
0; nlodularit) .  The total  p r o g r a m  c G s t  d e c r e a s e s  as  th+, !lz ir .crcases far 
the  expenda'lie payloads but r e m a i n s  relat ively consta:it l z r  tt. . I  q:.-orbit 
maintainable payloads. 
reductInn, mainly in  the  number of payioad buys but alsi .  
number  of launches The on-orbit maintainable p rogram cos t  showed a lower ,  
fa i r ly  constant total  cos t ,  because the number of Dayload buys is the s a m e  
over  the range of MML) coDsidered. 'The t e ' a l  p rog ram cost  of the  ground- 
refurbishablL payload was between the on- orbi t  maintainable and expendablL 
payloads. 
aumber  of payload buys is the pr imary  cos t  d r ive r .  The 1 .5  ye,ir  p r o y a m  
duration b a s i c a I ' j  eqiiaiizes the new buys among the three  types cf payloads 
and r e su l t s  i n  near ly  equal total  p rog ram cost  IO? the  t h r e e  types  of payloads. 
The unit cost  is the , y h a d  
The unit ccjst i nc reases  a s  the M M D  i n c r e a s e s  due t o  the. 
The higher unit cost  of an on-orbi t  maintainable 
The expendable prograni  cost  d ~ . ~ p s  bt.czxse of the  
8 the expected 
The Lotal p rog ran ,  cos t  shows that i n  a short-durat ion p r o g r a m  the 
In Fig:tre 3-20 ,  the total  p-  ?gram c o d  is shown 's the  proZ.ra7: 
duration i 3  var ied.  
i nc rease  than the expendable payload 
advantage for short-durst ion p rograms  while the on- c rb i t  maintainaF.lt? pay- 
load shows lor..er cos t s  as  the p rogram i s  extended. These  cos .3  at.Lurned 
only one RDT&E Q for t  over  the p rogram durat ion whic.1 would indicate that 
the comparison i s  rea l i s t ic  ot,ly n - re r  that  progranb l ife wJ-.!ch does not r e q u ; r e  
a major  nev cievelopment effor t .  
The on-orbi t  niaititaiiiable payload has  a lower  cost  
The expendable payloads show a cos t  
To exanline the cffzct of repair cos t  on the total  p r o g r a m  cos t ,  the  
on-orbit  maintenance r epa i r  cos t  factor . 
cos t  factor  w e r e  var ied about the i r  nominal values of 0.2.5 ai?J 0 .  39 ,  
the t round-  refvrbishment  cepa i r  
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respectively. 
tainable cost remains below the ground- refurbishable cost over the cost 
factor range and where both service concepts remained below the expendable 
payload. 
concepts is primarily due to the repair  cost. 
concept assumes that the complete payload will be refurbished, whereas the 
on-orbit maintainable concept assumes that refurbishment is only performed 
on the modules that are retrieved and returned. 
resulting from higher unit cost, higher expected number of launches, and 
lower launch-operation costs for on- orbit maintainable over ground- refur- 
bishment payloads are small in comparison to  the 3ifference in service cost. 
This result is shown in Figure 3-21  where the on-orbit main- 
The difference in the total payload cost for the two service mode 
The ground-refurbishment 
The other differences 
The t r ip  charges were varied from dedicated launches to  sharing 
the t r ip  charges among five separate missions. The total program cost, as 
a function of t r i p  charge, is shown in Figure 3-22 for the three types of pay- 
loads. It can be observed that this effect is small  for a single satellite on- 
orbit. The cost slope is low and the cost ranking did not change. 
One aspect of on-orbit maintenance affecting a low- cost  approach for 
long-duration missions is the repair  strategy. 
function of the number of modules to be replaced per visit and the failure 
predictio-i method. The effects of these two factors on the total program 
cost is shown in Figure 3-23. 
the failed module is replaced, up to an optimum at about 30 percent of all the 
space-replaceable modules in the payload. The conditional failure prediction 
is based on most probable failure t imes,  and the perfect-failure prediction 
(PFP) is based on accurate failure prediction; i .e. ,  there is no time devia- 
tion about the failure time. 
mentation, telemetry, and data analysis; however, with nominal module 
instrumentation, one would expect that failed modules , penultimate failed 
modules, degrading modules, and modules with depleted consumables can be 
diagnosed accurately. 
should be better than conditional and should approach PFP capability. 
cost reduction is not significant enough to expend additional RDTbE funds 
The on-orbit strategy is a 
The cost reduces substantially i f  more than 
To achieve PFP will require extensive instru- 
Thus, the identification of modules to be replaced 
The 
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to  achieve PFP beyond that for instrumentation required to  identify module 
failure modes. 
From the cost analysis of the LST single payload on-orbit, the type 
of payload has  been shown to be the most significant parameter  influencing 
the cost. 
resulting in a low-cost approach. 
not have significant impact on program cost. 
on-orbit maintainable payloads appears to be to  replace 30 percent of the 
modules per  visit. 
The program duration appears  to determine the type of payload 
The repa i r  cost  factor and t r ip  charge did 
The proper repair  strategy for 
C SHUTTLE- LAUNCHED DEFENSE b'JPPORT PROGRAM DESIGN 
ANALYSIS 
The Defense Support P rogram (DSP) satellite was selected for 
analysis, because it represents  an applications-type payload in a high-altitude 
orbit  requiring a Tug. Also, design information and costs  on this satellite 
were documented and complete enough to permit the analysis to  be pursued. 
The current  DSP is a spin-type payload, but it was modified in  this 
study to  a three-axis stabilized configuration. The payload configuration used 
in this study is not a recommended Shuttle-Launched DSP (SLDSP) design, but 
is a representative payload with adequate technical and cost  data. The anal- 
ysis  reported here  used the technical data f rom Reference S to configure the 
SLDSP. 
to  evaluate the effect of payload parameters  on total program cost and not 
to recommend a design or to produce a point design. 
modularity and reliabilities were varied over a wide range in this analysis. 
Moreover, the number of satell i tes in the system was limited to one, and 
the effect of a multi- satellite system was not investigated. 
This analysis differs f rom previoue studies in that it was performed 
Therefore,  the payload 
1. RELIABILITY MODEL 
The SLDSP reliability diagrams for the SYSOPT program were 
developed and the pertinent redundancy, failure ra te ,  and weight information 
were compiled for the Shuttle-launched version of the DSP from available 
sources  to  minimize estimating. After the SLDSP was modeled, the 
91 
system was then reduced to a single-string configuration by removing the 
redundancies. 
The reliability block diagrams were developed f rom References 8 
and 9 and are shown in Figures 3-24  through 3 - 3 2  fo r  the housekeeping 
portion only. 
redundancy, and weight. 
to  the Shuttle. 
stabilized type from a yaw- spin-type stabilization concept. 
where the level of reliability data needed was not provided in the referenced 
studies, previous contractor reliability analyses on the satellite were used. 
These include failure ra tes ,  duty cycles,  internal redundancies, and modes 
of operation. 
Included with the reliability model a r e  the failure ra te ,  type of 
The propulsion subsystem was changed to adapt i t  
The attitcde control subsystem was altered to  a three-axis- 
In the a r e a s  
The assumptions made in this task were  a s  follows: 
a. 
b. 
The pr imary and backup units were identical. 
Expendables for one- year operation were used in the single- 
string configuration. 
subsystems for three-month blocks were  7 .25  kg (16 lb) 
expendables and 2.92 kg (6.4 lb) hardware. 
The units that were not made redundant were ear th  sensors  
(RADEC), adapters,  inertial  balancing mechanism, switches, 
and spaceframe. 
Components do not approach wearout within 10 years. 
Standby failure r a t e s  were 10 percent of active failure ra tes .  
Equivalent fa i lure  ra tes  were estimated for boxes without 
failure data by estimating the reliability a t  1 5  months to com- 
pute the constant failure rate.  
The added expendables t o  the propulsion 
c .  
d. 
e. 
f. 
The reliability data were inputted into the SYSOPT and the optimum 
redundancies based on weight were obtained for  various payload MMDs.  
characterist ic is  shown in Figure 3 - 3 3  starting from a single-string M M D  of 
about 0.5 years to a maximum M M D  of about 4 . 8  years ,  
MMDs of 1 ,  2 ,  and 4 . 5  years  were selected for detailed analysis. 
This 
For  this study, 
T' par ts  count for each unit modeled in the reliability diagram 
(except for the mission equipment) for SLDSPs with the three M M D s  i s  listed 
in Table 3- 11. This part count was then used for the conceptual design 
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Table 3-11. SLDSP Parts Quantity List 
# 
No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
L 
Subsystem 
Structure 
Proplaion 
Uec. Power 
Elec. Distr. 
; o m  (Link 1 
(Link i 
~~ ~ 
Module 
Structure 
Cas Generator Aery 
Feed Aasy 
hotallation Hdwr 
Hi &vel+ Vernier  Thrusters 
Low Level Thrusterr 
Solar A r r a y  
Solar A r r a y  Drive Motor 
Shunt Element Assy 
Power Conditioning Unit  
Reconditioner/ Battery 
Elec. Integration Aery 
Auxiliary Integr. Aery 
Platform Convt rte r 
Cabling 
Hi Gain Antenna 
Combine r 
Convtd Xmtr West 
Convtr/ Xmtr East 
KGX 28 
Hi Gain Antenna 
Combiner 
Switch 
Switch 
Conv/ Xmtr/ DBA West 
Conv/ Xmtr/ DBA Ealrt 
KGX 28A 
Digital Telem Unit 
rypc 
Ledundanc y 
None 
s 
S 
s 
s 
s 
s 
A 
B(4) 
S 
B(2) 
S 
s 
s 
A 
S 
s 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
None 
None 
S 
S 
S 
s 
7- -
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
4 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 - 
- 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
4 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 - 
% -
1 
2 
1 
2 
2 
2 
1 
2 
5 
2 
3 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
2 
3 
3 
4 
2 
2 
1 
1 
4 
4 
4 
5 - 
NOTE: A = Active 
B = Binomial ( ) # Req'd 
bl = Normal 
S = Standby 
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Table 3- 11. SLDSP P a r t s  Quantity List  (Continued) 
No. 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39  
40 
41 
- 
44 
45 
46 
47 
4a 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 - 
Subeye tern 
Comm (Link 3' 
Data Link 
(Common) 
(Data Xintr) 
(Cmd Xmtr 
LRecvr) 
Module 
Omni Antenna 
Diplexe r 
Hybrid 
Command Format 
Combiner 
Switch 
Down Convtr/ Uplink Portion 
Cmd Tone Generator 
Ranging Filter Inhibit 
Conv & SC Cond Unit 
EHF & AQU Antenna 
Dual Subdecoder 
Dual Multiplier 
Monopulse Comparator 
Switch 
Ant Structure Deploy 
Diplexe r 
Switch 
Switch 
Power Supply/ TWT 
Hybrid 
Switch 
Switch 
XB-ADA-X4 Exciter (Link 1) 
XB-ADA-X4 Exciter (Link 2) 
Switch 
Link 1 Demodulator 
Diplexe r 
Switch 
Avail Diode Amp/ Link 3 Exiter 
Monopulse Combiner 
Switch 
Down Converter 
Type 
Redundancy 
A 
A 
A 
S 
A 
None 
S 
S 
A 
S 
A 
S 
S 
A 
None 
A -. 
A 
None 
None 
S 
A 
None 
None 
S 
S 
None 
S 
A 
None 
S 
A 
None 
S 
7- 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
2 
1 
1 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
I 
1 
2 
2 '  
1 
2 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
2 
-
- 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
2 
2 
1 
2 
1 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
.1 
2 
2 
1 
2 
2 
1 
2 - 
'rl 
7 7  -
2 
2 
2 
4 
2 
1 
4 
3 
2 
3 
1 
3 
5 
3 
1 
2 
2 
1 
1 
3 
2 
1 
1 
3 
3 
1 
3 
2 
1 
4 
3 
1 
4 - 
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Table 3- 11. SLDSP Parts Quantity List (Continued) 
TYpc 
Redundancy 
B(3 1 
s 
s 
s 
5 
s 
S 
s 
A 
No. 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
71 
72 
D lYr1 
1 ‘ 2  4. 5 
4 5  7 
1 1 1 
2 3  5 
1 2 3 
2 2  3 
1 2 2 
1 1 1 
1 2 3 
1 1 2 
Subrystem 
Attitude Cont 
Module 
Earth Sensor Assy 
Red. Equip Switch Aasy 
Contr Elec Aeey 
A C Converter 
Valve Driver Assy 
Rate Gyro Assy DC-. 0045 
Sun Senror Asay 
Gimbal Elec Arsy 
Single Axir Gimbal Drive 
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analysis to  examine module s i ze  and module simulation to compute the expected 
number of launches. 
2. CONCEPTUAL DESIGN 
The number of modules was varied from the eight space-replaceable 
The vari- modules in the reference SLDSP design reported in Reference I O .  
ations in this study are: 
a. 
b. 
Two and 13 space-replaceable module configurations 
Parts count as determined by SYSOPT optimum par t s  alloca- 
tion program 
The basic s t ructural  concept that was defined in Reference 10 was 
used for the 2- and 13-module configurations. The modules in each of the 
on-orbit maintainable configurations were volume checked to  determine i f  
they could accommodate the equipment necessary for each of the selected 
MMDs ( 1 ,  2 ,  and 4 . 5  years) .  In addition to  o orbit maintainable payload 
concepts, a brief examination was performed on the modifications that could 
be  made to convert to a ground-refurbishable and an expendable payload 
ve r sion . 
a. Reference SLDSP 
Figure 3-34 shows the reference SLDSP (eight modules) reported in 
Reference 10 and included in this report  for completeness. 
it was desired to  determine i f  the equipment and components required to 
achieve MMDs of I, 2,  and 4.5 years  could be packaged in the reference 
concept. 
replaceable modules, and the resulting module weights were determined. 
Based on an average packing density of 320 kg/m 
volume p e r  module to contain the subsystems as described by the SYSOPT 
analysis for the MMDs of I, 2, and 4 . 5  years was determined. 
volume was then compared to  the available volume in the reference design. 
The resul ts  of this comparison a r e  shown in the center column of Table 3-12. 
From the table, it can be seen that the equipment can f i t  within the available 
0.38 m 
For this study, 
The par t s  listed in Table 3- 1 1  were allocated to their  proper space- 
3 3 (20 lb/ft ), the required 
This required 
3 3 ( 1 3 . 5  ft ) volume per module in all cases except for the Link 2/3 
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This figure intentionally omitted for 
security reasons. See Foreword. 
Figure 3 - 34. Space-Serviceable Spacecraft 
(Eight-Module Configuration) 
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Table 3-12. Required Volume Per Module 
For Subsystem Packaging 
13 
-2 3 10 m 
0.9 
0.9 
1.7 
11.6 
12.2 
23.8 
2.0 
2.0 
4.0 
i5.9 
20.4 
46.1 
10.5 
16.4 
28.0 
4. s 
6.8 
13.0 
54.0 
13.6 
120.1 
28.0 
- 
ITEM 
*3 
0.3 
0.3 
0.6  
4.1 
4.3 
8.4 
0.7 
0.7 
1.4 
5.6 
7.2 
16.3 
3.7 
5.8 
9.9 
1.7 
2.4 
4.6 
19.0 
26.0 
42.6 
10.0 
ACS Propuleion 1.4 
1.4 
3.1 
11.6 
12.2 
23.8 
4.0 
4.0 
7.6 
15.9 
20.4 
46. 1 
10.5 
16.4 
28.0 
9.6 
13.6 
26.0 
Elect. Pwr/ 
Distribution 
(No Solar A r r a y s )  
0.5 
0.5 
I. 1 
4.1 
4.3 
8.4 
1.4 
1.4 
2.7 
5.6 
7.2 
16.3 
3 . -: 
5. e 
9 . 9  
3.4 
4.8 
9.2 
C ommunicatione 
Link 1 (1) 
Link 2/(" 
Link 3 
(3  1 Data Link 
ACS Elect.  
Sensor  Elect- 
ronics (4) 
Available (5 ) 
Volume /Module 
- 
E 
- 
1.0 
2.0 
4.5 
1.0 
2.0 
4.5 
- 
- 
1.0 
2.0 
4.5 
1. 0 
2.0 
4.5 
1.0 
2.0 
4.5 
1.0 
2.0 
4.5 
1. 0 
2.0 
4.5 
- 
- 
- 
NUMBER OF MODULES 
2 
10 -2 m I f t3  
8 
-2 3 O m  
1.4 
1.4 
3.1 
11.6 
12.2 
23.8 
4.0 
4.0 
7.6 
15.9 
20.4 
46. 1 
10.5 
16.4 
28.0 
9.6 
13.6 
26.0 
54.0 
73.6 
120. 1 
38.0 
ft3 
0.5 
0.5 
1.1 
4.1 
4.3 
8.4 
1.4 
1.4 
2.7 
5. b 
7.2 
16.3 
3.7 
5.8 
9.9 
3.4 
4.8 
9.2 
19.0 
26.0 
42.6 
13.5 
-.- 
NOTES: 
(1) Link 1 volumes have been added to the payload volumes for total  (SRU 12)  
required volume. 
(2) Link 2 and Link 3 are in  the same  module. 
(3) Data link equipment is on the back of the antenna. 
constraints do not apply. 
(4) Optics weight i s  not included in modules. 
(5) Available volumes baaed on a 4 . 4 m  (14.5 ft) dia x 0.76m (30 in)  deep 
baseline spacecraft .  
Module volume 
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communications modulc in  the 4.5-year MMD case and the sensor  electronics 
in nearly all cases .  
to  641 kg/m3 (40 lb/ft ) f rom the previously assumed 320 kg/m (20 lb/ft ), 
the electronics can be packaged in the sensor module in the I -  and 2-year 
MhT9 configuration. 
can also be  packaged by increasing its packing density to 641 kg/m 
f rom 320 kg/m (20 lb/ft  ). The 641 kg/m (40 lb/ft ) packing density is 
considered to  be a maximum and is based on densities achieved with a man- 
euvering reentry vehicle. 
were  to  be used, would be  to reduce accessibility for installation, checkout, 
and repair  of equipment and possibly increase equipment heating problems. 
By increasing the packing density of the sensor  electronics 
3 3 3 
Likewise, the Link 2/3 equipment for  the 4.5-year MMD 
3 3 (40 lb/ft ) 
3 3 3 3 
The impact on the design, i f  this higher density 
3 3 However, even with the 641 kg/m (40 lb/ft ) packing density, the 
sensor  electronics required for the 4.5-year MMD exceed the available 
packing volume. One 
is to  lengthen the spacecraft f rom 0.76 m (30 in. ) to 2.4 m (95 in. ) in  order  
t o  increase the available volume per module to  i .  21 m (42.6 f t  ). 
would allow packing of t h t  sensor  electronics in a single module a t  a packing 
density of 320 kg/m 
in.)  would allow packaging a t  a density of 641 kg/m3 (40 lb/ft ). 
solution is to divide the Link 2/3 and the sensor  electronics into two modules 
each. 
data bus design and the module/ spacecraft electronics interface. 
There are several  design solutions for  this problem. 
3 3 This 
3 3 (20 lb/ft  ). Lengthening the spacecraft only I .  2 m (47 
3 Another 
This concept would have to  be studied to  determine the impact on the 
b. Maximum-Module SLDSP 
The subsystems of the reference SLDSP were studied to determine 
With the the maximum number of modules into which they could be divided. 
a id  of various technical specialists,  the subsystems were divided into 13 
modules and arranged as shown in Figure 3-35. 
It  should be noted that there  a r e  spaces for 16 modules, beginning 
with No. I in the 1:OO-o'clock position and preceeding clockwise to No. 16. 
Spaces 1,  2, and 15 are left empty to provide a c lear  view for the second- 
surface m i r r o r  radiator on the sensor  (module No. 16). Spaces No. I and 15, 
however, contain second- surface m i r r o r s  to  provide a cold viewing surface for 
the radiator.  
110 
This figure intentionally cn for 
security reasons .  See Foreword. 
Figure 3-35. SLDSP Spacecraft (13-Module Configuration) 
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Modules 3 ,  5 ,  1 1 ,  and 13 contain the attitude co.itrol p r - m l s i n n .  
.:les in  
; ley were  
The propulsion subsystem was  divided into four self-contained m 
o r d e r  t o  gain a longer control moment arm about the ro l l  a i s .  
placed in s lo t s  3 ,  5 ,  1 1 ,  and 13 r a the r  than the 45-deg slot posit.ons 2, 6, 
I O ,  and 14 in o r d e r  t o  avo;? interference with the second-surface m i r r o r s  of 
the  senso r  a-id a l so  to  allow for placement of the c r \ .  ,%- l ink  antenna in slot  
No. 6. 
Module No. 4 cor ins a completely redundani Link 1 data  t rans-  
missicjn sys t em including a replaceable antenna. 
pletely redundant, r a the r  than partially redundant, t o  avoid a l a r g e  impact 
and ma; >r redesign on the  data bus and a l so  to  avoid a multi-pin connection 
a the module / spar: ec  raft interface.  
The Link I s y s t e x  is com-  
Module No. 6 contains the c ross - l ink  communications sys tem.  To 
re\luce power l o s s e s  ana t o  eliminate waveguide in te r faces ,  the electronics 
w e r e  placed on the back of the  antenna. 
into m o r e  than one modulc due to  the l a rge  power l o s s e s  which would be 
incur red  with long lengths of waveguide. 
This sys t em could not be split-ub 
Modules No. 7 and 10 conta;t~ completely redundant attitude control 
electronics and senso r s .  
NO. 8 and 9 because the i r  €unctions a r e  distinct and somewhat different. 
The RADEC sys t ems  w e r e  spli t  between modules 
Module No. 12 contains the Link 2 and 3 communications sys tem.  
This  sys t em could not be spli t  into m o r e  than one module because of the  
impact on the  design of the  da ta  bus. 
spacecraft  interface tlescribed in Reference 10 would have t o  be  increased  
to  a multi-pin connector should the Link 2 /3  sys t em requ i r e  . plitting. 
Also, the bas ic  single-pin module/ 
The electrical power sys t em,  consisting of a single a r r a y  and 
Attempts to  split the a r r a y  into two ba t t e r i e s ,  was left in one module. 
resulted in mutual a r r a y  shadowing and interference with the l ine of sight f o r  
the  rad ia tors .  
Module No. 16 contains the senso r ,  the second Link 1 sys t em,  and 
the  Data Proceee ing  Electronics System. 
in Reference I O .  
It is uncharged f r o m  that describer! 
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Table 3-11 l i s t s  the par ts  count provided by SYSOPT. The Link 1 
systems a r e  located in  modules 4 and 16 and were designed to be completely 
redundant systems; i . e . ,  the system in module 4 is to  be  identical to that in 
module 16. However, the equipment l ist  was changed t o  show a single antenna 
and some electronics in module 16 and the remainder of the Link I electronics 
in  module 4. 
It is quite possible that it would require multi-pin connectors a t  the module/ 
spacecraft interface, and perhaps require that the data bus be redesigned. 
The impact of this equipment split on the design is not known. 
The equipment required for achieving MMDs of I ,  2, and 4.5 yea r s  
*as checked to  determine i f  it could be packaged within the module as shown 
in  Table 3-12. A s  with the 8-module configuration, problems arose  with the 
13-module configuration. 
lengthened to 3.25 rn (128 in .  ) to  accommodate the sensor electronics in a 
single space-replaceablc module package a t  320 kg/m 
ened to 1.62 m (64 in . )  to package it at  641 kg/m 
possibilities for this problem would be the same as those suggested for the 
eight-module configuration. 
In this case,  the spacecraft would have to be 
3 3 ( 2 0  lb/ft  ) o r  length- 
3 3 (40 lb/ft ). The design 
c . Minimum- Module SLDSP - 
Figure 3-36 is an outboard profile of a SLDSP spacecraft configured 
with two modules. 
different than that of the 8- and 13-module versions,  the baseplate concept 
and the index/translation motion for removal/replacement of the module is 
retaLied. The configuration was developed to determine the distribution of 
equipment for each module for use in the reliability model. There a r e  no , 
probierria i i x d v e d  with packaging the equipment required for MMDs of I ,  2, 
and 4.5  years  into this spacecraft as shown in Table 3- 12. 
Although the shape of the 2-module payload is somewhat 
d. Ground- Refurbishable and Expendable SLDSPs 
A ground-refurbishable version of the DSP,  based on the concept 
developed for the on-orbit maintainable SLDSP, would be identical to the 
version shown in Figure 3-34 except that the equipment required for on-orbit 
servicing would be removed. This would include the baseplates,  t racks ,  and 

This figure intentionally omitted for 
security reasons. See Foreword. 
Figure 3-36. SLDSP Spacecraft Two-Module Configuration 
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p e r ; s p  the data bus. 
bracketry for eq;*ipnient mounting tied directly to the semi- tuonocoque 
structure.  
shaft connections. 
The baseplates would be replaced with the necessary 
Also, the replaceable dr ives  would be replaced with conventional 
The redundancy requirements to achieve MMDs of 1, 2, and 4.5 
yea r s  would not result in the same pzckaging problems as for the space- 
serviceable versions,  because the envelope constraints of the individual 
module no longer apply s i n c e  the modules are no longer removable. 
equipment may be mounted on the inside of the main s t ructural  ring to  
increase the envelop5 available for equipment packaging. 
Lxceas 
The expendable SLDSP is identical to  the ground- refurbishable 
SLDSP except that. in addition to the removal of the servicing equipment, the 
docking coue is also removed. Here again, an  increase in usable volume for 
the equipment packaging is available on the inside of the main structural ring. 
Due to brevity of the study, the ground- refurbishable and expendable 
versions of the SLDSP were assumed to be simplified versions of the on-orbit 
maintainable version for comparative purposes. It should be noted, however, 
that i f  ei ther concept proves attractive, specific configurations should be 
developed &ich would be optimized for  e i ther  the ground- refurbishable or 
expendable SLDSP payload rather  than using configurations based on a n  on- 
orbit maintainable SLDSP. 
3. MASS PROPERTIES 
The reference SLDSP weight es t imate   at developed from the 
Spacecraft Synthesis P rogram (SSPRO) using the mission equipment defined 
in Reference 10. The SLDSP reference weight is for an expendable payload 
that is three-axis stabilized with a one-year MMD. The current  expendable 
satellite is a ya-M- spin configuration. 
current  and the reference configuration are the changes to the .mission equip- 
ment, stabilization concept, and s t ructural  design to use the full 4.4-m (14.5-ft) 
diameter,  and the elimination of the movable ballast. 
The major differences be tween the 
With these modifications to the configuration for on- orbit servicing, 
the refercncc weight was determined using the SSPRO. A printout of one 
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SLDSP case is duplicated in Table 3- 13 which include3 the weight estim,*tes 
for the reference weight and three Shuttle payload types. It should be re' og- 
nized that for the case examined in Table 3- 13, the reference payloa4 we i f . c  
is for a one-year MMD and the three Shuttle payloads are for two-year BLM9s. 
To account for the MMD effect on weight, the parts count determined 
by the SYSOPT program was csed. 
provided in Figure 3-37 for the subsystems including the misoion equipment. 
The influence of modularity was determined from several  payload modularity 
studies. 
relationships, the SSPRO computed the weights as MMD was varied fr0.m 1 t o  
4.5 years  and rrmiularity was varied from 2 to 13 space-replaceable modules. 
The resulting weight relationship is 
These data were shown in Figure 2-4. With the MMD and modrrlarity 
4. EXPECTED NUMBER OF LAUNCHES 
The expected number of launches for the SLDSP was determined 
from the S A M s  program for configurations with 2, 8, and 13 modules and 
MMDs of 1, 2, and 4.5 years. 
modules were computed from the reliability model. 
listed in Table 3- 14 with an estimate of the predicted MMD. These were inputted 
into the S A M  to compute the expected number of launches for the three types of 
replacement strategy (random, conditional, and perfect failure prediction) 
which were considered in evaluating the method of selecting the modules to 
be replaced beyond the failed module. 
in Figures 3-38 ,  3-39, and 3-40 are applicable to on-orbit servicing of space- 
replaceable modules. 
cables, and sensor optics, and any failures in these areas will require ground 
refurbishment. 
replaceable i tems is 0.014 for all of the on-orbit maintainable configurations. 
The Weibu l l  functions for each of these 
These functions are 
The expected numbers that are shown 
The non- replaceable module consists of the spaceframe, 
The expected number of launches per year for the non- 
5 .  COST ANALYSIS 
The unit coat of the SLDSP was computed for expendable, ground- 
reiurbishable, and on-orbit maintainable payloads with MMDs of 1, 2, and 
4 . 5  years. 
is the total program cost of a one-SLDSP on-orbit system for a 10-year 
These casts  are shown in Figure 3-41. Also shown in the figuTe 
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2 Space Replaceable Modules 
1 Non-Replaceable Module 
E = 0.0142 
Note:  Data applicable to  random, 
conditional, and PFP 
replacement s trateg  s .  
1 2 3 
Number of Modules Replaced per  Visit  
Figure 3-38 .  Expected Launch Rat(-  for a Tw+Modulc SJ,IlSP 
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3 . 0  
2 . 0  
1.0 
0 
8 Space  Replaceable Modules 
1 Non-Replaceable Module 
E = 0 .0148  
rllrllll 
MMD 
Yr 
1 
2 
4 . 5  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
Number of Modules Replaced per Visit 
Figurz 3-39 .  Expected Launch Rate for an Eight-Module SLDSP 
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3. 
13 SPACE REPLACEABLE MODULES 
1 NON-REPLACEABLE MODULE 
E= 0.014 
2 
1. 
0 I I I I 1 . 1 . 1 1  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7. 8 9 10 11 12 13 14' 
Number of Modules Replaced p e r  Visit  
Figure 3-40. Expected Launch Rate  for a 13-Module SLDSP 
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Figure 3 - 4 1 .  Effect of Mean Miss ion  Duration on SLDSP Uni t  
and Program Cost 
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program duration. 
and RDT&E cos t .  
loads appear  to  reach  a minimum program cos t ,  but the  to ta l  p r o g r a m  cos t  
of the  expendable payload continues to  d e c r e a s e  as MFKD is increased .  
4 .5-year  MMD, the ground- refurbish;Lb!e and on-orbit maintainable payloads 
are  not expected to  r equ i r e  refurbishment  because the spare payloads will  
s e rv i ce  the  expected fai lures .  It is not economical to  design payloads with 
MMDs beyond what can b e  effectively used during the p rogram durat ion un- 
less high rel iabi l i ty  is des i red .  The optimum MMD for on-orbit  servicing 
of a one-satell i te sys tem a p p e a r s  to occur  at about two y e a r s  and it should be  
more economical  than a 4 .5-year  expendable payload. 
included in th i s  comparison becauce the miss ion  opera tes  at high altitude. 
The total  p rog ram cos t  includes payload unit, opera t ions ,  
The on-orbit maintainable and ground-refurbishment pay- 
At a 
Sort ie  payload is not 
The r e p a i r  s t ra tegy  for the  configurations with the  2 ,  8,  and 13 
modules was per formed by varying the  niimaer of modules  rep laced  p e r  visit .  
The r e su l t s  3 f  th i s  tradeoff a r e  shown in F igu res  3-42 and 3-43 which ref lect  
the performance l imi t s  of the Tug. 
4- and 6-module rep lacements ,  respect ively,  exceed the  Tug serv ice-  shar ing  
capabilitv. 
than four and six modules p e r  payload are replaced.  The minimum cos t  
however ,  is reached p r i o r  t o  exceeding the Tug perform-ance capability. 
optimum appezars to be  replacement  of about 3 and 4 modules  for the 8- and 
13-module configurations. 
number of space-replaceable  modules that  should be replaced p e r  visit .  
For the  8- and I?-module des igns  the 
The Tug is performing dedicated se rv ice  miss ions  when more 
The 
This  amounts  to about 30 percent  of the  total  
The cos t  effect of the  number of modules in  a payload on total 
p r o g r a m  cost  is shown in F igure  3-44 for designs with MMDs of 1 ,  2, and 
4 . 5  y e a r s ,  Both the 8- and 13-module configurations reflect. the  30-percent 
replacement  concept: however,  the 2- module configuration cannot show th is  
effect  because  any servicing will  rep lace  50 percent  or I 0 0  percent  of the  
modules.  
module configuration s ince t h e r e  is no maintenance per formed on the replaced 
modules.  
The 4 .5-year  MMD design does not show th is  pat tern for a two- 
This  trLdeoff indicates  that  the number of modules in the  payload 
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should be enough to effectively utilize the 30-percent optimum replacement 
for a one- satellite system. 
several Satellites in the system may exhibit a different optimum replacement 
percentage. 
study. 
Operational satellites which generally have 
The multi-payload case should be investigated in any follow-on 
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4. COMMON HARDWARE 
A. IN TRODUC TION 
The results of two studies are presented which indicate the potential 
savings in costs that may result from the utilization of common attitude con- 
trol subsystem hardware and of standardized solar cell modules. Common- 
ality of spacecraft hardware should, of course, be a very powerful means of 
reducing payload costs. 
of spacecraft subsystems by the Orbiter or Tug to be feasible, it is necessary 
to have equipment in the form of easily re2laceable modules, and it is essential 
to standardize these modules to the greatest extent possible for refurbish- 
ment. 
Also, for the concept of on-orbit service and repair 
In order for a single attitude control design to be suitable fer z 
group of vehicles having different values for the design parameters which 
determine stabilization requirements, a common specification bounding the 
requirements must be met by the subsystem. 
mission requiring the greatest accuracy, the one with the longest design life, 
the one with the heaviest vehicle, etc. This implies that for some, if not all, 
of the missions, the equipment is overdesigned and, therefore, is probably 
larger and heavier than sibsystems would be if they were custom designed 
for each particular application. However, overdesign can be viewed as 
performance margin and, as will be discussed presently, may prove to be 
advantageous if held within reasonable bounds. Furthermore, in view of 
the Shuttle's capability for placing very heavy payloads into orbit, the impor- 
tance of small size and weight can be de-emphasized. 
That is, it must satisfy the 
At every step, from the original conceptual design to the end of the 
operational phase, commonality of subsystem hardware can provide large 
cost savings on a space program involving a number of different missions 
(Table 4- 1). 
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Table 4- 1. Cost Savings from Common Hardware 
ACTIVITY 
Preliminary System Studies 
Preliminary Development 
Prel iminary and Final Design 
1 Drawings 1 Tooling 
~ Fabrication 
Acceptance Test 
Final Development 
Ins tallation 
P re - flight Checkout 
Maintenance and Repair 
REASONS FOR LOWER COST 
Fewer studies 
Fewer development area.s 
Fewer designs 
Fewer drawings 
Common tooling 
Lower unit cos ts  due to  large 
Common test  specs, t es t  procedure2 
quantities of same par t s  
and tes t  equipment. Simplified 
training of tes t  personnel 
Fewer  designs to debug 
Common fixtures. Simplified train- 
See Acceptance test, above 
Common tools, instructions, pro- 
cedures  and spare  par ts .  Simpli- 
fied training of maintenance and 
repa i r  pe rsonnel 
ing of installation personnel 
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The performance margin provided by designing the equipment to 
the "worst-case" specification, covering a group of space vehicles with 
varying requirements, can be a valuable feature. Fo r  example, assume 
that on a group of 12 different vehicles, 3-require  a pointing accuracy of 
0. 002 radians while 9 others  need only 0. 01 radians. The attitude con- 
t rol  subsystem wou: i then have to be designed around the 0.002-radian 
requirement, which is five t imes as accurate as it needs to be for three 
quarters  of the flights. 
to-one pe r fo rmawe  margin which means that the equipment accuracy could 
deteriorate in  service by a factor of five and sti l l  meet  specified pointing 
requirements. 
the subsystem. 
However, on these nine missions,  there  is a five- 
This should significantly improve the reliability and life of 
Another possibility for exploiting performance margin is to have 
two c lasses  of t e s t  specifications for  the same equipment: one giving require- 
ments for high-accuracy missions and another for the less-accurate missions. 
On the la t ter  equipment, the performance margin could significantly reduce 
test  costs. 
little performance margin, which is probably due to the current  emphasis on 
small  size and weight. 
peak performance, they a r e  likely to fail certain tests.  A s  a result ,  months 
may be wasted nursing such equipment through tes t  since many adjustments,  
replacements, and r e r u n s  must b e  made. 
may often be devoted to negotiating waivers with the procuring agency. 
Subsystems presently in production appear to be designed with 
Unless they are "tuned up'' with each assembly at 
Zn addition, much time and effort 
The use of two se ts  of specifications must be traded off against 
other considerations, such as the necessity for having two types of spare  
subsystems a s  an example. 
shows e r r o r s  during tes t  which a r e  significantly la rger  than those permitted 
by the high-accuracy specifications. This may indicate a malfunction which 
w i l l  seriously jeopardize the reliability on the moderate-accuracy 
applications. 
Also, caution is advisable when equipment 
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Commonality resul ts  in  l a rge r  quantities of each i tem and should 
also increase reliability, since l a rge r  production runs usually produce m o r e  
reliable equipment. 
appropriate action h a s  already been taken to remove them before the majority 
of the units are manufactured. 
ciencies but a r e  in the area of quality control. 
modified manufacturing o r  assembly operations and additional inspection 
procedures can be initiated to prevent recurrence of these problems. 
Most of the "bugs" are disclosed on ear ly  lots, and 
Many of these problems are not design defi- 
A s  the program proceeds,  
It appears  that the policy of common hardware should be adopted 
to the greatest  possible extent on payload subsystems. 
resul t  in very significant cost savings in engineering, manufacturing, tes t ,  
maintenance , and repair and should provide hardware having improved 
reliability. 
This approach should 
B. ATTITUDE CONTROL HARDWARE 
The spacecraft stabilization requirements for  53 different payloads 
w e r e  determined f rom the 197 I and 1972 Shuttle Payload Data Books (Ref. 
11 and 12). 
ing as many as 12 flights. 
A total  of 177 flights is planned for  these payloads, some involv- 
The 53 payloads were arranged in  14 groups in  which (he mission 
stabilization requirements and spacecraft  configuration appear sufficiently 
similar to  permit common attitude control subsystems to be employed 
without considering design life. 
mission duration t imes  for on-orbit o r  ret r ieval  servicing intervals can be 
achieved by redundancy of the same stabilization assemblies. 
It was assumed in this study that mean 
Since all Sortie missions covered in the 1972 NASA Payload Data 
Book are stated to require  no stabilization subsystem (because attitude 
contzol will be provided by the Orbiter) ,  the question of stabilization hard- 
ware  commonality on that type of mission was not addressed. 
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1. ANALYSIS 
The 5 3  payloads considered in this stud-; were taken from the NASA 
This summary lists 68 missions from the and Civil Payload Data Summary. 
1972 NASA Payload Data Book and 9 from the 1971 Data Book. 
24 payloads was eliminated from the study, since they involved revisits and 
Sortie missions in which attitude control is supplied by the Orbiter o r  
special payloads, such a s  large spact stations and planet rovers, which are 
not compatible with the common hardware concept. The information given 
i n  the Payload Data Books was incomplete for many of the payloads. 
areas where data was lacking, estimates were developed based on mission 
de sc  r iptions . 
A total of 
In 
Initially, the payloads w e r e  tabulated i n  three-axis and spinning 
These were in the order  of payload number and included param- groups. 
e te rs  affecting stabilization requirements such as pointing and attitude 
determination accuracies, reference orientation, altitude, payload weight, 
life, maintenance policy (expendable, on-orbit, o r  ground-refurbishable), 
and Shuttle visit intervals. 
blies specified in the Payload Data Book w e r e  listed. 
In addition, the types of attitude control assem- 
The kinds of stabilization sensors and actuators to be employed 
depend upon both the vehicle configuration and the type of mission. 
vehicle types and missions were envisioned as follows: 
Possible 
Vehicle Configuration 
Type 1: Three-Axis Pneumatic Control 
Type 2: 
Type 3; 
Type 4: Pure Spin 
Type 5: Dual Spin 
Yaw Spin (vehicle angular momentum cancelled by 
counter - rotating wheel) 
Three -Axis Momentum Control (control moment 
gyro or reaction wheel) 
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Missions 
Class I: 
Class II: 
Class 111: 
Earth Orbit, Earth Pointing 
Stellar /Sun Orientation, Non-Earth Pointing, 
Heliocentric, Planet Flyby 
Planet Orbit 
The vehicle types can be considered to fall into two major classifi- 
cations: those having angular momentum' and those with zero angular momen- 
tun ( see  Figure 4-1). 
that Class I, 11, and I11 missions were called for in Type 1, 3, and 4 vehicles. 
No missions involved Type 2, and all  those under Type 5 were Class I. 
A review of the payloads covered by the study showed 
The first grouping of payloads for determining common hardware 
potential was based on the premise that for  a given vehicle configuration and 
mission class,  the attitude sensor characterist ics a r e  largely determined by 
pointing accuracy, and the actuator ( "muscle") requirements a r e  dictated by 
pointing accuracy and vehicle weight. 
combination of vehicle configuration and mission c lass  were arranged in order  
of decreasing pointing accuracy. 
payloads w e r e  tabulated in order  of increasing vehicle weight. 
listing of this kind is shown in Table 4-2, which covers Type 3 vehicles (three- 
axis momentum control) and Class I missions (ear th  orbit, earch pointing). 
The horizontal lines show how the subsystems fall into four groups: (1) high 
accuracy, (2) medium accuracy/light weight, (3) medium accuracy/iieavy 
weight, and (4) low accuracy. Furthermore,  there  could be considerable 
commonality of actuators and sensors. 
be required for the 136-kilogram ( 300-pound), lightweight vehicles, but, 
conceivably, a single additional design could handle a l l  other vehicles, which 
range in weight from 454 to 1,361 kilograms (1,000 to 3,000 pounds). Com- 
mon sensors could probably be used on both lightweight and heavyweight, 
moderate-accuracy systems. 
Therefore, a l l  missions for each 
Where accuracies w e r e  the same, the 
A typical 
One actuator design would probably 
'Angular momentum a s  used in  this study does not refer to inertial angular 
momentum but is measured relative to a reference coordinate frame: 
e. g., a local vertical orbit plane reference frame. 
136 
137 
+4 t-l l4 
L J U U  
a u  
d d  
- 9 "  
-1 rr) m 
CI 
U U U  z z z  u u  z z  
m u l  
I C I C  . .  
4 -  
SLH3I'Td 'ON 
m 
a, 
u 
k 
i 
E 
0 
U 
k 
a, 
m 
(d 
m 
C 
6 
m 
12) u 
k 
3 : 
2 
5 
k 
m 
W 
m 
a, u 
k 
3 
2 
9 
k 
(d 
W 
0 
0)  
Y 
Y 
C 
0 
u 
(d 
&I 
U 
G 
t-c 
w 
m 
a, u 
k 
1 
0 
m 
2 
w" 
5 
k 
m 
a, u 
k 
1 
a, 
0, 
5 
rr; 
k 
m 
W 
'ON a V 0 7 A V d  
138 
It appears desirable that certain other payloads having s imilar  
attitude control requirements should employ different configurations of 
stabilization hardware: 
a. The mission might specify use of a slightly modified version 
of an existing spacecraft, such a s  Mariner, Pioneer, o r  
Tiros. This would avoid the cost and r isk involved with 
a completely new vehicle design. 
b. A spinning payload might be needed for certain sensors used 
on the mission. 
C .  Large vehicles req-iring frequent repointing should probably 
employ control moment gyros. 
d. Certain types of miss!ms may require some sor t  of momentum 
control in order  to conserve propellant. 
With these constraints in mind, the initial groups of the types shown 
in Table 4 - 2  were reduced in  number by combining payloads that had s imilar  
attitude control requirements but with different stabilization hardware con- 
figurations specified in the Payload Data Books. This resulted in a total of 
14 groups. Because of the unique requirements of certain missions, six of 
the groups consisted of only one o r  two payloads. 
groups had 3 to 13 mipaions. 
involving 177 f l ighs .  
The remainder of the 
There was a total of 53 different payloads 
(See Tables 4-3 through 4- 16. ) 
In the Payload Data Books, five of the satellites a r e  specified to 
be the dual spin type. 
NCN-8, and NCN-9. Since stabilization sensors  and actuators a r e  mounted 
on the non-spinning portion of the spacecraft, as on three-axis subsystems, 
it appeared that further hardware commonality could be achieved by changing 
the dual-spin types to the three-axis momentum bias configuration. 
and actuator requirements were similar to those on a group of three-axis 
subsystems employing the momentum bias technique, and the five dual 
spinners were shifted to that type of attitude control. 
These a r e  payloads NE2-41,  NC2-49, NCN-7, 
Sensor 
As mentioned above, six of the groups contain only one or two pay- 
loads, due to unique requirements. The payloads involved a r e  a s  follows: 
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a. 
b. 
C. 
d. 
e. 
f. 
Exp lo re r  (NA2-1, NA2-2) - N o  o the r  miss idn  r e q u i r e s  this 
combination of high pointing accu racy  ( 
and light vehicle weight (169 kg). 
i mil l i r ad ians )  
Radio Ast ronomy Observa tory  (NA2-11) - This  :.q a spinning 
vehicle that  s tab i l izes  a c i r c u l a r  antenna ( 10 k i lome te r s  in 
d i ame te r )  a s  well  a s  four  s m a l l  ou te r  sa te l l i t es  att;.ched to 
the antenna. 
requi red ,  s ince  unusual dynamic p rob lems  appea r  likely. 
A spec ia l  ac tua tor  design is expected :o L e  
Explo re r  (NP2-15) - This  is a spec ia l  spinning v.+icle 
employing a s ingle  react ion wheel fo r  varying the spin speed.  
Gravi ty  and Relativity (NP2-16, NP2-17) - These  a re  
relat ivi ty  theory exper iments  that  r equ i r e  ylfy spec ia l  gyro-  
scopes  with d r i f t  uncer taint ies  of 7. 69 Y 10 
(0. 0005 a r c  seconds p e r  y e a r ) ,  which i s  far beyonr’ tho s t a t e  
of the  a r t .  
rad ians  'set 
Encke Rendezvous (NU2-36) - This  comet  randezvous missintn 
r e q u i r e s  a spec ia l  vidicon s e n s o r  to achieve ,he sp.?cified 
pointing accu racy  of 0.29 mi l l i r ad ians  ( I  a r c  mir,ute). 
Bio-Research  Module (NB2-55) - T’ie low accuracy  ,,inting 
requi rement  (87.3 mil l i r ad ians )  can probably b e  achieved 
without the u s e  of gy ros  o r  o the r  momentum devices  employed 
on all o the r  t h ree -ax i s  vehicles .  
Gravity grac’;ent s tabi l izat ion was specified in  the Payload Data Book 
f o r  Geopause (NE2-45) which r e q u i r e s  a pointing accu racy  of 52 mil l i r ad ians  
( 3  degrees) .  
(30 a r c  seconds)  is a l s o  specified,  which will necess i ta te  a s t a r  s enso r .  
changing from gravi ty-gradient  to momentum b ia s  stabil ization, i t  was  possi-  
b le  to group this  paylcqd with o t h e r s  of similar s i z e  which a l s o  have s t a r  
s e n s o r s  of the same o r d e r  of accuracy .  
However,  an  at t i tude determinat ion accu racy  of 0. 15 mil l i rad ians  
By 
Because magnet ic  torquing is feasible  only ove r  a l imited range of 
a l t i tudes,  it h a s  not been specified on any of the subsys tems,  s ince  it would 
i n c r e a s e  the number  of g r o u p ,  and th i s  would b e  undesirable  f r o m  the 
commonality standpoint. 
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2. RESULTS 
Tables 4 3  tiirough 4-16 ciivide the 53 payloads covered by this study 
into 14 groups. 
1972 Payload Data Books, i t  appears  that s.Ji of the missions tabulated -n a 
given group could be handled by a common attitude control subsystem. 
Each table l is ts  the system requirements and the types of sensors  and 
actuators proposed for the common stabilization system. 
that the ranges of accuracies and vehicle weights on each chart  a r e  restricted,  
so that the same sensor and actuator can be emGloyed for all missions in the 
group. 
On the basis of the inforrat ion contained in  the 1971 and 
It will be noted 
On some c\arts,  the range of mean mission durations is rather  L r g e ,  
particularly on distant F!anet flybys which, of course,  a r e  experdable and 
cannot be serviced a t  regular inter-.ah. In order  to achieve the desired 
life and reliability on extended mispions, it will be necessary to  employ 
redundant, dormant assemblies.  However, it should be noted that this doss 
not affect commonality of hardware,  since identical assemblies can be involved. 
The redundancy required for meeting expected life o r  T e a n  mission 
duration specifications could be based upon the design life of current  hard- 
ware. 
enhanced reliability is beyond the scope of this study. 
for  which information i s  not available, such a s  the required reliability for 
the entire spacecraft and the extent to which the failure ra tes  of other sub- 
systems contribute to t!-e overall  reliability. 
reduxidant assemblies needed has  not been specified at  this time. 
However, the extent to which redundancy must  be employed for 
It involves factors 
Therefore, the number cf  
In the case of the Large Solar Observatory (NA?.-7), which weighs 
14,643 kilograms (32,282 pounds), redundant control moment g; ros  of the 
type used on lighter vehicles in the group will be required in  order  to meet 
torquing requirements. 
A completz attitude control subsystem involves a number of aif- 
ferent assemblies: attitude sensors ,  sensor electronic 3, actuators,  actuatar 
electronics, interface electronics between the sensors  ,anti actuators, 
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and a computer for such functions a s  control law implementatioli, seqaenciEg 
discretes, and failure detection analysis. For the concept of on-orbit 
servicing, subsystems will presumably be modularized. These modules 
must be accessible to the Orbiter or 'Tug for on-orbit checkout, replenish- 
ment of consumables, and for removal and repiacement. 
Since different functional considerations determine the location of 
sensor and actuator assemblies, it seems logical to assume that they will be 
in separate modules. Also, it appears desirable to include the associated 
electronics in each module. Different groups of missions will require dif- 
ferent combinations of sensor and actuator modules. Therefore, for moZule 
commonality, the interface electronics should be in a separate module. 
Off-the- shelf hardware could probably satisfy the requirements for 
most of the groups of common attitude control s .bsystems shown in Tables 
4-3 through 4-16 
each of the 14 groups, where currently available sensor and actuator assemblies 
appear capable of meeting the performance requirements. 
done to show the feasibility of employing one common assembly for handling 
the range of performance covered by all of the missions in each group. 
Actsally, 
The missions involved a re  scheduled far into the future, and improved, 
more reliable equipment will undoubtedly be available by that time. 
the concept of replaceable modules will almost certainly result in extensive 
design changes mi current hardware. Table 4-18 summarizes the common 
hardware assemblies required for the 14 groups. 
Spzcific hardware has been identified in Table 4-17 for 
This has been 
kese particular pieces of hardware would probably not be employed. 
Also,  
C. SOLARARRAY 
Interest in reducing the cost of solar cell power systems in recent 
years has gi-en rise to the concept of solar aryay standardization a s  a 
potential cost savings technique. It is reasonable to think that the present 
arrays which are custom designed specifically ' i r  each mission are  more 
costly than a solar array ' 
which clouds the feasibihty of standardization, however, is  the possibility 
of increased array weight and array area which might u1timatel.y result in 
qr, which has been standardized. An uncertainty 
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Table 4 -  17. Applicable  C u r r e n t  H a r d w a r e  
SROUP 
NO. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
ASSEMBLY 
Rate-1ntt.g . G y r o s  
Sun Sen  so r 
S t a r  Sen so r 
Vidicon 
J e t  T h r u s t e r s  
Rate-  Integ. Cy  ros 
Sun Sersor 
S t a r  Sensor 
Plane t  S e n s o r  
J e t  T h r u s t e r s  
Rate-  Inte g. G y r o s  
Sun S e n s o r  
S t a r  S e n s o r  
J e t  T h r u s  t e  TS 
~ 
E a r t h  S e n s o r  
Sun S e n s o r  
J e t  T h  rc s t e  rs 
2-Deg- E ree - Cy rc 
E a r t h  S e n s o r  
Star S e n s o r  
Sun S e n s o r  
(3) React ion 
Wheels  
J e t  T h  r u s t e  rs 
E a r t h  S e n s o r  
Sun S e n s o r  
S t a r  S e n s o r  
horn e n  turn Whe e 1 
J e t  T h r u s t e r s  
MANU- 
F A C  T U  R ER 
Lockheed 
ADCOLE 
TRW 
Lockheed 
Lockheed 
ADCOLE 
TRW 
Loc kheed 
Lockheed 
ADCOLE 
TRW 
Lockheed 
~ ~ 
B a r n e s  
ADCOLE 
Lockheed 
TRW 
I T T  
Bendix 
SPe rrY 
Lockheed 
TRW 
ADCOLE 
I T T  
Spe r ry 
Loc kheed 
MODEL 
ARA 
140 1 
P i o n e e r  F /C 
Agena 
ARA 
140 1 
P i o n e e r  F/G 
Agena 
ARA 
1401 
P i o n e e r  F /C  
Agena 
~~ 
13- 181X 
140 1 
Agena 
AOGO 
OAO 
18 18823 
45Q RWA 
Bores ighted  
Agena 
AOGO 
1401 
OAO 
Bo res ighted  
4 5 4  RWA 
Agena 
REMARKS 
Special Design 
Data Unavailable 
Special 7.69 X 
10' l4 mrad/sec 
Telescope s e n s a  
for fine pointing 
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Table 4- 17. Applicable  C u r r e n t  H a r d w a r e  (Contintled) 
- 
REMARKS 
Telescope s e n s o i  
f ine pointing 
MODEL I MANU- FACTURER I ASSE,MBLY NO. I 
7 E a r t h  S e n s o r  TRW 
Sun S e n s o r  ADCOLE 
M o m  e n  t urn W he e 1 Bendix 
Jet T h r u s  t e  rs Lockheed 
AOGO 
1401 
1880272 
Agena 
8 
1 
Sun S e n s o r  ADCOLE 1301 
S t a r  S e n s o r  TRW P i o n e e r  F / G  
Jet Th r u s  t e  rs Lockheed Agena 
Sun S e n s o r  ADCOLE 1301 
S t a r  S e n s o r  TRW P i o n e e r  F/G 
, J e t  T h r u s t e r  Lockheed Agena 
Sun S e n s o r  ADCOLE 1301 
Star S e n s o r  TRW P i o n e e r  F/G 
(1) React ion 
Wheel Bendix 1880272 
J e t  Thruste rs Lockheed Agena 
9 
Sun S e n s o r  
S t a r  S e n s o r  
Jet T h r u s t e r s  
E a r t h  S e n s o r  
Sur. S e n s o r  
M o m  e n  t urn W hee 1 
J e t  T h r u s t e r s  
Rate-Integ.  G y r o s  
Sun S e n s o r  
Star S e n s o r  
CMG's 
J e t  T h r u s t e r s  
ADCOLE 
ITT 
Lockheed 
TRW 
ADCOLE 
Lockheed 
Spe rrY 
h c k h e e d  
Bendix 
ITT 
Bendix 
Lockheed 
AOGO 
140 1 
Agena 
4 5 0  R WA 
ARA 
181882 3 
AOA 
Boresi ghted 
HEAO 
Agena 
10 
11 
12 
13 
1301 
OAO 
Agena 
Bo resi ghted 
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Dynamic ProLl. 
expec ted  tha t  ma 
requi  re s p e c i a l  
a c t u a t o r  des ign  
I On sp in  axis 
Table 4- 17. Applicable Current Hardware (Continued) 
Earth Senior  
Earth Sensor 
Barnes 13-181X 3- ( 2 )  Radiation Balance 
TR W AOGO 1 I / 0  (0 .06)  2-Axis Sweep Through 
14 
Momentum Wheel 
.Momentum Wheel 
Sun Sensor 
S ta r  Sensor 
Radio Signal 
Patte m 
Je t  Th ruste  r s 
Spe r r y  
Bendix 
I 
~ ~ ~ ~~ 
CMG Bendix HEAO 611 newton-meter-sec 
(450 lb-ft-sec) 
Jet Thrusters Lockheed AGENA 0.23 kg to 4 . 5  kg 
(0. 5 lb to 10 Ib) thrust 
representative 
c 
MANU- 
FACTURER 
ADCOLE 
TRW 
Lockheed 
MODEL 
1301 
Pioneer F/G 
Agena 
REMARKS 
Pioneer qesign 
Table 4- 18. Common Hardware Assemblies for Stabilization Systems 
ACCURACY 
ASSEMBLY hlILLIRADIANS COMMENTS 
Sun Sensor Spinning Vehicle 
Sun Sensor Null Seeker 
Solid State Scan I Electronic Scan Star Sensor TR W Pioneer F/G I 9 . 7  (0.5) I Star Sensor I ITT Borerighted - 1  (0.0013) 1 OAO 
~ ~~ ~ 
61  newton-meter-iec 
2 . 8  newton-meter-sec 
(2 .06 Ib-ft-sec) 
( 4 5  Ib-ft-sec) 
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an increase in total program costs. 
concluded that standardization appears to be feasible in the Shuttle time 
frame when potential solar a r r a y  design freedoms such a s  the relaxation of 
s be and weight constraints become more practical. 
One recent study group (Ref. 13) 
This study attempts to make a first-order estimate of the cumulative 
solar a r ray  cost savings that may be gained by means of solar a r r a y  stan- 
dardization for Shuttle payloads. 
and custom a r rays  a r e  compared for several  types of typical missions. 
The weight, area,  and cost of standardized 
1. SIZING OF SOLAR ARRAYS 
Table 4-19 summa-izes the results of the solar a r ray  sizing analysis. 
Column 1 is a summary of the missions and types of solar a r rays  which 
a r e  typical of earth-orbiting spacecraft using solar power systems. 
a r r a y  temperature and charged particle radiation fluence given in columns 
2 and 3, respectively, a r e  the major orbit-dependent environmental facrors 
that affect a r ray  performance. 
solar cell was selected for use for synchronous and 12-hour elliptical orbits 
because of the more severe radiation environments compared to a low ear th  
orbit. 
(column 4) w a s  determined from the calculated I-V curves shown in Figur ... s 
4-2 and 4-3. The number of single solar cells connected in series (column 
5)  required for the a r r ay  to operate a t  the maximum powerpoint is based on 
an a r ray  operating voltage of 28 volts. 
is based on a nominal a r r ay  output of 1 kw. 
power if a r r ay  size a t  other power levels is desired. 
Average 
For  the customized ar rays ,  a 10 R-cm 
The maximum power point of single cells a t  the end of a mission 
The area of each customized a r r ay  
This a rea  scales linearly with 
The standardized a r r ay  must be capable of meeting the require- 
ments of several  types of missions, even though some loss of performance 
would be expected. 
the reference configuration for the standard module because this configuration 
would meet the performance requirements of all  the missions considered. 
The size and weight impact of using the standard module was determined by 
calculating the I-V curve operating point for each mission, followed by the 
The ser ies  configuration of 71 cells was selected a s  
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calculation of an a r r ay  a rea  for the mission. 
a value of 7. 3 kg/m 
ized oriented a r r ays  and is consistent with use of the Shuttle where a r r ay  
weight is not expected to be a major design constraint. 
2 2 arrays,  it  was assumed that 3.4 kg/m (0 .7  Ib/ft ) of substrate and structure 
were chargeable to the solar array.  
In estimating the weight impact, 
2 2 ( I .  5 lb/ft ) was used for both customized and standard- 
For  body-mounted 
Table 4-20 l ists  those general characterist ics of a standardized a r r ay  
which seem likely a t  this time. 
area solar cells would be used to minimize solar cell and a r r ay  fabrication 
cost. 
to maxiiclize a r r ay  power-to-weight ratio and, a s  such, would be constructed 
using relatively heavy substrate. 
thick cells i o  partially compensated by the increase in cell efficiency with 
cell thickness (Ref.  14). Also, large a rea  cells increase the a r r ay  packing 
factor, which is defined a s  the ratio of active a r ray  a rea  to total a r r ay  area. 
Array structural design, however, also depends on thermal design and st i f f -  
ness requirements. 
cannot be identified until standard cell and standard a r r ay  specifications are 
developed which define these requirements. 
values for design parameters for custom a r rays  which been flown. 
It is expected that relatively thick and large- 
It is  also expected that standard a r r ay  modules would not be designed 
The weight penalty incurred by the use of 
Further construction and material details, therefore, 
Table 4-20 also shows typical 
2. POTZNTIAL COST SAVINGS 
The estimate presented herein of the potential cost saving realized 
from ar ray  standardization in the 1970-1990 time frame is a first-order 
approximation Lased on certain key assumptions concerning future solar 
a r r ay  utilization in space and solar cell  cost projections. 
a r r ay  cost can be subdivided into recurring and nonrecurring costs. 
costs include costs of materials (solar cells, covers, etc. ), fabrication labor, 
management support, and acceptance testing. Nonrecurring costs include 
design analysis, prototype and qualification testing, labor, and test  equip- 
ment. 
built, whereas nonrecurring costs, a s  a first approximation, a r e  independent 
In general, solar 
Recurring 
Recurring costs tend to vary directly with the amount of flight hardware 
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of the amount of flight hardware built. 
shown that a r ray  recurring costs tend to correlate relatively well with a r r a y  
area a s  opposed to maximum o r  average a r r ay  power output. This correla- 
t ion is used in the present analysis. 
A previous study (Ref. 15) has 
The mission planning model summarized in  Table 4-21 was used to 
estimate the cumulative solar a r r ay  capacity required for ZOD, NASA, and 
other Shuttle payloads over the 12-year period, 1979- 1990. 
of the previous subsection, the average yearly production requirement for 
custom versus standard a r ray  panels is 622 m /year (6700 ft /year) and 
678 m /year (7300 ft year), respectively. 
Using the results 
2 2 
2 2 
The data shown in Figure 4-4 (Ref. 15) were used to estimate 
solar a r r ay  recurring cost per unit a r r ay  area.  
the cost of materials, fabrication labor, test, and management and support. 
These data indicate that a r r ay  costs per unit a r r a y  a rea  a r e  reduced as  
larger units a r e  built. 
for each of the 42 spacecraft launched per year were pracured individually, 
so that the average procurement is 14.9 m /spacecra:t (160 ft2/spacecraft). 
This assumption tends to maximize the cost per unit area,  because some 
projects would involve multiple launches of identical a r r ay  designs, and the 
average procurement would exceed 14.9 meter 
for custom ar rays  is $75,347/m 
cost for the 1979-1990 time frame is  approximately $570 million. 
The recurring costs include 
For  custom arrays,  it was assumed that the a r r ay  
2 
2 2 
($7000/ft ), s 3  that the total a r r ay  recurring 
(160 f t  1. The average cost 
2 2 
The concept of a standard a r ray  module permits long-term purchasing 
and the stockpiling of modules by users  or  manufacturers. Under these coil- 
ditions, the size of a single procurement by the user  or  a centralized agency 
wc -Id exceed that needed for a single flight project. It is assumed here 
that NASA and DOD needs a r e  equivalent and that each obtains 339 m /year 
2 (3650 f t  /year) of standard a r r ay  modules a s  a single procwement. Under 
these conditions, Figure 4-4 shows that the recurring cost of standard 
modules i s  $32, 300/m2 ($3000/ft ), so the total recurring cost fcr the 500 
spacecraft is $260 million. 
2 
2 
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Table 4-21. Solar A r r a y  Planning Model 
Type of Solar  Ar ray  by Orbit Relative Number of Launches 
Sync h ronous 
Body Mounted 
Oriented Panel 
Low Ear th  Orbiting 
Body Mounted 
Oriented Panel 
Elliptical 
Oriented Panel 
4 
2 570 
19% 
19% 
2570 
12% 
Average A r r a y  A r e a  p e r  kw', Customized: 19. 1 m'/kw (205 ft'/kw) 
Average A r r a y  A r s a  p e r  kw', Standardized: 20.8 m2/kw (224 ftL/kw) 
Total Number of Spacecraft: - 500 
Average A r r a y  Power Output p e r  Spacecraft: -780 watts 
Solar  A r r a y  Requirements 
2 2 Customized Modules: 7,430 in (80,000 ft ) 
2 2 
Standard Modules: 8,080 m (87,000 f t  ) 
3 3 Cumulative Weight Penalty: 4.76 x 10 kg ( 10.5 x 10 lb) 
I. 
2. 
Using Tpble 4-19, Column 6 d;. ., 'le percentages above. 
Using Table 4-19, Column 7 data, and the percentages  above. 
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Additional savings in  so l a r  a r r a y  Copt can b e  real ized because  of 
the expected reduction i n  s o l a r  cell cos t s ,  a s  indicated by  the CuA*.*e.i tr.uwrr 
i n  F igure  4-5. 
whe-e cos t s  are  reduced a s  the ce l l  manufac turer  gains experience in  reyet-  
i t ive manufacturing operations.  The cos t  of s tandard ce l l s  would probably 
show a f a s t e r  ini t ia l  decline,  s ince  the s tandard ce l l  would b e  the s a m e  as  
o r  ve ry  similar to a ce l l  a l r eady  in production arLd only ce l l s  of a single type 
and size would h e  produced. Using the F igure  4-5 data ,  i t  is est imated that  
custom ce l l  cos t s  would d e c r e a s e  an  average  of 14 percent  durlng the per iod 
1970-1990, whereas  the cost  of a s tandard cc11 is est imated to d e c r e a s e  an  
average  cf 2 5  percent .  
are  based on the assumption that no new so la r  ce l l  technology is introduced 
in  the in t e r im  period. ? h e  learning curve  fo r  the s tandard ce l l s  i s  expected 
to flatten out arocnd 1993, because  by then the technology and manufacturing 
methods for  the i r  production would have been well  established. Since s o l a r  
ce l l  cos t s  are b ,  Zroximately 30 percent  of panel cos t ,  the ave rage  expected 
reduction of cost  fo r  custom and s tandard flight panels  through learning is  
4 percent  and 7 percent ,  respectively.  Applying these  percentage reductions 
to the r ecu r r ing  cos t  e s t ima tes  developed above gi-.ws total  r ecu r r ing  c o s t s  
fo r  cus tom and s tandard a r r a y s  of $550 million and $243 million, respectively.  
The savings are a r e su l t  of the so-cal led "learning effect" 
The extrapolated port ions of the c u r k e s  in  F igu re  4-5 
Pote,itial cost  reductions of other  a r r a y  componen' . result ing ;ram 
the  learning etfect  have been neglected. 
the production technology fo r  a r r a y  subs t r a t e s  and o ther  o lec t r ica l  com- 
ponents is well  es tabl ished,  and any potential savings can b e  neglecteu 
compared to  the  potential so l a r  ce l l  cos t  savings. 
This  is justif ied on the  b a s i s  that  
Estimates of nonrecur r ing  cos t s  for  customized and s t a d a r d  a r r a y  
modules  a re  much mc.7.; difficult because  of the genera l  lack 
h is tor ica l  cos t  data-  A rec-?t  stud;. (Rei .  16) has  shown that : x e c u r z i n b  
cos t s  range f rom 0 percent  to 50 percent  of total  a r r a y  cost  an2 depend, to 
a l a r g e  extent, on p r o g r a m  requi rements  r a t h e r  than technology requi re -  
ments .  
stdiled 
Major nonrecur r ing  cos t  i t e m s  include th3W.a aailociated with a r r a y  
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Table 4 - 2 2  Solar Panel Cost Breakdown 
ITEM 
DESIGN ANALYSIS* 
FABRIC A TION 
Labor 
Mate rial 
Quality Cot;rol 
Documentation 
Management & Support 
PANEL TEST 
Prototype * 
Qualification Test  * 
Acceptance Test  
Quality Control 
Test Equipment* 
* Nonrecurring cost  items 
RELATIVE C-T, % 
5.0 
20.0 
27.0 
7.0 
6 .0  
13.0 
0 . 9  
0 . 9  
11.0 
5 .5  
3 . 7  
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design and analysis, prototype fabrication and testing, and tes t  equipment. 
The potectial savings that may be realized via standardization &re even more 
uncertain. 
program (Ref.  171. 
total a r r ay  C O ~ :  can be considered as nonrecurring. 
it is assumea that the nonrecurring costs during the period of interest  are 
approximately L O  percent of the total cost of customized arrays.  
standard a r r ays ,  it is assumed that nonrecurring costs constitute only five 
percent of total a r r a y  costs. 
total nonrecurring costs  for custom and standard a r r a y s  are approximately 
$60 million and 1 3  million, respectively. Total costs a r e  summarized in  
Table 4-23. 
Tab- 4-21 shows relative array cost items for a current  NASA 
These data show that approximately 10 percent of the 
In the present analysis, 
For 
Based on these assumptions, the estimated 
Table 4-23. Estimate of Total Solar Array  Cost, 
1979 - 1990 
Item 
Recurring Cost 
Nonrecurring Cost 
Total Cost 
N e t  Savings 
Standar d 
240 
253 
357 
Customized 
Array, $M 
550 
60 
610 
D. CONCLUSIONS 
As anticipated, this study has indicated that commonality of attitude 
control subsystem hardware should be very advantageous for Shuttle payloads. 
Minimizing the number of different aensbrs  and actuators should result in  
large cost savings in engineering, manufacturing, test, maintenance, ;nd 
repair. 
ficant performance margins. 
In Iddition, i t  should provide more reliable equipment having signi- 
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Coxnmon hardware should be employed on payloads having E i m i l a r  
requirements. 
grouping types of missions (earth orbiting and earth pointing, for example) 
and then establishing subgroups with similar accuracies and weights. 
Candidates for common hardware were selected by first 
A total of 5 3  different payloads involving 177 flights was considered 
in the study. 
systems could accommodate all of these payloads. 
hardware commonality would occur among sensor and actuator modules. 
It appears that only 14 different types of attitude control sub- 
In addition, considerable 
The results of this study have also shown that the use of standard 
solar a r ray  modules during the 1979-1990 time period for several different 
types of mission projects could result in significant savings in solar a r ray  
costs while incurring relatively minor a r ray  size and weight penalties. 
results, however, hinge on several key assumptions which tend to maximize 
the cost of custom arrays and minimize the cost of standard arrays.  These 
assumptions must be verified and modified, if necessary, in a more detailed 
analysis befo e a realistic appraisal of standardization can be made. 
indicated cost saving potential of $357 million is great enough so that a more 
thorough investigation seems warranted. 
These 
The 
E. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Hardware commonality should be a basic policy for attitude control 
subsystems on Shuttle payloads. 
minimum number of diAArrent sensors, actuators, and interface electronics 
modules suitable for all anticipated Shuttle missions. 
savings which result from hardware commonality, it is recommended that 
the subsystem modules be identical for expendable, on-orbit repair, or  
retrieve /refurbish missions. An additional reason is that all subsystems, 
even those on expendable missions, should be checked out by the Shuttle or 
Tug when the payload is placed in its final orbit or  in a p r k i n g  orbit in 
order to insure that no malfunctions occurred during ascent. 
of spacecrdft hardware will result in standardized checkout test equipment 
and procedures aboard the Shuttle or Tug and will F -mi: zeplacement of 
any failed modules without brhging the spacecraft back to earth. 
Design studies should be initiated on a 
In view of the cost 
Commonality 
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Based on the results of the present study, it is recommended :.at 
the feasibility and potential advantages of solar array standardization be 
investigated in more detail. 
this follow-on work should include the following: 
Using the present results as a point of departuze, 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
The feasibility of a specification for standard cells and/or 
modules capable of meeting the requirements of a wide 
variety of NASA and DOD missions 
The impact of array hardening requirements on the feasibility 
of standardization 
A detailed estimate of the potential nonrecurring cost savings 
resulting from ar ray  standardization 
The effect of cell and/or array module standardization on 
the development and implementaticn of improved solar cells 
and module fat rication techniques 
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5. SORTIE PAY LOAD OFERATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
It has  been suggested that certain Sortie payloads in the NASA 
mission model may have substantially overlapping data requirements 
with other payloads and that a cost savings could be obtained by flying 
these pairs  as joint payloads. One such pair  is the combination of the 
Solar Shuttle Observatory (SSO) and the Atmospheric Science Facility 
(ASF) because the ASF requires substantial quantities of solar data for 
its OWP use. 
The first  phase was to determine the instrument complement for 
a joint mission, the requirements th i s  complement would place upon an 
integration facility (0 r facilities), and the orbital operations this comple- 
ment would demand of the astronaut and mission specialist. 
mission could then be utilized to construct a general model of the require- 
ments the scientific instrumentation would place on integration facilities, 
Sortie modules, and specialists. 
The joint 
The second phase examined the compatibility of the experiment 
equipment operations with the operational requirements of tLe Space 
Shuttle. 
sequences, time lines, and facilities. 
This effort evaluated the experiment requirements, op2rational 
Since results f rom the f i rs t  phase showed ASF-SSO is not a useful 
combination, a modified Atmospheric Science Facility was selected to pro- 
vide a model for the integration facility impact study and the orbital opera- 
tion study. 
scripticn. 
The modified ASF described here  is not a current NASA de- 
The modified Atmospheric Science Facility is based upon the 
Martin Marietta Corporation Study of ail Atmospheric Science Facility (3ef. 19). 
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Since the Martin study was published, there have been continuing formal and 
informal critiques. 
ideas expressed in these critiques and in discussions with Dr. R. D. Hudson 
of the Johnson Space Center. Comments of the NASA working group review 
of the Martin study and a few ideas generated in the Space Physics Labora- 
tory of The Aerospace Corporation have also been implemented. 
ing modified Atmospheric Science Facility is utilized to provide input data 
for the second phase of this study. The exact instrument complement is 
not vital to the overall study ,ince the final models a r e  supposed to be gener- 
a l  guidelines for  planning purposes. Consequently, the modified Atmospheric 
Science Facility has not been submitted to Dr. Hudson for explicit approval, 
though the concept h a s  been approved for the purpose of this study. 
modifications a r e  made to utilize a payload which is somewhat more  complex 
and therfore more like other payloads, involves man to a greater  degree, 
and should be more  nearly representative of the final concept of this evolv- 
ing facility. 
The modified ASF attempts to incorporate many of the 
The result-  
The 
B. ANALYSIS OF A JOINT ASF/SSO PAYLOAD 
The analysis of a joint payloa? concept for these two missions 
includes a determination of potentially COI imon instrumentation, data- 
collecting techniques, and orbital reqJirements. 
A summary of the ASF instrumectation is given in Tahle 5-1. This 
table includes an XUV-UV solar intensity monitor and a high-reeolution 
solar emission line spectrognvi l .  
Table 5-2 l is ts  candidate instruments for inclusion on the SSO. 
This list is taken from Referetce 19 and includes an 0.3-m telescope and 
associated spectroheliograph for :he ultraviolet a s  well as a 0. 5-m telescope 
and associated spectroheliograph for  the extreme ultraviolet solar  radiation. 
When the SSO instrumentation is casually inspected, i t  appears that all of 
the instrumentation would be useful to the ASF experimenter. 
astronomer is interested in very small regions on the solar disc. 
However, the 
If the 
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field-of-view (FOV) requirements on the S O  ultraviolet instrument a r e  
compared with the solar  disc area,  it can be seen that a r a s t e r  scan and 
summation of - 64 FOV elements would be required to provide the solar 
disc total energy. 
about 370-m (0.2-nmi) resolution, but the SSO would yield 1. 9m (0. 001 nmi). 
In order  to obtain intensities over a full line width for ASF purposes, either 
the SSO instrument focusing properties must be degraded, thereby making 
the data worthless to the solar astronomer, or the data must be obtained by 
scanning and summing the full width of the line at each of the 65 FOV element 
locations. 
would not be able to continuously monitor a small  active region on the sun, 
and the ASF experimenter would be faced with an extraordinary data storage 
and handling requirement. 
The UV monitoring function or the ASF facility requires 
If the data were to be used by both facilities, the so la r  astronomer 
Another aspect of the problem is one of spacecraft stability. The 
j i t ter  requirement for the SSO is very tight (0. 015 arc-sec /sec  with a point- 
ing accuracy of 0.5 arc-sec).  
these t a k s  is marginal at best; i t  is certain that several  groups of ASF 
instruments would not be permitted to slew from one look direction to another 
during solar  operations. 
The ability of the Sortie Lab to accomplish 
Table 5-3 i l lustrates the SSO instruments field-of-view requirements 
which a r e  not consistent with the ASF requirement for full so la r  disc data. 
Table 5-4 provides a comparieon of the spacecraft attitude requirements. 
can be seen in Table 5-4, the ASF instrumentation would generally be in 
motion in o rde r  to  compensate for spacecraft orbital motion, which would be  
detrimental to  the solar physics data. 
expected to be eufficent for the ASF facility, but the SSO will require special 
image motion compensators as well a s  occ more  stage of pointing control 
beyond the experiment-pointing base. 
As 
The Orbiter pointing capability is 
Other a reas  of incompatibflity a r e  the desired orbit  capability and 
the cleanliness requirements. 
185km (100 mi) because of atmospheric absorption. 
The SSC, facility cannot properly operate near  
The SSO requires 
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Table 5-3. Solar Shuttle Observatory Instrument 
Field of View 
Instrument 
Coronograph 
Flare Detector 
EUV Spectrograph 
UV Spectroheliograpl 
X-ray Spectroha. io- 
Visible Spectrohelio - 
graph, etc. 
graph 
FOV 
1 so 
Full disc 
5 min 
4 min 
4 min 
4 rnin 
Purpose 
1 sec resolution of solar 
prominences at the solar limbs. 
Flares at  these locations a re  
less important to earth phenomena 
than flares from more nearly 
central locations. 
Identify and study active regions 
and flares. 
Scan over the disc and sum the 
results f om - 64 FOV elements: 
provide spectral line profiles and 
total flu data. 
i.e., 10 8 words. These would 
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500-km (270-nmi) orbit  thus reducing performance margin for inptrumenta- 
tion which can be carried.  
(100 nmi). 
eclipse time: the P-SF would utilize that orbit once but, for subsequent 
missions, would require different launch times. The SSO also has a stated 
requirement fo r  contamination c a r e  that would seriously imDact the cost of 
preparing the ASF instrumentation. 
The ASF can operate near  optimum a t  185 k m  
Additionally, the SSO requires the orbit to provide mimimum 
The most basic compatibility problem is one of data collection. 
The solar  physicist wants high spatial resolution to follow the growth and 
decay of very small active regions on the sun. He would select those por- 
tions of the solar  spectrum which provide information on solar processes. 
Tnese specific spectral  lines would be monitored in  very high resolution 
in order  to measure line widths which permit the calculation of temperatures 
and velocity fields. 
radiance from the entire solar disc that falls upon the earth. The spectral  
information required is much more  coarse,  eince the atmospheric absorp- 
tion of eoiar energy is due mostly to continuum absorption processes. 
relatively few cases  of absorpt im resonance o r  accidental resonance for 
which solar line widths, shapes, and intensities a r e  required are in ge:eral 
founc? at  wavelengths of l e s se r  interest  to the so la r  physicist. Cor. qquently, 
we find that the spatial resolution, time history data, and spectra' uata 
req:iired by the two facilities ar? not complementary. 
In contrast, the atmospheric scientic f wants the total 
Those 
The two facilities might still occupy the same Sortie Lab a s  two 
st rangers  might occupy the san 2 apartment building: they would share  the 
same plumbing but would not reinforce one another's productivity. 
each one interferes with the other. 
below: 
In fact, 
The incompatibilities a r e  summarized 
6 
1. 
2. 
The SSO separately records 64 FOV elem ts  and - 10 
resolution elements which require summa.-on for ASF rurposes. 
The wavelengths chosen for observation by the solar  physicist 
for solar studies m i y  be irrelevant to ASF purposes. 
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3. T i m e  shar ing  between the ASF "scitn and sum" mdde and the 
SSO "set and record  each spat ia l  a lement"  mode is imprac t ica l  
on a seven-day miss ion  s ince  the mairi A S F  t?x~?c-' -1rnents re- 
qui re  simultaneous s o l a r  d i sc  data. 
The high resolution elem2nts  , - f  S S O  exper iments  a r e  -.re:-y 
cost ly  ana iiot required by ASF. 
essent ia l ly  wasted when use3  for  A 5 F  purposes  r a the r  than f o r  
col l r  .ting s o l a r  physics data,  
4. _ _  
SSO instrgimentation is 
5 . The SSO experiments  ought to a l l  be flown 
the ve ry  l a rge  visible region te lescope;  the combined pzylosd 
cannot a l l  fit i n  a single Sortie 
a g:oup including 
nd r each  500 kni (27Onmlj. 
6. The loca l  t ime of ascendinp ~ o d ~ '  dcce;>table to the SSO (maxi- 
mum. sunlit  orbit) in a 55 dp .ciiner? orb i t  is only one of 
s e v e r a l  o rb i t s  the ASF would Iik: to J t i l i ze  in RuSsequent 
miss ions .  
of these is compatible with the  SSO. 
If given a life expe.::ancy c l  six miss ions ,  only one 
C. THE MODIFIELD ATMOSPHERIC tc' ENCES FACILITY 
In l ine with the philosophy expres sed  by the r epor t  of tb.e Atmospheric  
and Spqce Sciences working grcup, (Ref. 201 the  scdpe of t h  
to include =ctive experimentation with the environment,  m o r e  emphas i s  on 
solar-terrestrial relationships,  and provision fo r  monitoring s t r a tosphe r i c  
and m e s o q h e r i c  minor  consti tuents.  
ASF was  expanded 
The object ives  chosen f o r  -he expandea idmospi ie r ic  Scier-ce Faci l i ty  
a A e  as fol!ows: 
1. Estab:ished the 2ffects of s , 'ar  var iabi l i ty  as a function 
of w ~ ~ , a l e n g t h  
Pliotoicnization r a t e s  
Photodissociation r a t e s  
I',mlperature and resul tant  chcmica i  qui l ibr ium 
cl!angca: e. g . ,  0 ion r'ens?t:r 3 
2. Establ i sh  remote  sensing techniques including the  addition 
of a ver t ica l  component tz  aatell i te da ta  
Cor-,position dnd i t s  var iabi l i ty  
A,rcsbls 
Pollutants 
183 
3. Investigate active chemistry with the upper atmosphere 
Determine the exited-state popuLation of the 
Determine the role played by minor constituents in 
ambient atmosphere 
the chemical equilibrium 
4. Determine diffusion rates 
Establish the eddy diffusion cmcept  on a firm 
Establish the facts about local contamination around 
Establish the s ize  and dynamics of the spacecraft 
experimental basis 
a manned spacecraft 
wake, bowshock, etc. 
In order  to accomplish these objectives, instrumentation has been 
added to the ASF as listed in Table 5 - 5 .  
the slave satellite which permits simultaneous "in situ" measurements with 
its own instrumentation and absorption, resonant scatter,  o r  emission 
measurements with the Sortie Lab instrumentation. 
evaluation of the possible contaminant cloud surrounding the Sortie, the 
effect of the Sortie wake, etc. The slave Satellite, which ca r r i e s  both 
corner  reflectors and laser detectors, can also be used for  absorption 
measurements between itself and the Sortie Lab independent of the so la r -  
zenith angle. 
Atmosphere Explorer C spacecraft (Figure 5-1). 
plasma lab Sortie studies also contemplate use of a slave satellite. 
The most important departure is 
This permits a real 
The basic model of the slave adopted for  this study is the 
It should be noted that the 
The other instrumentation worth special note is the Light Detection 
and Ranging (LIDAR) unit which is a l a se r  utilized for  studies of aerosol 
scattering. With the LIDAR and the UV l aser ,  i t  is likely that remote 
sensing of lower atmospheric pollutants and minor constituents can be 
studied. 
It is not the purpose of this report to define the instrumentation in 
detail but rather to a s ses s  the requirements that a Sortie payload places on 
an integration facility and on orbital operations. Therefore, the modified 
Atmospheric Sciences Facility is not developed further. 
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D. INTEGRATION A T  A SORTIE CENTER 
The concept of the Sort ie  payload sys t em is that as a universa l  
Sort ie  L a b  module and pallet  become available a t  an  integrat ion cen te r  
(probably a launch s i te ) ,  a pre-bui l t ,  tes ted,  qualified, and ca l ibra ted  group 
of instrur- ients  at  the integration s i t e  is ready for  mating to the pallet. 
in terface is a s imple  design with no complex alignment p rocedures  required.  
The packages and the operat ions required to in tegra te  them onto the 
The 
Sortie Lab pallet a r e  l is ted in Table 5 - 6 .  
based  upon actual  operat ion t imes  and do not include possible  delays between 
oDerations due Lo scheduling of peoplr ,  documentation, quality a s s u r a n c e  
checks,  o r  on-the-job training. An iri;:case of 50 percent  i n  t ime  is s o m e -  
t imes  ,-equired, depending upon the concsi.; f o r  and operat ional  philosophy of 
the mantgement  2 roup. 
they are 1-a: , -d ort eiurrent experience uncrating and checking existing sa te l l i t e  
instrumentat ion,  
Lab is a r ez~b~nab l :*  es t imate  based on design expectations.  
that  th i s  operation could take much longer  i f  the  in te r face  cabling design 
w e r e  not careful ly  worked out in  advance. 
conser-rative for a Sort ie  Lab  integrat ion a f te r  the p rocess  has  become 
routine. 
The man-hour  e s t ima tes  are 
The operat ional  t imes  l isted are considered rea l i s t ic ;  
j ’ t r l  t ime  required fo r  installation of consoles  in  the Sort ie  
It  is possible  
The t imes  indicated should be 
E. ORBITAL OPERATIONS 
A series of typical exper iments  has been blocked out fo r  the purpose 
of helping the sys t ems  des igner  understand what the  sc ien t i s t  would l i k e  to 
do. 
by a sc ien t i s t  and /o r  a highly t ra ined  technician. 
es t imated  a t  200 hours  ove r  the 6-day period. The t ime l ines  a r e  shown in  
F igu re  5-2 ,  and they a r e  tight f o r  two men because the average  work  day is 
16.5 hours.  
The ope ra to r  duties in Table  5-7 are  d e s c n  bed a s  i f  they w e r e  per formed 
The total  work  t ime  is 
This  tight scheduling is based on a number of observations:  
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1. Scientists spend very long hours in the laboratory when exciting 
experiments are reaching fruition. 
change character  arld work an eight-hour day on a seven-dav 
the consoles during their  waking hours. 
This mission profile is presumed to be a f i r s t  o r  survey ASF 
mission in which many techniques will be tested for future 
development where legitimate and useful data for scientific 
purposes a r e  also obtained. 
It is not l ike ly  they will 
mission, and it is equally unlikely theycould be taken -.' . .-lTp* 
2. 
3. Each of the instruments is sufficiently automated that the 
scientist must  spend most  of his t ime in monitoring data, in 
quick analysis, and in selecting detailed modes of operation. 
He should not be required to manually operate equipment 
normally. Therefore,  t ime for  eating, coffee breaks,  etc. is 
available within the allotted t ime elements, and experience 
shows that many meals  a r e  taken a t  the d e s k  o r  in the labora- 
tory during intense data-recording runs. 
The addition o f .  third man would reduce the average work day to 
11 hours. 
other two and provide a third party to discuss data which can be very bene- 
ficial. 
possible. 
He would also be useful to relieve some of the s t ra in  f rom the 
The t ime lines shown should be considered the maximum schedule 
The operations listed a r e  not necessarily those f o r  an actual flight, 
but they should be useful to the system analyst in understanding the potential 
des i res  of orbiting scientists who may be expected to approach problems 
somewhat differently than astronauts. 
F. GROUND OPERATIONS 
The upper level integration flow cycle for  the Shuttle, Sortie Lab, 
and experiment is shown in Figure 5-3. 
Sortie experiment s tar ta t  the lead center  and end after landing and removal 
of the equipment. The operatione where the experiment will interface with 
the Sortie Lab occur during experiment installation, orbital operations, and 
experiment removal. The experiment interfaces with the Sortie Lab, and 
the Sortie Lab interfaces with the Orbiter. The orbital configuration of the 
modified ASF is shown in Figure 5-4, and the experiment equipment l ist  is 
shown i n  Table 5 - 9 ,  
The ground operations fo r  the 
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The lead center se rves  as the starting and focal point for  all of the 
experiment equipment. Individual instruments and their controls will a r r ive  
from manufacturers, research agencies, o r  other sources. The lead center 
can mount the instruments in the appropriate gimballed main assembly and 
their  controls in the control consoles. 
attached to the Sortie Lab Module standard fittings. 
ment can be physically mocked up in the flight configuration. 
data collection and storage system, the electn cal  power, and environmental 
control systems should be available for integration checkout. 
electrical harnesses  should be fabricated and certified. 
properties data can be determined i f  required. 
should be aligned, the calibration established, and a complete performance 
verification conducted with the Sortie Lab. It was assumed that the experi- 
ment is capable of performing on-orbit calibration so that ground calibration 
at the launch site would not be required. 
The control consoles wi l l  then be 
All experiment equip- 
The Sortie Lab 
Interconnecting 
Preliminary mass 
The experiment equipment 
Upon completion of the lead center operation, the experiment equip- 
ment would be disassembled to the main assembly level as  listed in Table 
5-8 for shipment to the launch site. 
For  integration of the experiment equipment with the Sortie Lab 
at the launch site, the installation of the instrument assemblies on the pallet 
and the control consoles in the Sortie Lab module should be done simultaneous 
ly  on a no-interference basis. 
should be planned serially as should the pallet installation activities. 
this approach, the operational sequence and t i m  lines for the experiment 
installation and checkout operaticzs a r e  shown in Figure 5 - 5  for the Sortie 
Lab module and in Figure 5-6 for the pallet. It can be seen that about nine 
single-shift working days are required. The checkout t imes shown include 
verification of the interface to the data collection and storage equipment of 
the Sortie Lab module. 
However, work in the Sortie Lab module 
Using 
The checkout of support equipment items is defined a s  end-to-end 
type verification where known signals a r e  inputted and the outputs a r e  
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monitored. 
should be the m o s t  efficient approach. 
position the a s sembl i e s  will  be required.  
are foreseen.  
557m (6000 ft ) that  have been identified in  Reference 21 .  An overhead 
c r a n e  of 907-kg (2-ton) capacity with a c l e a r  hook height of 9. I m  (30 ft)  
should be adequate. 
A spec ia l  t e s t  console (built and checked a t  the lead cen te r )  
Special handling equipment to 
No unusual facil i ty requi rements  
Faci l i ty  floor space  needs for integration would be met by the  
2 2 
The expendables and serv ic ing  items a r e  conceived to  be: 
1. 
2. 
3. 1 roll  of film fo r  each  UV documentation c a m e r a  
4. One LNZ bottle 
40 ro l l s  of Polaroid f i lm 
10 ro l l s  of s t r ip-char t  r e c o r d e r  paper  
on the gene ra l  purpose spectroscopy unit 
The f i r s t  t h r e e  i t e m s  can be s to red  during the integration activity. 
bottle should be instal led ju s t  p r i o r  to install ing the Sortie L a t  to the Orbi te r .  
The L N Z  
The personnel  for th i s  operat ion are  two c r e w s  of t w 3  technicians 
each: one c r e w  fo r  control  console installation in the  Sortie Lab  module and 
the second for ins t rument  installation on the pallet. It is expected that  four:  
m e n  would be augmented by the miss ion  and payload spec ia l i s t s  who would 
assist in checkout act ivi t ies  and problem resolution. 
seven, intimately familiar with the experiment  equipment and a s s i s t ed  by 
launch-base personnel ,  is anticipated. No fu r the r  ground operat ions devoted 
to verifying exper iments  which are planned p r i o r  to  launch. 
Thus,  a total  c r ew of 
After re turn  f m m  orb i t ,  the  Sort ie  Lab i s  removed f rom the Orbi te r  
~ ? c l  t r a n s f e r r e d  to the payload facil i ty for  removal  of the exper iment  
equipment. 
ment  equipment removal  as for integration. 
expected to be s i m i l a r  in  that work will  be done concurrent ly  on the pallet  and 
in  the Sort ie  Lab  module. 
same as the mechanical  installation t ime (with no checkout). 
the time required for removal  of the experiment  equipment is five working 
days,  sequenced and t imed as shown i n  F igure  5-7. 
The facil i ty and personnel  requi rements  a r e  the s a m e  for  experi- 
Operat ions for removal  are 
The removal  t ime  is expected to be about the 
On this  basis, 
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G. SORTIE PAYLOAD CAPABILITY 
The combination of the Solar Shuttle Observatory and the Atmospheric 
Science Facility was determined to be incompatible because the two Sortie 
missions are not mutually supporting, have different orbital  requirements, 
and interfere with one another's operation. 
incompatible, it was necessary to develop a model Sortie payload for  the 
study. 
incorporate more  recent research requirements. 
modified version was provided in the scientific orbital  operations for  use in 
modeling a standard mission. 
Since these payloads were  
For  this model, the Atmospheric Science Facility was modified to 
The description of the 
The modified Atmospheric Science Facility representing the 
standard mission w a s  found to be operationally compatible with the existing 
definition of the Sortie Lab (Ref. 22) and Space Shuttle (Ref.  23). 
operational comparison of the Shuttle and Sortie Lab capabilities and the 
experiment requirements a r e  summarized in Table 5- 9. The resulting 
compatibility appears due to the nature of the equipment design concept. 
provide this compatibility, the experiment equipment should include the 
following design features: 
An 
To 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. Minimum servicing and expendables 
Experiment hardware interfaces with the Sortie Lab only 
On-o rbit alignment and calibration capability 
Experiments delivered assembled a t  the launch s i te  i n  flight- 
ready condition 
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APPENDIX A. STRUCTURAL DESIGN 
This appendix i s  an attempt to generate general design c r i te r ia  
and guidelines for  lowcos t  flightworthy structure in t e rms  of design safety 
factors by a rational approach which maintains adequate s t ructurzl  integrity. 
I t  i s  primarily a discussion on promising alternatives to procedures which 
are now almost traditional io r  weight-optimized s t ructure  development. 
this form, it is intended to stimulate fur ther  cost reduction thinking when 
applied to specific designs to be developed by particular engineering and 
fabrication facilities. 
In 
The diversity of current  viewpoints on the actual utility of sa fe ty  
factors and the proper numerical  values which a re  appropriate for  any par-  
t icular mission will prevent unanimous agreement on any recommended 
values. 
therefore recognized a s  being somewhat arbi t rary,  reflecting the judgment 
and experience of The Aerospace Corporation. They are intended as start ing 
point values to be modified as low-cost experience i s  gained o r  a s  other 
data becomes available. 
The recommended safety factors resulting from this analyris a r e  
Results of this effort a r e  a lso summarized in Appendix B in a form 
famil iar  to potential hardware developers. 
mater ia l  supplied for imlusion in the work statement f o r  a number of DOD 
programs and is in the form of sample general s t ructural  design c r i te r ia .  
The c r i te r ia  a r e  intended to form the basis of and provide direction for  
the detailed c r i te r ia  to be developed by the structure subsystem developer. 
This appendix i s  typical of 
A. ASSUMPTIONS 
It i s  assumed that the requirements for safety and reliability of the 
payload structural  subsystem do not decrease for Shuttle-launched payloads. 
Considerations of Shuttle and personnel safety alone require that the payload 
be designed to prevent damage o r  injury. 
(the characterist ic which is defined here  a s  performing an intended function) 
Payload structural  reliability 
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also must  be maintained throughout the specified design life due to the im- 
practicability of performing on-orbit spaceframe repairs.  
that i t  is not cost effective tc  purposely design structure to a specific failure 
rate hecause of the Shuttle t r i p  costs.  
design goals of no performance degradation, rupture, o r  ccllapse during 
design life at limit load and the requirement to demonstrate the existence of 
specified design safety factors by tes t  or  appropriate analysis. 
It i s  assumed 
These assumptions a r e  reflected in 
It is a basic premise that safety factors do not attempt to allow for  
overloading o r  any other anomalous environmental condition. If performance 
margins  are necessary o r  desirable, appropriate adjusixients should be made 
to  the specified limit o r  design conditions. 
The following development also leads to the implicit assumption that 
the purpose of design safety factors is to account f o r  differences in strength 
capability between tes t  and flight hardware. 
is not test-verified, safety factors must  be increased to encompass unavoid- 
able uncertainly in analytical strength prediction. 
In the case of s t ructure  which 
B. ANALYSIS 
1. GENERAL 
To explore the cost  reduction potential associated with ove r-designed 
structure, 
currently applied by the aircraf t  and aerospace industries. 
share  the requirements placed on Htructure of extremely high reliability and 
safety, because of the very high costs  associated with failure, and minimum 
practical  weight, because of relatively high transportation costs.  These 
requirements have been m e t  quite successfully through development and 
inspection programs which involve extensive analysis effort, complex fab- 
rication methods, rigorous quality specifications, and static tes t  qualification. 
Expensive, but cost  effective, structure i s  the result. 
it is illustrative to first examine the function of safety factors  as 
These industries 
If transportation costs  become less sensitive to weight, as with 
Shuttle-launched payloads, i t  is possible that a heavier structure may  be 
designed which i s  l oue r  in cost. There a r e  two basic ways that this type 
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of cos t  reduction m a y  be acccmplished: by under-optimization a n d / o r  by 
over-design. 
independent approaches  to cos t  reduction. 
over-  de signed s t ruc tu re  . 
It is important  to recognize that these a r e  a lmos t  totally 
This  study p r imar i ly  a d d r e s s e s  
2. UNDER - OPTIMI ZA TION 
Relaxation of weight cons t ra in ts  immediately sugges ts  that  the 
design and fabi-ication effor t  assoc ia ted  with weight optimization be reduced 
or even eliminated. 
have been adequately reported in  the l i t e r a tu re .  
is the use  of less efficient s t ruc tu ra l  m a t e r i a l s  (IC 
p e r  unit of load-carrying capability) and eliminatio 
in lower s t r e s s e d  regions of each  s t ruc tu ra l  e lement  (less machixing, chem- 
mill ing,  lightening holes,  e tc . ) .  Additional cos t  savings are r-alized 
through assoc ia ted  reductions in  ana lys i s  complexity, d e v e l o - p e n t  tes t ing 
of exotic materials, problems with flaw sensi t ivi ty  of highly tempered  
me ta l s ,  and so on. 
tion a r e  d i r ec t  t r a d e s  of c o s t  and weight and do not general ly  improve safe ty  
o r  reliabil i ty.  
Most  of these  cost-avcidance zrsas are obvious and 
T-r-: -a1 ol' these  approaches 
:est, higher  weight 
-.ate rial removal  
All of the  cos t  savings in  the ca tegory  of under-optimiza- 
3. OVER-DESIGN 
Over-designed s t ruc tu re  involves a genera l  i nc rense  in  s t rength 
by increas ing  the s i ze  of load-car ry ing  s t ruc tu ra l  e lements .  One ra t ional  
way of allocating e x t r a  m a t e r i a l  through the e t ruc ture  is by the applicatic- 
of increased  fac tors  of sa fe ty ,  This  approach will i nc rease  hardv.. .re L ~ S ;  
and weight but offers potential ove ra l l  cos t  savings by reduciqg deveiopment 
c o s t s  assoc ia ted  with qualification analysis  and test. For example,  if 
safety factors are made  sufficiently high, i t  m a y  be possible to e l iminate  
s ta t ic  tes t ing completely without sacr i f ic ing reliabil i ty and safety. 
media te  safety f ac to r s  may allow simplif ied testing. The potential savings 
assoc ia ted  with over-designed s t ruc tu re  can only be determined by detailed 
cos t  ana lys i s  of a pa r t i cu la r  design; however, a feeling for t i i s  potential m a y  
be obtained f rom a s imple  considerat ion of approximate cos t a ,  
Inter-  
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Struc tura l  subsys tem weight for lightweight payioads approxi- 
I r y  large ma te ly  15 - 20 percent  of the  total  payload weight. 
satel l i te  in the 5, 000-kg (11, 000-lb) category,  a yield fac tor  . $ t  :;afety of 
th ree  could be achieved for less than a (0.2)(5,000)(3- 1) -. 2, Q33-kg (4,400-lb) 
i nc rease .  
a l loys) ,  a $4, 000 investment  of fe rs  the possibil i ty J f  e l iminat ing a s ta t ic  
tes t  and test hardware  cost ing $100,000 - $200,000. 
t raded  whatever  additio,,,l effort i a  required,  perha2s  engineer ing analysis .  
Even for 
At a materi; I cos t  of less tkan $42. ifO/kg ($0. %/lb) ( a l * m i n u m  
Against th i s  m u s t  be 
It is apparent  that  to continue this  type of est imat ion it '.s n e c e s s a r y  
to  de te rmine  fac tors  of safety which will al iow th is  o r  o the r  approaches  to 
s t ruc tu re  qualification. It is also n e c e s s a r y  t o  define m o r e  accura te ly  the 
requi rements  piaced on ana lys i s  and quality control  by this approach,  
par t icu lar ly  i f  they differ  f rom c u r r e n t  requi rements  for :est-qualified 
lightweight s t ruc tu re .  
of safe ty  fac tors ,  as now utilized, i s  necessa ry .  
To this  end, an  undersranding of the real function 
4. SAFETY FACTOR UTILITY 
Examination of the inten6:d function of safety f ac to r s  n e c e s s a r y  
for a n  understanding of t h e i r  re la t ionship to tes t ing,  quality control ,  and 
ana lys i s  is difficult because of the many  in te rpre ta t ions  cu r ren t ly  popular  
within the industry.  
o rgan iza t im  as to  the function of safety fac tors .  
ana lys t s  cons ide r  t h e i r  purpose i s  to cove r  ignorance a n d / o r  e r r o r  in an 
a s so r tmen t  of a r e a s  including hazard ,  load uncertainty,  m a t e r i a l  un- 
cer ta in ty ,  p r o c e s s  var ia t ions,  and ana lys i s  inaccurac ies .  Insight ; T I ~ O  
the  actual  role of safe ty  f a c t o r s  m a y  still be gained, however,  by examining 
one of the s e v e r a l  ra t ional  design approaches  now being used. 
approach, f rom a weight, schedule,  and reliabi1ir.y standpoint involvas the 
following basic  tasks:  
The re  is seldom agreement  even within a s ingle  
Various des igne r s  and 
An ideal  
a. Establ ish upper-bound loads including dynamic loading 
effects  ( l imit  loading) 
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b. De temine  upper-bound cr i t ical  s t resses  for limit loads 
and ultimate loads (product cf limit load and safety f ac tod  
(This may be accomplished through a combination of rigorous 
analysis, conservative assumptions, and experimental analysis. ) 
Size each stzuctural element using lower-bound element 
capability so that yielding does not occur below limit load 
aad rupture does not occur  below ultimate load. (Performance 
of this task presumes a knowledge of minimum mater ia l  and 
assembly quality based on purchase specifications, process 
control, and inspection.) 
Qualify the design by applying l imit  and ultimate loads to a 
prototype structure 
Control the quality of all subsequent units to a level consistent 
with the specified design safety factors. 
c. 
d. 
e. 
Figure A- 1 i s  a simple illustration of the variables involved in a deterministic 
establishment of safety and reliability. 
loads and load-carrying capability which have been normalized to limit 
loads. As such, they are safety factors by definition. Yield and ultimate 
factors of safety are shown in four general categories: those specified as 
design requirements, those theoretically attainable, those actually present 
in fabricated structure,  and those which are demonstrated by static test. 
The xange in theoretical safety factors is the result  of expected variations 
in strength of the actual design where the upper l imits correspond to 
"perfect" fabrication from mate rials which happen to have upper-bound 
strength characterist ics.  The lower l imits correspond to the minimum 
strength which could result within the adopted mater ia l  specifications, 
fabrications, fabrication methods, process controls, and inspection require- 
ments. Theoretical safety factors a r e  a characterist ic of the design and 
i t s  quality specification only and a r e  not directly affected by any strength 
analysis which is conducted. If the design is based on analysis, however, 
an inadequate design may result from analytical e r r o r s .  
factors are a characterist ic of specific hardware and the conformance of 
quality control to quaiity specification. 
conducted rigorously, as would be necessary for weight efficiency, several  
fundamental relationships may be deduced from the figure. 
The ordinates plotted a r e  applied 
Actual safety 
If the previous design tasks  are 
' 5  
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Figure A- 1.  Ideal Lightweight, Test-Qualified Design/ 
Safety Factor Relationships 
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A successfu l  l imit  and ult imate load t e s t  of the prototype es tab l i shes  
the load-car ry ing  capabili ty possible with that par t icu lar  design. 
a r t i c l e  i s  probably damaged by  the tes t ,  however, and i t s  subsequent utility 
as a flight article i s  not known. 
nornial ly  require  a dedicated tes t  a r t i c l e  to  ve r i fy  the design. 
The test 
Payloads designed to these  safety f ac to r s  
S t ruc tura l  capabi l i t ies  of each  untested flight s t ruc tu re  will be 
genera l ly  different, resul t ing in the ranges indicat ed.  
of these  ranges  is known only if t he re  is adequate quali ty control and 
conservat ive s t r e s s  analysis .  
l ished requi rements ;  some exceed these  requi rements  becduse of the appli-  
catii-n of conservat ive stress ana lys is  and ?he unavoidable var ia t ions in  
fabr ica ted  hardware .  In th i s  ideal  ca se ,  the real utility of a design safety 
f a c t o r  is s imply  to provide an  a r b i t r a r y ,  pre-specif ied e lement  of saiety 
i n  the event of overloading, without necessa r i ly  contributing t o  reliabil i ty.  
It does  not compensate  for uncertainty in liniit load determinat ion,  quality 
control ,  or  s t r e s s  analysis .  
is higher  than required,  but by an amount which is not known. Th i s  is 
ce r t a in ly  a des i r ab le  feature ,  and if the family is l a rge  enough, i t  may 
be possible to s ta t i s t ica l ly  evaluate  the consequences of errors o r  anomal ies  
i n  determinat ion of l imit  loads. Nevertheless ,  th i s  additional safety i s  
the resu l t  of material and p rocess  var ia t ions and design conservaf i sm 
r a t h e r  than the application of safety fac tors .  
The lower  bound 
This  family of s t r u c t u r e s  m e e t s  the es tab-  
The mean  safety and reliabil i ty f o r  the family 
Turn ins  away now frnm ide31istic s i t u ~ t i z ~ s ,  it  is pwssibie to 
a r r i v e  at the re lat ionship shown in F igure  A-2 through a combination of 
the select ion of an  upper-bound s t ruc tu re  for tes t ,  inadequate quality 
control ,  a n d / o r  s t r e s s  ana lys i s  errors. 
be the best  of the family (quite possible with prototype hardware) ,  the 
design requi rements  are not m e t  except for the test a r t i c l e ,  and th i s  
fact  will not be known prior to  flight. A h i s  si tuation a r i s e s  e i t h e r  because 
the  upper-bcund s t r e s s  was  under-determined or  because the lower-bound 
capabi l i ty  was over-s ta ted,  but the cnd resu l t  i s  the same. 
If the tes t  a r t i c l e  happened t o  
1-erforniance 
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dcprada t ion  nl.iy rt.sult in va ry ing  dt-gretss i n  c r i t i c a l  flight s t r i  c t u r e  
a l ignment .  T h e r e  will  ex is t  an  unknown, r rducvd clcnic.nt of safe ty .  I! 
even  mort. s e r i o u s  e r r o r s  ex i s t  in the ana lys i s ,  +h i s  will b txonie  appa ren t  
th rough t e s t  f a i lu re ,  and c o r r e c t i v e  des ign  modi f ica t ions  will be r equ i r ed .  
F ina l ly ,  i f  triore s e r i o u s  qual i ty  con t ro l  l a p s e s  occur,  i t  is poss ib le  to 
unknowlnglb h r r i v r  a t  a state shown i n  Figiirt. A-3  where  haza r "+us  <light 
i n i l u r e s  will  occu:. 
T h e r e  a r e  m a n y  o t h e r  considrraiic:;:; ;:\ .he actua! -I - -?elopmt*nt and  
qual i f icat ion of fl ight ha rdwarc  such  a s  o t k  : t.?ivi &-onmental t l f f rc ts ,  l ife 
r equ i r emen t s ,  component  t e s t s .  e t c .  It i s  bthlievrd, however ,  that  thc 
following gene ra l  conclus ions  n i ay  be drawn f o r  wei. ht-opt imized s t r u c t u r e :  
a. Flight  s t r u c t u r e  sa fe ty  ( the abi l i ty  to sus t a in  l imi t  l oads  
without rupture  o r  collapstb) i s  es tab l i shed  by thc des ign  
u l t imate  safe ty  f ac to r ,  prutotypta tl-st to  u l t imate  load, and 
qual i ty  con t ro l  which i n s u r e s  that all s t r u c t u r e s  art' a t  
1tBast 80 percent  a s  capable  a s  the prototype.  
F l igh t  structurtx re l iab i l i ty  ( t h e  abi l i ty  to  p e r f o r n i  i t s  in -  
tendtad function in tht. des ign  cnvi ronment )  i s  a function 
of the  prototype t e s t ,  degret .  of conservaLism o r  e r r o r  
in  thc s t r u c t u r a l  ana lys i s ,  and qual i ty  con t ro l  level .  S o m e  
dcgrada t ion  in p e r f o m i a n c c  niny r e su l t  f r o m  e i t h e r  uncon- 
st ' rvative ana lys i s  or inadequate  qual i ty  cont ro l .  
i s  es ta ' j l ishcd only if a l l  flight s t r u c t u r e  is the same a s ,  
o r  bettc.r than, tht. t e s t  a r t i c l e .  For tuna te ly ,  va r i a t ions  
i n  yield capabi l i ty  a r t '  usua l ly  m u c h  less than v' ir iations 
i n  ultimatt. capabi l i ty ,  
m i n o  - yic!ding of p r i m a r y  s t r u c t u r e ,  and evcn  a l ignment -  
c r i t i ca l  payloads can  tole ratt: loca l  yielding with only m i n o r  
e f fec t  o n  m i s s i o n  qual i ty .  
relativtbly s m ~ l l  yield f a c t o r s  of safe ty  (1.0 to  1 .  1) a r e  
used .  
within to le rab lc  l in i i t s  by t c s t  and qual i ty  con t ro l .  C o n s e r -  
vat ive des ign  an ' t lysis  will s o n i c t i m e s  conlpensa tc  f o r  poor  
qual i ty  and will  enhance  re l iab i l i ty  at  the expense  of weight, 
but sonit' c o n s c  rva t i sm cannot  be specif ied quant i ta t ively 
o r  eva lua ted ,  ana lys i s  i s  not a definable con t r ibu to r  to 
re l iab i l i ty .  Unconsc rva t i sm in  thti ana lys i s  m a y  lowcr  
m i s s i o n  qual i ty  but not below acceptab le  l in i i t s .  
e r r o r s  which would r e su l t  i n  unacceptable  p e r f o r m a n c e  a re  
de tec ted  by prototype t c s t s .  
b. 
Reliabi l i ty  
Most  payloads art' not a f fcc t rd  by 
It i s  f o r  t h e s e  r e a s o n s  that 
It is then concluded that  re l iab i l i ty  is cstab1isht.d 
Analys is  
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c .  
d.  
Tes t ing  es tab l i shes  the safety and reliabil i ty of the design. 
Quality control  es tab l i shes  the safety and rel iabi l i ty  of the 
untested flight hardware ,  and m u s t  be consis tent  with the 
safety f ac to r s  utilized. 
Analysis has  only a m i n o r  and undeterminable effect  on 
safe ty  and reliabil i ty.  I t s  p r i m a r y  function i s  to speed 
convergence of the design by el iminat ing e x c e s s  weight 
and avoiding t e s t  fa i lures ,  thereby reducing the develop- 
men t  schedule.  
and l imit  load determinat ion,  however, for complex s t ruc tu re  
governed by iner t ia l  response  to t rans ien t  events .  
in  the developmer!t o r  qualification for the payload s t ruc tu re  
t o  sustain overloading. 
Safety fac tors  for  lightweight s t ruc tu re  contribute t o  safety 
but not reliabil i ty ( s ince  the yield fac tor  i s  1 .0)  and do no t  
compensate  for e r r o r s  i n  the design ana lys i s ,  l imit  load 
determinat ion,  o r  quality control .  
Andlysis e r r o r s  lead to test f a i lu re s .  
Quality control  e r r o r s  lead to flight fa i lures .  
e. 
Analysis may be required f o r  t e s t  planning 
i .  Accurate  l imit  loads are essent ia l .  There  i s  no allowance 
g. 
h. 
1. 
In general ,  then, i t  i s  seen  that 2 Drough tea t  p rogram and r igorous quality 
cont ro l  a r e  essent ia l  to hardware  qualification. 
p r e p a r e  m o r e  o r  less r igorous design ana lyses  to prevent  schedule problems 
and possibly for o the r  reasons  not d i rec t ly  re la ted to schedule o r  quality 
control.  
in &nese th ree  a r e a s  of effort  m a y  be examined: analysis ,  t e s t ,  and quality 
control .  
upper  bounds cer ta in ly  ex is t ,  and i t  is t h e s e  values  and ihe cor responding  
requi rements  which are  of i n t e re s t .  
Most organizat ions a l s o  
A s  safety f ac to r s  and \\-eight are increased ,  potential reductions 
The re  a r e  probably optimum values of design safety fac tor  and 
5. INCREASED SAFETY FACTORS 
If safe ty  f a c t o r s  are inc reased  above the values  cu r ren t ly  uti l ized 
f o r  lightweight expendable payloads and o ther  development and qualification 
procedures  remain unchanged, t he re  will be an  inc rease  in weight and in 
assoc ia ted  cos t  for the e x t r a  ma te r i a l .  
in improved safety and rel iabi l i ty  (the s t ruc tu re  will be safe  and reliable,  
for design loads as well as loading above l imit  load) or ,  a l ternat ively,  will 
Any inc rease  in s t rength  will resu l t  
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al low l a r g e r  s t rength deviations between the t e s t  and flight s t ruc tu res .  
If i t  is a s sumed  that limit loads for the Shuttle are adequately known by 
whatever  m e a n s  are  required,  t he re  i s  no pa r t i cu la r  need for an improve-  
ment  in  safety and reliabil i ty.  The possibil i ty then exists of reducing the 
effort normal ly  devoted to controll ing s t rength  scatter; namely,  the speci-  
f ication of close drawing to le rances  on dimensions and s t ra ightness  and 
rigid specifications on procurement ,  p r o c e s s  control ,  and inspection. 
Lumping th is  effort into the ca tegory  of quality control ,  F igu re  A-4 shows 
the relat ionship between prototype-demonstrated safety factor and allowable 
s t rength  scatter t o  prevent  fa i lure  of untested flight hardware  at l imit  load. 
F igure  A-4 also shows that cons iderable  reduction in  quality 
cont ro l  effort can be obtained with modes t  weight i nc reases .  
an  ul t imate  f ac to r  of safe ty  of 2 i n c r e a s e s  the s t ruc tu re  weight by less 
than 60 percent  (going from F.S. = 1.25 to 2 . 0 0 )  and the sa te l l i t e  weight 
by less than 12 percent  aepending on s t ruc tu re  type) while increas ing  the 
the allowable s t rength s c a t t e r  by 150 percent  (from 0 . 2  to 0.5). It would 
appear that a s s u r i n g  quali ty of only 50 percent  of perfect  would involve 
v e r y  min ima l  effor t  compared  to  that cu r ren t ly  exe r t ed  to  obtain 80 percent  
quality. 
For example, 
The cu rve  in F igu re  A-4 also appl ies  to yield f ac to r s  of safety,  
except  that  control  of yield or  deflection r equ i r e s  even less quality control .  
Prototype test-qualified s t r u c t u r e s  thus appea r  to offer a promis ing  tradeoff 
between weight and quality control  effort .  This  is a t rade  which should be 
considered by the spacecraf t  cont rac tor ,  based on h i s  knowledge of c u r r e n t  
costs and considerat ion of a l t e rna te  techniques which will a s s u r e  quality, 
but within l a r g e r  bounds. 
In addition to inc reased  weight and potentially lower  quali ty cont ro l  
cos t s ,  t he re  will be o the r  assoc ia ted  changes which a l so  requi re  cons idera-  
tion. Tes t  act ivi ty  will remain  the s a m e  as  f o r  lightweight s t ruc tu re  except  
that  l a r g e r  loads,  consis tent  with the higher  safety f ac to r s ,  m u s t  be applied. 
Design analysis ,  for whatever  purpose i t  is normal ly  done, is not i nc reased  
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3.0 
2 .0  
1.2 
1.0 
L Attainable by current quality control 
Allowable ultimate strength deviation between test article 
and untested flight articles. 
Figure A-4. Prototype Test-Qualified Structure 
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o r  decreased in scope. 
each contractor to determine new procedures in procurement and inspection 
to provide consistent quality a t  a lower level. There will also be a slight 
increase in the cost  of fabricating and joining heavier structure as well a s  
a potential for  nominal schedule improvement related to simplified procure- 
ment and inspection. 
There will be a non-recurring effort required for 
This approach does not imply that care lessness  i s  now more 
tolerable. 
l imits  on dimensions, mater ia l  flaws, and workmanship quality. A side 
benefit of fewer rejected p a r t s  and less salvage activity will also be realized. 
It mere ly  allows simplified techniques by increasing acceptable 
A second cos the igh t  trade becomes possible when both yield and 
ultimate factors a re  increased to a level somewhat above 1.25, if it  is also 
required that no s t ructural  yield or  damage result  af ter  application of tes t  
loads. The required design and tes t  factors must  be determined by con- 
sideration of cyclic loading and life requirements so that the test  demon- 
s t ra tes  a factor of safety of 1.25 af ter  the test  cycle. This approach wi l l  
provide a step reduction in program cost  by allowing flight of the tes t  item. 
Flight use of the tes t  art icle will require that the tes t  be sufficiently 
instrumented to detect any permanent reduction in capability. An increased 
dependence on the design analysis may  be required to identify cr i t ical  a r eas  
for instrumentation. Post-test  inspection will be required, and special 
considerations a r e  necessary so that loads may be a. died without alteration 
of the s t ructural  design. Cost benefits will be approxim-:iely $45.00/kg 
($20/lb) for fabricated aluminum payload structure,  l e s s  any additional 
teet  and analysis cost. 
These two approaches, reduced quality control and re-use of the 
tes t  art icle,  may be combined. Doing so suggests another possible economy: 
testing to a level above the 1.25 limit but below the design value. 
reduce tes t  failures associated with design e r r o r s ,  a benefit whose worth 
must  be evaluated by each particular design organization based on their  
t es t  experience and design confidence. 
This will 
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One-of-a-kind payloads would seem to benefit mos t  by such an 
under-test  approach, particularly where development schedules are short .  
Structural  safety and reliability for  programs with a single payload a r e  
not determined by quality control o r  analysis but by direct  demonstration. 
Ir, the preceding discussion, it i s  noted that confidence in the 
safety and reliability of the tes t  ar t ic le  is higher than for untested s t ructure  
by  removal of the reliance on quality control. 
o r  acceptance testing of each s t ructure  should be explored. 
normally associated with qualification t e s t s  would ahnost certainly result 
in  total cost  increas2 unless ways can be found to simplify acceptance tests.  
It would seem that the most  promising way of simplifying testing would 
involve changes to the basic s t ructural  design. 
to an enveloping test  condition rather  than flight conditions, for  example, 
i t  may  be possible to adequately test  some configurations by application of 
loads a t  a single point. The fitting to  accommodate these loads could also 
serve  as a convenient means of handling the payload, eliminating special 
handling fixtures. 
6. UNTESTED STRUCTURE 
Therefore, the possible proof 
The large cos ts  
If the s t ructure  i s  designed 
The relationships shown in Figures  A- 1 through A- 3 show clear ly  
the demands which a r e  placed on analytical effort in the absence of a 
s t ructural  test. 
lytical effort in the absence of a s t ructural  test .  
there  i s  a dependence on analytical and inspection thoroughness and accuracy 
which past tes t  experience has shown to be unacceptable. 
have studied the e r r o r  disclosure function of testing from a statist ical  
approach and have concluded generally that i s  i s  impractical  to  increase 
safety factors to a level necessary to achieve acceptably low service failures 
without a demonstration of capability. 
required safety factors of from about 4.0 to 11.0 (Ref.  A- 1) with some authors 
taking the position that only an infinite factor would suffice. 
value8 are clear ly  e i ther  impossible o r  economically infeasible for  complete 
F o r  low factors of safety there is a dependence on ana- 
For  low factors of safety 
Several authors 
Their results indicate a range in 
Any of these 
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a i r c r a f t  o r  aerospace  s y s t e m s  of cu r ren t  technology, except possibly in  
spec ia l  applications which are  not constrained by weight. Nevertheless ,  
a n  a t tempt  will s t i l l  be made  to  define no- tes t  safety f ac to r s  for Shuttle- 
launched payloads through an exami.iatinn of mitigating Shuttle cons idera-  
t ions and attaining contemporary  de te rminis t ic ,  r a the r  than 3a, levels  of 
per formance  and safety. 
Re-examination of F igu re  A-4 suggests  that  no-test  safety f ac to r s  
m a y  be determined i: a l l  of the uncertainty between predicted s t rength and 
ac tua l  s t rength is known. 
band in addition to  analytically based uncertainty,  which cons is t s  of: 
This  will involve the usual quality control  to le rance  
a .  Uncertainty of detailed s t r e s s e s  
b. Uncertainty of allowable s t r e s s e s  
c. Numerical  e r r o r .  
If these cannot be adequately bounded, t e s t s  will be required.  
Uncertainty of detailed s t r e s s  distribution i s  a function of s t ruc tu ra l  
configuration, and m a y  be controlled to  some extent by the analytical  r i go r  
applied. 
s t ruc tu ra l  complexity, depending on knowledge of boundary conditions, 
fa i lure  modes ,  and applicabili ty of available empir ica l  data. This  indicates  
that  design fac tor  of safety requi rements  for untested designs sho-dd depend 
p r i m  r i ly  on the relative complexity of the s t ruc tu ra l  forms and a s semblages  
uti l ized. 
Table A- 1 and reflected in the design c r i t e r i a  in Appendix B. 
ra t ings shown are subjective and m u s t  ul t imately be negotiated with the 
procuring agency responsible f o r  s t ruc tu re  qua1ifi:stion. 
and examples  of varying degrees  of complexity a r e  given in Appendix C 
for th i s  purpose.  
designed to inc rease  safety f ac to r s  if the s t ruc tu re  i s  s imple (amenable  to 
conservat ive anal.ysis) and if adequate analysis  i s  performed.  
complex s t ruc tu ra l  forms, higher  f ac to r s  a r e  required together  with m o r e  
comprehensive analysis .  
Uncertainty assoc ia ted  with allowable s t r e s s e s  i s  a l so  related to  
Recommended safety f ac to r s  for  var ious tes t  options a r e  given in 
The complexity 
A genera l  guide 
The ge,.eral philosophy allows the use  of untested s t ruc tu re  
F o r  m o r e  
There  a r e  some ve ry  complex s t ruc tu re  types 
A- Ib 
Table A- 1. Design Fac tors  of Safety and Test  Options 1 
VI Complex Structure or  
Qualification- Te sted De signs 
2 Dedicated Test  Article 
Flight Sample Test  Article 3 
Test  Required 
4 Ac c e ptanc e - Te s t e d De si gn s 
Development- Tested Structural  
Subassembly 
Dedicated Test  Article 
Flight Sample Test  Article 3 
5 Untested Designs o r  Subassemblies 
I Simple Structu-e 
II 
111 
IV 
V Moderately Complex Structure 
Yield 
1.00 
1.25 min 
1. 10 min 
1.00 
1.25 min 
1 .5  
1.9 
2 . 3  
2.7 
3.0 
U 1 t im a t e 
1.25 
1.25 min 
1. 10 min 
1.25 
1.25 min  
2.0 
2 .5  
3.0 
3.5 
4 . 0  
Test  Required 
1. A11 factors  presume rigorous quality control (80 percent of ideal). 
Relaxation of quality requires l a rge r  safety factors.  
2. Qualification testing implies the flight of a t  least  one untc?sted 
art icle.  
3. Test  loads mus t  be determi.ned from life requirements.  
4. Acceptance testing i s  performed on each flight ar t ic le .  Test  
loads mus t  be determined from life requirements.  
5. Untested s t ructure  requires  rigorous conservative s t r e s s  analysis. 
Complexity rating examples are given in Appendix C. 
Test  loads a r e  the same a s  design loads. 
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which will require  testing, in which c a s e  design safety f ac to r s  a r e  de te rmined  
f rom o the r  considerat ions prebiously d iscussed .  
affords  cost-  saving potential in development, fabrication, and the e l imi  ;ation 
of testing. 
Simplicity of design thus 
The recommended design safety fac tors  shown in Table A-1 a r e  
somewhat a r b i t r a r y  by necessi ty .  
with c u r r e n t  DOD prac t ice  which, together  with the  assoc ia ted  surveillanci- 
And ana lys i s  requi rements  impcsed on cont rac tors ,  has  produced adequate 
s t r u c t u r e .  
of over-est imat ion of loaci-c, r ry ing  capability, even with high ana lys i s  
s tandards  and independent review. It i s  felt ,  however,  that  the  f ac to r s  
proposed are sufficient to  cove r  these var ia t icns  i f  c u r r e n t  ana lys i s  s tandards  
a r e  maintained and an objective review procedure establ ished.  
Tes ted  design f ac to r s  a r e  cons is ten t  
The no-test  f ac to r s  acknowledge that  t he re  wili be some degree  
Refer r ing  again to F igure  A-4, i t  i s  seen that wlth c u r r e n t  quali ty 
control  technique?, t he re  will ex is t  an ad-litional a l l o w a x e  for analyt ical  
var ia t ions which range f rom aboiit 25 percent  underprediction fo r  the 
s implcs t  s t ruc tu re  to about 55 percent  underprediction for  the n o s t  complex 
s t ruc tu re  for  which analyt ical  qualification i s  allowed. 
range of 20 percent  also exis t s .  
A rpa l i ty  cont ro l  
A s e a r c h  f o r  compiled s ta t ic  t e s t  experience has  pnuclced  c.nly 
one such data  se t .  
wings, fuselages,  landing gear ,  and horizontal  and v r t i c a l  s tabi l ize  rs 
during the 1940's have been compiled. 
ult imate load of which 3 were m o r e  than 50 percent  understrength.  
were  60 percent  unders t  rength, and one was 65 percent  understrength.  
The compilation does not s epa ra t e  the contributions of ana lys i s  and quality 
control  in  these fa i lures  (Ref. A-2).  
Fa i lu re  leve ls  fo r  45G stat ic  t e s t s  of m i l i t a r y  A r c r a f t  
The re  were  14 fa i lures  below 
Two 
None of these  s t r u c t u r e s  would have experienced se rv ice  fa i lures  
if designed to the recommended f ac to r s  shown in Table ti-1. 
confidence in the reccmmended approach i s  gained by considerat ion of 
advances in ana lys i s  technology s ince that t ime  and the relatively benign 
loads environment  assoc ia ted  wish Shuttle mis s ions .  
Additional 
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The increased importance of analysis for  untested s t ructure  is 
reflected in the general analysis requirements below. 
e r r o r s  is best accomplished by an independent review o r  evaluation of the 
analysis. It should be required that this objective surveillance be performed 
by a government organization or  their  specified re€ resentative. 
Control of numerical  
7. ANALYSIS REQUIREMENTS FOR UNTESTED DESIGNS 
Structural design is strongly affected by objectives whicd cannot 
be absolutely defined o r  imposed because of performance, risk, cost, o r  
other  factors that depend on hazards involved, the mission constraints, o r  
details of the vehicle, i t s  structure,  and mode of operation. The pr imary  
objectives addressed here  are the requirements for the design of a Space 
Shuttle payload which eliminates or minimizes proof of performance t, sting. 
Weight 2nd volume constraints a r e  considered to be of secondary importance. 
However, the payload must  safely complete the required number of missions 
in  i t s  specified life and accomplish this a t  minimum cost. 
paragraphs present the requirements which must  be m e t  in o r d e r  to achieve 
the design objectives. 
The following 
The spacecraft design shall possess  sufficient strength, rigidity, 
and other necessary character is t ics  that a r e  required to survive the cr i t ical  
loading conditions that exist within the envelope of mission requirements a s  
dictated by all life phases. 
that does not reduce the probability of the successful completion of the 
mission. 
or  environments due to malfunctions that would create  conditions outside 
the expected mission design envelope. 
It shall survive those conditions In a manner  
The structure shall not be designed to withstand loads, pressures ,  
Rigor and conservatism shall be exercised in the construction 
and use of mathematical structural  models that describe spacecraft 
periormance. 
empirically well founded to assure  the accurate prediction of all pertinent 
a spe 7 t s  of structural  behavior . 
The models shall be sufficiently comprehensive and 
A- 19 
In the formulation GI the mathematical  model, the magnitude, 
direction, spatial distribution, and time variation of all external limit 
mechanical loads, p ressures ,  and forcing functions shall  be determined 
by conservative analyses of the deFign environments unless provided by 
NASA i n  the form of enveloping quasi-static loads. 
e rature distribution throughout the spacecraft and i t s  time dependence 
shall be accurately determined by suitable analyses of the design environ- 
ments. 
between mate  r ia l  s t resses ,  strains,  temperature, and time shall  be based 
o n  extensive tes t  data which accounts for the possible influences of 
specimen-to-specimen scat ter ,  mater ia l  behavior nonlinearities, stiffness 
eccentricity effects, and degrading environmental effects. The mathematical  
model shall  properly incorporate the appropriate boundary, juncture, and 
initial conditions. When uncertainty a r i ses ,  these conditions shall be 
specified ir, various candidate models so that pertinent aspects  of st ructural  
behavior can be conse rvarively bounded. The mass distribution, damping 
factors,  and other  quantities of importance to the dynamic behavior of the 
spacecraft  shall be accurately determined and incorpo-ated into the mathe- 
mat ical  model. If large s t ructural  displacements appear  likely, the 
equations of motion shall include appropriate geometric nonlinearities. 
The analyst shall carefully configure the mathematical n o d e l s  
In addition, the temp- 
The constitutive relations which accurately character ize  the relation 
to  insure that all redundant load paths, cutouts, sources  of pres t ress ,  
s t r e s s  concentration, s t ructural  misalignments, and cr i t ical  dimensional 
to!erances have been accurately accounted for. In addition, sources  of 
flexibilitylstiffness due to flexible payload interfaces, bearing systems, 
mechanisms, and pr imary load-path subsystems such as stowed or depioyed 
antennas and solar  a r r a y s  shall  be determined by appropriate analyses o r  
subsystem development tes t s  and accounted for in the payload mathematical  
mddels. 
When uncertainty exis ts  in r e g a r d  to the assumptions made in the 
formulation of spacec raft mathematical models, the extent of the uncertainty 
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should be established by candidate formulations which conservatively bound 
the extent of the uncertainty o r  by low-cost subsystem development tests.  
Carefully administered general  sys tems engineering/technical direction, 
supported by a n  independent analysis, is highly recommended for  spacecraft 
sytems that are qualified by analysis only. 
emphasize simplicity in form and combination of components, assemblies,  
and sys tems to facilitate accurate determination of load paths and to increase 
confidence in the calculated s t ructural  behavior. Construction features, for 
which test data and theory are in substantial agreemeats,  should be utilized 
to the fullest extent possible. 
The s t ructural  design should 
Values for the allowable mechanical properties of the spacecraft 
s t ructure  in its design environment shall  be taken from sources  approved 
by NASA, such as MIL-HDBK-SB, MIL-HDBK-17, MIL-HDBK-23A. or 
the AFML Advanced Composite Design Guide. When values for mechanical 
properties of mater ia l s  or joints are not available because they are new or  
used in a new environment, they shall  be determined by analytical o r  tes t  
methods approved by NASA. 
t o  establish values for the mechanical properties on a statist ical  basis. 
t e s t s  shall  be performed in accordance with procedures in ASTM E8-69, 
E9-70. and AFML-TR-66- 386. 
95 percent confidence) shall  be obtained and used for allowable s t resses .  
The effects  of temperature,  thermal cycling, heating rate, processing 
variables, and detrimental environments shall  be accounted for in defining 
allowable mechanical properties. 
s t ructure  shall  be obtained from references approved by NASA, or by 
experiment, for  appropriate cyclical loading and loading rates  in the applicable 
environments. Character is t ics  of the payload s t ructural  mater ia l s  as 
regards failure due to  cracking, corrosion, creep, meteoroid impact, 
o r  irradiation shall be s imilar ly  established so that these failure mechanisms 
can be avoided during the service life of the payload. 
A sufficient number of tes ts  shall  be performed 
The 
"A" values (99 percent nonexceedance with 
Fatigue-life character is t ics  of the payload 
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The mathematical model s h a l l  yield time histories. as  aopropriate, 
of pertinent internai displacements, rotations, s t resses ,  s t ra ins ,  loads, 
and moments in t e rms  of the applied loads and temperatures.  
the model shall predict susceptibility of the payload to  general  instability 
buckling, panel buckling, and crippling. 
reduced to allowable values by empirically determined conservative knock- 
down factors, as approved by NASA, which account for the influence of 
characterist ic s t ructural  imperfections. 
failure data should be utilized to the fullest possible extent. 
In addition, 
These theoretical values shall  be 
In this regard, historical  buckling 
Based upon a conservative evaluation of the internal loads time 
histories, the payload shall  be designed to possess  adequate strength, stiff- 
ness, and other  necessary character is t ics  to withstand l imit  loads in the 
expected operating environmenta ihrcughout i t s  se i  -rice life without experi- 
encing detrimental deformation. Similarly, the payload shall  be designed to 
withstand ultimate loads in the expected operating environments without 
experiencing collapse o r  rupture. 
loads but not to the s t r e s s e s  a r i s ina  from temperature differences and 
gradients. The margin of safety shall  be positive and shall  be determined 
at allowable ultimate and yield levels and at  the temperatures  expected for 
all c ritical conditions. 
8. QUALITY CONTROL REQUIREMENTS 
Design factors  shall  be applied to l imit  
The control of quality involves the coordinated efforts of -many 
scientific and production disciplines and cannot be treated exhaustively 
here.  
fection but in the ability to rely on lower-bound quality levels. 
considerable experience in a i rc raf t  and lightweight aerospace s t ructures ,  
quality standards and procedures have evolved which a r e  consistent with 
qualification and acceptance methods. 
fac tors ,  acceptable reliability and safety have resulted. 
The importance of quality i s  obvious, not f o r  the attainment of per-  
Through 
Combined with the traditional design 
Continuation of these quality-screening procedures is necessary 
fo r  untested low-cost structure.  Acceptance testing i s  actually a quality- 
limiting process in itself which requires that any contemplated changes 
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in procurement, inspection, or ikbrication quality control be based solely 
on a willingness to experience more,  o r  less,  acceptance tes t  failures.  
This is the case regardless of whether the structure is weight o r  cost  
optimized. 
designing to  factors higher than those shown in Table A-1 for acceptance- 
tested structure so that quality standards may be relaxed without incurring 
higher tes t  failure rates.  
reliability a t  all; i t  is a direct  trade of quality control cost  against structure 
weight and cost  and the cost  of tes t  failures. 
Over-designed structure,  however, offers the possibility of 
This type of trade does not affect safety o r  
Qualification-verified designs also allow relaxed quality standards, 
but since quality in this case is an essential safety and reliability determiner, 
it is necessary to establish new standards of control which will essentially 
guarantee lower-bound quality at a new level. 
ca r r i ed  out as a separate effort, preferably on contractors. 
This is a task which must  be 
9. EXPENDABLE PAYLOADS 
The discussion and cr i te r ia  developed herein apply to all mission 
The design of expendable mission payloads will not differ f rom the types. 
other  three mission types, because the payload may be returned i f  the 
payload does not satisfactorily pass the on-orbit predeployment checkout. 
10. ON- ORBIT MAINTAINABLE PAYLOADS 
No special conside rations a r e  necessary for  on-orbit maintainable 
payload missions, since i t  is a basic premise that structure should be 
designed to include the necessity of on-orbit maintenance. 
11. GROUND-REFURBISHABLE PAYLOADS 
Al l  structure should be designed to the specified number  of missions 
and lifetime. Special situations may  develop, however, where i t  may  be 
advantageous to design to  shor te r  life and reverify further use by periodic 
acceptance tests.  This technique may also be useful in extending the mission 
cycles beyond original design. In any case,  the s t ructure  should be examined 
f o r  evidence of dis t ress  in cri t ical  a r eas  and checked for alignment a t  each 
ground- refurbishment phase. 
A-23 
12. SORTIE PAYLOADS 
As with all man-tended missions,  i t  i s  possible to incorporate 
into the design provisions for  real-time vernier  alignment of components. 
While this would tend to reduce the required design yield factor of safety, 
it  is recommended that the c r i t e r i a  in Appendix B be applied uniformly 
to  all payload types. 
C .  CONCLUSIONS 
It is concluded that the attainment of near-cptimum payload 
structure,  considered from a total developm9nt and production cost  stand- 
point, requires that the potential economies of over-designed s t ructure  be 
conside red. 
between s t ructural  weight and the cost-  relatsd activities associated with 
development, fabrication, analysis, test ,  and quality control. When these 
are considered in relation to a specific contractor 's  experience, specialty 
field, t es t  facilities, and cost experience, it will be possible to select  the 
most  promising t rades  for detailed cost studies. It is also intended that 
some of the approaches discussed in this report, being somewhat uncon- 
ventional, will inspire fur ther  re-examination of cur ren t  traditions and 
expose additional cost-saving ideas. A general conclusion, fur ther  re- 
inforced by this study, i s  that simplicity of design and qualification is the 
single most  significant cost  reducer i n  the absence of weight constraints, 
when properly executed. 
Several  possible tradeoffs a r e  identi.fied in this appendix 
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APPENDIX B. LOW-COST SPACECRAFT STRUCTURAL 
DESIGN CRITERIA GUIDELINES 
FOR SHUTTLE-LAUNCHED PAYLOAE* 
A. INTRODUCTION 
1. SCOPE 
This appendix presents the basic requirements and information 
governing the design of the spacecraft  s t ructural  subsystem for Space 
Shuttle payloads. Included herein are: 
a. 
b. 
c. 
d. 
Basic facts and references pertinent to the s t ructural  design 
Basic objectives for the philosophy of st ructural  design 
Conditions and environments for which the vehicle must  
be investigated and designed 
Requirements for  establishing loads and other  
environmental factors for the design conditions 
Requirements and alternatives for  establishing 
evidence of s t ructural  adequacy 
e. 
i. Definition of t e r n s .  
2. AUTHORITY 
This document shall govern the design of the spacecraft  s t ructural  
Any deviation from these requirements shall  be noted along subsystem. 
with proper justification. 
3. INTENT 
The intent of these c r i te r ia  is to provide a set of design conditions, 
requirements, and objectives which, when implemented, will insure that 
the s t ructural  subsystem achieves acceptable and compatible s t ructural  
integrity. 
f 
This appendix i s  based on work performed and published in  an Aerospace 
Corporation internal report  by J. E. Anderson and J. T. Hook, S acecraft 
Structural  Design Cri ter ia  Document, ATM-68(3305)-61 (June 1 + 
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B. DEFINITIONSD NOMENCLATURE, AND REFERENCES 
1. DEFINITIONS 
a. Limit Load 
Limit load is the maximum anticipated load, o r  cr i t ical  combina- 
tion of loads, which a s t ructure  may be expected to experience during the 
performance of specified missions in specified environments. Since the 
actual loads that a r e  experienced in service are in par t  random in nature, 
statist ical  methods for predicting limit loads shall  be employed wherever 
appropriate. 
b. Yield Load 
Yield load is obtained by multiplying the limit load by the yield 
factor of safety.  
c.  Ultimate Load 
Ultimate load is obtained m y  multiplying the lirzif load by the 
ultimate factor of safety. 
d. Factor of Safety 
The factor of safety is an a rb i t ra ry  factor meant to account for  
uncertainties and variations from item to  item in material properties, 
fabrication quality and details, and internal loads distribution. 
e. Amlied TemDe rature s 
Applied temperatures are maximum calculated temperatures to  
which the structure will  be subjected during the perfonnan,:e of specified 
missions in specified environments. 
f .  Crit ical  Condition 
A cr i t ical  condition is a loading o r  temperature condition which 
dictate8 the design of a portion of the structure.  
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g. Failure 
A s t ructure  is considered to have failed when i t  can no longer 
perform its intended function. 
a condition exis ts  which may result  in  the loss  of the vehicle, or any par t  
thereof, and/or  may  present a hazard to operating personnzl. 
Fai lure  of a s t ructure  has  occurred when 
2. REFERENCES/APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS 
The following documents a r e  applicable to the extent specified 
herein. 
a. MIL-HDBK 5B, "Strength of Metal Aircraft Element" 
b. MIL-HDBK 17, "Plastics for Flight Vehicles" 
c. MIL-M-8555A, ?Missiles, Guided: Design and Construction, 
d. Shuttle Environmental Requirements Speciiication 
e. Shuttle Loads Specification 
f .  
When a conflict occurs  between the applicable documents and this 
General Specifications for" 
Meteoroid Environment and Penetration Criterion 
document, the latter shall govern. 
C. DESIGN CRITERIA 
1. GENERAL DESIGN PHILCSOPHY 
The structure shall possess  sufficient strength, rigidity, and other  
necessary  character is t ics  required to survive the cr i t ical  loading conditions 
that exist  within the envelope of mission requirements as dictated by all 
life phases. 
reduce the probability of a successful completion of the mi esion. 
It shall  survive those conditions in  a manner  that does not 
Consistent with the s t ructural  design principles and assumptions 
l isted herein, the s t ructure  shall  be designed to achieve minimum cost 
wherevei practicable. 
system weight and development schedule. 
Proper  consideration shal l  be given to the effect on 
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The s t ructure  shall be designed by consideration of all cr i t ical  
Provisions shall  be incorporated in the flight and non-flight conditions. 
design for assembling, handling, transporting, and storing which will 
minimize overall  mission costs.  
2. 3ESIGN CONDITIONS AND ENVIF-ONMEXTS 
The environmental phenomena corresponding to each design condition 
shall include factors that can influence the s t ructural  design and typically 
include heating. vibration, shock, and acoustics in  addition to qJasi-static 
and dynamic loads. 
of prolonged exposure to the space environment. 
phenomena shall be determined statistically. 
Consideration shall  be given to the deter ior i t ing effect 
Where possible, all such 
a. External and Internal Load Distribution 
External loads shall be determined by conservative analyses of 
the design environment unless otherwise specified. 
load distribution shall  be determined by rational analyses. 
deformations, nonlinearities, and temperatures  on internal loads distribu- 
tion shall be included in analyzing the load distributions. 
The internal s t ructural  
Effects of 
b. Combined Loads and Internal P res su re  
When internal pressure  effects in a combined load condition a r e  
stabilizing o r  otherwise beneficial to s t ructural  load capability, the minimum 
anticipated internal operating pressure  fo r  that condition shall be used instead 
of the ultimate design internal pressure  in the ultimate loads analysis. 
c. Malfunctions 
The s t ructure  shall  not be designed to withstand loads, p ressures ,  
o r  environments due to malfunctions that would create  conditions outside 
the expected mission design envelope. F o r  Shuttle mission phases, mal- 
functions shall  not result  in s t ructural  failures that jeopardize Shuttle or 
c r e w  safety. 
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d. Misalienment and Dimensional Tolerances 
The ei.ects of allowable s t ructural  misalignments, control m i s -  
alignments, and other permissible and expected dimensional tolerances 
shall  be considered in the analysis of all loads, lcad distributions, and 
s t ructural  adequacy. 
e. Dynamic Loads 
Dynamic loads shall  be determined for quasi-static and transient 
phenomena expected in each design environment. The calculation of all 
dynamic loads shall  include the effects of vehicle s t ructural  flexibilities 
and damping and coupling of s t ructural  dynamics with the control system 
and the exte rnal environment. 
Iterations of the dynamic loads calculations shall be performed 
as necessary to reflect design changes and/or  mathematical model refiae- 
ments.  The final set  of dynamic loads shall  be determined with the use of 
experimental values of dynamic character is t ics  as obtained from appro- 
priate tes t s  and modal surveys. 
f. Load and Thermal Fatigue 
The effects of repeated loads and evaluated temperature will be 
considered in the s t ructural  design. 
the vehicle in flight shall not be impaired by fatigue damage resulting from 
exposure to non-flight and launch environments. 
The design s t ructural  adequacy of 
g. Vibrational and Acoustical Loadings 
The effects of the vibrational and acoustical environments shall  
be accounted for  in design wherever possible by rational analysis of the 
response of the dynamic system to the environment. 
h. Creep  Deformation 
The effects of permanent c reep  deformation shall  be considered 
by rational methods of analysi s, 
buckling, etc. 
a s  the maximum permissible value. 
Where not otherwise cri t ical;  i. e. , c reep  
a permanent deformation of one percent shall be considered 
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i .  T h e r m a l  S t r e s s e s  
The effects  of t he rma l  s t r e s s e s  sha l l  be combined with the appro-  
p r i a t e  load s t r e s s e s  when calculating required s t rength.  
sha l l  be based on the applied t empera tu res ,  heating ra tes ,  e tc .  and sha l l  
be cons idered  l imi t  values .  
T h e r m a l  s t r e s s e s  
3. MATERIAL PROPERTIES AND A L L O W A B L S  
Values f o r  the allowable mechanica l  proper t ies  of the spacecraf t  
s t ruc tu re  in  i t s  design environment  sha l l  be taken from s o u r c e s  approved 
by NASA, such as MIL-HDBK-SB, MIL-HDBK-18, MIL-HDBK-23A, o r  the 
AFML advanced Composite Design Guide. 
p rope r t i e s  of m a t e r i a l s  o r  joints  are not available because they are new 
o r  will be employed in  a new environment,  they shal l  be de te rmined  by 
analyt ical  o r  t e s t  methods  approved by NASA. 
sha l l  be per formed to  es tab l i sh  values  for the mechanica l  p rope r t i e s  on a 
s ta t i s t ica l  bas i s .  
i n  ASTM-E8-69, E9-70, and AFML-TR-66-386. "A" values  (99 percent  non- 
exceedance with 95 percent  confidence) sha l l  be obtained and used for 
allowable s t r e s s e s .  The effects  of tempera ture ,  t he rma l  cycling, heating 
rate ,  p rocess ing  var iabies ,  and de t r imenta l  environments  sha l l  be accounted 
for in defining allo. .dble mechanica l  proper t ies .  Fatigue-life c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  
of the payload s t ruc tu re  shal l  be obtained f rom re fe rences  approved by 
NASA, o r  by experiment ,  for appropr ia te  cycl ical  loading and loading rates 
in  the applicable environments .  
materials as r ega rds  fai lure  due to cracking,  cor ros ion ,  c reep ,  meteoro id  
impact, o r  i r rad ia t ion  sha l l  be s imi l a r ly  es tabl ished so that  these fa i lure  
mechan i sms  can be avoided during the se rv ice  l ife of the payload. 
When values  f o r  mechanica l  
A sufficient number  of tests 
The t e s t s  sha l l  be per formed in accordance with p rccedures  
Charac t e r i s t i c s  of the payload s t ruc tu ra l  
4. STRENGTH REQUIREMENTS 
a. At Yield Load -- 
The s t ruc tu re  sha l l  be designed to have sufficient s t rength  to 
withstand s imultaneously the yield loads,  applied t empera tu re ,  and other  
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accompanying environmental phenomena f o r  each design condition without 
experiencing excessive elastic or plastic defon  ation. 
b. At Ultimate Load 
The s t ructure  shall be designed to withstand simultaneo.isly the 
ultimate loads, applied temperature,  and other accompanying environmental 
phenomena without failure. No factor of safety i s  applied to any environ- 
mental  phenomena except loads. 
c .  Margin of Safety 
Margin of safety i s  defined as: 
1 
R MR = -  - 1 
where R is the ratio of applied load (or  s t r e s s ,  when applicable) to the 
allowable load (or s t r e s s ) .  In determining the factor R, the effects of 
combined loads o r  s t r e s s e s  (interaction) shall be included. 
5. STIFFNESS REQUIREMENTS 
a. Under Yield Loads 
The s t ructure  shall  not experience excessive deformations a t  
yield loads and in the appropriate design environment. 
b. Under Ultimate Loads 
Structural  deformations shall  not precipitate s t ructural  fzilure 
during any design conditions and environment at  loads less than ultimate 
loads. 
c. Component Stiffness 
The fundamental resonant frequency of any component weighing 
22.7  kg (50 lb) o r  l e s s  shall  be 50 cps or grea ter  when mounted on i t s  
immediate support structure,  unless i t s  s t ructural  integrity under dynamic 
loads i s  demonstrated by analysis or test .  
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6. THERMAL REQ’J. REMENTS 
The effects  of t e m p e r a t u r e  sha l l  be cons ide red  in  design of the 
T h e r m a l  ana lys i s  sha l l  be based on ra t iona l  t r a a s i e n t  ana lys i s  vehicle.  
of hez t  f luxes from heating. engine exhaust  gas  radiat ions,  engine s y s t e m  
a n d  e lec t ronic  equipment  hea t  soiirc-s, and ccns idera t ion  of the hea t  s ink  
effect  of the mass of s t r u c t u r e ,  fuel, and equipment .  
T h e r m a l  effects  on the s t r u c t u r e ,  including heat ing rates, t e m p e r a -  
t u r e s ,  t h e r m a l  stresses and  deformat ions ,  and mechan ica l  and phys ica l  
p rope r ty  changes,  will be based  on a c r i t i c a l  design heat ing environment .  
7. FACTORS OF SAFETY 
The  s t r u c t u r a l  subsys t em sha l l  be designed to  the following tabulated 
factors of safety,  which a l low f o r  a l t e rna t ive  me thods  of es tab l i sh ing  des ign  
adequacy. 
cons idera t ions  which sa ’ i s fy  the gene ra l  design philosophy. 
The design ver i f icat ion method se l ec t ed  sha l l  be based  nn cost  
Complexi ty  ra t ings  f o r  untested c!esign a re  given as examples  
only. 
based  cm ana ly t ics l  confidence f o r  the pa r t i cu la r  design,  and are subjec t  t o  
approvzl  by NASA. S t ruc tu ra l  a s s e m b l i e s  with m i x e d  f a c t o r s  of sa fe ty  
a re  acceptable  i f  component p a r t s  a re  deve-oped in  acco rdance  with the 
r equ i r emen t  below. F a c t o r s  h ighe r  than :equired are allowed and m a y  be 
n e c e s s a r y  to min imize  ove ra l l  deployment cos t .  
Selected r a t ings  m u s t  be supported by  a rat ionale  for t h e i r  se!ection, 
Yield Ult imate  -- 
1 
2 
Qualification- Te s ted Designs 
Dedicated T e s t  Ar t ic le  
Fl ight  Sample  T e s t  Ar t ic le  
4 
1.00 1 .25  
1 .25  m i n  1 .25  m i n  
1. 10 m i n  1.10 m i n  
3 
Acceptance - Te  s t ed  De si gn s 
Pevelopment-  Tes t ed  S t r u c t u r a l  
Subas senibly 
Dedicated T e s t  Ar t ic le  
F l igh t  Sample  T e s t  - \ r t ic le  3 
1.00 
1.25 m i n  
1 .25  
1 . 2 5  m i n  
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5 Untested Designs or Subassembl ies  
I Simple S t ruc ture  
I1 
111 
.v 
V Moderately Complex St ruc ture  
VI Complex St ruc ture  or 
Lncertain Analysis 
Y ie Id Ultimate -
1 . 5  2 . 0  
1.9 2.5 
2.3 3.0 
2.7 3.5 
3.0 4.0 
Te s t Requi red 
NOiES: 
1. All f ac to r s  p re sume  r igorous quality cont ro l  (80 percent  i f  ideal) .  
2 .  Qualification tes t ing impl ies  the flight of at least one untested 
l e s t  loads are the same as design loads.  
3. Tes t  loads mus t  be determined from life requirements .  
4. Acceptance tes t ing is per tormed on each  flight article. 
5. Untested s t ruc tu re  r equ i r e s  r igorous  conservat ive stress analysis .  
Relaxation of quality requi res  l a r g e r  sa fe ty  fac tors .  
a r t ic le .  
T e s t  
loads m u s t  be de termined  from life requi rements .  
Complexity ra t ing examples  are given in  Appendix C. 
8. DESIGNPHASES 
The payload shal l  be capable of withstanding design load conditions 
as  specified (Ref. B-1) and environments  to  which i t  i s  exposed as specified 
(Ref. B-2) in addition to the orb i t  phase specified herein.  Components sha l l  
be dedigned fo r  the mos t  s e v e r e  environmental  Conditions with considerat ion 
of both ope rational and nonoperational s t a t e s .  
a. Orbit  Phase  
The payload shal l  be designed for geophy--ical environments  and 
loading conditions assoc ia ted  with orb i ta l  flights. ‘;he design of the vehicle 
and its p a r t s  shall be based on, but not l imited to, considerat ion of the 
follcwing conditions. 
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b. Maneuuverine Loads  
Loads resu l t ing  from m a n e u v e r s  for changing o r b i t s ,  s ta t ion-  
keeping, a t t i tude cont ro l ,  and rendezvous a long  c r i t i c a l  t r a j e c t o r i e s  u s ing  
ac tua l  propuls ion,  guidance, and con t ro l  s y s t e m s  sha l l  be de te rmined .  
c .  Ar t i f ica l  Gravi tv  
Where requi red  by the mis s ion ,  the loads induced by a r t i f i ca l ly  
s imula ted  gravi ty  sha l l  be de t e rmined  including the e f f ec t s  of pe r tu rba t ions  
such  a s  docking with o t h e r  vehicles ,  movemen t  of equipment ,  ini t ia t ion a n d  
te rmina t ion  oi  a r t i f i c i a l  gravi ty ,  e t c .  
d.  Meteoro id  Envi ronment  
The  payload will encounter  3 flux of m e t e o r o i d s  as  i t  orbits the  
e a r t h .  The  s t r u c t u r e ,  p r e s s u r i z e d  volumes,  the m a l  r a d i a t o r s ,  solar 
panels ,  e tc .  sha l l  be designed to  achieve  the  r equ i r ed  probabi l i ty  tha t  
me teo ro id  pene t ra t ions  will  not i m p a i r  t h e i r  s a t i s f a c t o r y  functioning. 
magni tude  and c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of th i s  flux as  well  as m e t h o d s  f o r  ca lcu la t ing  
the  probabi l i ty  of penetrat ion sha l l  be taken as specif ied in Reference  B-3. 
The  
e. Radiation Envi ronment  
The  effect  of both na tu ra l  and a r t i f i c i a l  radiat ion envi ronment  s h a l l  
be cons ide red  in  designing the s t r u c t u r e ,  r ad ia to r s ,  solar panels ,  e tc .  
including not only the de t e r io ra t ion  and  induced radiat ion effects an the  
materials, but a l s o  the shielding that m a y  be r equ i r ed  for sens i t i ve  equip-  
nient .  The  radiat ion envi ronment  is specif ied in Reference  B-2. 
f .  Othe r Envi ronmenta l  F a c t o r s  
O t h e r  geophysical  env i ronmen t s  pecu l i a r  t o  space  m u s t  be cons ide red  
in  the  des ign  of the payload. 
sput te r ing  due to  impinging a t o m s  and ions.  
vehic les  such  as  in t e rna i  p re s su r i za t ion  and the t h e r m a l  e f fec ts  due t o  
in t e rna l  heat ing,  s o l a r  heating, and e x t r e m e  cold due to ambient  s p a c e  
t e m p e r a t u r e  m u s t  a l s o  be cons ide red .  
These  include the effects of vacuum and 
I t e m s  pecu l i a r  t o  individual 
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D. REQUIRED ANALYSES 
1. EXTERNAL LOAaS ANALYSES 
External  loads sha l l  be developed in  accordance  with p rocedures  and 
for  the  conditions specified in  Reference B- 1. 
be developed consistent and conservat ive combinations of c r i t i ca l  loads for 
application in internal  loads ana lyses  and in s t ruc tu ra l  tests where  required.  
F rom these  ex te rna l  loads  sha l l  
2. THERMAL ANALYSES 
T h e r m a l  ana lyses  for the payload sha l l  be provided which shall 
include cor re la t ion  of predicted and exper imenta l  heat t r a n s f e r  data i f  
available.  
and s teady-state  exte  mal su r face  t empera tu res  and t rans ien t  and steady- 
s t a t e  i n t e rna l  t empera tu re  dis t r ibut ions for all p r i m a r y  and secondary  
s t r u c t u r e s  a s  required t o  de te rmine  c r i t i ca l  design conditions. 
sha l l  cons ider  the the rma l  conductivity of m a t e r i a l s  and in te rna l  radiation 
and convective effects  on the  heat  t r a n s f e r  sys tem.  
distribution plots for all s t ruc tu ra l  components de te rmined  t o  be critical 
sha l l  be presented  in  graphical  form. The ana lyses  sha l l  be i n  sufficient 
detai l  that the inboard operat ing environments  m a y  be de termined  for 
assoc ia ted  in te rna l  equipment and secondary  s t ruc ture .  
The ana lyses  sha l l  be in sufficient detail to provide t r ans i en t  
The ana lyses  
Time- tempera ture  
3.  INTERNAL LOADS AND STRESS ANALYSES 
Internal  loads and s t r e s s  ana lyses  of the s t r u c t u r e  sha l l  be per- 
fo rmed  by appropr ia te  and conservat ive methods.  
indicate anticipated modes of fa i lure  for p r i m a r y  s t ruc tu re  and sha l l  
demonst ra te  positive m a r g i n s  of safety. S t r ePs  ana lyses  sha l l  include 
considerat ion of fatigue. c r e e p  rupture ,  cor ros ion ,  t he rma l  and mechanical  
h i s tory ,  and o the r  de t r imenta l  effects  that  m a y  resu l t  from se rv ice  through 
the seve ra l  design phases .  
with the s t r e s s e s  due to  ex terna l  loads in the s t r e s s  analyses.  
The ana lyses  sha l l  
Thermal ly  induced s t r e s s e s  sha l l  be combined 
The mathematical model shall yield time histories of pertinent 
inte mal displacements, rotations, s t r e s ses ,  s t ra ins ,  loacs, and moments 
in t e rms  of the applied loads and temperatures.  
shall  predict susceptibility of the payload to general instability buckling, 
panel buckling, and crippling; these theoretical values shall  be reduced 
to  allowable values by empirically dete =.lined conservative knockdown 
factors,  as  approved by NASA, which account for  the influence of character-  
ist ic structural  imperfcctions. In this regard, historical  buckling failure 
data should be utilized to the fullest possible extent. 
In addition, the model 
Rigor and conservatism shall  be exercised in  the constructior- 
and use of mathematical s t ructural  models that describe spacecraft  per-  
formance. 
well founded to assure  the accurate prediction of d l  pertinent aspects  of 
s t ructural  behavior. 
The models shall be sufficiently comprehensive and empirically 
In the formulation of the mathematical model, the magnitude, 
direction, spatial distribution, and time variation of external l imit  
mechanical loads, pressures ,  and forcing functions shall  be determined 
by conservative analyses of the d e s i p  environments. In addition, the 
temperature distribution throughout the spacecraft, and i t s  t ime dependence, 
shall  be accurately determined by suitable analyses of the design environ- 
ments.  
between mater ia l  s t resses ,  strains,  tempe rature,and time shall  be based on 
extensive test  data which accounts for the possible influences of specimen- 
to specimen scat ter ,  mater ia l  behavior nonlinearities, stiffness eccen- 
tr icity effects, and degrading environmental effects. The mathematical 
model shall  properly incorporate the appropriate boundary, juncture, and 
initial conditions. When uncertainty a r i s e s ,  these conditions shal l  be 
specified in various candidate models so that pertinent aspects of s t ructural  
behavior can be conservatively bounded. The m a s s  distribution, damping 
factors, and other quantities of importance to the dynamic behavior of the 
The constitutive relations which accurately character ize  the relation 
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spacecraft shall be accurately determined and incorporated into the 
mathematical modei 
the equations of motion shall  include appropr;ate geometric nonlinearities. 
If large structural  displacements appear likely, 
The analyst shall  carefully configure the mathematical models 
to  insure that all redundant load paths, cutouts, sources  of pres t ress ,  
s t r e s s  concentration, structural  misalignments, and cr i t ical  dimensional 
tolerances have been accurately accounted for. In addition, sources  of 
flexibility/ stiffness due to flexible payload interfaces, bearing systems, 
mechanisms, and pr imary load path subsystem- such as stowed/deployed 
antennas and solar  a r r a y s  shall be determined by appropriate analyses/  
subsystem development tes t s  and accounted for  in the payload mathematical  
models. 
When uncertainty exis ts  in  regard to  the assumptions made in the 
formulation of spacecraft mathematical models, the extent of the uncertainty 
should be established by candidate formulations which conservatively bound 
the extent of the uncertainty o r  by low-cost subsystem development tests. 
Carefully administered general systems engineeringhechnical direction, 
supported by a n  independent analysis, is highly recommended for  space- 
craf t  systems that a r e  qualified by analysis only. The s t ructural  design 
should emphasize simplicity in form and combination of components, 
assemblies, and systems to  facilitate accurate determination of load paths 
and to increase confidence in  the calculated structural  behavior. Con- 
struction features, fo r  which tes t  data and theory are in substantial 
agreement, should be utilized to the fullest extent possible. 
4. DYNAMIC ANALYSES 
Intensities of acceleration, shock, vibration, and acoustic noise 
may vary with location in the cargo bay and phase of the mission profile. 
The equipment and structure shall bc designed to the cr i t ical  environmental 
conditions which are established for  each particular location. In addition, 
the expected ground handling and transportation conditions shall be taken 
into account. 
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Dynamic loads analyses shall be conducted in cases  where rapidly 
applied or fluctuating loads give r ise  to dynamic response of the vehicle o r  
i t s  component parts.  
shall be analyzed, if required, with full consideration of the dynamic inter-  
actions of the spacecraft and Shuttle. 
dynamics and structural  dynamics shall be considered. 
Transient loading events of the boost pL3se of flight 
The interaction of control system 
5. ANALYSES RELATED TO ORBITAL PERFORMANCE 
In the case of spacecraft for  which mission performance is affected 
by structural  deformations and dynamic response to  mechanical excitation, 
analyses sufficient to identify and evaluate the effects of these phenomena 
shall be performed. 
to excitation by rotating machinery and other moving parts,  rocket motor  
thrust, etc. shall be considered. 
Thermal deformations a s  well as the dynamic response 
E. REQUIRED TESTS 
1. STATIC TESTS 
a. - Development Tests  
Development tes ts  a r e  tes t s  performed to  determine and evaluate 
design feasibility, functional parameters ,  technological data, packaging 
and fabrication techniques, and environmental limitations. This category 
of testing includes tes ts  designed to (1) demonstrate that the d e s i m  meets  
the specified requirements, (2) identify cr i t ical  areas where design im- 
provement may be required, (3) identify primary failure modes o r  cr i t ical  
environments, o r  (4) demonstrate that the probability of passing q u  Ification 
i s  sufficient high to warrant commitment of equipment to thc qualificLtion 
test. 
compatibility o r  integration tests.  
program objectives shall be conducted. 
These tes ts  may be conducted to any hardware level and include 
Development testing required to meet 
b. Qualification Tests  
Qualification tes ts  a r e  tes ts  performed to demonstrate adequacy 
of the structural  design to sustain cri t ical  design loads and environmental 
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conditions in the manner required. 
and manufacturing processes  employed in the qualification test  specimens 
shall be identical to those of the flight art icles.  
The s t ructural  configuration, mater ia ls ,  
When environmental conditions cannot be properly conservatively 
simulated in the test, allowances for  mater ia l  properties, combined loading, 
and other missing effects shall be provided in the test  procedure and loads. 
Where pr ior  landing histories affect the s t ructural  adequacy of a tes t  
article, these shall be included in all tes t  requirements. 
mentation i s  required in  o rde r  to properly evaluate the results of these tests. 
Adequate instru- 
The tes t  art icle shall support 100-percent yield loads with no 
permanent deformation and without experiencing structural  member  defonna- 
tion that will cause interference with other structural  members  and/or  non- 
structural  components. The test  ar t ic le  shall  support 100-pe rcent ultimate 
loads without failure of the pr imary structure o r  any other s t ructure  that 
may cause failure of the mission. 
tural  te:ting of all vehicle system sections shall consist  of an adequate 
portion of the adjacent struc .lira1 section to provide boundary o r  support 
conditions which a r e  identical to ihe support conditions to be realized in 
the flight art icle.  
The support fixture to be used in struc- 
c. Acceptance Tes ts  
Acceptance tes ts  are tes ts  performed on deliverable equipment tu 
detect and eliminate ar t ic les  of substandard manufacture or oi defective 
workmanship and to demonstrate, within the scope of the tests,  that the 
properties of the equipment a r e  identical within acceptable l imits to those 
of the qualification art icles.  
waived if  product quality can be assured through appropriate quality 
control and inepection procedures. 
Acceptance testing of structure m a y  be 
2. DYNAMIC TESTS 
a. Ground Vibration Tests  
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Ground vibration tes t s  shall be conducted as neces t a ry  on the 
spacecraft for  the purpose of experimentally determining natural fre- 
quencies, mode shapes, and s t ructural  damping. The tes t  ar t ic le  should 
be of prime quality structure,  complete in every detail with all  significant 
installed equipment. Mass simulations of unavailable components may  be 
acceptable. 
Spacecraft mounting, or  support, 3x tu res  shall  provide boundary 
conditions compatible with the conditions being simulated and shall  prevent 
significant dynamic interactions of the tes t  ar t ic le  with the support structure.  
It shall  be the objective of the mode survey tes t  to thoroughly 
define a complete se t  of modes in the frequency range of interest  (e.g., 
0-50 cps for  loads determinations). 
measured modes directly in the desired analysis task, i f  required. 
This will permit  the utilization of 
b. Fatigue and Acoustical Tes ts  
Fatigue tes t s  shall be performed a s  necessary on cr i t ical  s t ructural  
specimens to demonstrate fatigue life under vibratory loads. Acoustical 
t e s t s  of c r i t i ca l  s t ructural  specimens shall  be conducted to demonstrate 
the ability of the vehicle s t ructure  to satisfactorily survive the acoustical 
environment. 
3. TESTS RELATED TO ORBITAL PERFORMANCE 
Where dynamic response character is t ics  are cr i t ical  to the 
adequacy of orbital  performance, vibration mode surveys of the spacecraft 
system, or subsystems, shall be conducted to verify the validity of the 
analytical model. Similarly, equipments which give rise to disturbances 
on orbit  shall  be subjected to tes t  to verify the nature and magnitude of 
these effects. 
Where thermal  deformations a r e  cr i t ical  to the zdequacy of 
orbital  performance, tes t s  to verify analytical predictions of these effects 
shall  be conducted. Applied temperatures  may be determined by conservative 
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analysis where feasible; otherwise, the s t ructure  shall be subjected to 
sources  of thermal  radiation simulating those to which i t  will be exposed 
in cr i t ical  orbit conditions. 
F. REQUIRED DOCUMENTATION 
Documentation of the required analyses and tes t s  specified herein 
shall be prepared and submitted to  NASA as contractual i tems.  
reports  shall  contain an adequate description of the data, assumptions, and 
methods used as well as a summary and discussion of significant results. 
Test  reports  shall  contain adequate descriptions of the tes t  setup, instru- 
mentation, and loads or other excitations applied. 
as reduced data shall  be presented. Where appropriate, analyses of 
experimental e r r o r  shall  be included. 
G. R E F E R E N C E S  
Analysis 
Raw test data as well 
B-1. B. Allesina, and E. F. Styer, Studies of Cost 
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B-2. 1. Bouton, M. Fish, and D. J. Trent, Quantitative Structural  
Design Cr i te r ia  by Statistical Methods, Volume 11, AFFDL-TR-67- 
107, (February 1968). 
B- 3. Structural  Design Factors ,  (Review Draft), NASA SP-8OXXX 
(February 1973). 
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APPENDIX C. STRUCTURE COMPLEXITY RATING 
This appendix defines and descr ibes  the complexity categorizatior, 
used in selecting the design factor of safety. 
A. COMPLEXITY I 
Structural  assemblies in this category are typically simple with 
relatively few, well-defined elements. Internal load distributions a r e  
accurately known by application of static equilibrium principles o r  simple 
redundant s t ructure  techniques. 
varying cross-section without significant stress concentrations. 
modes are well defined and preclude general  or local instabilities, whether 
elastic o r  inelastic, and fatigue. 
f rom published minimum properties of conventional mater ia l s  or handbook 
solutions whose application is rigorous. Structural  elements in  this category 
include uniform compact s t ruts ,  beams, and thin rings. Axisymmetric 
straight-meridian monocoque shells, shear  panels, and plates subject to 
known uniform loads are included. 
when simply and continuously connected, are Complexity I if there a re  no 
non-linear s t r e s s  considerations to and including ultimate load. 
B. COMPLEXITY II 
Members  are uniform or of regularly 
Fai lure  
Allowable stresses and loads are obtained 
Structural  assemblies of these elements, 
Complexity I1 st ructures  are those for  which the number and 
redundancy of elements requires finite element o r  continuum analysis for 
internal loads distribution, thereby precluding absolute conservatism at 
every  point. 
dimensions and do not produce overlapping s t r e s s  fields a r e  allowed i f  
covered by empirically verified handbook cases. Fai lure  modes of local 
instability with well-defined loads and boundary conditions are allowed i f  
based on vtr i f ied published crippling o r  panel buckling data. 
S t ress  concentrations which are small in relation to member  
Tension field 
c- 1 
and fatigue fai lure  modes  are  not permit ted.  Ring-stiffened she l l s ,  deep 
beams, and r l  gs a r e  included in Category I1 in  a s sembl i e s  which provide 
reasonable  cer ta in ty  of load distribution a c r o s s  e lement  boundaries.  
C .  COMPLEXITY 111 
St ruc ture  in  th i s  ca tegory  includes l ine-geqerated ax isymmetr ic  
she l l s  with genera l  instabil i ty fa i lure  m o d e s  if amenable  to conservat ive 
specification of boundary conditions and supported by empir ica l ly  based  
c r i t i ca l  buckling data.  Post-buckling capabi l i t ies  are discounted except  
for semi- tension field beans e las t ica l ly  buckled. 
she l l s  subject to concentrated o r  rapidly varying tangential  loads a re  in- 
cluded i f  supported by sui tably refined finite e lement  analysis .  
monocoque she l l s  not subject to general  instabil i ty fa i lure  m o d e s  are  
s imi l a r ly  included . 
Stable ax i symmet r i c  
Semi- 
D. COMPLEXITY IV 
S t ruc tu res  of th i s  ca tegory  requi re  exhaustive compute r  ana lys i s  
as a resu l t  of complex load paths  among a l a r g e  number  of s t ruc tu ra l  
e lements .  Doubly curved,  stable,  ax i symmet r i c  she l l s  are included for 
s i tuat ions where boundary conditions are continuous and well  defined and 
for tangential  loads developable in  th ree  o r  f ewer  hannon ics .  Fatigue 
fa i lure  modes  a r e  included only in  areas of known uniform s t r e s s e s  in  
conventional mate rials designed to  the lowe r-bound endurance l imit .  
Th i s  ca tegory  a l so  includes semimonocoque she l l s  in  instabil i ty fa i lure  
m o d e s  when suitable finite e lement  mode l s  are establ ished which account 
for element-  to-element  eccent r ic i t ies ,  and conservat ive application of 
appropr ia te  c r i t i c a l  buckling data  is possible .  
E. COMPLEXITY V 
S t ruc tu re  foims and a s sembl i e s  in this  ca tegory  a r e  the most 
complex types fo r  which qualification may be es tab l i shed  by ana lys i s  
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without test. A l l  previous structure types and corresponding failure modes 
a r e  included, together with the additional complexities introduced by access  
openings, either framed o r  flanged, and the inclusion of eccentric, dist:rete 
mechanical interface attachments. 
associated with shell-type pr imary structure and, although local in nature, 
often a r e  the details which l imit  overall  payload load-carrying capability. 
Assignment of these effects to this category should only be made when the 
These added effects are normally 
construction details and analysis refinement allow 
of redundant load paths and localized s t r e s ses  and 
F. COMPLEXITY VI  
the accurate establishment 
failure modes. 
Structural  forms  in this category require development, acceptance, 
o r  qualification test  regardless of design safety factor.  Configurations, 
complexities, and failure modes not specifically included in Categories I-V 
a r e  relegated to Category VI which includes: 
1. General shells 
2. Fittings, unless consisting of previously described elements 
3. Normal, non-uniform loads on shells 
4. 
5. 
6. Geometric non- linearities 
7. 
8. Anisotropic mater ia ls ,  except metall ic honeycomb. 
Fatigue failure modes at s t r e s s  r i s e r s  
High temperature effects which introduce mater ia l  non- 
line ari t ie s 
Mechanisms and moving mechanical assemblies 
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APPENDIX D. FACTOR OF FETY FOR 
PRESSURE VESSELS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In this appendix, the principles of l inear elastic fracture  mechanics 
were applied to establish the appropriate factors of safety fo r  design and 
proof t e s t s  of pressure vesse ls  for  the four types of Shuttle payloads: 
expendable, on-orbit maintainable, ground- refurbishable, and Sortie. 
Aluminum, titanium, and s teel  were represented among the six common 
alioys selected for  this study. A brief description of these alloys and  the 
rationale leading to the i r  ir,itial selection are summarized below, and the 
mater ia l  strengths and fracture  toughness are shown in Table D-1. 
1. 2219-T851 ALUMINUM 
The Al-Cu allov 2219-T851 is re; dily weldable an ! aseful for  
applications at a wide range of temperatures  from -452'F ( -4OK)  to 60U°F 
(-589OK). 
corrosion cracking, and has  been used in cr i t ical  cyrogenic applications 
as well as those requiring high strength and creep  resistance at  relatively 
high temperatures  (400°F - 60O0F). 
It is a relatively tough material ,  is highly resicrtant to stress- 
2. 6061-T651 ALUMINUM 
Allov 6061-T651 is a readily wetdsble Al-Mg-Si alloy possessing 
high resistance to corrosion. It has been used in a wide range of appli- 
cations, including cyrogenic applications requiring high toughness. 
3. 5A 1 - 2.5Sn TITANIUM 
The all-alpha alloy Ti- 5A1-2.5Sn has excelient weldability, 
toughness a t  low temperatures,  and long-te m elevated temperature 
strengths. It is not so readily formed into complex shapes ar other 
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alloys with s imilar  room-temperature properties but far surpasses  them 
in  weldability. Most forming and welding operations must  be followed 
by a n  annealing treatment to relieve residual s t r e s ses  impneed by tho 
pr ior  operation. 
tures. The alloy has  goDd oxidation resistance up to 1050°F (-840OK). 
It is metallurgically stable a t  moderate elevated tempera- 
4. 6A1-4V TITANIUM 
The alloy Ti-6Ai-4V can be used in e i ther  the annealed or solution- 
t reated-plus aged (STA) condition and is weldable. 
is from -320°F (-77.6OK) to 750°F (-672OK). For maximum toughness, 
this alloy should be used in  the annealed condition, and for  maximum 
strength, the STA condition. Stress- relief annealing after welding is 
recommended. This alloy is resistant to  exidation a t  least to 1000°F 
(-811OK). 
Temperature use range 
5. T-1 STEEL 
U S  "T-1" steel  is a low carbon, quenched, and tempered COP- 
structional alloy steel  combining toughness at low temperature, high 
strength a t  elevated temperatures, ease of fabrication, and excellent 
weld bility. It is a proven engineering material for  pressure vessels  and 
has superior atmospheric corrosion resistance compared with structural  
carbon steel. It is suitable for many applications involving temperature& 
up to 900°F (-755OK). This alloy must  be used in the heat-treated condi- 
tion, but stress relieving of weldments made of T-1 steel is not generally 
considered necessary because such weldments are tough in the "as-welded" 
condition. However, under certain conditions in which stress corrosion 
is involved, stress relieving may  be necessary. T- 1 steel may  be readily 
cold fonned o r  hot fonned prQ;rided the hot forming is done at temperatures 
below l l O O ° F  (-866OK) in  o r d s r  to  preserve the criginal mechanical 
properties and toughness. 
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6. HP9Ni-KO-0. 25C STEEL 
The steel alloy HP9Ni-4Co-O.25C was developed specifically 
for high hardening and toughness with ease of fabrication. This alloy 
requires quenching and tempering and is readily weldable, even in the 
heat-treated condition, without detrimental effect. Since no preheat o r  
postheat a r e  required, welding during refurbishing in  the field is possible. 
Fabrication procedures are generally the same as f o r  the familiar SAE 4340 
steel. 
B. GUIDELINE DEVELOPMENT 
1. ASSUMPTIONS 
It i s  possible to cold form HP9Ni-4Co-O.25C even af ter  heat treating. 
Certain assumptions on fracture  data were invoked to simplify the 
transformation of this guideline into a practical  sciution. 
these assumptions we re the following: 
Foremost  of 
a. 
b. 
C. 
d. 
e. 
Upper bound flaw growth rate fo r  each alloy is used to 
generate conservative values of proof and design factors 
of safety. 
Although the deep f law magnification factor  Mk inc -eases 
from 1.0 to 1.6 as the flaw deepens with additional cycles, 
this factcr is taken as a constant value of 1.6 to provide 
a conservative design criterion. 
The maximum values of the s t r e s s  intensity f ac to ra re  
limited to the threshold values to minimize the effects 
of sustained loads flaw growth. 
The , t ress  level during proof tes t  will be limited f.3 the 
uniaxial yield strength of the mater ia l .  
The pressure  vessel  shall  be designed to withstand proof 
pressure  without yield o r  excessive deformation and shall  
withstand ultimate pressure  without rupture o r  collapse. 
2. CYCLIC FLAW GROWTH LAW 
The equ-+ion proposed by F o m a n ,  Kearny, aud Engle (Ref.  D-1) 
relating the rate  of crack  propagation under cyclic loading to the stress 
intensity factor range AK is 
D-4 
-= da C(AK)n 
dN (1-R)K -AK 
C 
da 
dN where -= crack growth rate, m/cycle; 
AK = Kma, - Kmin; 
2 = range of s t r e s s  intensity factor, (MN/m )&; 
R = load ratio in a given cycle; 
2 K = critical stress intensity factor, (MN/m )&; 
C 
coefficients determined emerically to 
provide best f i t  to test data 
By writing this equation in the form 
where (a/Q is the normalized flaw depth, KIc is the critical stress intensity 
factor, and AK is the range of initial stress intensity factor, Pittit et a1 
(Ref. D-2) found that the growth of part through cracks in Inconel 718 at 
cryogenic temperatures was adequately described. 
found by Au and S p a r e  (Ref. D-3) 
et a1 (Ref.  D- 4) 
and Bainitic), 300 M ( 0 . 4 5 ~  and 0.39c), and D6AC for an air environment 
at room temperature. 
a s  the appropriate cyclic flaw-growth law for the six selected materials.  
The suitability of this equation is evidenced by an examination of Figure D-1 
for  2219-T851 Aluminum, Figure D-2 for  6A1-4V Titanium, and Figure D-3 
f o r  HP9Ni-4Co-0.25C Steel. It is seen that the scatter is appreciable. 
The upper bound values of C for each of the six materials  are tabulated 
in Table D-1. 
Ii 
Equation (2) was also 
to apply to the data trend of Pendelberry 
involving cyclic flaw-growth data for 9Ni4Co (Martensitic 
Accordingly, Equation (2 )  will be used in this study 
3. EQUATION FOR PROOF FACTORS 
An equation relating proof test  factor and the number of cycles 
remaining for a flaw to grow from some initial size (-KIi) to the threshold 
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size  (-KTH) was previously derived by Au and Speare (Ref. D- 3) using the 
conventional equations of l inear  elastic f racture  mechanics and Equation 
(2). This equation i s  
where N = number of cycles remaining for  a flaw to grow from 
R(i-TH) some initial size (-K .) to  the threshold size (-KTH); 
I1 
KIc = plane s t ra in  fracture toughness of the mater ia l ;  
3 = proof tes t  factor; 
= proof tes t  s t r e s s  level; - proof 
C.:z = 1.21~MkC; 2 
C = upper bound flaw-growth 
KTH 2 threshold stress intensity factor; 
ie oeffi 
M = deep flaw magnification factor; 
= I 60 f u r  this study. 
k 
In F igur t - s  D-4, D-5, and D-6, Equation (3) is displayed graphi- 
cally for  several  values of - 
proof 
4. PROOF TEST PHILOSOPHY 
and KTH/KIc for T-1 steel. 
Equation (3) can be used with the appropriate proof tes t  require- 
ments  to establish the appropriate procf tes t  factors.  
aerospace pressure  vessels,  the proof test  requirements a r e  well known. 
However, there are no established proof test  requirements for reusable 
pressure  vessels  such as those intended for  the Sortie mission and those 
designed for on-orbit maintenance and ground refurbishment. 
following paragraphs,  seve ral proof tes t  philosophies a r e  bdvanced for 
consideration along with the proof test  requirement for  expendable p re s su re  
ve s selb . 
F o r  single-use 
In the 
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a. P r e s s u r e  Vessels for Expendable Payloads 
Consistent with established "safe-life I t  design philosophy, these 
pressure  vessels  shall be proof-pressure tested before w e  to demonstrate 
a safe-life of a t  least  four pressure  cycles to mean effective operating 
pressure  (MEOP). 
b. P r e s s u r e  Vessels for  On-Orbit Maintainable Payloads 
Since the mater ia l  performance and degradation ( i f  any) in space 
environment fo r  long periods of time are not known at this time, i t  is 
proposed that allowances be provided to account for this  possibility. It 
is also hypothesized that the frequency of ret r ieval  of these p re s su re  
vesse ls  for maintenance is no m o r e  than once every two to three years.  
It follows, therefore, that these pressure  vessels  a r e  readily demated 
from the payloads such that failure of the vessels  during hydrostatic proof 
tes t  will not damage the res t  of the payload system. 
cept of safe life design to a t  least  four t ime? the specified service life 
is enforced. 
The traditional con- 
The above considerations led to the formulation of the proof test 
philosophy that pressure  vessels  designed for on-orbit maintainable 
payloads shall  be proof-pressure tested initially, before the vessels  are 
put to service,  to demonstrate a safe-life of 20 przssure  cycles to MEOP. 
Thereafter,  these pressure  vessels  shal l  be proof tested to demonstrate 
a safe-lice of 16 pressure  cycles to MEOP af te r  the first use, 12 pressure  
cycles to MEOP a f t e r  the second use, and 8 pressure  cycles to MEOP 
af te r  the third and subsequent uses. 
c. P r e s s u r e  Vessels for Ground-Refurbishable Payloads 
Ground- refurbishable payloads involve retrieval of the ent i re  
payload for  ground refurbishment. In this context, two distinct classes 
of pres su re  vossels must  be considered: vessels  which can be demated 
from the paylcads and vesse ls  which a re  integral  with the payloads. 
D-13 
Consider f i r s t  dematable pressure  vessels.  Their proof test re- 
quirements should not differ substantially from those designed for on-orbit 
maintainable payloads. Therefore, fo,. this study, these two types of 
pressure  vessels  are equated as identical. 
On the other hand, vessels  that a r e  integral  with the payloads 
should not be expected to undergo ma jo r  refurbishment after e x h  use. 
Indeed, any refurbishment should be limited to normal  maintenance and 
resupply function. Clearly, catastrophic fa i lures  of integrally designed 
p res su re  vessels  during proof t e s t s  a r e  intolerable. However, the possi- 
bilities of failure during proof tes t  always exist  from e r r o r s  in design, 
manufacturing, undetected flaws, etc. 
therefore requires that these "safe-life" designed pressure  vessels  also 
be "fail safe. I' In this context, fail-safe behavior of a pressure  vessel  is 
defined as a 'Ileak-before-burst' ' non-catastrophic failure mode resulting 
from a localized, non-propagating rupture of the vessel  v;all. 
priate proof tes t  philosophy must  there-ore  require that the pressure  vessel  
be proof tested initially to demonstrate compliance with expected service 
life, followed by proof tes t  af ter  each use tc verify a safe life of four 
pressure  cycles to MEOP. This proof tes t  philosophy is based on the 
argument that successful compliance with the initial proof tes t  will ensure 
that the vessels will meet their  service life rzquirements i f  no new flaws 
are iiitroduced during operation, and the subsequent proof tes t s  will ensure 
that no detrimental new flaws a r e  intorduced during the previous use. 
The recognition of such possibilities 
The appro- 
d. P r e s s u r e  Vessels for  Sortie Payloads 
By definition, Sortie payloads return to tZleir launch site at 
frequent inte rvals. Minimum maintenance and repa .- -? refore 
important requisites for  pret. ' a r e  vessels  designed * ' j  - purpose. It 
i a  also surmised that these vessels  a r e  exposed to relatively benign en- 
vironments and a r e  housed protectively within the spacecraft .  
these circumdxncee,  i t  appears reasonable to postulate a proof-test 
Under 
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philosophy requiring only an initial proof tes t  before the vessels  are put 
to service,  to a proof pressure  sufficient to denionstrate a saie life of 
four times the specified service life. 
tioiis are violated, reproof testing may  be necessary and is, in fact, 
recommended to a s su re  ope rational success.  
Obviously, if the assumed conai- 
5. FACTORS OF SAFETY 
The significance of the proof tes t  on the s t ructural  design and 
s t ructural  performance of pressure  vessels  has  previously been discussed 
in detail by 'I iffany (Ref .  D- 8) and also by Au and Spear (Ref. 0-3). 
i f  a pressure  vessel  successfully sustains an e1as:ic proof stress of 
Briefly, 
- ' uope ra t isg U proof 
where u is the proof-test factor, the maximum initial flaw size which can 
exist  immediately af ter  the tes t  i s  l / u  of the cr i t ical  s ize  at the operating 
pressure .  
the cr i t ical  value. 
maximum initial-to-critical s t r e s s  intensity ratio K ~ ~ / K ~ ~  is squal to 1 /CY. 
Accordingly, a properly designed and successfully exec iited proof-pressure 
tes t  is perhaps the most reliable nondestructive inspection technique avail- 
able for insuring that there  are no initial flaws in the vessel  of sufficient 
s ize  to cause failure under operating conditions. 
2 
The *Jesse1 will fail i f  the flaw grows from this initial value to 
In addition, a successful proof tes t  indicates that the 
The appropriate proof factors for  the four types of pressure  
vessels  can be quantified by suitably combining the aforementioned proof 
tes t  philosophies with Equation (3) and limiting the s t r e s s  level during 
proof tes t  to the uniaxial yield strength of th material. 
fac tors  are tabulated in Tables D-2 to  D-5, incluoively. 
These proof 
With a knowledge of the proof factors, the design factor  <if safety 
can be obt, ned simply from the equation 
Ftu F.S. = u  r" 
t Y  
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Table I)-4. Proof Fac tors  and Design Factors  of Sa 
P300F TEST PHILOSOPHY: Proof test  initially to  demonstrate compliance with 
test  after each use to verify a safe  life of four p r e ~  
APPLICATLOX: Pressure  vesse l s  for ground- refurbishable payload; in which the 
with the spacecraft during proof test ing.  
. Proof Factors and Design Factors of Safety 
2 
TI TAXI U M STEEL 
5 A l - 2 .  5% 6 A t - 4 V  T- 1 H P 9 - 4 - 0 . 2 5  
initially to demonstrate compliance with  expected service liie folIo\ved by proof  
each use to verify a safe life of four pressure cycles to MEOP. 
round- refurbishable payle ,us in which th,. ?ressute vessels are integral 
king proof te  st ing . 
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for all pressure vessel  types previously discussed except those pressure  
vesse ls  which a r e  integral  with the payloads. For this configuration, the 
appropriate design factor of safety is the l a rge r  of 
Ftu F.S. = ai  
tY 
o r  F.S. = 0. 
Equation (6) defines the minimum iactor  of safety required for fail safe 
o r  leak-before-burst behavior a t  the proof pressure  level. 
is detailed under "Fail-safe Design" below. 
I ts  derivation 
Values of the appropriate design factor cf safety for safe-life 
design of the four types of pressure  vessels  are summarized in  Tables 
D-2 through D-5, inclusively. 
Figures  D-7 to D-10, inclusively. 
conventional, although arbi t rar i ly  chosen, valrles of 1.25- 1.40 for ex- 
pendable pressure  vesse ls  are quire appropriate for this application when 
They are also graphically displayed in  
From Figure D-7, it is seen that the 
/K - 1.0 for  single use. K~~ IC 
F o r  fail-safe desigq of pre w u r e  vessels  which are integral  with 
the payloads during proof testing, the design factors of safety a r e  shown 
graphically in Figurea D- 11 to D- 13, inclusively, for the materials under 
investigation and for KTH/KIC = 0.8. 
generated for  other values of KTH/KIc by combining the results of 
T2ble D-4 with Equation (6). 
Similar  d :sign curves can be 
6. FAIL-SAFE 3ESICN: LEAK-BEFORE-BURST CRITERION 
In Reference D-9, an equation defining the minimum factor of 
safety required in fail-safe or leak-Lefore-burst behavior at  the operating 
pressure  level was derived by OlPen and Speare. This equation is 
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whe re 
(F.S.) Fsmin =[(S) 2) (cpcapFj] lI2 (7) 
Mk 
0 = flaw shape parameter,  dimensionless; 
= s t r e s s  intensity magnification factor, and is a 
function of the flaw depth-to-wall thickness ratio, a / t ;  
= ultimate tensile strength of the material;  
= plane s t ra in  fracture toughness; 
Ftu 
K I C  
C = maximal value of s t r e s s  coefficients in the 
pressure  vessel; 
= 1/2 for  spherical  p ressure  vessels; 
= pressure-carrying capability of the vessel; Pcap 
R = characterist ic vessel  radius. 
Corresponding to Equation (7), the upper limit of pressure  which 
will result  in a fail-safe failure mode is 
'FSmax =[( 1.21nM; )($) (a)] 1'2 
Clearly, - 
Pcap x (F.S.) 'FSmax FSmin 
Defining the factor of safety as the ratio of the pressure that 
would cause failure of a vessel  to the pressure  that ac t s  on i t  in service, 
it is seen that 
) = (F.S.)  FSmin PFSma Accordingly, (F.S.) (pmeop 
PRECEDING PAGE BLANK NOT FILMED 
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and 
FSmin 
F. S. =cFsma) (F.S.  
Prneop 
As previously postulated, ground- refurbishable pressure  vessels  
which a r e  integral with the payload must  not fail during proof testing. 
other words, the maximum pressure  experienced during proof tes t  mus t  
not exceed the proper limits of ihat pressure  which will result  in a fail- 
safe failure mode. 
relationship mus t  hold ti,: fulfill our objective: 
In 
Thus, i f  a is the proof-test factor, the following 
Equations (9 )  and (10) can be combined to give 
Accordingly, p = CT pmeOp (F.S.) 
cap  FSmin 
When Equations ( 7 )  and (12) a r e  substituted into Equation (ll), 
the appropriate t-xpression for the required factor of safety to insure 
fail-safe operation at the proof pressure  level is obtained. Indeed, 
When pressure  vessels  a r e  designed in accordance with Equation (13), 
the cr i t ical  flaw depth a t  the proof pressure  level should equal the thick- 
ness  of the vessel  wall. To prove the validity of this statement, we note 
the following relationships: 
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and 
P R  
t = cyL 
tu 
for a pressure vessel in the form of a surface of revolution. 
But, Pproof - 'Pmeop - 
Hence, 
l o 2 l n M k  2 (p rye?)' 
t = ' Q -  -e-- 
= P + r o o P  for general From the familiar hoop stress equation Q 
pressure vessel shapes, we obtain 
proof 
When Equations (15) and (16) a r e  combined and the results simplified, 
we find 
Q (. KIc ) t =  
1.2 I n M t  proof 
= a  c r  @ Pproof (0. E. D.) 
The cr i ter ia  for the usage of Equation (13) a r e  that 
0 If F. S. 2 m, the potential failure mode is LEAK at 
the proof pressure level. 
0 If F. S. m, the potential failure mode ia  BURST at 
the proof pressure level. 
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C. GUIDELINE APPLICATION 
In the following paragraphs,  the design guidelines previously 
developed will be applied to two example problems showing the effect on 
pressure  vessel  design of operating pressure  and single versus  multiple 
tank arrangements.  
I .  EXAMPLE 1: EFFECT O F  OPERATING PRESSURE 
The design requirements are a s  follows: 
0 
U s e s :  15 
0 Ope rating pressure,  pmeop. a. 0.689mn!m (100 psi) 
Configuration: Spherical p ressure  vessel  with R = 45.7  cm 
0 Material: T- 1 Steel 
0 
Ground- refurbishable pressure  vessels  which are integral  
with the spacecraft during proof testing 
2 
b. 6.895 mn/m2  (1000 psi) 
( I d  in.) 
Environmental Effect: KTH/KIc = 0.8  
The design character is t ics  are summarized in Tablt 3-6.  It is 
seen that fo r  Vessel A, satisfaction of the safe-life requirement auto- 
matically fulfills the fail-safe cri terion, whereas, for Vessel B, the 
reverse  situation exists.  Furthermore,  both vessels  exhibit the leak- 
before-burst potential failure mode at the initial proof pressures .  
critical flaw depths for the subsequent proof and operating pressure  condi- 
tions are substantially l a rge r  than the wall thickness, insuring fail- safe 
failure modes for these conditione should undetected flaws grow to the 
critical size under abnormal circumstances.  
The 
2. EXAMPLE 2: SINGLE TANK VS. MULTIPLE TANKS 
The design requirements a r e  as follows: 
0 Ground- refurbishable pressure  vessels  which are integral  
with the spacecraft  during proof testing 
Table 3 - 6 ,  Design Characterist ics for  Example I 
~~~~ 
pmeop 
MATERIAL PROPERTIES(') 
Ftu 
O F  
KIc 
0 Fac to r s  of Safety e! 
t Y 
DESIGN CHARACTERISTICS 
- h ie -L i fe  
- F8il-Safe 
- Proof 
Initial 
Subsequent 
0 Vessel ' fhickness (3) 
0 Crit ical  Flaw Depth (4 1 
Surface Dearity 
0 Vesrel  Weight 
- P-oof P r e s s u r e  
Initial 
Subsequent 
- Operating P r e s s u r e  
0 Failure  Mode 
VESSEL A VESSEL B 
129 ksi 
118 ks i  
889 MN/m2 
814 MN/m2 
92 k s i  I 101 6 
m 
I --- 
I .  84 
(SATISFIED) 
1 .69  
1 .24  
0.013 in. 
0.00368 psi 
14.5 Ib. 
0.063 in. 
0 .  114 in. 
0. 176 in. 
LEAK 
0.033 c m  
0.261 g / m  
6.54 kg 
2 
0.160 c m  
0.290 c m  
0.447 c m  
129 ksi 
118 k s i  
92 k e i  6 
6 .895  MN/m2 
889 MN/m2 
814 MN/m2 
MN 
m 
101 2 Jm 
(SATISFIED 1 
3.81 
1 . 6 9  
1.24 
0.266 in. 
0.0753 psi 
306 lb. 
0.266 in. 
0.493 in. 
0.  760 in. 
0.676 c m  
5 . 3 0  g /m 
139 kg 
2 
0.676 c m  
1.25 c m  
1.93 c m  
LEAK 
NOTES: (1  ) F r o m  Table D- 1. 
(2) From Table D-4 or Figure D-13. 
R x F.S. Pmeop (3)  Calculated from the  equation t = * FtU 
(4)  Calculated from the equation a c r  
with Q = 1 and Mk = I .  6. 
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0 U s e s :  15 
0 Operating P res su re ,  pmeop = 6. 985 r n n / n i  ( 1 O C O  ps i )  
0 Configuration: Spherical pressure vessel  v d u m e  require- 
0 Material: T- 1 Steel 
0 
2 
ment - 400,408 c m 3  (24 ,433  in .  3, 
Environmental Effect: KTH/KIc = 0.8 
The Design Characterist ics are summarized in Table D-7. 
seen that multiple-tank arrangement results in considerable weight savings 
when pressure  vessels  are designed to internal volume constrzints.  
this context, the total weight fo r  the 10-tank configuration of 66 .2  kg (146 lb) 
i s  substantially less than the single tank weight of 139  kg (306 lb). 
cases ,  the proof-test factors a r e  identical to satisfy safe-life requirements, 
but the design factors of safety d i f f e r  sharply. 
fail-safe requirements dictate the selection of the appropriate design factors 
of safety for  all the multiple-tank arrangements except the 10-tank config- 
uration. All the vessels  satisfy the leak-before-burst cr i ter ion a t  the 
initial proof pressure  levels and a r e  fail safe against subsequent proof 
and operating pressure  conditions. 
for  weight-critical p ressure  vessels  which must  satisfy safe-liie require- 
ments  and are required to ensure a fail-safe failure mode, the designer 
should resourt  to multiple-tank arrangements whenever possible. 
It i s  
In 
In all  
F o r  this example problem, 
This example further i l lubtrates that 
D. CONCLUSIONS 
From the results of Tables D-2 to D-5, inclusively, and Figures  
D-11 to D-13, inclusively, the values of the proof factors and the design 
factors of safety are seen to be dependent upon the mechanical properties,  
f racture  toughness, and flaw-growth rates  of the mater ia ls ,  the mission 
requirements, the environmental effects, and the proof-test procedures. 
For expendabl 3ressure vessels,  the design factors of safety for  the six 
common alloys range from 1.20 to  1.33 when KTH/KIc+ 1. U. These 
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Table D-7. Des ign  Char 
24429 i n 3  
18 i n  
1 8  ks i - in  
PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION 
N u m b e r  of Tanks 
Volume p e r  Tank 
R a d i u s  
3 400,320 c m  
45.7 crn 
3.  15 MN/m 
STRESS P A R A M E T E R  
R . prneop 
0. 168 in 
0 , 0 4 7 4  p s i  
DESIGN CHARACTERISTICS 
0 F a c t o r s  of Safety ::: 
- S a f e - L i f e  
- F a i l - S a f e  
- Proof 
In i t ia l  
Sub s e q u e n t  
V e s s e l  T h i c k n e s s  :: 
0 S u r f a c e  Densi ty  
0 Tank Weight 
- Each Tank 
- Total Weight 
0 C r i t i c a l  F law Depth ::: 
- P r o o f  P r e s s u r e  
Ini t ia l  
Sub s e q u e n t  
- O p e r a t i n g  P r e s s u r e  
Failure Mode 
' 
(SATISFIED) 
3. 81 
1. 69 
1 
0 . 2 6 6  in  
0 . 0 7 5 3  p s i  
306 l b  
306 lb  
0 . 2 6 6  i n  
0 . 4 9 3  in  
0. 760 in  
!4 
0. 676 c m  
5. 30 g f c r n  3 
139 kg 
139 kg 
0. 676 c m  
1 . 2 5  c m  
1 . 9 3  c m  
LEAK 
12215 in3 1: 
1 4 . 3  in 
14.  3 k s i - i n  1 ;  
( SA TI S F' 
3. 0" 
O. 108 i n  
0 .311  i n  
0 . 4 7 8  in  
.*: Obtained f rom s a m e  e q u a t i o n s  a n d  s o u r c e  as Example 1 ,  T a b l e  D-6. 
, Table D-7. Design Characteristics for Example 2 
2443 in 
8 . 3 5  in 
3 320 cm 
5 .7  cm 
3 40032 c m  
2 1 . 2  c m  
,L MNIm 
3 4886 in 
10. 5 in 
10.  5 k s i - i n  
3 ; 1 2 0 0 , 1 6 0  c m 3  
3 6 . 3  c m  
3 80064 c m  
2 6 . 7  c m  
1 . 8 4  M N / m  8 . 5 5  k s i - i n  
(SA TIS.71ED) 
3.03 
1 . 4 6  M N / m  1 4 . 3  k s i - i n  2 . 5  M N / m  
- 
(SATISFIED) 
2 . 2 2  
1 . 6 9  
1 . 2 4  
0. 168 in 
0.0474 p s i  
121 l b  
242 lb  
0 .  168 i n  
0.311 i n  
0 .478  in  
0 . 0 9 1  in 
0 . 0 2 5 7  p s i  
0 . 4 2 7  c m  
3 .  34 g / c m  
3 
54. 9 kg 
109. 8 kg 
0 . 4 2 4  c m  
0 ,  790 c m  
1 . 2 1  c m  
3 5 . 8  l b  
1 7 9  l b  
0 . 0 9 1  i n  
0 . 1 6 9  in  
0 . 2 6 0  i n  
0 . 2 3 1  c m  
1 . 8 1  g / c m  3 
1 6 . 2  kg 
81 kg 
0 .231  c m  
0 . 4 2 9  c m  
0 .660  c m  
LEAK 
1 .  8 4  
(SATISFIED) 
1 .  6 9  
1 . 2 4  
0 . 0 6 0  i n  
0 . 0 1 6 8  p s i  
1 4 . 6  l b  
146  lb  
0 .  060 i n  
0 . 1 1 3  i n  
0. 175 i n  
0 . 1 5 2  c m  
1 .  1 8  g / c m  3 
6. 62 IC, 
6 6 . 2  kg 
0 .  152 c m  
0 . 2 8 7  c m  
0 . 4 4 5  c m  
LEAK 
&rnple 1 ,  Table D-6. D-41 

values are seen to agree  with the conventional, although arb i t ra r i ly  chosen, 
values of 1.25-1.40 fo r  this type of pressure  vessels.  This a g r e e m v t  is 
particularly relevant due to the time-tested nature of the convent;(>. 
value s . 
For the other types of Shuttle payloads, the values of design 
factors of safety differ considerably from the conventional values. 
results of this investigation clear ly  demonstrate the inadequacy of the 
single factor of safety design philosophy practiced conventionally. In fact, 
no single fixed factor of safety is appropriate to ensure safe-life o r  fail- 
safe behavior for  all pressure  vessels, nor i s  the single factor of safety 
design philosophy adequate to address  the diversified design possibilities 
offered by the increased capability and versatility of the Space Shuttle 
program. By suitable aoplication of the principles of f racture  mechanics, 
candidate mater ia l s  fo r  specified mission objectives can be ranked on the 
basis of their  s t ructural  performance, resulting in improved harmony 
among mater ia ls ,  design requirements, and safety of airborne pressure  
vessels. In addition, meaningful design tradeoffs are possible when 
factors of safety a r e  established in a rational manner. 
1 3 % ~  
E. RECOMMENDATIONS 
It is recommended that this guideline be enforced on all pressure  
vesse l  design for the four types of Shuttle payloads under consideration. 
To further quantify the valueo fo r  the proof and design 'actors of safety, 
i t  is also recommended that a detailed material characteriza'.ion program 
be implemented so that specific flaw-growth rates,  strengths and fracture  
toughness date, etc. in the expected operating environments can be ascer- 
tained for  candidate pressure  vessel  mater ia l s  in the appropriate fluid 
environment. 
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APPENDIX E. THERMAL CONTROL 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The basic function of the thermal control subsystem is to pro- 
vide thermal control to the other subsystems within the payload. 
potentially greater  payload weight and volume capability available in the 
Shuttle e ra ,  the thermal control 
there a r e  no payload failures caused by loss  of thermal control. 
With the 
ubsystem (TCS) should be designed so thnt 
In order  to effect this, tradeoff sttldies should be performed to 
identify the penalties associated with various degrees of cold side bias. 
Cold side bias requires designing the TCS to operate at  or near  the cold end 
of a subsystem/component's acceptable temperature range. 
of design approach, the result  wil l  be a subsystem,. nponent with better 
reliability characterist ics because of i t s  lower operating temperature and 
greater temperature margin on the hot side. 
margin which is lost by this design approach will be recouped by adding 
heaters. The pr imkry tradeoff involves the additional weight and volume 
associated with the heater power versus  the increase in mean mission 
duration (MMD) and increased confidence in thermal control performance. 
With this type 
The cold side temperh*ure 
In the modular spacecraft concept, each module should have 
This will alleviate interface problems such as i t s  own autonomous TCS. 
fluid connects and mating of cri t ical  heat paths. 
Generally, subsyetems /components have different temperatiire 
limits for operating and non-operating conditions. The use of a cold side bias 
design is directed toward the ope rat-hg temperature limits. Consideration 
will need to be given to designing the TCS so that subsystem/component 
temperature can be passively controlled when the normal TCS system is in- 
operable. This will provide capabi lity to maintain acceptable temperatures 
during completely quiescent modes. 
E-1 
ANALYSIS B. 
1. 
- 
COST CONSIDERATIONS 
The objective of this appendix is to provide guidelines for the 
production of low cost, reliable payloads launched with the Shuttle. Cost is 
distributed over a large fleet of spacecraft and not charged to just one 
specific vehicle. 
a cursory review of subsystem relative costs was made. Cost information 
w a s  taken from Reference E-1 and i s  shown in Table E-1 to provide an 
appreciation of the relative costs of Spacecraft subsystems. The data a r e  
for four different representative NASA spacecraft, and botn RDT&E and 
recurring costs a r e  shown. 
In order  to realistically assess  the cost savings potential, 
Experiment costs are not included in this table. Altho-h the 
percentages for the various subsystems differ among the four missions 
because of differences in orbital and mission objectives, the fact that thermal 
control costs a r e  relaAvely small i s  irrefutable. Therefore, reducing costs 
directly related to thermal requirements will  not significantly reduce the 
cost of the spacecraft. 
duced into the thermal analysis by reducing the total thermal effort m a y  result  
in increased costs +le to failures of the vehicle. 
Instead, additional uncertainties which may be intro- 
The basic purpose of the thermal control subsystem is to provide 
a support function. 
systems may function properly. 
result not only in loss of the thermal control subsystem proper but also in the 
failure of one or more  of the other subsystems. 
It ensures a benign environment in which the other sub- 
Failure of the thermal control slabs) stem may 
2. REVIZW OF SPACECRAFT ANOMALIES 
The extent to which thermal problems currently result in space- 
craft anomalous behavior will h-ive s o m e  bearing on the approaches taken for  
a Shuttle payload. If therrladl anomalies a re  shown to be minimal and result  
in minimal impact OR spacecraft performance, the thermal design approach 
probably will not differ in the Shuttle e r a  from what is done today. 
E-2 
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Failures and anomalies which occurred on selected Air Force 
Programs were reviewed to determine any common underlying causes and 
to determine corrective actions (Ref. E-2). 
classified by discipline, and the results show that of the failure/anomalies 
reviewed, 11.6 percent we-e attributable to thermal design. Failures / 
anomalies included overheating caused by surface degradation o r  contam - 
irlation, thermal runaway c f batteries, and inaccuracies in temperature 
predictions due to analysis and simulation. Although the 11.6 percent 
failures/anomalies did not result in total loss of mission, thermal subsystem 
failures/anomalies did cause a disportionately higher percentage of anomalies 
than its cost would indicate. 
Failures /anomalies were 
The basic finding of the failure/anomaly review was that a 
s ip i f ican t  number of failure/anomalies we re due to inadequate thermal design 
resulting from insufficient temperature margins in the TCS design. It must 
be concluded that where system tradeoffs dictate, greater  margins should be 
included in the TCS design. Cold side bias with active heaters is a means of 
providing greater  temperature margins. 
3. EFFECTOFTEMPERATUREONFAILURERATE 
It has been shown that for semi-conductors and microelectronic 
integrated circuits, the Arrhenius model gives a fairly good representation 
of the failure rate (Ref. Z-3). The Arrhenius model states that the failure 
rate is exponentially related to the negative of the reciprocal of the absolute 
temperature. Figure E- 1 illustrates this relationship. 
Mechanical failures, such as breaking of solder joints and 
seals, a r e  primarily caused by thermal s t resses ,  and occur more readily 
at  lower temperatures a s  shown in Figure GI. The resv.ltant total failure 
rate also is shown as a dashed line. 
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ARother consideration is the effect of temperature variation o r  
temperature cycling on failure rate. 
not well known in te rms  of quantitative failure ra tes ,  but qualitatively, the 
failure rate inc leases  with increasing temperature cycling. 
The effect of temperature cycling is 
Although the quantitative effect of temperature on failure rate 
is not well defined because of the individual characteristics of each component 
and despite the dearth ai  available data ai this type, several general c u r l -  
clusions can be drawn regarding the effect of temperature on failure rate: 
a. 
b. 
Failure rate will increase with both too low and 
with too high an operating temperature. 
There is generally a minimum in the temperature- 
failure rate curve. 
Temperature cycling tends 5" increase failure rate. C. 
Thermally, the message is that in order  to reduce temperature- 
induced failure rates,  components should be run at  a relatively constant 
temperature. 
optimally (from failure rate considerations) is characterist ic of each specific 
component. 
of the currently utilized temperature ranges. 
meager supporting the fact that the lower end of the temperature range is 
near  opt; 1a1, data on NiCd batteries was found which supports this con- 
tention. (Ref. E -4). 
The temperature level a t  which a specific component operates 
Typically, however, optimal temperatures a r e  near  the lower end 
Although documented data is 
4. COLD SIDE BIAS 
Common practice is to design the thermal control sxbsystem so 
that there a r e  q u a l  margins on both the hot and cold sides. The rationale 
is that it i L  equally difficult to predict hot or  cold temperatures, and a 
compon .it is therefore equally likely to fail as a result of either a too cold 
or a too hot environment. 
E-6 
Cold side bias is a concept wherein a component is designed 
thermally to operate relatively near its cold temperature limit. 
is  that additional temperature margin is gained on the hot side with loss of 
temperature margins on the cold side. Heaters a re  then used to provide the 
necessary cold side margin. 
The result 
The cold side bias concept is illustrated in Figure E-2 which 
shows internal heat flux as  a function of temperature for both the maximum 
and minimum enviror.menta1 conditions for a typical geosynchronous orbit. 
A typical electronic equipment operating range is also shown in Figure E-2. 
When operating in the cold bias mode, the nominal temperature 
of the equipment is reduced, and the temperature margin on the hot side is 
increased. These advantages are not free; the penalty to provide these 
characteristics is additional heater power. The amount of additional power 
required is dependent on the orbital conditions and the amount of heater 
margin one wants to incorporate into the design. The additional power 
requirement will probably be acceptable because of the large weight and 
volume capability of the Space Shuttle. 
Figures E-3 through EL5 show radiator heat rejection capability 
as a function of temperature for various orbits. The minimum and maximum 
environments refer to the minimum and maximum orbital h e a t h  conditions. 
For example, for a radiator with a constant internal load, its temperature 
will cycle (horizontally) between the minimum and maximum environments. 
Thermal extremes a re  greatest in the synchronous orbit and smallest for 
the low earth orbit radiator facing the earth. 
5. EFFECT OF COLD SIDE BlAS DESIGN ON SURFACE PROPERTY 
CONSIDERATIONS 
Past experience has shown that thermal surface property 
degradation results in substandard thermal performance of certain space- 
craft. The primary causes for performance degradation have been UV 
radiation damage and surtace contamination. 
. 
The result of these types of 
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damages is primarily an increase in surface absorptivity. 
using second surface mi r ro r s  is showing an u degradation of approximately 
two percent per month, and similar degradation data has been shown for 
white paints (Ref. E- 5). Consequently temperatures inc rease. 
One spacecraft 
The use of the cold side bias concept for common spacecraft 
equipment results in increased temperature margins on the hot side. 
causes of solar absorptivity increase cannot be alleviated by design o r  
material  control consideration, nominal temperatures can be expected to 
increase. 
side temperature margin so that the time to reach the maximum permissible 
temperature, and therefore vehicle life, is increased. 
If the 
However, the cold side bias concept increases the available hot 
6 .  PASSIVE THERMAL CONTROL I N  THE NON-OPERATIONAL MODE 
The use of a cold side bias design will result in a relatively 
constant temperature component design a t  a relatively low temperature. 
use of a cold side bias design concept, however, will have limitations due to 
several  considerations. First, the orbital considerations and the tradeoff 
between the benefits of cold side bias and heater power must  be considered. 
Second, the problem of a module or subsystem getting too cold in a failed 
mode must be considerec. 
The 
In present expendable satellite design, no consideration is 
given to the design requirements for a salvageable satellite in the event of 
a failure. When one speaks of refurbishing a satellite, one must consider 
maintaining the failed satellite in a refurbishable condition. Additionally, 
in the event of a failure, the design must effectively isolate the failure so 
that secondary failures will not result. 
pr imary cause of secondary failures is components becoming excessively 
cold after a power failure. A power failure may result in both the loss of 
internally generated heat and heater power capability. Subsequently, the 
component may be permanently damaged by the excessive cold. In order  
to avoid this problem, the use of the cold side bias design must  be tempered 
In the a rea  of thermal control, the 
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with the constraint that the TCS should be required to prevent component 
temperature in a zero-powered condition from falling lower than the component 
specified minimum non-operating temperature. 
7 .  APPLICABILITY TO PAYLOADS 
The philosophy of improving TCS performance to provide 
better payload temperature control is applicable to expendable, on-orbit 
maintainable, and ground refurbishable payloads. 
side bias can be applied is dependent on the weight and power penalties 
involved. The acceptability of these penalties is rather a function of the 
orbit than the type of mission. Orbital parameters a re  important, became 
they define the space environmental condition and also determine the payload 
allowable total weight. 
The extent to which cold 
C. CONCLUSIONS 
In determining thermal guidelines for spacecraft design in the 
Shuttle era, several initial considerations were investigated. First, since 
the ultimate objective is to provide guidelines for a low cost payload, space- 
craft subsystem relative costs (excluding experiment costs) were reviewed. 
Second, spacecraft experienced failures and anomalies were reviewed to 
determine the extent to which thermal problems have contributed to failures/ 
anomalies in the past. 
evaluated. Finally, a thermal gukdeline was developed which is believed will 
result in a more reliable and cheaper vehicle. 
A review of spacecraft system cost data revealed that thermal 
subsystems were one of the least expensive subsystems. Thermal control 
amounted to less than five percent in each of four typical NASA spacecraft 
missions reviewed. Consequently, a significant cost savings will not be 
effected by reducing TCS related coats. Even i f  TCS related costs can be 
totally eliminated, total cost will not be reduced appreciably. Consideration 
of spacecraft experienced failures and anomalies seems to indicate that in 
Third, the effect of temperature on failure rate was 
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the Shuttle e ra ,  more effort (both analytical and experimental) should be 
expended in the a rea  of thermal control, because the results of failures/  
anomalies attributable to thermal design may result in losses fa r  greater  
in cost than the actual cost of the TCS. 
It would appear that the thermal design approach to use in the 
Shuttle e r a  would be to incorporate an improved TCS to increase performance 
and reliability. 
tzaditionally have been constraints on vehicle weight and volume. Weight 
limitations a r e  reflected primarily in constraints 6ri ava3able rower for 
thermal control. 
The pr imary obstacles to improved thermal design 
With the Shuttle, it is anticipated that we; -nd volume 
constraints will be relaxed to result in a better spacecraft - +  I. 
Reliability and failure rate data indicate that te.. pG;Tature has 
an impact on MMD considerations. First order  considerations indicate that 
electronics failure rates can be approximated by Arrhenius ' Law, which 
states that failure rate is exponentially related to the reciprocal of the 
absolute temperature. Consequently, it  appears that from a component/ 
subsystem reliability standpoint, it will be advantageous to opcrate the 
component at a reasonably low temperature. However, the iower temperature 
limit will be limited by mechanical-failure -rate considerztions . Additionaily, 
the implication is that it is advantageous to operate components at a 
relatively constant temperature. 
A basic conclusion which was deduced from the a b w e  review was 
that trying to reduce thermal cost will not significantly reduce program cost. 
Additionally, since thermal control is ? relatively low cost item, the 
additional weight and volume available for Shuttle payloads should be used 
to provide a better performing TCS which should result in a better performing 
spacecraft. 
These conclusions and reliabil'ty data resulted in the proposed 
application of the cold side bias concept in which components a r e  operated 
near the cold end of their thermal operating range. In order  to do thi5, 
heater power is required. 
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D. RECOMMENDATIONS 
It is recommended that in the design of Shuttle pa .*ads,  the 
in par t  to additional weight and volume capability of the Shuttle be utili-,. 
provide more  stringent temperature control in order  to i P c ? e a c  subsystem/ 
component performance characteristics. 
heavier anJ  perhaps more expensive thermal contA :l subsystem, it is 
believed that on an overall systems basis, it wi l l  result in a cheaper vehicle 
because of improved per 
will depend on the penaities involved (weight, power, volume). Consequently, 
i t  is :'.so recommended that improved methods of temperature control be 
..valuated on an individual payload basis because of the differences in the 
importance of tradeoff parameters  for each payload. 
Allhugh t h i s  may result in a 
rmance, life, and reliability. 
The degree to which b?tter temperature control car' be effected 
a means 
E. 
E- 1. 
E-2. 
E- 3. 
E-4. 
E- 5. 
It is further recommended that co:d side bias be considered as 
of providing improved thermal control. 
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APPENDIX F. HEACTION CONTROL 
A. INTROCUCTION 
The development and fabrication of high- efficiency, reliable 
reaction control subsystems for conventional satellites has been 
(historically) very costly. 
lau x h  weight capacity of expendable boosters which imposes stringent 
weight limits on the satellite, high reliability demands, and highly pre- 
cise impulse bits required by the satellite control subsystem. It is 
apparent that the unique capabilities of the Space Shuttle (excess launch- 
weight capacity, orbit rendezvous, and retrieval) may be utilized to 
substantially reduce these costs while maintaining the required satellite 
operational reliability. 
This situation is the result of the limited 
ASSUMPTIONS -B. 
The reaction control subsystem provides thrust for such 
functions a s  attitude control, stationkeeping, spin-up, despin, on-orbit 
maneuvering, spin-axis precession, and apsis corrections. This analysis 
specifically exclude8 the orbit injection maneuver which requires its own 
unique tradeoff study  comparing the use of the Shuttle/Tug, an expendable 
kick stage, or an additional propulsion subsystem within the payload. 
Table F-1 lists some of the types of propulsion subsystems 
available for consideration in payload design. 
assumed sufficient to analyze only the three most common types, which 
a re  inert gas, hydrazine monopropellant, and the N204/MMH bipropellant. 
For this analysis, it  is 
Table F-1. Types of Propulsion Systems Considered 
Inert Gas 
Freon 
* Nitrogen 
Helium 
Argon 
Ammonia 
Mixed Gases 
Tridyne (02 t H2 t N2) 
Freon - Nitrogen 
Helium - Nitrogen 
Liquid Monopropellant 
* Hydrazine 
Peroxide 
Heated Cas 
Electrical (NZ,  NH3, etc.) 
Radioisotope (Hg, C 5’ NHJ) 
Nuclear Reactor (HZ) 
Ionic -
Cesium 
Pulsed Plasma 
Teflon 
Mercury 
Colloid 
Clyce rol 
Subliming Solid 
Solid Propellant 
Liquid Bipropellant 
* Storables (N204/MMH, IRFNA/UDMH, etc. ) 
Cryogenics (FZ/H2, OZ/HZ, etc.) 
Electrolysis 
Hydrazine 
Water 
Peroxide 
I 
* Most commonly used for satellites 
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In order to reduce study examples to manageable numbers 
of variables, it is assumed that the payload requires 12 thrusters in 
the 89-N (20-lb) or less thrust range. 
of 65 sec, 200 sec, and 300 sec for nitrogen, hydrazine monopropellant, 
and bipropellant, respectively, the propulsion subsystem weight, cost 
and volume were determined and are  presented graphically in Figures 
F-1 through F-3, These results are  useful for comparative purposes 
during preliminary design and as an example of the approach to an 
appropriate system tradeoff analysis, 
Assuming specific impulses 
C. ANALYSIS 
The approach to selection of the most cost-effective propulsion 
subsystem is keyed to the payload type. An expendable payload with a 
long life may require a much more sophisticated system than an on-orbit 
maintainable or ground-refurbishable payload in order to meet the weight 
and reliability requirements. 
be a pressure-regulated nitrogen gas subsystem. It is the simplest and 
least costly of any of the subsystems for total impulse requirements less 
than approximately 6.7 x 10 newton sec (15,000 lb eec). As requirements 
exceed this value, the inert gas subsystem becomes too coetly, primarily 
due to the large volume, high pressure tankage required, Comparative 
weights of the three systems versus total impulse requirements are  
given in Figure F-1, and the rapid increase in weight with total impulse 
requirements of the nitrogen subsystem is apparent here. 
impulse delivered of 6.7 x 10 newton sec (15,000 lb sec), the inert gas 
subsystem is four times as  heavy as the other two subsystems, and the 
tank -rolume is an order of magnitude greater than that for the liquid 
subsystems (Figure F-3). An assumption of "no redundancy" was made 
in the data provided in  Figures F-1 through F-3. 
include cost or weight of any positive expulsion device. 
However, the first consideration should 
4 
Far a total 
4 
The data do not 
Because cost 
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is the prime consideration, the nitrogen gas subsystem should be given 
first choice if the weight and volume are not incompatible with system 
requirements . 
If the nitrogen subsystem is not feasible (because of high 
total impulse requirements or excessive weight), the next consideration 
should be the hydrazine monopropellant subsystem. A typical N2H4 
subsystem would operate in the blowdown mode (no regulator) with the 
propellant tank filled with hydrazine and pressurant in approximately 
equal volumes. Such a subsystem actually has fewer components than 
an inert gas system and may have equivalent o r  higher reliability 
will depend on the mission duration/refurbishment cycle in which the 
expected failure rate of mono-propellant thrusters is traded against the 
failure rate of a regulator. 
is 
The hydrazine subsystem shows a cost advantage over a 
bipropellant subsystem for total impulse requirements less than 13 .3  x 
10 newton sec (300,000 lbsec). At this point, the greater volume and 
weight of the hydrazine propellant required demand large costly tank 
volumes. Also, in this region it becomes necessary to consider a 
pressure-regulated subsystem to reduce system volume by storing the 
pressurant in smaller high pressure tanks, thereby adding complexity 
and grading reliability. 
5 
If neither of the discussed subsystems can meet the total 
impulse requirements within the weight and volume constraints, the 
liquid bipropellant subsystem remains as the only choice. Here the 
tradeoff is between the reduced weight and volume of a bipropellant 
subsystem against its increased complexity and hazard and reduced 
reliability. 
A mention should be made of a combined mono/bipropellant 
subsystem using N204/N2H4 propellants. In this concept, hydrazine 
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can be used to power small attitude control thrusters which operate 
mostly in a pulsing mode, while the bipropellant with high specific 
impulse can be used for any larger  engines expending a great :r amount 
of total impulse. 
For  the liquid propellant subsystems, operation under zero g 
environment will be a requirement. To meet this requirement, bladders 
o r  surface-tension devices will be employed. 
organic materials o r  metals. 
of material compatibility with the fluids used and the number of expulsion 
cycles and temperatures to which they a r e  subjected. In general, 
nonmetallic bladders are suitable for multi-expulsion cycle application 
while metallic ones a r e  limited usually to one or  two expulsions (exceptions 
to these are the metal bellows). 
successfully employed with large tanks on the tank's outlet to trap enough 
liquid to allow the start of a rocket engine (as on the Agena). 
a lso been experimentally demonstrated i n  smaller tanks  but have not 
been used in the numbers that bladders have. 
in the design of surface-tension devices to ensure that heat soakback 
does not vaporize +he propellant downstream of the surface-tension screen 
creating a A P  that forces the trapped liquid back through the screen 
during a coast period, leaving only gas between the screen and the rocket 
engine inlet. 
Bladders may be either 
The selection will be made on the basis 
Surface-tension devices have been 
They have 
Care must be exercised 
For  some specialized applications , the water electrolysis 
propulsion subsys tern could be considered. 
to extended-duration missions that do not require large intermittent 
expenditures of propellant which would require prohibitively large 
electrical power and/or gaseous (hydrogen and oxygen) storage. 
type of propellant generation (the evolution oi hydrogen and oxygen from 
water by electrolysis) has been demonstrated but has not been developed 
to the point of flight-qualified hardware. Thr  inherent advantages of the 
system are high I (combustion of H2 and 02), storage of the propellant 
as  water (compact), very low hazard, no toxicity, etc. 
This subsystem is applicable 
This 
SP 
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The propulsion subsystem components can be divided into 
three categories with respect to their expected reliability. 
components are  grouped in Table F-2. 
are  low reliability and have a useful life limit expressed in number of 
cycles. The low reliability of propellant tanks is due to the corrosion 
hazard of liquid propellants. Increased safety margins for such tanks 
will be an important factor in improving their reliability. 
in Category 11 are  of medium reliability, are, in general, not subject to 
mission time limitation, and could be reused in a refurbishment cycle 
after a suitable checkout test. The components in Category III have 
essentially unlimited life. It is possible to bring the high-pressure 
vessels into that category if the safety factors are  suitably increased. 
The costs shown are  typical for small number production components 
and do not reflect the cost reduction which could be realized with larger 
production batches and modified specifications. 
These 
The Category I components 
The components 
A detailed discussion of the properties of the three types of 
interest is presented in the following paragraphs along with the rationale 
for the RCS design approach for each type. 
1. EXPENDABLE 
The selection of a propulsion subsystem for an expendable 
payload is mainly mission dependent. The impulse requirements, the 
life on orbit, reaction force levels, etc. a re  determined by the missicn, 
satellite mass properties, and attitude control method employed. 
propulsion selection then is made to provide the reaction control 
subsystem that will meet the required mission reliability with minimum 
cost. 
The 
The tradeoff of weight, cost, and volume for the reaction 
control subsystems that will meet the technical requirements of the 
miesion must be made (as illustrated in Figures F-1 through F-3). The 
selection will then be self evident. In determining projected reliability 
levels, the factors listed in Table F-2 may be used as  a guide. 
Table F-2. Typical RCS Component Character is t ics  
Component 
Category I 
Propellant Tanks 
Thrusters ,  N2H4 
Thrusters ,  
Th-u ste r Valves 
Thruster Valves, 
Thruster  Valves, 
N2H4/iWH (2 req'd) 
Pres sure  Transducers 
Pneumatic Regulators 
Check Valves 
Po s i t  ive Expulsi op 
N204/ MMH 
GN2 
N2H4 
... - 
Bladde r s 
Category IX 
-- 
Nitrogen Tank 
Thruste rs, GN2 
Fill and Drain Valves 
The r mi s te rs 
-~ ~ - - .  
:ategory ILZ 
Pyro Valves 
F i l te rs  
Piping & Brazed Jointr 
Brackets, Structural  
Comnonents 
Typical 
Cycle 
Liie 
50 
100,000 
50,000 
200,000 
100,000 
50,000 
100,000 
100,000 
100,000 
50 
200,000 
50 
1 
1 
--- 
--- 
Typical 
Production 
cos t  ($1 
8,000 - 3 
16,0OO/ft 
4,000 each 
8,000 each 
4,000 each 
4,000 each 
4,000 each 
500 each 
5,000 each 
500 each 
4,000 - 
5,00O/ft 
500 each 
500 each 
500 each 
Typical 
Rzliability 
Factor  - 
1 0 - h ~  
330 
166 
40 0 
347 
347 
3 47 
340 
245 
250 
300 
- -. _ . . -  
14  
17 
70 
25 
1-10 
1-10 
1 
F- 10 
In principle, the expendable payloads do not I equire propulsion 
modularization since no refurbishment is possible, although in pre-orbital 
checkout in the Shuttle, a replacement of a module, i f  found defective, 
could enhance the overall mission success. 
However, i f  the principle of standardization of certain 
subsystems, including propulsion, is developed because of the on-orbit 
o r  on-ground refurbishable payloads, it may be economically attractive 
to use similar standard housekeeping modules in expendable payloads. 
The question of redundancy of propulsion components for  
expendable pvloads  should be resolved by consideration of component 
reliability, such 2 s  shown in Table F-2, against the desired mission 
time and reliability goals. 
A number of options a r e  open to the designer to achieve 
minimum cost a t  the required system reliability le-del. If the total 
impulse requirements a r e  low, a totally redundant nitrogen gas subsystem 
might be less expensive and more reliable than a single hydrazine sub- 
system. 
may be made redundant to improve its reliability. 
a great need for  redundancy in this type of payload a s  opposed to the 
refurbishable type, particularly for long duration missions. 
Lower reliability components within a single hydrazine subsystem 
There may be, indeed, 
Consideration must be given to the Shuttle interface require- 
ments for  crew safety, propellant dump requirements (in case of an 
abort), environment, etc., and this is equally applicable to all of the 
other payloads. 
2. ON-ORBIT MAINTAINABLE 
The concept of maintaining a satellite on orbit as compared 
to the expendable concept may profoulidly influence the design of the 
propulsion subsystem and the choice of ptopellante, since the choice 
of a subeyeteni based solely on the total impulse requirements may no 
longer be valid. As an example, consider the long-life expendable 
satellite with large total impulse requirements that normally would 
force the choice of a bipropellant liquid subsystem to meet the weight 
and impulse limitations. 
number of times during its life on orbit, a simple nitrogen gas subsystem 
that is resupplied a t  intervals may meet the system requirements at 
significantly lower cost and with higher reliability. 
resupply missions should be flown exclusively to resupply the propellant, 
the cost of the resupply mission must be included in the tradeoff study 
and might negate the lower cost of the inert  gas subsystem. 
assumed, however, that programmed on-orbit maintenance will be for 
the benefit of many systems and that the propulsion subsystem will ! ,z  
planned to use this available maintenance to best advantage. 
If the same satellite may be visited some 
Obviously, i f  the 
It is 
The planning of the quantity of propellant and type, then, 
is to meet the impulse requirements between resupply visits. 
fundamental decision faces the designer at this point. 
the propellant, shall the resupply vehicle refill the original tanks on the 
satellite, replace tank modules with fully charged tank modules, o r  
perhaps replace the complete propulsion subsystem modules which wi l l  
contain a block of thrusters, tanks, and appropriate valving? 
primary advantage for the las t  approach is that it eliminates Fropellant 
and pressurant interfaces (and potential leaks) and reduces interfaces 
to a single electrical connection for propulsion control. 
of this approach would be in the duplication of tanks, regulators, valves, 
etc., since two o r  more modules will be contained in a payload which 
increases the weight and cost. Also, such modules must be designed 
to car ry  the maxirnum propellant that is required for any situation (no 
propellant crossfeed capability), thus adding weight. 
be identical in order to minimize cost. 
Another 
Having selected 
The 
The disadvantage 
Each module would 
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Another alternative is to replace an empty +ank with a fu l l  
tank but not replace thrusters, valves, regulators, etc. This requires 
a quick-disconnect-type fluid connection whlcl~ has a leak potential. In 
the event this approach is chosen for the refillable tank, redundancy in 
some critical components, such as dcial- seat disconnects and latching 
solenoid valves, may be desirable to provide the reliability for the 
system that is specicied. 
liquid propellants, this approach may be considered superior to the 
alternative discussed below, because it provides for an  automatic 
replacement of a positive expulsion device which may be cycle limited. 
For  the requirement of zero g expulsion with 
On-orbit refueling with no routine hardware replacement 
The most obvious is a third option that has a number of advantages. 
one is the cost savings, not only in  reduced hardware requirements but 
also in making no demands on the satellite design to facilitate exchanging 
modules to satisfy the total impulse requirement. In its simplest 
concept, only a quick disconnect would be required to refuel the tank. 
This would be the least  costly and lightest of the above concepts for a 
given propellant. 
and multiple-cycle demands on an expulsion device. 
The disadvantages a r e  possible leakage at  the disconnect 
Finally, there is the situation where, either because of 
design constraints, refueling-in-orbit hazards, o r  the high cost of 
complete multi-propulsion modules, large enough tanks will be provided 
to contain all the fluids required for the mission. In such a case, the 
choice of the propulsion subsystem will be based on the previously 
discussed total impulse criteria. However, even in this case, the 
problem of flu:d disconnects wil l  face the designer. 
In the modularization of propulsion subsystems, two principles 
will be involved: one is to inc:lude in a module all  of the low reliability 
components (Category I) which may need refurbishment, and the second 
is to provide isola:iz3 valves so that a malfunctioning module could be 
isolated and the remaining modules car ry  on the attitude control functions 
into the next refurbishment cycle. 
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The FleetSatCom reaction control subsystem offers an 
excellent example of modularization, it is relatively complex, and i t  
incorporates most of the features and component types that a r e  used 3n 
satellite payloads. 
FleetSatCom reaction control subsystem. 
the form of a system schematic such that the propellant flow path from 
the propellant tanks to the thruster nozzles can be easily traced. 
system incorporates protection against likely single-point failure n o d e s  
by the use of standby redundant thruster systems. 
Figure F-4 is a block diagram of the present 
The blocks a r e  arranged i n  
The 
Figure F-5 ill-istrates (in block-diagram form) the application 
of modularity to the FleetSatCom type of reaction control propision 
subsystem. 
contained propulsion module. 
located cn the spacecraft to provide the required r eac t im  control forces. 
RedundanLy requirements would be met by simply addint additional 
standby modules. 
since a complete system can be removed and reidaced a s  a unit. 
general approach also leads to the possibility of stan:brdized propulsion 
system modules that may be used on 3 numb. 
The entire Figure F-5 system would be a complete, self- 
The modules would be strategically 
This approach has tk, advantage of ease of maictezance, 
The 
:rent payloa :'s . 
This idealized approach could only be conslriere2 for Space 
Shuttle launches, since there a r e  very large penalties tc be pai2 in 
weight, volume, mass  properties, and performance. Also, the block 
diagram has been simplified so that it does not include instrumentation, 
heaters, electrical control to valves, test  ports, and structurzl  
inter fa cee . 
Figure F-5 also illustrates a lower level of subsystem 
modularity. 
has been demonstrated to be practical on several  programs and shaulc? 
be emphasized as a standardization objective for the SLuttle era. 
modularization of other subsystem elements such a s  tankage and the gas 
For instance, the use of interchangeable thrustek. modules 
Further 
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Figure F-4. Block Diagram of a Typical Satellite Propulsion 
Subsystem (FleetSatCom) 
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'Pigure F- 5 .  Block Diagram , V I  Modularized Propulsion 
System (Flee tSatC om) 
generator-plenum subsystem leads to a building-block approach which 
could provide cost savings through standardization. This approach is 
currently employed to a certain extent on Air  Force programs, as each 
new program tries to make maximum use of previously qualified and 
flown hardware. This huilding-block approach of assembling standardized 
subsystem and subassembly modules into a propulsion system is generally 
the most effective approach, but it necessitates breaking propellant feed 
system attachments for module replacements. 
If the propulsion subsystem has, for instance, a pressure 
regulator, the designer's option is to either include it in one of the 
replaceable modules or  to provide a redundant regulator(s). 
The question of redundancy in the attitude control subsystem 
has to be carefully considered becaust the docking maneuver will, in 
general, require an attitude-stabilized payload. A single failure or even 
a dual failure mode has to be considered either by module redundancy 
or  by a backup cold gas system. 
The problem of fluid disconnects was mentioned before. 
Drip-free fluid disconnects a r e  at present available and a redundant 
seat arrangement, perhaps combined with an isolation valve actuated 
before a disconnect operation, could possible ensure hazard- and leak- 
f ree  operation. Similar attention should be paid to electrical connectors 
which will probably lead to a departure from the standard multi-pin 
concept , 
To take full advantage of the Shuttle era, consideration 
should be given to standardization of propulsion modules into two or  
perhars three thrust levels to suit the variety of payloads anticipated 
by NASA with a resulting reduction in  RDT&E and production costs. 
weigh the possibility of relaxing some of the specifications for components 
such as thrusters (number of cycles), valve leakage criteria, and higher 
Considering the refurbishment potential, the designer should 
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safety factors which would reduce the cost of production and testing of 
the components. 
hermetically sealed should be considered which would eliminate prelaunch 
testing of the thrusters. 
ICBM system, and the bipropellant thrusters a r e  only sample tested at  
the factory. 
Similarly, the possibility of pre-fueled fluid tanks 
Such a procedure is adopted at  present in an 
An important factor for the in-orbit replacement is the need 
for telemetry signals either to the Shuttle or  to the ground which will 
give an indication of a module's health. Tank pressure and temperature, 
thruster pressure, propellant valve motion indicators and tern-peratures, 
and others will be monitored throughout the mission duration. 
L 
For all of the above, the Shuttle environment and crew safety 
criteria must be accommodated. This may mean venting partially 
expended modules being returned from orbit, providing means for  
propellant dumping of loaded modules and/or tanks, and orienting tanks 
with bladders to avoid subjecting the bladders to damaging loads during 
Shuttle ascent. 
3. GROUND REFURBISHABLE 
In the ground-refurbishable concept, the selection of an 
attitude control propulsion subsystem will follow the criteria of total 
impulse discussed before. The modular concept for a propulsion system 
will still be advantageous here, siiice on return to the ground, new or 
refurbished modules can be easily replaced, resulting in short turnaround 
time. 
Since return of the complete payload to the ground can be 
considered as  a more costly and complex operation than in-orbit 
refurbishment, more attention should be given to the degree of redundancy 
and component reiiability for maintenance of attitude stabilization during 
the mission and docking maneuver with :hc vquired degree of reliability. 
Since no need for in-space refueling or  module replacement exists, there 
is no problem with fluid or electrical disconnects. 
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The procedure during ground refurbishment in principle 
should be s imilar  to the maintenance practices of scheduled airlines, 
and a study of airline procedures should be of value in establishing 
design requirements. 
The telemetry requirements for monitoring propulsion 
parameters  will be similar to those for on-orbit maintainable payloads. 
The Shuttle concept provides the possibility of detailed 
examination of failed and/or matured components which will be an 
important factor in the hardware updating and evolution. 
result  in longer life components, thus reducing future payload costs. 
D. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This will 
When cost is the primary criterion, selection of reaction 
control subsystems of greater weight and volume and lower impulse 
efficiency may be preferred. 
of its capability for larger  and heavier payloads. 
system selection is dependent on the mission; i. e., expendable, on-orbit 
maintainable, or ground refurbishable. 
systems (even for high total impulse missions), cold gas attitude control 
subsystems may be desirable. 
selection of a cost-effective reaction control subsystem for each of the 
three payloads. Iviodularization of the RCS should lead to the standardiza- 
tion of two or three thruster levels for  a variety of payloads. 
This is possible with the Shuttle because 
The propulsion sub- 
F o r  on-orbit maintainable 
Tradeoff studies a r e  required for  
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APPENDIX G. ELECTRICAL POWER 
Analyses should be performed concerning possible cost savings in 
the use of secondary batteries with solar cell arrays in Shuttle payloads. 
is recommended that Shuttle payloads consider the use of short-life NiCd, 
AgZn, and Pb-acid battery designs for low earth orbit and inclined elliptical 
orbit spacecraft with replacement of the batteries at the end of their design 
lifetimes. Also, battery operating temperatures should be considered, since 
battery operating temperatures influence the cost of batteries. 
must be compared to cost in the thermal control area from relaxed thermal 
design requirements to determine i f  overall cost savings accrue from wider 
battery temperature ranges. 
battery designs fo r  periodic battery replacement via the Shuttle. 
It 
This cost 
The analyses hinge upon the use of short-life 
The use  of NiCd batteries for periodic replacement may be less 
expensive over a 10-year operational period in space than one designed to 
endure the entire mission duration. 
they a re  typically designed for low depths of discharge. Conversely, a short- 
lived battery can be designed for deep discharge with little excess capacity. 
Since battery cost is approximately proportional to capacity, it  is conceivable 
that smaller batteries replaced periodically would incur less overall cost 
than one set of large batteries without replacement. 
Figure G-1 that designing for shorter life with periodic replacement in 
synchronous orbit will always cost more than designing for 10 years. 
is explained by the relatively few charge-discharge cycles in synchronous 
orbit. 
If batteries a re  designed for long life, 
It can be seen from 
This 
The inclined elliptical and low earth orbit cases, however, show that 
a significant cost reduction can be obtained by periodic replacement of short- 
lived batteries. 
design period a re  small (10-20 percent). Substantial gains in battery 
In these cases, the depths of discharge for the five-year 
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Figure G- 1 .  NiCd Battery Utilization Results 
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utilization through high depths of discharge a re  realized for shorter lifetimes, 
Figure G-1 shows an optimum design life of two to three years. 
involve three battery replacements over a 10-year Operational period and 
would save 20-30 percent of battery costs in comparison to replacing the 
batteries after five years. 
This would 
A hattery costs about $220 per kg ($lOO/lb). If launch costs were 
$880 per kg ($400/lb), the total cost of batteries for 10 years at  $1, 100 per 
kg ($500/lb) would be about $250,000 for a 500-watt spacecraft in either 
inclined elliptical o r  low earth orbit. 
would yield savings of $50,000-$75,000 over a 10-year operational period. 
Reducing this amount by 20-30 percent 
Wide battery temperature ranges and particularly high battery 
temperatures are  detrimental to battery life, Consequently, it  is conventional 
to design for narrow battery temperature ranges in long-life applications. 
With the Shuttle, long battery lifetimes and narrow battery temperature ranges 
may not be necessary or  desirable, Wider battery temperature ranges and 
lifetimes shorter than the mission life could be accommodated by periodic 
battery replacement. 
Figure G-2 shows the effect of battery temperature on battery cost. 
0 Batteries normally experience excursions through some part of the 0-40 C 
range; for example, the batteries may be designed for a 0-10 
Thus the average cost incurred over a narrow range such as this must be 
evaluated and compared to the average cost over larger operating tempera- 
ture ranges. 
0 C range. 
NiCd batteries are normally used in secondary (charge-discharge) 
battery applications because of their long-life capability. 
battery replacement, shorter-lived but less expensive battery types may be 
economically attractive such as Ag Zn and Pb-acid batteries. 
With periodic 
Table G-1 summarizes the battery cost estimates where "i" repre- 
sents the battery life (replacement period). 
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Table C-1. Battery Costs Per  Kilowatt 
& 
NiC d 
Ag Zn 
1 Cost ($ / kw) I 
Low Earth Orbit Synchronous Orbit 
100,000 20,000 
40,000 ------- 
3 
1 1 * 
I 30,000 20,000 i i Pb- Acid 
~~ - 
For the AgZn battery in synchronous orbit, a life of several hundred 
Sealed Pb-acid batteries show c-onsi- 
A lifetime of one to two years in low 
cycles and several years seems likely. 
derably greater cost savings potential. 
earth orbit would save 70-85 percent of the cost of NiCd batteries. 
rapid charge techniques have been proposed which might allow greater depths 
of discharge and greater savings. In synchronous orbit where two or more 
years life seems likely, the cost saving relative to NiCd batteries would be 
substantial. 
Also, 
It should be noted that the magnitude of potential cost savings implied 
in the table above could be significantly affected by launch costs. 
costs were assessed on a per kilogram basis, then low weight could be impor- 
tant to low total cost, and the situation portrayed in the table night not be 
realis tic. 
If launch 
It is recommended that Shuttle payloads should consider short-life 
NiCd battery aesigns with periodic battery replacement for low earth and 
inclined elliptical orbit spacecraft as a means of significant cost savings. 
Shorter-life battery designs may be economically attractive with 
periodic battery replacement. 
battery temperature ranges may not be necessary or  desirable. 
battery temperature ranges and lifetimes shorter than the mission life could 
be accommodated by periodic battery replacement. 
costs of such a battery design approach must be assessed. 
Also, long battery lifetimes and narrow 
Wider 
The impact on battery 
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Less expensive battery types such as  AgZn and sealed Pb-acid 
batteries may be econoi-kically attractive with periodic battery replacement. 
The results a r e  applicable to both on-orbit maintainable and ground- 
refurbishable Shuttle payloads. 
definition must be designed for mission duration. 
use laboratory- supplied power. 
The batteries for expendable payloads by 
The Sortie payload8 wil l  
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APPENDIX H. ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION 
This analysis is to provide an approach and a set  of parametric 
data which will facilitate low cost payload design. 
a r e  herein investigated for comparing centralized with decentralized power 
distribution methods. Figure H- 1 illustrates the basic differences between 
the two concepts. 
Trade-off considerations 
Because of the wide variety in the types and nature of the pay- 
loads, it became necessary to define some payload a s  a baseline for the 
comparison. 
representative of the payloads to be carr ied aboard the Shuttle. 
cal  load distribution was normalized to that of the DSP satellite. 
assumptions a r e  a s  listed: 
The Defense Support F *ogram (DSP) satellite was chosen a s  
The electri- 
Other 
a. 28 volt raw power 
b. 
c. 
d. 
5 0  percent of satellite power to mission equipment 
50  percent of satellite power to vehicle electronics 
Of the 50 percent for vehicle electronics: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
53 percent for communications, data processing, 
and instrumentation 
16 percent for attitude control 
27 percent for stabilization and control 
4 percent for  communications and power control 
e. 
f. 
f. 
All loads a r e  assumed to require regulated power a s  
a worst-case situation. 
Cable losses  a r e  assumed to be insignificant for 
costing. 
Loads range from 100 to 2,000 watts. 
Figures H-2 and H-3 depict the deientralized and centralized 
power distribution modularization concepts, respectively. In each diagram 
the dotted blocks indicate the redundant partner where redundancy is required. 
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The heavy-lined blocks indicate how the subsystems can be modularized. 
It can be seen that the prevailing philosophy is that of configuring the modu- 
larization so that each redundant segment can be removed without disturbing 
the operation of the other redundant half. 
satellite in the event that a unit has to be replaced. 
This prevents downtime of the 
In both concepts, raw spacecraft power is received by the 
In the decentralized system (Figure H-2) the Power Control Unit (PCU). 
PCU regulates and switches the primary 28-volt power to the Load Control 
Unit (LCU) which in turn routes this power to the proper user loads, essential 
o r  non-essential. 
perform the function of converting the primary and 28-volt power to the secon- 
dary voltages required by these loads. 
tralized system a r e  much simpler *..an that for the centralized system, 
since only one primary powe .: voltage need be distributed rather than many 
secondary voltages. 
The user  loads will include localized converters which 
The duties of the LCU for the decen- 
Referring to Figure H-3, the raw spacecraft power is received 
by the PCU, then processed and distributed to the LCU. All active power 
distribution functions (switching and selection of redundant loads o r  con- 
ver ters)  and most iault-isolation operations will be handled by this unit. It 
receives the processed, regulated 28-volt power and routes it to the proper 
converters, receives regulated secondary voltages from the converters, 
and finally routes these to the proper user loads, essential o r  non-essential. 
Failure of an essential converter or  load will cause the LCU to switch to an 
appropriate operal. le redundant unit. 
The inverters supply a small percentage of the power; hence, 
cost impact as far as tradeoff analyses a re  concerned is minimum. 
sider, therefore, the case of essential and non-essential converters. 
weight /watt ratio decreases a s  the power output increases. 
i n  a decentralized system with smaller converters, the weight will be 
greater than that of a larger converter in a centralized system. 
illustrated in Figure H-4. 
three mission equipments, the decentralized converters would weight about 
Con- 
The 
Consequently, 
This is 
For  instance, for 1000 watts power output. and 
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22.6 kg (50 lb), while the centralized converter would weight about 13.6 kg 
(30 lb). 
centralized unit may weigh more because more secondary voltages must be 
distributed. 
for both cases  of about 13.6 kg (30 lb) for the PCU plus LCU units. 
To this weight should be added the weight of the PCU and LCU. The 
However, it will be assumed here  that the same weigbt applies 
The harness weight deperds on the power transmitted, payload 
The wide variation in weights indicates geometry, and level of redundancy. 
the difficulties in assessing the cost. 
to be a small part of the total power system cost and are therefore ignored 
in this analysis. 
In any case, harness costs are expected 
In assessing the cost figures for an  electrical  power system (less 
batteries and solar array) ,  data a r e  available which show that the first unit 
cost is directly proportional to weight. Thus a centralized system which is 
lighter than the decentralized one (by 9 kg for the 1000-watt case) will probably 
cost less. 
for all loads will imply a greater initial development effort, since small  
converters for a decentralized system of proven design are readily available. 
The development cost of a new system is an order  of magnitude higher than 
the first unit cost. 
system, particularly since the small  weight penalty involved will probably 
be acceptable for Shuttle payloads. 
However, a centralized converter system with a single converter 
Consequently, it will be less costly to use a decentralized 
There a r e  also other factors in favor of a decentralized system. 
A major drawback of a centralized system is that of reduced flexibility. 
Major changes in  payload power requirements could lead to  an  expensive 
redesign effort. In a decentralized system, the change would only affect 
the particular module supplying the load, and ar.,ither converter could most 
likely be found among existing designs. A summary of other factors favoring 
the choice of a decentralized power supply a r e  tabulated in Table H-1. 
On the basis of this evaluation, a decentralized power con- 
ditioning system is a candidate configuration for  a lower cost effect. A 
decentralized system offers lower overall weight and complexity, reduces 
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cost, increases reliability, and lends itself to modularization of decen- 
tralized converters to allow individual replacement for fault isolation. 
These conclusions apply equally to the on-orbit maintainable, 
ground-refurbishable, and expendable types  of payloads. Since the Sortie 
payload is retained with the Shuttle during the mission duration, its power 
is received from the Shuttle itself. No separate power source in the pay- 
load is necessary. Load distribution equipment for special Sortie experi- 
ments may be required in the payload. 
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APPENDIX I .  BACKUP SYSTEM FOR RETRIEVAL 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Study has been performed to de termine  a method of providing suf- 
ficient control  for retriteval assuming p r i m a r y  vehicle attitude cont:ol is 
lost .  
fa i lure  and the consequences of these fa i lures  on payload dynamics.  
docking is a prerequis i te  for on-orbi t  maintainable and ground-refurbishable 
payloads, a system m u s t  be implernented t o  a s s u r e  that r e t r i eva l  can  be 
accomplished i n  the event of a payload failure.  
The study trxamined var ious  modes  of p r i m a r y  att i tude control  sys tem 
Since 
In o r d e r  to per form th is  analysis  on a backup sys tem for retr ieval ,  
the Large  Space Telescope (LST), as  proposed by NASA/MSFC 
se lec ted  for analysis .  
(CMCs) for f i n ( -  .rttitude control and colt1 gas reaction control system (RCS) 
t h r u s t e r s  f r J 1  acciuisition, powered fl:ght orbi t  adjustment,  init ial  CMG spin 
up, iincl g:nit*rg!c:ncy opcr;ition. I I .  C M G  momentum management  is provided by 
electromagnet ic  torque control.  
possible  failure modes  of three-axis  controlled vehicles,  it i s  believed 
that t h e  iinalyscs conduc-tcbd iipply to this  g e n e r a l  c l a s s  of payloads. 
dnalyses  arc: riesc ri twd in the following paragrsphs.  
Ref. I- l ) ,  was 
This  payload design includes cont ro l  moment  gyros  
Since th i s  vehicle r ep resen t s  m o s t  of the 
The 
Typical p r i m a r y  control  sys t em malfunctions were  assumed.  These  
included : 
1. 
2. 
Elec t r ica l  power fai lure  during the CMG-controlled mode; 
could include a total  vehicle power fai lure  
Hardover  CMG torquer ;  could be caused by a fai lure  
in the to rque r  positioning c i rcu i t ;  e .g . ,  a n  open 
fcodback t r ansduce r  
Roll hardove r command during RCS-controlled mode;  
could be caused by a n  attitilde sensor fa i lure  (The 
roll axis was chosen because,  for th i s  vehicle,  roll 
att i tude acce lera t ion  is the  highest.) 
3. 
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4. Single RCS thrus te r  control valve stuck open; could 
be a mechanical failure; i .e. ,  the thrus te r  would remain 
on although commanded to off 
The resultant effects on vehicle motion, possible fault detection 
schemes based on these effects, possible corrective actions, required 
backup control equipment, and backup equipment available in the LST 
were determined for each of the assumed pr imary control systems 
malfunctions. 
Assuming that no backup control system was available, the 
steady-state spin rate about the principal axis  of maximum moment of 
inertia was also determined for  each malfunction. 
Assuming that the steady- state uncontrolled spin was attained, 
and a backup system was available, the impulse required to stabilize the 
vehicle and maintain control was dete m i n e d  for each malfunction. 
Based on results of the above analyses, three operational 
alternatives were studied: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Docking with the uncontrolled satellite af ter  it attained 
steady-state spin 
Switching the pr imary  system off and the backup system 
on upon malfunction detection 
Switching the pr imary  system off upon malfunction detection 
and switching the backup system on after the satellite had 
attained the steady-state spin, possible shortly before 
rescue vehicle launch 
B. ASSUMPTIONS 
The LST vehicle character is t ics  are described in Reference 1-1. 
Figure 1-1 stows a block diagram of the attitude stabilization and control 
system, and Table I- 1 summarizes  the system hardware. Nomenclature 
therein i s  a s  follows: 
1. Wide-angle Sun Sensors  (WASS) - Provide inertial  attitude 
reference for t ransfer  to the coarse  and fine pointing modes 
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2. 
3. 
4. 
5 .  
6 .  
7. 
Fixed-Head Star  Trackers  (FHST) - Provide inertial  
attitude reference for reference alignment and coarse 
pointing mode 
Reference Gyro Assembly (RGA) - Provides ra te  and 
position information in all control modes, provides the 
only attitude reference during s t a r  t racker  or guide s t a r  
occultation periods and slew maneuve rs 
Magnetometers - Measure ear th 's  magnetic field for 
electromagnetic control computations 
Digital Control Units ( D C U s )  - Receive data inputs from 
the various sensors  and provide outputs to the CMG, 
magnetic torquer, and RCS electronics; also provide 
gyro compensation using other sensor  and/or  ground 
update information 
Transfer  Assembly (TA) - Provides interface to bring 
configurations of sensors  and actuators on-line as required, 
routes signals, and provides failure isolation; also provides 
low level processing for  fault detection, signal processing, 
switching logic, and command implementation and includes 
emergency operational c i rcui t ry  to permit the spacecraft  
to acquire the sun using only this c i rcui t ry  in conjunction 
with the WASS, PGA, and RCS 
Control Moment Gyros (CMGs) - Provide control torques 
for  vehicle stabilization in the coarse  and fine CMG control 
modes. [Six CMGs are oriented (as shown in Figure 1-2) so 
that their  momentum vectors a r e  constrained to  lie in the 
planes of the six sides of a right hexagonal pyramid, of 
which the slope of the s ides  of the pyramid is 524 mrad  
(30 deg) with respect to the base. 1 
Four  active CMGs provide momentum values up to 678 N-m-sec 
(500 ft-lb-sec) in the X-axis, 1017 (750) in the Y-axis, and 1196 (875) 
i n  the Z-axis. Only three active gyros a.re required for satisfactory 
ASCS performance; therefore, four failures are required before performance 
is degraded. 
in other vehicles. 
briefly, as will be shown la te r .  
The reaction control system is a s  shown in Figure 1-3. 
However, this high degree of redundance may  not be available 
Therefore, the resul ts  of reduced control were examined 
It is 
assumed that signals f rom the pressure  t ranrducer  just ahead of the 
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S i x  CMGs Ehployed: 
Numbers 2, 3, 5, & 6 are operational. 
Numbers 1 & 4 are standby. 
B 524 mrad (30 deg) 
e 
V 
Figure 1-2. Orientation of CMCs on LST 
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p r e s s u r e  regulator  will be used to switch open the GN2 tr..ik isolation 
valves  in sequence as the jas is used. 
contains two act ive and two standby th rus t e r s .  
can  be isolated by the normal ly  open latching solenoid valves  shown; 
therefore ,  should a t h r u s t e r  s t ay  open, i t  is a s sumed  that the Fa i r  would 
be shut off by applying power i o  the closing solenoid of the isolation valve. 
The four  GN2 tanks have a total  capaci ty  of 114 kg (252 lb) of gas  +.th a 
specific impulse of 70 seconds.  
be instal led as shown in F igure  1-4 with the following cha rac t e r i s t i c s :  
Each of the four  t h r u s t e r  modules  
Each p a i r  of t h r u s t e r s  
The t h r u s t e r  modules  a r e  a s sumed  to 
Thrus t  level p e r  
t h r u s t e r  - N (lb) 
Minimum impulse  l i t  
p e r  t h r u s t e r  - N-sec  
(lb- s ec )  
Moment arm -m ( f t )  
Vehicle x r  oment  of 
ine r t i a  2 kg-rn2 
(slug-ft  ) 
Angular acce lera t ion  
(10-lb t h r  st  level)  
m r a d / s e c  E (deg/sec  ) 
Yaw - Roll 
4 4 . 5 0 r 2 . 2  4 4 . 5 o r 2  L 4 4 . S o r 2 . 2  
(10 .0  o r  0 .5)  (10.0 or 3 . 5 )  (10.5 o r  0.5) 
--Pi tch  -
0.44 0.44 0 .44  
(0.10) ( P .  10) (0.10) 
4.15 1.52 4.15 
(1 3.60) ( 5.00) (i3.60) 
12 5,00@ 17, 700 130,000 
(92,400) (1  3, 040) !95 ,  700) 
2.910 7 . 5 6 0  2.840 
(0. 167) (0.439) (0.163) 
C. ANALYSIS 
1. 
.- 
ELECTRICAL POWER FAILURE WHILE SYSTEM IS IN THE CM.G- 
CONTROLLED MODE 
A s  atated e a r l i e r ,  it was a s sumed  that 4 CMGs a rc  active 
normal ly  and that they can provide up to 1186 N-in-sec (875 ft-lb-aec) 
of momentum in the 2 axis. 
interrupted,  the ro to r  spin m o t o r s ,  as well as the gimbal t o rque r s ,  
If e lec t  r i ca l  power to the CMCs is 
1-8 
s - @e t 
yv 
4 
8 5  
41 
t.r*ew looking forward 
Figure 1-4. Roll and Yaw Ph;se Plane Loci 
and Thruster Arrangement 
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de-energized. 
be no initial effect. If external torques are present, the system will have 
sluggish response; however, the vehicle will still remain under control, 
because the spinning rotors will oppose the change in momentum required 
by the extenial  torques. 
will spin down, and their  momentum will be t ransferred to the vehicle. 
In the steady state, assuming the absence of external torques, the vehicle 
will attain a constant spin rate about thz principal axis of steady-state 
spin rate, as shown in Table 1-2 was found to be about 9.08 mrad/sec  
(0.52 deg/sec). Table 1-2 also shows that about 87.2 N-m-sec (64.3 
ft-lb-sec) of RCS impulse or  0.42 kg (0 .92 lb) of GN2 would be required 
to stop the spin. 
If no external disturbing torques are present, there will 
Eventually, due to energy dissipation, the rotors  
It can be seen that the pitch moment of inertia is very nearly 
equal to the jaw moment of inertia. Under these conditions, the spin 
about the yaw axis i s  lightly stable, so that any relatively small disturbing 
torque will produce rather large and slow- subsiding vehicle oscillations 
about the other two principal axes. 
The above considerations are important with respect to the 
feasibility and advisability of docking with the uncontrolled vehicle. More 
about this will be discussed in the following Section D. 
The most  obvious way to detect this failure is to monitor the 
rotor speed. Of course, a more  general vehicle power failure would be 
indicated by a power-off electrical  power system status signal. Either 
of these signals coul i  be used to switch-in the backup RCS (or  the primary 
RCS in the U T  i f  i t  is operational). 
at this time o r  just prior tc  rescue vehicle launch is subject to other 
considerations which will be explained later.  
Whether the backup RCS is switched-in 
0 
Backup equipment required for this failure, as well as those 
included in the U T  design are listed in Table 1-2. 
1-10  
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2. HARDOVER CMG TORQUER 
As shown in Table 1-2, th i s  fa i lure  would have negligible effect  
except for reduced control  capabili ty in this  mode .  
vehicle design, insufficient cont ro l  capabili ty we re left after th i s  fa i lure ,  
possible  co r rec t ive  act ions and backup equipment would be required.  
The Table also lists the backup equipment available in  the LST design. 
With respec t  t o  the "Steady State Uncontrolled Motion" l is ted for th i s  
type of fai lure ,  i t  should be clar i f ied that the att i tude e r r o r s  and r a t e s  
actual ly  per ta in  t o  controlled motion in this  control  mode  s ince  it is 
a s s u m e d  that enough control1 capabili ty remains  a f t e r  the fai lure .  
s tant i  i l l y  reduced control  would produce l a r g e r  att i tude and att i tude rate 
e r ro rs . 
It, in a pa r t i cu la r  
Sub- 
3. HARDOVER COMMAND I N  ROLL IN RCS-CONTROLLED MODE 
This  type of fai lure  would c r e a t e  an  eve r - inc reas ing  roll rate 
until e i t h e r  the malfunctioning RCS were  switched out o r  the propel lant  
were  depleted.  If one full tank of propellant were  allowed to  deplete,  
Table  1-2 shows that  the resul t ing roll spin rate would be about 1.69 
r a d / s e c  (97  creglsec), and the resul t ing cent r ipe ta l  acce le  Lation a t  the 
t ip  of the solar panels  wouid be approximately 1.8 g 's .  After a r a t h e r  
long period, depending on energy  dissipation rate, th i s  m o m e n t m i  would 
be t r a n s f e r r e d  into the principal ax i s  of maximum r n t  
producing a yaw ra t e  of about 226 m r a d / s e c  (13  d e g / r .  
requi red  to s top  the s teady-state  spin is a l so  shcvwn. 
-nt of iner t ia ,  
. The impulse 
In c a s e  of a depletion of four  tanks of GN2, the resul t ing 
rotational r a t e s  and cent r ipe ta l  acce le ra t ions  would be much  m o r e  
seve re ,  as shown. 
It is c l e a r  that  th i s  fa i lure  r equ i r e s  f a s t  switch-off of the mal- 
functioning RCS. Whethe t the backup RCS is  switched in  immediately 
o r  delayed until jus t  p r i o r  to  rescue  vehicle launch is subject to  o the r  
considerat ions to  be d iscussed  l a t e r .  
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4. SINGLE RCS THRUSTER CONTROL VALVE STUCK OPEN 
The sequence of events following this failure depends on complete 
s,-stem dynamics and design character is t ics ;  however, it is believed that 
the results obtained in the following analysis i l lustrate the most  severe 
case. 
Figure 1-4 shows typical phase-plane roll and yaw loci for 
off-on control. 
th is  discussion. Figure 1-4 also shows the thruster  arrangement. Simul- 
taneous firing of 1 and 2 or 3 and 4 would produce yaw moments plus 
la te ra l  acceleration in the Y-axis direction, and simultaneous firing of 
5 and 8 or 6 and 7 would produce pitch control plus la teral  acceleration 
in Z-axis direction. On the other hand, firing any roll control th rus te r  
alone would produce roll plus yaw in addition to sbme lateral  acceleration 
in the Y-axis direction. 
The pitch plot would be identical but is not needed for 
It is assumed that the following sequence of events develops: 
a. 
b. 
At time to, the roll and yaw states  are as shown, and 
thrus te rs  1 and 3 f i r e  to  cor rec t  the roll error. 
At time t l ,  the roll command signal is switched off, but 
th rus te r  1 remains open, so the negative roll rate keeps 
increasing until, at time t2, i t  hits the -17.5 m r a d / s e c  
(- 1 deg/sec) roll rate limit. Some yaw moment develops 
in this t ime interval, but, due to the low y a r  acceleration, 
no significant yaw motion occurs. 
At time t2, the autopilot commands thrus te rs  2 and 4 to 
fire in o r d e r  to  stop the roll. 
now firing. The increased yaw acceleration causes  the 
yaw rate to increase,  until, a t  t3, it  reaches t17 .5  
m r a d / s e c  ( t 1  deg/sec) limit. 
At time t3, the autopilot commands thrus te r  3 to open in 
o r d e r  to  stop the yaw rate. 
are now open. 
At time t4, the autopilot commands thrus te rs  2 and 3 to 
close because they a r e  opposing and cancelling each other. 
At this time, the magnitude of the roll ra te  is romething 
less than -17.5 m r a d / s e c  (-1 deg/sec), arrd the yaw rate 
is approximately t17.5 m r a d / s e c  ( t 1  deg/sec).  
moment is applied since only thrus te rs  1 and 4 a r e  firing. 
c. 
Thrus te rs  1, 2, and 4 are 
d. 
T h r u s t e r s  1, 2, 3, and 4 
e. 
No net 
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There a r e  many possible sequences following t ime tq, but it is 
felt that this is the condition of highest possible ra tes  in pitch and yaw. 
It is assumed that, a t  propellant depletion time, this is the prevailing 
state; therefore, it may be assumed that the initial condition on the 
ensuing free body motion is: 
and Y o =  t17 .5  m r a d / s e c  (1 deg/sec). 
D. RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION 
= O.,  0 = -17.5 mrad / sec  (-1 deg/sec),  
0 
Although for  some failures, the resulting steady-state uncontrolled 
motion is a rather  slow spin, it  has been pointed out previously that this 
vehicle has two principal moments of inertia that are nearly equal. 
characterist ic causes  the spin about the Z-axis to be very  lightly stable 
so that, in the presence of external disturbing torques, ra ther  large and 
slow-subsiding oscillations about the other two axes would be expected. 
Also, for  the roll hardover command malfunction, the resulting yaw 
steady-state spin i s  shown to be at  least  227 m r a d l s e c  (13 deg/sec).  
This value i s  substantially l a rge r  than the allowable 1.75 mrad / sec  (0.1 
deg/sec) specified in the Orbiter docking specification (Ref. 1-1) . 
more, the acceleration a t  the solar panel t ips due to the steady roll spin 
was found to  be about 1.8 g's.  This value exceeds the allowable 1.5 g 's  
specified in Reference I- 1. 
This 
* 
Further-  
These considerations indicate that, for  three axis-controlled 
vehicles, docking with the body in an uncontrolled steady-state spin i s  
not feasible for  the roll hardover command failure and that prompt attitude 
stabilization i s  required from a backup system to prevent vehicle damage. 
Docking with a tumbling body has  been investigated (Ref.  1-2). 
The preferred approach is to include a self-propelled, self-stabilized 
"third" vehicle designated a s  the "Module f o r  Automatic Dock and Detumble 
(MADD)". 
device are approved, backup control is preferred for three-axis active 
controlled vehicles. 
However, until the feasibility and cost effectiveness of such a 
*The feasibility of docking with a port normal  to the Z-axis was being 
considered. 
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The above reasoning suggests that, a t  least  for some malfunctions; 
e .  g., roll hardover command in the RCS-control mode, automatic mal- 
function detection and pr imary  control system switch out logic a r e  required. 
It remains to be decided whether the backup system should be switched in 
immediately* and automatically o r  by ground command pr ior  to rescue 
vehicle launch. Some considerations pertaining to these alternati  ves  follow. 
The amount of gas impulse required to restabilize the hardover 
command case would depend on the t ime required to  sense the malfunction 
and on whether the restabilization occurs  while the vehicle is sti l l  spinning 
about the roll axis or whether sufficient t ime has  elapsed for the momentum 
transfer  to the yaw axis to occur. This i s  due to the fact that the yaw RCS 
lever  arm i s  4 .15m (13.6 ft), while the roll l ever  a r m  is only 1 . 5 m  (5  ft).** 
From this p i n t  of view, it would be m o r e  advantageous to switch in the 
backup RCS just  p r ior  to  rescue vehicle launch. 
Table 1-2 shows that the amount of GN2 required to maintain 
unforced l imit  cycle attitude control i s  very small (only about 0.0045 
kg/hr).  Due to external disturbance torques (at this altitude mostly 
gravity gradient and magnetic), the actual amount could*** be higher; 
however, it would sti l l  be very small, so that NASA's proposed 30-day 
RCS control would not impose a ser ious weight penalty. Nonetheless, 
this conside ration also favors delaying the backup RCS switch-in. 
The reliability of the backup system, once i t  i s  switched in, 
would be obviously higher if it  i s  switched i n  l a te r  so that the required 
* For the LST, there is enough sensor  redundancy to be Able t o  
switch in the backup RCS immediately; however, if the backup 
rate gyros were the only available sensors ,  a minimum time 
of about 10 minutes would have to be allowed for  gyro spin up 
and warm up. 
Rotational impulse is equal to T (At) (0, where Tht is total 
impulse (N-sec) and A is the torque lever  a rm.  
It is well known that a forced limit cycle m a y  require less 
ACS prope3ant. 
** 
*** 
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proper  performance time i s  reduced. However, reliability would be 
enhanced by elimination of the backup receiver and command link a s  
explained below. 
An advantage of automatic switching in of the backup RCS upon 
malfunction detection i s  that i t  would be autonomous and, therefore, 
independent of the ground command link. 
(as listed in Table 1-2) would not be required. * Another possible advantage 
of automatic immediate switching in of the backup RCS could be that mission 
operations and/or  experiments could sti l l  be conducted until the rescue 
vehicle a r r ives  . 
A backup command receiver 
A possibly significant disadvantage of immediate backup RCS 
switching to continue operation for  a ra ther  long period before rescue i s  
that it may require a complete backup electr ical  power supply system. 
It i s  apparent that a clear cut choice between the alternatives of 
switching in the backup RCS immediately upon malfunction detection o r  
waiting until just p r ior  to rescue vehicle launch i s  not possible. 
each satellite design, then, the designer would have to evaluate consid- 
erations as explained above. For the LST, unless continued RCS 
operation for  the 30 days is a hard and fast  requirement, i t  is felt that 
delayed switching i s  to be preferred.  If, on the other hand, prompt 
rescue launches can be assured,  automatic switching would be preferred.  
For 
E. CONCLUSIONS 
The foregoing analyses and results leas to the following 
conclusions: 
1. Docking with the uncontrolled payload i s  not feasible for  
the roll hardover malfunction and is not recommended 
for  the case of other malfunctions for the vehicle studied 
because of marginal Z-axis stability. 
* A reliable telecetering down link would be required anyway, since 
it would not be reasonable to r isk a rescue mission without p r io r  
knowledge of dis t ressed vehicle attitude control. 
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2. A simple backup RCS should be provided. It should 
include, at  least, the following equipment: 
C om pone n t 
4 Thruster  Modules 
1 RCS Electronics 
3 Rate Gyros 
1 Switching Assembly 
Propellant Supply (1 Tank, 
valves, lines) 
Propellant (GNz) 
Command Receiver 
Electrical  Power Supply 
9.1 
8 . 3  
10.9 
4.5 
56.7 
2 8 . 6  
15.4 
317.5 
20 
16 
24 
10 
125 
63 
34 
700 ** 
Total 
~ 
450.0 
~- 
992 
The LST includes the necessary backup equipment, except 
for the rate gyros, but includes redundant attitude sensors  
t o  provide the same function. 
A malfunctioning CMG control system m a y  have no 
significant effect; the refore, not all  malfunctions of this 
type of system require switching the system off and the 
backup system on. 
For those malfunctions that require switching off the 
active system, the switching off should be done immediately 
upon malfunction detection. 
The alternatives of switching on the backup RCS system 
immediately af ter  switch off of the active malfunctioning 
system, o r  switching i t  on just p r ior  to rescue vehicle 
launch, mus t  be evaluated for  each vehicle design. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
F. RECCAfMENDATIONS - 
It is recommended that, until and if successful and cost-effective 
docking with a tumbling body as proposed i n  Reference 1-2 i s  demonstrated, 
provisions be incorporated in on- o rbi t maintainable and ground- refurbishable 
* Weights a r e  typical and a r e  extrapolated from data in Reference 1-1. 
** Assuming a completely redundant e lectr ical  power supply system 
fo r  continued operation of at  least  30 days. 
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satellite designs for stabilizing t'-e vehicle af ter  failure of the pr imary 
stability control system. 
include, a t  least ,  the equipment l isted in the "Conclusions" subsection 
of this appendix. 
Thc. backup attitude control system should 
It i s  desirable,  as in the case for  the U T ,  that redundant pr imary  
control capability be incorporated in the vehicle design for reasons of 
mission operational reliability. In such a case,  no additional backup 
control equipment i s  required. 
The decision a s  to whether the backup control system should be 
switched in shortly after malfunction detection and pr imary  control system 
switch off o r  f i r s t  p r ior  to rescue vehicle launch should be made for  each 
design. 
subsection D of this appendix. 
Some considerations pertinent to this decision a r e  included in 
It should be noted that the analyses, results,  conclusions, and 
recommendations herein a r e  believed to apply, in general, to three-axis 
active-cont rolled vehicles. 
been conducted with respect to other  types of vehicles; e. g., spin- 
stabilized and gravity- gradient stabilized satellites. 
N o  investigation of the basic problem has 
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APPENDIX J. GROUND OPERATIONS TIME 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Based on the massive amount of documentation related to the overall  
concept of the low cost Shuttle system, the review of information directly 
related to payload operations, and the resul ts  of a specific examination in a 
previous study (Ref. J-2). i t  was apparent that the present way of conducting 
prelaunch operations is not in consonance with the Shuttle concept. 
launch operations presently require f rom as little as 8 days f o r  a very  
simple payload to a s  much a s  60 days for  a very sophisticated payload with 
a nominal median of 20-25 days. 
ous study and led to the realization of the t inLe impact on the Shuttle. This 
subsequently caused the investigation of the potential for reducing the time 
required for prelaunch operation. The preliminary results show that it is 
feasible and reasonable to expect that p rekunch  t ime can be reduced to the 
order  of 10-12 days, or approximately half of the present requirement. This 
t ime increment has been the basis  for comparison and a potential goal for 
achievement (see Figure J- 1 ). 
Pre- 
The foregoing data were  used in the previ- 
B. APPROACH 
The approach was to analyze the prelaunch operations for  a group 
of payloads representative of the four types of payloads considered; identify 
the prelaunch operations having the capability for reduction of time; con- 
s ider  changes for  the design of the payload, the facility and equipmenband 
operational procedures; and develop candidate design guidelines for the 
accomplishment of time reduction for the payload prelaunch operations. 
The prelaunch operations analyzed for  potential time reduction were  
obtained for 24 payloads which are typical Shuttle payloads and which include 
examples representative of the four types specified for  this study. The data 
sources  were : 
1. Martin Marietta Corp. Operations and Checkout Plan for Pay-  
load Car r i e r s  reports  (Ref. J-3). 
for the Shuttle. 
Included 12 NASA payloa IS 
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2.  McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Co. DOD Space Transportation 
System Payload Tnterface Studies (Ref. J-4). Covered three 
specific DOD payloads for the Shuttle. 
Service Ii,terface Study (Ref. J-5). Covered bypica1 payload/ 
Tug opet a t iom . 
4. Aerospace Corporation. Payload Analysis for Space Shuttle 
Applications Study (Ref. 5 - 2 ) .  Included information related 
to a large number of predominantly NASA payloads. 
for f i v e  current  payloads having typical -.nd peculiar operations. 
3 .  General Dynamics /Convair Aerospace. Space Tug Launch Site 
5 .  Aerospace Corporation. Prelaunch Operations were obtained 
Using the data from the above sources,  P matrix was developed 
incorporating a composite list of a l l  of the prelaunch operations conducted on 
all of the payloads, and the time required for each operation wzs identified. 
These data were correlated and ranked in a list according to time and are 
presented in Table J - I .  This list i p  ;*ot a complete l is t  nf >peraticns, but i t  
i s  comprised of those operations considered a s  having the potential for re la-  
tively significant time reduction and was used a s  a guide in selecting a reas  
for further i nv e s t i g at i on. 
An analysis of these operations was conducted to determine the 
source and reasons for  the "excessive" t ime requirements, and efforts were 
concentrated Qn reducing the t ime needed for those items. The cr i ter ia  used 
for the develop3ent of the design guidelines associated with these operations 
included consideration of completely eliminating the operation, modifying 
existing methods, combining and/or conducting operations concurrently, and 
developing new design for the payloads, the supporting equipment and the 
operations. 
exist in the low cost Shuttle payload design philosophy (Ref. 5 - 6 ) ,  where the 
concept basically provides 
The aesumrtions made for this study a r e  basically the same a s  those that 
wete  made 'or the preliminary approach to the 10-12 day timeline for pre-  
launch o?erations and consist of the following: 
In addition, full advantage was taker, of the capabilities that may 
over -design and modular I-, v density packaging. 
1. The payloads a r e  complete and "flight ready'' when received 
a t  the Prelaunch Proceseing Facility (PPF) on the launch baee, 
Each unit is  an all-up assembly, has been previcusly subjected 
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Table J- 1. Time Ranking of Payload Operations 
I 
Range 
Operation 
Median 
-~ 
Payload Functional Testing 
Tug Mate 
P reps  for  Mate to Orbiter and Tug 
Inter fac e V e r i f i cat ions 
Leak Testing/ Propellant Loading 
Receiving and Inspection (1st Day) 
Weight and Balance 
Inc tallations 
Closeout Flight P reps  
Simulated Flight 
Ordnanc Checkout and Installations 
Non-Hazardous Servicing 
Contamination Contrcjl 
Transportation and Handling (Each Instance) 
I 
1-14 
1-6 
2 -4  
1-4 
1 -3  
1 - 3  
1-2 
1-2 
1-2 
1-2 
112-2 
1 
1-2 
1 
L 
7 
3 
3 
2 
3 
3 
i 
I. 5 
1 . 5  
1 
1 
1 
1 
j 
to a full integrated system test  (IST) m d  may require servicing. 
The assembly of certain small  items which incur little time cr 
r isk may be excepted, such a s  protecti,-e covers/caps,  spc.c;aS 
supports for transpoi istion, and other accessory type iter 
It is recognized that fzw payloads will reqLire the asserA 1 v 
of some major  i tems and 'hese c,.n be accommodated. 
The pryload8 a r e  generally "optimized" and modularized witn 
respect to the standardization o& the basic supporting s t ructure  
and, to A large degree, the basic hoiisekeeping subsv: toms. 
The paylodds are designed to vtilize standardiTcf* f -  . 3 t ,  check- 
out, servicing, and other support equipment -;.:ii I. will be 
2. 
3. 
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furnished a t  the launch base f o r  payload use. This specifically 
includes :he Unified Test  Equipment (UTE), the Launch Pro- 
cessing System (LPS), o r  other equivalent universal automatic 
type test equipment. 
fluid, propulsion, pyrotechnic, electric power, and all other 
subsystems. 
The payloads are designed to retain a maximum amount of 
autonomy; interfaces with the Orbiter and Tug will be 
minimized. 
4. T? payloads a r e  designed to be man-safe. This includes 
5 .  
While the foregohg assumptions are basically payload design guide- 
lines, the realization of their incorporation into the paykoads for  the Shutde 
is dependent on the detailed design guidelines as may be developed and imple- 
mented for each o i  them. 
The receiving and inspecticin of the payload have been shown to require 
2s m a y  LS three work shifts, ahi le  1.5  sh i f t s  are required for installing the 
various payload equipments. 
ations, they will be conducted serially in the overall flow of ope, 
currently to the maximum extent possible. 
tions have been treated together in  this section. 
In order  to reduce the total time for these oper-  
Lon and con- 
For  this reason, the two opera- 
It is expected that :he time required for the combined operations can 
be reduced to  not exceed two shifts because the payload will be delivered to 
the prelaunch processing facility in a "flight rear'y" condition, experienced 
launch base personnel will be performing many osers-tions normally sup- 
ported by payload personnel, and many of the operations will be co3ducted 
concurrently. During these operations, the payload will be removed f rom 
the transporter and installed on the payload processing fixture, and the man- 
agement of the contamination control and associated equipment will be accom- 
plished by laurch base personnel. Concurrently with the receiving inspection 
of the payl. ad,  the t ransportat ;m environmental monitoring record will be 
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cxaminctd, cer ta in  non-flight i t e m s  will he removed,  and  the  instz,llation of 
the fcw ~ a y l o s d  c-ciuinrlicnt itr.rris will commence .  The  dedicated paylqad pro- 
ces s ing  hay in  the. facil i ty will he rcady  f o r  the payload, t he  launch b a s e  sup-  
por t  c:qiiipmcnt wi l l  h a v r  hctc:n scheduled and ava i lab le ,  and  any  payload - 
pccul iar  s u p p r r t  cquiprricnt will  h a v e  been in tegra ted  and the  compatibili2y 
with ?hc *-unc-h base sy.:tcm es tab l i shed  p r i o r  to the  a r r i v a l  of the  payload. 
To ;Iccornplish th i s ,  two guidel ines  should be adopted: 
a. Thc: paylodd sha l l  be bas ica l ly  designed for de l ive ry  in  the  
"flight rcady" conditio.1, and  the  amoun t  of equipment  to be 
asscmbler i  following de l ive ry  sha l l  be minimized  t o  the  
g r e a t e s t  nxtsnt possible .  
The  des ign  of the  payload and any  equipment  to be assembled 
following de l ive ry  sha l l  p rovide  s i m p l e ,  fa i l - sa fe ,  low-r i sk  
intcrfacing ha rdware  with suff ic ient  accessibi1:ty to enhance  
the ease of a s s e m b l y  and prec lude  damage .  
b. 
2. WEIGIIT AND SALANCE 
This  operatiori typical!y r e q u i r e s  two work  sh i f t s ,  or  approx ima te ly  
16 hours, dur ing  the  payload p r e l  lunch Operations.  
dedicated t o  the p r o c e d u r e s ;  the  concur ren t  p e r f o r m a n c e  of o t h e r  t a s k s  is 
precluded.  
ment  (Ref. .J-7) genera ted  by NASA r e q u i r e s  tha t  the p r e c i s e  payload mass 
c e n t e r  o f  g rav i ty  must  bc es tab l i shed  p r i o r  t o  instal la t ion in the  O r b i t e r ;  
however.  the r e q u i r e m e n t s  for maintaining the  m a s s  p r o p e r t i e s  of the  pay-  
loads far exceed the  r e q u i r e m e n t s  for the  pu rpose  of de te rmin ing  the  c e n t e r  
of grav i ty  of the loaded Orb i t e r .  
p r io r  -d t h e  prelaunch Operations cycle .  This  IL cons is ten t  with the  r ece ip t  
of a "flight ready" sa t e l l i t e ,  and it is r ecemmended  tha t  t h e  phys ica l  weight 
and balance opera t ion  be e l imina ted  from the  payload pre launch  ope ra t ions .  
The  t i m e  i s  completely 
The  Spacc  Shut t le  Rase l ine  Accommodat ions for Payloads  docu- 
The  weighing ope ra t ion  m a y  be conducted 
With the  el iminat ion of t h i s  opera t ion ,  the  problem a r i s e s  of con-  
t ro l l ing  the  mass p rope r t i e s  of the payload in the  event  tha t  module o r  o t h e r  
equipment  changes become n e c e s s a r y  dur ing  prelaunch o r  in-orbi t  opera t ions .  
This  nlay bt handled by maintaining s t r i c t  a c r u r a c y  a.nd cont ro l  ol-er the 
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payload data book and incorporating the following design guideline as 
appropriate to  the particular payload: 
The interchangeability designed into the payload modules and 
other replaceable equipment will include the requirements for 
mz s s properties interchangeability . 
i h e  replacement of a payload module while on-orbit with a module 
that i s  hea l ie r ,  due to  updated design o r  other changes, also creates  a pay- 
load mass  properties problem. 
approach to solving this problem: 
The following two guidelines provide an 
a. The payload design r r i y  incorporate bailast mounting recep- 
tacles, if necessary,  in sufficient quantity and located appro- 
priately on the payload to accommodate changes that may 
occur that violate the mod- le interchangeability. The ballast 
may be added o r  removed manually as required on the ground. 
The design of the balancing system equipment will be recvired 
to have the capability for on-orbit changes to be perf?rnl,l 
remotely by the manipulator a r m s .  Quick-disc nnect tapered 
plugs of various mater ia ls  may be considered a:. one approach 
for the weight/receptical design. 
The payload design may incorporate electro-mechanical 
device(s), if necessary,  to adjust the m a s s  properties of 
the payload by moving ballact weights on command. The 
weights may be mounted on rods which are oriented prop- 
e r ly  to obtain the effective spatia: weight Iccation and may 
be moved by screw o r  other action. A t  least  two types of 
such devices are  presently being used successfully, one of 
which is used on a spinner 3nd the other on a 3-axis con- 
trolled satellite. 
b. 
3. LEAK TEST AND PROPELLANT LOADING 
These operations a r e  almost always conducted in se r i e s ,  and the 
time required fo- the overall procedu .e is  nominally three work shifts. 
Presently,  leak testing is accomplishL>d by pressure/ t ime monitoring and 
kubble or sniffer testing of each potential source,  both of which allow to a 
limited c' ,gree the concurrent performance of other tasks but leave some- 
thing to  be desired in t e rms  of accuracy. A third method used is to bag the 
entire .. . , 'oad, charge the system with an  inert gas seeded with a low level 
5-7 
radioactive t racer  g a s ,  circulate the bagged mass  of a i r  through an analyzer, 
and monitor for total allowable system leakage. An accessory probe i s  used 
to isolate the individual source(s1 if required. 
highly accurate but requires dedicated t ime for the bagged portion of the oper-  
ation. 
reduction in time, xnd i s  in consonance with verification testing of highly rel i -  
able payloads, i t  is  recommended for use  in the Shuttle. 
launch base facilities, and the equipment associated with leak testing are 
s imi la r  to and a r e  combined with those for the propellant loading operation. 
This method is effective and 
Since this -cethod readily lends itself to accomplishing a significant 
The payload, the 
The propellant loading and final pressurization operations are pres  - 
ently slow processes that are accomplished by a minimum number of person- 
nel for safety reasons and require dedicated time. In addition, all other per-  
sonnel not directly supporting the operation a r e  evacuated from the entire 
area so that other tasks in the total support system as well as those associ-  
ated with the payload cannot be performed concurrently. 
this situation and accomplish this operation in a safe, rapid manner, while 
allowing a large number )f other tasks to be conducted concurrently, the 
following design guidelines should be considered: 
In order  to reverFe 
a. Design the fluid systems for payloads and servicing equipment 
to working pressure-to-burst  ratios sufficient to meet the 
safety requirements that will permit conducting other opera- 
tions concurrently with fluid system servicing operations. 
Design the fluid systems to minimize the number of sources 
for leaks. 
Design to maximize the use of brazed or v;c.lded couplings for 
system components as well as the normal plumbing. 
Eliminate the requirement for "one-more-time" flushing, 
draining, and purging during prelaunch operations This 
action may be taken by relying on previous operations, qual- 
ity control, and by taking advantage of the system redundancy 
features and the elimination of single point failures incor- 
porated in the payload design. 
Increase the rate  of fluid flow f w  loading and unloading oper- 
ations. 
load fill and drain lines, couplings, and 1arg:r capacity com- 
ponents associated with the systems. 
b. 
c. 
d. 
e. 
This may be accomplished by designing la rger  pay- 
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f. The ground support equipment for both leak testing and fluid 
servicing should be designed as standardized equipment fur- 
cished for payload u s e  a t  the launch base. 
t h i s  equipment is envisioned a s  consisting of self-sufficient, 
highly mobile units which will be used to service the several 
payloads in process in the prelaunch operations facility. The 
units may also be used for operations conducted a t  other on- 
base facilities including payload assembly and integration, 
storage,  post-landing, and refurbishment a reas .  
ment will be operated by experienced launch base personnel. 
The conczpt of 
The equip- 
In addition to expediting propellant loading and unloading, the u s e  of 
larger fi l l ldrain couplings a l so  provides capabilities that a r c  both required 
and beneficial to the system. 
current  operations, the payload /ground system coupling design will incor- 
porate multiple redundancy features to positively sea l  and lock the connec - 
tions to a s s u r e  the prrvention of incipient o r  accidental leakage and unin- 
tentional disconnect. The safest design should be implemented, and deci- 
sions should not be made on the basis of payload vs  ground equipment con- 
nector considerations. The larger coupling could a l so  enhance the capabil- 
ity, safety, and t ime considerations in conducting on-orbit servicing opera-  
tions, and the increased s izes  of other components may be used to advantage 
in detanking or jettisoning operations. 
To provide the level of safety required for con- 
By impiementing tli - above design guidelines for the payload and the 
support equipment, the total time required for leak testing and propellant 
servicing should not exceed I .  5 work shifts. 
Consideration should be given tu factory (or launch s i te  assembly) 
loading of propellants and gases  with hermetically sealed tanks. 
testing is then possible in the prelaunch operation and propellant o r  gas 
valves can be only electrically tested for continuity of the circuit  and valve 
s tem motion (if proper indicators are  provided). Such a procedure is adopted 
in one of the operational ICBMs and when applied here  would result  in simpli-  
fication of the prelaunch procedure. 
No thruster  
4. PAY LOAD FUNCTIONAL TESTING 
Functional testing over the years  has  progressed towarti the "ship 
This philosophy. while attractive, will probably never and shoot" concept. 
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be fully realized. However, further progress toward this end has been 
shown to be feasible and demonstrated to be ?oasible and is in fact a neces- 
s a ry  ingredient in the overall Shuttle concept. 
varying degrees in all of the various studies an; other l i terature related to 
the Shuttle in general and to payload operatiow in particular. 
as applied to satellite type payloads i s  not without precedent, since at  least 
one program has successfully launched sophisticated satellites under the 
10-12 day goal mentioned in this study 
further improvements. 
was required in achieving this capability for one type payload. 
efforts will be cecessary in implementing this approach for the Shuttle so 
that, by proper management of planning and design, the time required fo r  
testing af the large quantity of payloads to be processed may be reduced to  
contribute to the cost effectiveness of the overall system. 
This has been reflected to 
The approach, 
and demonstrated the capability of 
This is an exception and great effort in many areas 
These same 
The time for functional testing has been shown to require as much 
as 14 work shifts; however, most of the payloads examined required times 
close to the median of 7 shifts. 
examined were based on their application to the Shuttle, and improvements 
in reducing the time required for testing were  already reflected to some 
extent in the data. 
shifts shown in this data to the 11.5 days shown for testing in the data col- 
lected for our previous study (Ref. 5-2), which was based on the prevaletrt 
way of tes t ing today. 
Approximately half of the payloads 
This could be seen in comparing the median of 7 
In order  to achieve the reduction of time to the level of approximately 
seven shifts, o r  three days for  this study goal, the general philosophy previ- 
ously mentioned must be implemented for the Shuttle payloads. The prime 
element in the recommended test philosophy i s  to reduce payload testing at 
the launch site, particularly during the operations in the prelaunch process- 
ing facility. 
level of the tests conducted. 
ered may he determined by tradeoffs, including payload reliability /availability 
The driving factor in reducing this testing i s  in IDwering the 
The extent to which the level of testing i s  low- 
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requirements, r isks ,  time, costs, and other factors which will be different 
for each individual payload program. No attempt has been made to firmly 
define the level of testing. However, the trend and direction of the recom- 
mended philosophy i s  indicated and has been amplified sufficiently to show 
some of the methods for and the results of reducing the t ime for payload p re -  
launch testing to what i s  considered a nominal minimum limit. 
In the planning of prelaunch tes t  operations and in  the design of the 
payload tes t  equipment, and other support equipment, consideration should 
be given to the follo - ig guidelines: 
a. In the design of the payload and the supporting test  equipment, it 
should be emphasized that testing during the prelaunch oper- 
ations will be tc establish flight readiness verification. This 
is essentially status type testing, which is basically designed 
in most cases  to isolate down to the replaceable module level. 
The guide to be used is that the prelaunch testing will, as a 
minimum, identically duplicate whatever on-orbit, pre-  
release,  flight-readiness -type functional testing i s  defined 
for the particular payload. 
(Note: The capability will exist in the tes t  equipment to con- 
duct in-depth payload performance testing. However, this 
type of testing during the prelaunch operations cycle i s  not 
considered as t k  baseline, since i t  conflicts with the basic 
payload design and tlight readiness verification testing con- 
cepts for the Shuttle. 
time, and be ?,<pensive in te rms  of software and other factors 
for some programL., it may be implemented to accommodate 
justified cases.  Generally, only cri t ical  portions of the pay- 
load should bc subjected to this level of testing.) 
Payload? should be designed to interface with and utilize uni- 
versal-type test  equipment. This equipment is characterized 
by the Unified Test Equipment (UTE) (Ref. 5-8 )  o r  the Launch 
Processing System (LPS) (Ref. J-9) concepts, and may also 
be used in  the payload ground refurbishment cycle and a t  the 
factory. This type of equipment has a lso been considered 
necessary (Ref. J- 10) to accomplish the required 160-hour 
turnaround cycle (Ref. J- 1)  for the Orbiter.  
Payload design shall include features t'.at wi l l  contribute to 
the reduction of time required to perform configuration setup 
and teardown fo- tes t  operations. These a r e  pres  .:tly 
extremely time-consuming operations and, while significant 
-
While such testing would require more  
b. 
c. 
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reductions a r e  inherent  in the reduced te: !. .ng concept,  fu r the r  
reductions may be rea l ized .  Payloads should be modular ized 
and incorpora te  simplified s tandardized t e s t  connectors  of a l l  
types.  builtin hat antennas,  a l ignment  a ids ,  and o ther  small 
i tems  that would not requi re  removal  f rom the satel l i te .  
Location of payload equipment should consider  concurren t  
oper3t ions and el iminate  requi rements  t o  r eo r i en t  o r  other  - 
wise  move the payload. 
The payload design should provide whenever possible  fo r  auto- 
mat ic ,  remote ly  control led,  or  fully access ib le  cal ibrat ion 
fea tures  for the applicable equipment.  
Payload equipments requir ing highly p rec i se  physical  a l ign-  
ment  should be designed for the  accomplishment  by se l f -  
contained means  whereve r  possible.  Replaceable equipment 
will  conform to interchangeabili ty des ign  requi rements  or  
have been previously assembled  to the payload and designed 
al ignment  retention capabi l i t ies  will be uti l ized. 
a l ignments  will be minimized to the maximum extent pcss ib le  
but where  requi red  wiil  be accomplished using payload refer- 
ences.  
pa r t  of t h e  payload or  temporar i ly  mounted to accu ra t e  pay- 
load r e fe rence  posit ions.  
Payload and support  equipment design sha l l  include provis ions 
for module rep lacement  in  a safe  rapid manner .  Require-  
ments  for accessibi l i ty  and or ientat ion m a y  be dr iven  by 
ground r a t h e r  than on-orbi t  operat ions a u e  ?o the p re sence  
of folded antenna, s o l a r  a r r a y s ,  support  f ix tures ,  t e s t  equip- 
ment ,  and a 1-g environment.  
The design of payloads will  include the incorporation of elec- 
t r i ca l  in te r face  t e s t  points that  are a n  in tegra l  paist of the 
interfacing equipment. Tes t s  a r e  delayed and l a rge  amounts  
of t ime  a r e  cf ten expended in  determining if an indicated prob-  
l e m  is in the payload, the t e s t  equipment,  or  the var ious  in t e r -  
facing connections. 
:he t ime required to isolate  malfunctions and identify the  
offending unit without breaking the interface,  provide a s impl i -  
fied rapid means  to posit ively verify a n  in te r face ,  and may be  
used in  a l l  phases  of g r o m d  testing. 
d. 
e. 
Manual 
Accessory  optical  a ids  may  be designed as a n  in tegra l  
f .  
g. 
Incorporation of these  points will reduce  
5 .  TRANSPORT-~ ' iV AND HANDLING 
The ground tra.isportation of the payload, and the assoc ia ted  han- 
dling and prepara t ions ,  are shown t o  typically r equ i r e  one full work shift  
eaci: time rhe payload is moved f rom one place of operat ions 'io another  a t  
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the launch base. 
flows of operations include moving to a safe a rea  for propellant loading and 
pressurization, to a special a r e a  for EM1 tes ts ,  to other a reas  for simulator 
and Tug mating, and sti l l  others for simulator and Orbiter mating. Move- 
ments in scme of the more specialized cases include to and from facilities 
used for  payload sterilization, installation of specialized pyrotechnics, and 
short- term and long-term storage.  
Some of the movements that have been propased 1.- norr..;l 
In addition to the above prelaunch transportation operations, there  
are those associated with the on-base payload refurbishment cycle opera- 
tions, the inovements to and from the launch stand in accomplishing the 
quick-change of payloads, and the transportation of payloads from the fac- 
tory to the launch base. 
reducing the time for prelaunch operations, they also apply to the other areas 
and may be used in the support of all four types of payloads. 
While the design guidelines a r e  directed toward 
The design of the payloads should include as  a n  integral part  of the 
payload standardized equipment designed for supporting, hoisting, and other- 
wise handling the payload and which will interface and be used with standard- 
ized handling equipment. The general cr i ter ia  for payload equipment design 
would include: 
a. Simplified equipment that will d i i x t l y  interface with the 
ground equipment without the requirement to assemble / 
disassemble special adapters. 
Multiple use capability to allow the use of horizontal support 
fixtures having the capability of -:-orienting the payload in 
pitch and roll and for Orbiter manipulator a r m  attachment. 
Compatibility with standardized hoisting slings for mating 
the payload horizontally and the handling gear  used for  mat-  
ing the payload vertically. 
b. 
c. 
The payload should be designed, the flow of prelaunch operations 
should be planned, and the facilities and equipment provided to minimize the 
number of times the payload i s  required to be moved. 
tages, this will reduce the potential for payload damage, eliminate require- 
ments for retesting, enhance the control and maktenance of contamination, 
hmong other advan- 
5-13 
reduce  the amount  of support  faci l i t ies  and equipment requi red ,  and r e su l t  
in a significant reduction in the t ime  for prelaunch operat ions.  
for reducing these  moves include: 
The c r i t e r i a  
L 
d. The payload will include the design required for safety suf-  
f icient to pe rmi t  a l l  operat ions to  be conducted in the payload 
process ing  facil i ty,  or  o the r  areas as applicable,  without the 
payload being moved, without evacuat i rg  personnel ,  and while 
o ther  operat ions a r e  being per formed concurrent ly .  
Faci l i t ies  should be  se lec ted  o r  designed to  accommodzte  the 
payload prelaunch operat ions within a s ingle  facil i ty or com-  
plex of connecting faci l i t ies .  
out-of-doors between faci l i t ies  i s  to be  par t icx lar ly  avoided 
wherever  possible .  
in the s a m e  facil i ty where  the prelaunch procesaing is accom-  
plis hed 
operat ions.  
s imu la to r s  
load problem a r e a s  a r e  discovered.  
ab le  for the payload prelaunch process ing  facil i ty to  be con- 
tained within the s a m e  building as the Orb i t e r  maintenance 
area, or in a connected adjoining building, to provide passage  
of the  payloads without spec ia l  transpoi-tation considerat ions.  
f .  The launch base  s tandardized t e s t ,  se rv ic ing ,  and o the r  sup-  
port  equipment should be designed and installed to  faci l i ta te  
opera t ions  with the s e v e r a l  payloads being s imultaneously 
processzd  in the  prelaunch operat ion facility. 
lations a r e  not accomplished,  the equipment should be 
designed to he highly mobile ,  with the  capabili ty of coming 
to and supporting the payloads in the i r  respec t ive  locations.  
During all t ransportat ion and handling operat ions,  the envi-  
ronment  to which the payload is subjected should be  monitored 
and recorded .  
re la t ive humidity, and any o ther  fac tors  to which the payload 
i s  sensi t ive.  
should be s tandardized in o r d e r  that  the  data  may  be  rapidly 
reviewed by s tandard equipment followi-ni; any payload move-  
ment .  The sensing equipment for the var ious  functions m a y  
be a par t  of the design and installed a-;:opriately on the pay- 
load where  i t  may be used  for  o ther  than ground t r anspor t a -  
tion and handling purposes .  
e.  
'The movement  of the payload 
The s torage  a r e a  for paylosds should be  
to faci l i ta te  subsequent rapid minimum movement  
Also located h e r e  should be the  Tug and Orb i t e r  
to  avoid payload movement  in the event that  pay- 
It would be highly d e s i r -  
Wheze instal-  
g. 
This includes shock and vibration, t empera tu re ,  
The instrumentat ion and sensing equipment 
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6. ORDNANCE CHECKOUT AND INSTALLATION 
The total  t ime  required for  ordnance s y s t e m  c i rcu i t  checkout,  
installation of ordnance,  and the  installation and removal  of safe and a rm-  
ing equipment i s  shown to  r equ i r e  a s  much as two work shif ts .  
payloads incorpora te  ordnance and present ly  have the requi rement  for  
manned access into the Orb i t e r  payload bay during operat ions at  the  launch 
pad 
m a y  be eliminated and t h e  prelaunch 0 1 , .  rations t ime reduced to  a II aximum 
of one shift  by incorporat ing the following guidelines: 
Most of tne 
The undesi rablc  requiremcnt  for post-mate a c c e s s  to  the payload 
a.  Curren t ly  the m o s t  common method of safing and a rming  
pyrotechnic devices  involves the  u s e  of in-flight j umpers  
( I F J s ) ,  one of which grounds the  fir ing networks and p r e -  
cludes unplanned activation of the ordnance.  This i s  
replaced before  launch with a flight-configured jumper  
wnich will  allow activation. These  devices  should be  
replaced by switches designed to be manually operated and 
with redundant interlock f ea tu res .  The safing / a rming  act ion 
may be manually accomplished on the  ground o r  by means  of 
a manipulator  arm while in orb i t .  An a l t e rna te  means  could 
also posses s  the s a m e  fail-safe f ea tu res .  The design should 
also incorpora te  the capabili ty for continuous s ta tus  indica- 
tion and appropr ia te  flight c r e w  caution and warning displays.  
These fea tures  will a l s o  b e  of u s e  during on-orbi t  payload 
r e t r ieva l  Operations. 
(hef. J-11) that appea r  to  have m e r i t  &,id r ep resen t  the 
d e s s r e d  approach.  
Payloads should be  designed for the  installation of c l a s s  A 
anc B pyrotechnics  p r i o r  io the  rece ip t  of the payload at the  
prelaunch processing facility. The design should include the 
provis ions for appropr ia te  a c c e s s  to the uni ts  foilowing the i r  
installation for the m r p o s e s  of possible  r emova l / r ep lacemen t  
of squibs  and the installation of ini t ia tors  p r i o r  to  mating with 
the Orbi te r .  
se remote ly  controlled e lec t romechanica l  devices  that  would 
Severa l  methods have been proposed 
b. 
7 .  TUG AND ORBITER MATING, VERIFICATIONS, AND FLIGHT 
PREPARATIONS 
Tug m i i n g  and in te r face  checkout, p repara t ions  for mating with 
the Orb i t e r  and interface ver i f icat ions,  non-hazardous servicing , closeout  
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flight preparations, and simulated flight tes ts  ai.e shown to presently total 
as much as 2 1  work shifts,  wit?i 1 2 . 5  shifts as  a median. The t ime required 
for each of thesc operations is highly dependent on the particular pay!oad,and 
i t  i s  difficult to differentiate and compare the individual operations to the 
study goal; however, it  is significant that the totals are roughly comparable 
to the study goal total. 
payload in  a total of no more  than six days, with t w ~  days allocated to the 
Tug operations, three days to thz Orbiter simulator, and one day for mating 
with the Orbiter.  
The goal is to accomplish these operations for any 
WhAe the t ime shown as presently required i s  compara3le to the 
goal, it  i s  to be emphasized that the t ime for each goal operation .s the maxi- 
mum time d o c a t e d  to be used as planned by a payload program. 
Ltions are not expected to normally utilize a l l  of the allocated t ime and the 
planning will include slack time for  trouble shooting, module replacement, 
and reaoht ion of an) problem a reas  that might be discovered during these 
operations. 
of the payload program with respect to the number of shifts worked, :he 
scope and depth of testing accomplished, the operations to be performed, 
and the slack time felt to be required. 
The oper-  
The planning of the utilization of this time is  the prerogative 
By utilizing the automated checkout/test equipment to conduct inter - 
face verifications and to repeat the paylcad status verifization tes ts ,  and 5y 
conducting other operations concurrently, is expected that the Tcg and 
Orbiter simulator operations will not require more  than one day each. The 
subsequent mating of the payload to the Orbiter and verifications must  be 
accomplished in approximately 12 hours, in accordance with Shuttle baseline 
requirements,  and the additional t imz in the allo. ,ition for this operation i s  
sufficient to pccomplish the final closeout preparations, including the final 
cleaning of the payload to meet contamination control r e  rements.  
Many of the design guidelines previously stated will a lso be appli- 
cable to this phase of the payload operations. 
include provisions for achieving the degrez of cleanliness required 
The payload design should 
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commensurate with mission requiremen's. 
by one o r  more  of the following, and thc approach should be in the order  
listed: 
The requirements 9hO~ld be met 
a. Design to tolerate the worst  degree of contamination to be 
encountered f rom the factory through mission accomplish- 
ment. Fo r  example, exposed mechanisms should incorporate 
large clearances,  loose tolerances,  wipers,  and seals .  Solar 
power and thermal  control surfaces should be sized to account 
for potential degradation from any contamination source.  
Design provisions for self-protection o r  control of contamina- 
tion. 
cal o r  other cri t ical  surfaces ,  that may be actuated by remcte 
?r t ime command signals. 
t raps ,  and sacrificial  surfaces should be irnplerr#ented. 
payload system inay include plastic bags a s  apprcprikte for 
the entire payload o r  for portions of it. 
Design the payload to permit  cleaning a, :I  to enhance the ease 
of achieving and maintaining the degree of cleanliness required. 
Examples include the selection of n;aterials that do nat generate 
and are  reEistant to the accnmulation of contaminates. 
materials should be compatible with cleaning solvents and the 
surfaces should be designed for  ease  of cleaning and maintain 
ing cleanlinecs. 
inside corners ,  orifices,  obscured 31 r faces ,  and a r e a s  that 
would impede the flow o r  puddle solvents during liquid flush- 
ing operations. 
furnished a t  the launch base for payload use. 
ment will consist of a large clean booth for each payload bay 
in the processing facility; a centralized a i r  source controlled 
to payload r tyuirements ,  vacuum, flushing, and other clean- 
ing equipment; clean-rc-mtvpe clothing; monitoring; and 
testing instrumentation and services .  Similar equipment and 
services  will be provided for the payloads a t  all other a r e a s  
as required. 
b. 
Examples include covers and/or  gas png ing ,  for  opti- 
The use of deflectors,  baffles, 
The 
c. 
The 
The design should eliminate natural t raps ,  
d. Contamination control, monitoring, and tes t  ea : i p n m t  will be 
The basic equip- 
D. CONCLUSIOYS 
The assumptions for  the study, which cons c _  of some of the basic 
low cost payload design concepts, a r e  more  than simply guidelines, 
a r e  requirements,  if the goal of 10-12 days for  payload prelaunch operations 
is  to bz achieved, Similarly, the guidelines developed from the examination 
They 
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of the individual operations for time reduction a r e  required, since most  of 
them a r e  outgrowths of the aSove mentioned assumptions /guidelines and show 
in ~ l l o x a  detail some of the ways in which the concepts may be implemented. 
By implementing the 6 assump:ions / guidelines and th, ' payload 
and operations guidelines develop ' 1  in the study, the goal of 10-12 days i s  
possibld. 
tions (Table 5-2) indicates positive margins between the new nominal time 
requirements and the t ime allocated as available in the goa . this level is  
the lower limit of that which can L e  achieved. 11s .ndic.ated will 
s e rve  to accammodate increases  in t ime occasioned by the n.1:rSr.r of pav- 
loads in process  a t  one time, the payload peculiars,  an? :)t:wr varisbles to 
be encountered. 
Xhile the summary of the time for  the paylcad prelaunch op. ra- 
The mar 
The predicted launch rates  for the initial par t  0.' the Shuttle program 
do not require that the payload processing meet  the 10-12 day goal. Also, 
the goal is not expectad to be achieved a t  the outset of the prograin, but thc 
capa?-,ility will be designed into the system and i t  may be approached throuyh 
an evolutionary process .  
concepts are implemented and proved, the technj cal  problems a r e  resolved, 
and confidence is  gained in the total approach. 
The reduction in time will improve as the basic 
Some payloads will probably utilize +'le 15-ft maximum dismeter  
capability of the Orbiter payload bpy and, due to s ize  li: litations during the 
factory-to-launch-site t ransportat im,  they will require some amount of 
assembly at the launch site.  
based on the receipt of a "flight ready' '  ueyload, it would appear tllai at 
least  two days should be added to the flow to accommodate tho: 7 pj - loads  
having this requi,  ement.. However, for  a given launch base plan, this will 
either reduce the annual launch rate  capability o r  Yeqtire additional facili- 
ties and equi?ment to process a t  least  rne  n;ore payload concurrently with 
the others being processed. 
facility for the a Psembly operations and d - liver the payloads in a 'flight 
ready ' conditicn to the payload processing facility. 
Since the prelaunch operations flow time i s  
The altern?.tive is to provide a separate  on-base 
TIic lattc- facility I 6  
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a highly specialized facility designed to provide a rapid uninterrupted flow of 
payloads to meet the launch rate  requirements (10-15 day centers).  
facility for payload assembly could be integrated with the facilities provided 
for payload refurbishment and preparations for payload return transportation 
to  the factory o r  lead center. 
scheduling effects , the shared use  of equipment,and the ability to integrate 
the Sortie, o r  other large payload components coming to the launch base 
from different sources,  a r e  among the advantages to be gained by this 
method. 
recommended for the Shuttle payload system. 
The 
The alleviation of potential problems and 
It has  been used in this study(as illustrated in Figure J-1) and is 
To meet the goal of 10-12 days for prelaunch processing operations, 
a r.iinirnum of two 8-hr work shifts per day will be required. 
on the new nominal t imes , which evolved from a l a r g e  number of payloads, 
and variances in actual requirements will be encountered. It is again empha- 
sized that the goal times allocated for each operation exceed the requirements 
and may be used a t  the discretion of the payload program. 
This i s  based 
A l l  of the operatiens examined, and the associated guidelines devel- 
oped, are applicable to the expendable, Sortie, on-orbit maintainable, and 
the groundqefurbishable payloads with two possible exceptions involving the 
Sortie payload. 
appear to  be required at  this time. 
of pressurized Sortie m o i d e s  and on-board pressure vessels  will generate a 
requirement for s imilar  operations and the general operations and design 
guidelines presented may be applied. 
appear to be a requirement for ordnance operations. 
The leak testing and propellant loading operation does not 
However, it i s  expected that the presence 
In addition, there does not presently 
E. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The investigatic,bs for this study have revealed several  a r eas  which 
will have an impact on the time required to conduct the payload prelaunch 
Operations, in addition to impacts o n  other elements of the system. Detailed 
studies a r e  recommended for  the following: 
1. The operations involved in handling radioactive thermoelectric 
generators (RTG) for payloads using this equipment a s  a power 
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source present problems for which there  have been no really 
satisfactory solutions developed. The problems of thermally 
cooling the units on the ground and protecting personnel from 
radioactive exposure in unmanned systems is difficult. Their 
use in the Shuttle may be expected to be more  difficult, par- 
ticularly where the system will be required to be installed 
late in the flow and most probably on the launch stand. 
It i s  always highly desirable that a payload a r r ive  at  the launch 
base a s  a completely integrated "flight ready'' unit and, since 
it i s  inevitable that some payloads will approach the maximum 
limits of 4.6-m diameter  by 18.3-m length, a considerable problem 
exists in how to t ransport  the payload from the factory to the 
launch site. 
usually the controlling factor in any of the modes of t ranspor-  
tation. 
road permit,  in Guppy-type a i rc raf t ,  o r  by a barge waterway 
system, all of which a r e  expensive. Presently,  the C-5A 
cargo a i r c ra f t  can handle 4.1 m high x 5.8 m wide x 37 .0  m 
long cargo and can exceed Orbi ter  payload weight limits. 
While the Guppy can handle the maximum payload diameter,  
there  are cr i t ical  weight/length l imits and few aircraf t  are 
available. The requirements for the transportation of l a r g e  
s ize  payloads will increase in the Shuttle era,and the solution 
to the problem could result  in increased assembly/ tes t  oper-  
ations and facilities a t  the launch site.  
area does not appear to have been addressed by any study, it 
is recommended that a detailed study of payload transporta- 
tion be initiated. Consideration should be given to a l l  move- 
ment requirements,  including the transportation f rom an 
alternate landing s i te  to the required destination. 
off study should be conducted to determine the effects of one-  
piece vs many-piece payload dts igns with respect to cost 
effectiveness, considering all elements of the payload sys  - 
terns including assembly, tes t ,  and on-orbit and refurbish- 
ment operations. 
The payload ground-refurbishment cycle needs to be studied 
in detail to resolve many problems /questions that have 
appeared. For  example, should the refurbishment opera-  
tions be conducted at the launch s i te ,  the depot, o r  the fac- 
tory? If conducted a t  the launch s i te ,  will the tes t  philosophy 
for the "new" payloads be different f rom the original, with 
respect to thermal  vacuum, acoustic, o r  other acceptance 
testing, o r  will facilities for this testing be required at  the 
launch base?  
The solution to the potential problems of compatibility of 
software developed for use  a t  the factory and that to be used 
2. 
Diameter i s  particularly important, since i t  i s  
Today the few outsized units a r e  handled by special  
Since this problem 
A t rade-  
3. 
4. 
a t  the  launch b a s e  f o r  tes t ing pu rposes  should be resolved. 
The  use of un ive r sa l  t e s t  equipment  s t a t ions  located a t  t h e  
fac tory  v e r s u s  o t h e r  me thods  should be examined  for c o s t  
e f fec t iveness .  
ing concept  a t  t he  launch b a s e  should be evaluated t o  d e t e r -  
mine  the extent  to  which so f tware  c o s t s  m a y  be reduced .  
The on-orb i t  payload r epa i r /ma in tenance  should be s tudied  in  
de ta i l  for e a c h  of the appl icable  payloads.  
d e t e r m i n e  r e q u i r e m e n t s ,  capabi l i t i es ,  and l imi ta t ions  and  
examine  the impac t s  on ground tes t ing  and o t h e r  objectives 
w h e r e  compat ib le  mult iple  pu rpose  features m a y  be incorpo-  
rated in the  payload des ign .  
The  impac t  of implementing the reduced  t e s t -  
5 .  
The  s tudy  should 
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APPENDIX K LAUNCH SITE TESTING 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Present-day launch site testing is a repetition of the factory 
integrated system test (IST) on most satellite programs. 
a complete set of factory AGE is shipped to the launch site, where it is set 
up to run the EST. 
permanently a t  the launch site where it is again used to run the IS' 
the satellite is delivered to the launch site and inspected visually for in- 
transit damage, an IST (perhaps abbreviated) is run to assure no electrical 
failures. The satellite is then mated to either the transtage or booster 
adapter fixture and made ready to mate to the booster. Usually an IST 
is run at  this point to assure proper performance prior to mating with the 
booster. After being mated with the booster, placed on the launch pad, 
another IST is run as near as possible to the start  of the countdown. 
ends the test sequence at  the launch site with the exception of anomalous 
conditions. 
the procedure presently followed for the medium to large classes of satellites. 
There are  some variances to the procedure described, but generally it is 
representative of most satellite programs. 
For some programs 
O n  other programs, a complete set  of AGE is installed 
After 
This 
It must be pointed out that the above : quence represents generally 
Upon inspection of the above sequence, i t  becomes obvious that 
the time the average satellite is actually in test (typically 30-50 hours) 
represents a small cost impact when compared to the cost of the AGE hardware, 
the expense of transporting the test and maintenance crews to the launch site, 
and the expense of retaining the test and maintenance crews at the launch site 
for extended periods. For a typical launch operation, approximately 20 to 40 
man months of effort a re  expended on operation and maintenance of the test 
equipment. 
AGE, test equipment, computer (not including software), communication and 
power equipment, and attitude control, it  can add from 1 . 5  to 3.0 million 
dollars to the project cost. 
If testing at the launch site requires an extra set  of electrical 
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It can be seen that any effort to save cost by reducing the 
amount of testing would not reduce cost. 
equipment to be used exclusively at  the launch s i te ,  w u l d  cost more  than 
it would save. Hence, saving must  come from the elimination of launch 
site testing, rather than reducing it. 
has the capability to perform relatively low-level payload tes ts .  
probability of success  is great  enough to offset the r i sk  involved in  not 
performing a full integrated system test .  
much a failure would cost versus  the savings realized from the elimination 
of launch s i te  testing. 
B. ASSUMPTIONS 
Effort to develop s impler  test  
This approach assumes the Shuttle 
The 
Further ,  it must be shown how 
The capability to tes t  the payload before deployment involves 
supplying power to the payload, communication with the payload, and data 
processing and display of tes t  results.  Each payload contractor will be 
required to supply software necessary to conduct the test  from the Shuttle 
computer . 
C. POWER REQUIREMENTS 
If prelaunch and pre-orbit  tes ts  a r e  to be conducted by the 
Shuttle on its payload, that payload must f i r s t  be supplied by the Shuttle 
with sufficient power properly conditioned to suit each payload. 
requirement could be made eas i e r  i f  a standard bus voltage could be agreed 
upon for all satellite contracts, since i t  is assumed this standard would 
also be adopted for the Shuttle power system. 
conditioned if necessary,  will be assumed to be available from the Shuttle. 
This 
In any case, power, properly 
D. COMMUNICATIONS REQUIREMENTS 
It  will be assumed here  that docking and undocking operations 
will be controlled from the Shuttle. 
between the payload and the Shuttle for the purpose of commanding the 
attitude of those satell i tes to which the Shuttle wil l  dock on orbit. 
This requires a communications link 
A further 
assumption is that a checkout of the payload will be required pr ior  t J  
injecting it into orbit. 
the Shuttle, along with a computer to  process the telemetry data. 
several  methods for  presenting the telemetry data to  other systems, but 
for purposes of this document it w i l l  be assumed the Shuttle will  contain a 
telemetry decommutator, a frame synchronizer, and a word formatter. 
F r o m  this equipment, data will be presented in a synchronized, parallel 
format with enough control lines to indicate when a new data word is present, 
when telemetry word one is present, and when the telemetry is synchronized 
(locked). 
Reference K- 1 . 
This again requires a link between the payloaa and 
There a r e  
The maximum data rate considered will be 256 kilobits, based on 
E. DATA PROCESSING REQUIREMENTS 
In line with the preceding assumptions made for the communica- 
tions link, there will be T. computer available on the Shuttle. 
will be used to process downlink telemetry and uplink commands. 
payloads whose command link is interactive, the computer will provide the 
closed loop necessary to execute commands. 
This computer 
For those 
This computer is assumed to  be for general usage in the Shuf'e 
and one of its tasks  will be processing telemetry for  checking out the payload 
both on the launch pad and immediately prior to  orbit injection. In o r  ' 2 1  that 
the computer handle the highest specified telemetry rate (256 kilobits) it 
must exhibit at  least the following characteristics: 
16 bit word length (minimum) 
65,536 words of executable memory 
10 million words of mass  memory 
Execution rate of 400-500 kilo-instructions 
per second (KIPS) 
A computer meeting these minimum general requirements would 
tr classified a mini-computer and would be capable of processing telemetry at 
the maximum rate, but very little interactive testing could be accomplished. 
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The general type of testing possible with a system of this nature is limited to 
activating a subsystem and checking its status. W i t h  the limited data process- 
ing capability described above, other systems could not be checked for 
spurious zeactions and data trends could not be checked. These a re  generally 
classified "go, no go" low-level tests. 
F. DISPLAYS REQTJIREMENTS 
For the low-level type testing assumed here, the display require- 
ments wil l  be relatively slight. A Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) display with 
graphic capability, interactive keyboard, and light pen will  be required. The 
CRT should be capable of displaying 40 to 50 lines of 80 characters each. This 
display must be available to the payload specialist who will act a s  test con- 
ductor. For the most part, the tests anticipated wil l  be performed in pre- 
arranged groups, each of which will  be started from the keyboard and the 
results (sometimes graphic) will  be displayed on the CRT. 
tape reader could be used advantageously to  automatically run tests, but is not 
coi.aidered a requirement. 
An iiitegral paper 
G. ANALYSIS 
1. PRE-ORBITAL TEST REQUIREMENTS 
Although testing prior to orbit injection has been assumed, 
the level and intent of that testing has not been specified. 
will be constrained by the capability of the data processing equipment, so the 
question becomes how much testing is required so that adequate data processing 
can be provided. 
The level of testing 
The tests performed just prior to  orbit injection need not be 
extensive for the expendable and refurbishable payloads because the detection 
of a failure i s  all that is required and not the isolation or diagnosis of that 
failure. Since these types of payload are  not serviceable in space, nothing 
could be done for a failure even if it could be diagnosed. 
is that there has been a failure in the payload and it can be returned for 
ground repair. 
The important fact 
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For  the on-orbit maintainable payloads, it is unlikely that spare 
modules would be carried into orbit with the payloads because of volume 
limitations. Diagnostic testing, then, is not a requirement, since the infor- 
mation is of no use to the Shuttle mission even if it is available. Low-level 
status testing is al l  that is required so that each subsystem is checked to 
assure  it has not failed. 
Section E is completely adequate for this type of testing. 
the software required in the Shuttle computer, since complex cross  checking 
and data trending is not required. 
The mini-computer described in general terms in 
This also simplifies 
2. BASELINE CONFIGURATION 
A baseline test  configuration and four alternates to  the baseline 
have been developed for comparison purposes. The baseline represents 
generally the present method of launch site testing for medium and large 
satellites. Each of the alternates will  be considered for its impact, both 
technical and economic, to the baseline for the four missions. Note that for 
each of the five configurations it is assumed that the payload is delivered to 
the launch site fully tested and qualified for launch. No recommendations on 
factory testing a re  being put forth here and only the subject of launch site test- 
ing will be considered. Table K-1 is a matrix comparing each of the alternate 
configurations . 
The baseline, a s  stated previously, represents generally the 
present methods of launch site testing and preparation for medium and large 
satellites. A complete set of factory AGE is supplied at the launch site for 
testing the satellite. Integrated System Tests (IST) a r e  performed on the 
satellite in the Satellite Assembly Building prior to  mating with tile booster 
and again (after mating to the booster) just prior to the s ta r t  of the countdown 
on the launch pad. No checkout capability is provided on the Shuttle. 
satellite is launched, placed in orbit, and checked out from its ground station. 
In case of an anomaly, a decision would be made a t  this point on whether to 
re-dock the satellite to the Shuttle and return to  earth, leave the satellite in 
orbit to be repaired on a subsequent mission, or discard the satellite a s  a 
failure. 
The 
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3. ALTER NAT ~2 CON FIGURATIONS 
a. Alternate I 
This alternate represents the baseline with the addition of low- 
level checkout capability aboarc the Shv.ttle. This requires the installation of 
a mini-computer aboard the Shuttle such a s  described in Section E. 
sequence of operations is the same a s  for the baseline up to and including the 
IST run just prior to the start  of the countdown. 
would run a short (1-4 hours) status tes t  on the satellitr. 
prior to orbit injection, the Shuttle would repeat this test. 
discovered at this point, the satellite could easily be returned t o  ear th  since 
it has not yet been undocked from the Shuttle. 
b. Alternate II 
The 
At this point, the Shuttle 
After launch and 
If an anomaly is 
This alternate is an extension of the baseline and Alternate I; 
.L 
Alternate II is  Alternate I without the factory AGZ:' Alternatc II requires the 
mini-computer but does not require factory AGE? The IST runs prior to 
mating with the booster and prior to countdown under Alternatc I a r ?  
eliminated. 
from the Shuttle. 
Alternate I. 
The only prelaunch test  is the status test run prior mtdown 
After  launch, the operation i s  the same a s  d, 3 c  rsbed in 
C. Alternate III 
Alternate III is a major departure 
requires no factory AGE* at the launch site but 
from the baseline in that it 
requires a l a r g e  computer in 
the Shuttle which can perform the same tests on the satellite a s  those 
performcd by the factory AGE. The satellite is delivered to the launch site 
fully tested and qualified *or launch. It i s  then mated to the booster and a full 
IST is run using the Shuttle computer. 
another IST (probably abbreviated) is run from the Shuttle. 
is discovered, the satellite can then be returned to rarth.  
After launch and before orbit injection, 
If an anomaly 
- 
* Electrical A G E  
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This alternate requires a rathcr large computer aboard the 
Shuttle in order to  perform ISTs on the largc satellitcs. 
be generally of the class of an IBM 370/145 (proposed by IBM for the DSP 
Phase LI AGE) with approximately 5 12 K bytes (1 28 K words) of esecutablc 
memory and 100 million bytes of mass  memory. 
This computer must 
d. Alternate IV 
This alternate rep- .aents the largest departure from present 
methods, in that it requires all  satellites to  include complete onboard check- 
out of each subsystem on the satellite. 
(Micro class) built into each subsystem which constantly run diagnostics on that 
subsystem and report status to a central computer for co~npilation. 
This wwuld include sniall computers 
The satellite, a s  in all  the other cases, lvould be delivered to 
ch. No testing would be the launch site fully checked out and qualified f\  i 
performed a s  such, but after mating to the Shuttle the satellite would be 
connected iiardline to the Shuttle computer, which would monitor th. perform- 
ance of the satellite subsystems through the onboard checkout units. This is 
equivalent to constant testing while the satellite is turned on; hence, it would 
satisfy the pre-orbital checkout requirements also. 
4. OPERATIONAL AND TECHNICAL IMPACTS 
The technical impact to present-day operations w i l l  vary with the 
alternate configuration. 
methods, since it represents the general methods now followed. 
The baseline causes zero impact to present-day 
Alternate I presents very little impact to  present-day operations, 
since ihe only requirement above the baseline is for a small computer cn the 
Shuttle wtlich wi l l  have access to the telemetry decommutators, 
will be available and only the interface with the decoinmutators must be added 
(assuming the telemetry rcceivcrs and decommutators are available). 
Additional software would be required from thc contractor to run the tests in 
the Shuttle computer. This software would bc 2 functional subset of the soft- 
ware developed for the factory AGE computer, but since the likelihood of having 
This computer 
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program-compatible computers is very slight, the software would be re- 
written. This software would be a requirement for any pre-orbital tests 
performed by the Shuttle also, so it cannot tc completely attributed to pre- 
launch te s t re qui re ment s . 
Alternate II seemingly presents a large impact to prelaunch test 
operations, but this impact is probably more emotional than technical. 
question to be answered b.ere is "How cssential i p  a complete prelaunch 
test?" This alternate configuration eliminates the ET-type test and sub- 
stitutes a short status-type test just prior t o  launch. As in Alternate I, this 
presumes the availability of a computer which bas a t e l ~  metry interface, so 
there really is no technical impact over chat  previously mentioned of needing 
the interface betwen the computer and the telemetry system. Operationally 
there is major impact, in that no ground testing as  such is conducted using 
ground AGE. 
The 
Alternate III would have major impact, both cperationally and 
technically. Since this alternate calls for a large computer aboard the Shuttle 
to run an IST-type test before launch, it also requires test personnel on the 
Shuttle to conduct the tests. Technology has not advanced as  yet to the point 
that such a large computer qualified for space is  available, so it would also 
require a major advance in the state of the a r t  of spaceborne computers. 
Alternate IV would have little impact to Shuttle operations or 
technology, but represents a major impact to the design and manufacture of 
satellites. It would require the contracting agency to specify a type system 
which has not as  yet been developed. 
latitude of developing his own onboard checkout techniques and equipment bJt 
each would be required to meet a standard interface. 
computers has not as yet becn advanced to the degree necessary for this 
application, but there are  several very small, space-qualified computers from 
which the technology cculd be developed. 
Each contractor would be given the 
The state of micro- 
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5. ECONOMIC IMPACTS 
In order to bound any cost savings made possible by reduced scope 
of launch site testing, some costs must be attached to current test operations. 
These costs \vould be associated with the baseline configuration. The costs are  
developed for three classes of satellites: 
a. 
b. 
Large satellites launched singly and generally of the 
refurbishable or  maintainable type. 
Medium size satellites launched in groups of two 
or more and likely to be of the expendable tj-pe. 
Small payloads often of the "piggy back" class. c. 
The cost of test operations at the launch site is att;-ibutod +o two major con- 
tributor s.  
First, there is the cost of transporting the test crew and AGE 
maintenance personnel to the launch site and back to the factory and supporting 
them while they are  at the launch site. This can involve from 5 to 15 men 
for up to two months. 
supplying a duplicate copy of the factory AGE:::for use at the launch site. 
cost for factory AGE varies with the size, complexity, and type of satellite, but 
the major determinant of cost of the AGE%s the data processing equipment. 
Generally, AGE costs range from $1 million to $3 million with a small nurr.ber 
of programs of special nature being outside these limits on both sides (software 
cost not included). 
The second major contributor to launch site costs is the cost of 
The 
* 
From this, the cost of launch site testing can be derived by adding 
a fixed cost (operations) to the cost of a set of factory AGE*amortized over the 
number of launches scheduled. For purposes of this document, the number of 
launches will be assumed to be 5. For a specific mission, the launch site 
testing cost could be computed exactly, but average costs  will  be used here. 
average of $5,000 per man month wi l l  be used for operations costs. 
An 
Q Electrical AGE 
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a. Baseline Costs 
Large Satellites 
Operations, 30 man months 150,000 
AGE Hardware * 600,000 
Total Cost Per Launch $750,000 
Medium Satellites 
Operations, 20 man months 100,000 
AGE Hardware * 400,000 
Total Cost Per Launch $500,000 
Small Satellites 
Operations, 15 man months 75,000 
AGE Hardware * 200,000 
Total Cost Per Launch $275,000 
bo Alternate I Cost 
Since Alternate I docs not eliminate any of the baseline testing, 
there will be no cost reduction, Instead, there will be a slight increase in the 
cost due to the added requirement of programming the mini-computer aboard 
the Shuttle. 
of comparison Alternate I cost wil l  be the same as baseline. 
This cost is not considered significant, however, and for purposes 
C. Alternate II Cost 
Since Alternate II proposes eliminating launch site testing, using 
5 factory AGE, all the baseline costs would be saved. 
attributed to this alternate with the exception of the previously mentioned soft- 
ware cost for the Shuttle computer. 
being considered since it is relatively small and is associated with another 
re  qui rement (pre -orbital t e st s ) . 
No added costs can be 
The Shuttle software cost, again, is not 
* Electrical AGE 
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The percentage of launch cost which can be saved using this 
alternate is: 
Large Satellites 7.1% 
Medium Satellites 9.5% 
Small Satellites 13.1% 
This assumes a Shuttle launch cost of $10.5 million and the 
following additional assumptions : 
(1) Single large satellites are  launched with one medium 
satellite. 
(2) Medium satellites are  launched in groups of two. 
(3) Small satellites are either "piggy back" with other 
missions or launched in effective groups of five. 
de Alternate III Cost 
Alternate II1 requires no launch site testing using the factory AGE: 
but it requires an equivalent to the IST to be conducted from the Shuttle using 
the Shuttle computer. 
saved, but software to run the test in the Shuttle computer will he required, 
This software is functionally identical to that already developed for the factory 
AGE: but it must be rewritten for use in a different cop uter  (the Shuttle com- 
puter). It is assumed this software will cost half as mu,h as a set of factory 
AGE, so half the hardware cost wi l l  be saved. Since no AGEikmaintenance 
personnel a re  required, and it can be assumed that the Shuttle equipment will be 
more compact and easier to operate, the operations cost will be approximately 
half those for the baseline. Therefore, this alternate saves approximately half 
the baseline cost but requires a very large (and expensive) computer on the 
auttle . 
The costs associated with duplicating the AGE will  be 
e. Alternate IV Cost 
Since this alternate conducts no ground test using the factory AGE$ 
all the costs of the baseline are saved. There would, however, be added cost 
* Electrical AGE 
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on the satellite of designing and installing the onboard checkout devices. 
Probably the net cffcct on the smaller satellites would be to  increase project 
costs, but it would be impossible to quantify these costs at this time. 
H. RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION 
Of the configurations, the baseline ar,d Alternate I offer the 
lowest risk and highest confidence of successful operation. 
representative of current operations and has becn developed from many years 
of experience. 
dimension of conducting a status-type test from the Shuttle. The advantage of 
these configurations is that they require little ncw procedural or technological 
development. The main disadvantage of these alternates is thev are relatively 
expensive, although the cost of launch site testing d o t s  not represent a 
significant portion of the total launch cost. 
The baseline is 
Alternate I includes all of the baseline and adds the further 
Alternate II offers the greatest cost savings but presents some 
element of risk in that no detail testing is performed after the satellite leaves 
the factory until it is on orbit, 
in order to launch without a detailed test at the launch site. 
fidence can, of course, be gained by running the low-level status tests from the 
Shuttle prior to launch. 
This requires a high confidence in *he satellite 
A degree of con- 
Alternate III reduces the risk, but requires a large computer 
aboard the Shuttle. This allows the detailed tests to be run before launch, but 
they are  conducted from the Shuttle without the need of facto;.y AGE. The dis- 
advantages are  that a set of extensive software must be developed for the Shuttle 
computer and that such a computer is not available using present technology. 
The size of the computer is the real problem because there is no demand for 
data processing equipment of this nature. 
development which would make it prohibitively expensive. 
Thus, it would require special 
Alternate IV, while offering great advantages in  all aspects of 
testing, seems somewhat utopian at this time. If each of the subsystems of a 
satellite could be made to completely test itself, this capability could be used 
K-13 
even down to the assembly line level. 
deal of research and, even if feasible, it would have to be required for all 
This approach would require a great 
satellites so that sthndardization could be effected. 
become widespread, they would also be very expensive. 
Until these 
I. CONCLUSIONS 
It appears, without 
III and IV are  inadvisable at this 
extensive study of 
time. If the state 
the subject, 
of tne art of 
subsystems 
that Alternates 
either large 
spaceborne data processing systems or self-contained diagnostic equipment 
were advanced significantly in the near future, these could become attractive. 
For the present, they are  unattainable. 
The baseline does not include a capability which is required; 
namely, the ability to perform a satellite checkout prior to orbit injection. 
There are methods of circumventing this restriction (e. g. , relaying the 
satellite telemetry to the ground for checkoutb but the requirement is not 
difficult to  meet using a computer already installed on the Shuttle. 
also the need for command and control contact between Shuttle and satellite 
whose requirements overIap those of testing. 
There is 
The choice, at  this time, appears to be between Alternates I 
and II, making it a choice between testing for higher confidence or  accepting a 
greater risk for cost saving. The smaller satellites appear to offer a good 
trade-off between these factors requiring relatively low confidence factors, but 
the large satellites whose failure would abort the complete mission may not be 
a good vehicle for this cost savings. 
J. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Alternate fI is recommended as  the optimum trade-off between 
cost savings and risk for satellites which are not launched singly. A further 
study of the incidence of launch site failures and the level of testing possible 
with Shuttle equipment is suggested tc make a final selection of the mode of 
operation. 
processing equipment and the viability of requiring self-contained diagnostic 
Further study should also pursue the questions of spaceborne data 
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equipment. 
change the recommendations. 
The availability of either Alternate ILl or Alternate IV could 
Further study should be pursued on aspects of testing other than 
The modularity of the repairable and refurbishable satel- at the launch site. 
lites codd yield some cost savings if the test equipment could also be 
standardized. 
could present opportunities for reducing both assembly line testing and inte- 
gration testing. These test sets would include a computer and be programmable 
over a wide range of subsystems and could be integrated into a larger test set 
for system testing. 
Test sets such as those developed for integrated circuit testing 
The use of Universal Test Equipment ( U T E )  at both the factory 
and the launch site should also be studied to determine its feasibility. The 
greatest problem in using UTE is designing it to accept the largest, most 
complex satellite and yet be cost effective on the smaller satellites. 
usage of UTE would be required in order to make it cost effective, and if 
the software required for its use is more costly than developing special AGE, 
then the UTE may not be economically feasible. 
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APPENDIX L. DESIGN 
Analyses have been conducted to identify alternative approaches to 
the modularization of payloads, to select preferred approaches where 
possible, and to identify the considerations o r  tradeoffs necessary to a r r ive  
a t  practical solutions to the many problems that will be encountered. The 
analyses have been conducted by establishing a conceptual design fo r  each 
of two diverse types of payloads which are used as baseline o r  reference 
designs. 
represent a typical synchronous orbit  payload launched and serviced on 
orbit  by the Tug. 
in Reference L-1. 
appropriate. 
vehicle representative of relatively large,  low-earth-orbit (LEO), Orbiter- 
launched and serviced payloads. 
Observatory Satellite (Ea) developed underNASA Study 2.6 was also 
considered for  reference purposes. 
The Defense Support Program (DSP) spacecraft  was used to 
Most of the Conceptual design effort on DSP i s  presented 
For completeness, the wbrk is included herein when 
The Large Space Telescope (UT) was used a s  a baseline 
A conceptual design of a modularized Earth 
The analysis of the subject Serviceable Payload Modularization i s  
presented in sections under the following subject heading .,: 
A. 
B. Replaceable Module Thermal  Control 
C . 
D. Replaceable Module/Payload Electrical Interface 
E. 
F. Module Removal/Replacement Using Manipulator 
G. 
H. Recommended Tradeoff Studies 
Replaceable Module/Payload/Se rvice Module Compatibility 
Replaceable Module /Payload Fluid Interfaces 
Non- replaceable Equipment in an On-Orbit Maintainable 
Payload 
Module Backup - Handling Provisions 
It was assumed that the design problems encountered with the DSP, LST, 
and E06 would be typical of those encountered in the design of any payload 
fo r  on-orbit maintenance. 
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A. REPLACEABLE MODULE/PAYLOAD/SERVICE MODULE 
COMPATIBILITY 
The design of a payload for  on-orbit servicing should not be 
divorced from consideration of the type of motion selected to t ransfer  
replaceable modules to and from the payload, the design of the service 
module, and the design of the modules themselves. 
The t ransfer  motion selected should be one which will result  in 
simple, reliable, lightweight mechanisms to accomplish the t ransfer  and a t  
the same time result in a spacecraft configuration which is compatible 
with the requirements of the mission. The service module design should, 
of course,  be compatible with the t ransfer  motion selected and the space- 
craf t  configuration. 
To help illustrate the design process for  a space serviceable 
spacecraft and its servicing eqiiipment, a discussion of the design of the 
Space Serviceable Defense Support Program ( ,DSPpspacec raft is presented 
in Reference L- 1. 
The SSDSP was assumed to be typical of spacecraft in geosynchronous 
orbit. 
problems encountered with the SSDSP design would be typical of those 
encountered in the design of any payload (low-earth to geosynchronous 
orbit) for  on-orbit servicing. 
craf t  was asuurned in all cases  to accomplish on-orbit servicing. 
Furthermore,  i t  was assumed that the general  nature of design 
Hard-docking between the 7u:q and the space- 
The study presented in Reference L-1 concluded that the design 
of a spacecraft for on-orbit servicing should not be divorced from the 
design of the service module, the design of the modules, and consideration 
of the type of motions required to achieve t ransfer  of the modules to and 
from the spacecraft. 
The t ransfer  motions selected should result in the design of a 
lightweight, simple mechanism to achieve those motions. 
The shape of the spacecraft and the service module should be 
compatible with the t ransfer  motions, 
* This program is r l so  re fer red  to a8 the Shuttle-Launched Defense Support 
Program (SLDSP), 
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The module design should allow for simplicity of removal/insertion, 
alignment and locking in place. 
common t c  a l l  modules in the spacecraft and be able to meet  the packaging 
requirements of each of the modularized subsystems. 
B. REPLACEABLE MODULE THERMAL CONTROL 
Furthermore,  i t  should be a basic design 
Design studies of the Defense Support Program (DSP), Earth 
Observatory Satellite ( E a ) ,  and the Large Space Telescope ( U T )  space- 
c raf t  were configured for  on-orbit servicing via a remote servicing module 
have indicated that the thermal  control system design of the individual 
modules should be self-contained. 
Ground refurbishable or  expendable spacecraft which have no 
replaceable modules that must  be automatically positioned and therefore 
no movable module /spacecraft  interface do not require self-contained 
thermal  control systems for  each subsystem o r  grouping of subsystems. 
The three payloads (DSP, EOS, and S T )  chosen for the space 
serviceable design studies were assumed to be typical of spacecraft in 
geosynchronous and low-earth orbit. 
problems encountered with these spacecraft  would be typical of those en- 
countered in the design of any spacecraft for  on-orbit servicing. 
It was assumed that the design 
The design studies performed and reported on in Section 4 of 
Volume I1 and Section 3 of Volume I11 were performed for  the on-orbit 
maintainable type of payloads. In these design studies, an interface 
between the module and the spacecraft which would be typical of that 
required for an on-orbit serviceable spacecraft was designed. 
face design i s  shown in Figure L- 1. 
position on the spacecraft, it  contacts the spacecraft at  three points only. 
These three points a r e  indicated by the a r rows  on Figure L- 1. The main 
feature of this interface is that i t  is simple and has  a minimum of contact 
points. 
This inter-  
When the module is locked into 
However, the concept of minimum contact points i s  not compatible 
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with the t r a n s f e r  of heat a c r o s s  the interface through conduction. 
contact between the module and the spacecraf t  does not provide good con- 
ductive heat t r ans fe r ,  therefore ,  i t  is des i rab le  to  have a self-contained 
t h e m a l  control  system. In addition, conductive heat  t r a n s f e r  a c r o s s  
Minimal 
5 2 
N / m  ) joints  quite often r equ i r e s  high clamping p r e s s u r e s  (15-20 x 10 
and ve ry  smooth sur face  fini shes  in o r d e r  to minimize  the rma l  res is tance.  
High clamping p r e s s u r e s  are difficult to achieve with a joint designed to  be 
ma ted  and demated in space.  
joint  could be a problem. 
Also, the pcss ib i i . ty  of cold welding the 
Because typical s e n s o r s  for space< I( t e  often i.lc lude those 
which opera te  in the IR region, cooling to ten. ,c+dtures in the neighbor- 
hood of 90°K - 120°K could be required.  
par t ia l  l i s t  of IR s e n s o r s  fo r  the &OS miss ion ,  along with the i r  required 
de tec tor  ope rating tempera tures :  
F o r  example,  following is a 
1. Thematic Mapper  (7 Detectors)  2 90EK 
2 900K 
2 900K 
2 900K 
1 200K 
1 200K 
90 K 
2. Cloud Phys ics  Radiometer  (InAs Detectors)  120°K 
As can be seen, a t  least four  of the de tec tors  m u s t  opera te  at 
120°K or lower  (Reference L-2).  Another example is  the focal plane 
de tec tor  a r r a y  f o r  the DSP which a leo  m u s t  operate  at  telati---iiy A ~ W -  
t empera tures .  Achievement of operat ing t empera tu res  in thesc ranges 
r equ i r e s  e i the r  the use of second sur face  m i r r o r  rad ia tors ,  solid cryogen 
refr igerat ion o r  some type of active refr igerat ion sys tem.  Fur the rmore ,  
to  t r ans fe r  the heat  away f rom the de tec tors  to the refr igerat ion system 
o r  rad ia tors ,  some form of conduction path, such as  a conducticn b a r  or  
heat  pipe is required.  In incorporat ing these concepts into a space 
serv iceable  spacecraf t  design, two basic  approaches  ci.n be considered: 
PRECEDING PAGE BLANK NOT FILMED 
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a. The cooling sys tem can be separated from +'- \ ' e t e c t o r s  
such that a joint capable of being deniated ,: 
the module /spacecraf t  interface i s  rtsquired ; 
path between the d e t e c t o r s  and cooling s ) - ~ t r ~ ,  o r  
The e c i rs  sys tem caiA be se:f-contained within the de tec tc r  
module.  
:iated at  
the conduction 
b. 
The conduction of heat  a c r o s s  a joint as in choice ( 3 )  above requi res  
ve ry  smooth sur face  'n i shes  and high clamping p r e s s u r e s  to minimize  the 
AT a c r o s s  that joint. Experience with the second sur face  m i r r o r  rad ia tor /  
conduction b a r  cooling sys tem f o r  the DSP h a s  shown that, even with a joint 
br'ween the conduction b a r  and rad ia tor  which has been assembled  on the 
ground and i s  not intended to be separated,  i t  is difficult to achieve good 
the rma l  conductivity a c r o s s  that joint. 
conduction b a r  joined to a magnesium radiator  f r ame  to  which second sur face  
m i r r o r s  a r e  mounted. The two are joined via four 10-32 sc rews .  Eeat  
is conducted away fr3m the de tec tors ,  through the conduction bar, a c r o s s  
the joint and through the rad ia tor  to space.  
had shown that the de tec tors  we-:e not being maintained a t  t he i r  operat ing 
t empera tu res  due to a reduction in  preload of the s c r e w s  holding the radia- 
t o r s  to the conduction bar .  
smooth sur face  finishes (10 micro inch  RMS) and a c lamping p r e s s u r e  of 
20 x 10 N/m minimum. The clamping p r e s s u r e  was monitored during 
a s sembly  via s t r a in  gages mounted on the bolts.  
used fo r  achieving good the rma l  conductivity a c r o s s  jGints include the use  of 
indium foil o r  t he rma l  g rease  combined with high joinL t r e s su ree .  
shows the var ia t ion of cc,ntact t he rma l  res is t ivi ty  with joint p r e s s u r e  for  a 
var ie ty  of materials ar.d sur face  finishes.  
The DSP uti l izes a magnesium 
Flight experience with the DSP 
The solution to ihe problem was to  specify v e r y  
5 2 
Other methods that can be 
F igure  L-2 
The foregoing d iscuss icn  shows some D f  the requi rements  f o r  
achieving a good the rma l  conducting joint. 
ductivity with 8 joint which m u s t  a l s o  be mated  and demated in space would 
r e su l t  in difficult design problems.  
Attempts to achieve good con- 
The high clamping p r e s s u r e s  and 
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very smooth surfaces required to achieve good heat t ransfer  a r e ,  on the 
other hand, conducive to cold welding in a vacuum. The mechanics of a 
mechanism which would provide high clamping pressures ,  even i f  the 
cold welding problem could be solved, would be very complicated. 
For the above reasons, i t  is felt that the thermal control system 
for each module should be self-contained (choice b). 
self-contained thermal control system for  each module can be readily 
achieved. For the SSDSP spacecraft, tLa thermal control system design 
is reported on in Reference L- 1. 
system such as multi layer blankets or mylar  o r  second surface m i r r o r s  
which act  as  passive radiators, o r  active control such a s  beaters. Heat 
is transferred within the module via conduction b a r s  o r  plates or  heat 
pipes. Although the SSDSP did not utilize active cooling such as solid 
cryogens o r  Vuilleumier refrigerators,  this could be readily accomplished. 
The replaceable feature of the modular concept would make active cooling, 
where required, an attractive concept. 
The design of a 
Each module has  e i ther  a passive 
The thermal  control system for  the EOS is quite similar to that 
of the SSDSP, except that the many IR sensors  on board the EOS require 
some form of active cooling to achieve the 90 K - IZOOK detector tempera- 
tures .  
attractive to consider active cooling. 
0 
Here again, the replaceable feature of the module makes i t  
C .  REPLACEABLE MODULE/PAYLOAD FLUID INTERFACES 
Fluid interfaces between a module and the payload which require 
demating and mating each time a module i s  replaced should be avoided in 
the design of a space servic-able spacecraft by making all  fluid systems 
self-contained within a module. 
Design studies (Section 4 of Volume I1 and Section 3 of Volume 111) 
in which the Defense Support Program (DSP), Earth Observatory Satellite 
(Ea), and the Large Space Telescope (UT) were configured for  on-orbit 
servicing via a remote service module have indicated that it is desirable 
L- '0 
to maintain the interface between the module and the payload o r  space- 
crafL ds simple as possible. 
mechanical interface required to align the module to the spacecraft and 
c a r r y  flight loads, and the electrical  interface required for  power and 
data transmission. Addition of a fluid interface would complicate the 
module/spacecraft process by reciuiring a t  least  one ex t ra  joint which 
would have to be aligned pr ior  to the final operation of locking the module 
to the spacecraft o r  require a mechanism which would align and lock the 
mating halves of the connector af ter  locking the module to the spacecraft. 
The interface should consist only of the 
Ground- refurbishable o r  expendable spacecraft which have no 
replaceable modules could be designed to have separable connectors, 
although generally, it  is recommended that brazed connections be used 
whenever possible. 
The difficulties involved with mating and demating fluid connectors 
remotely in space are influenced by the type of fluids required to be t rans-  
ferred.  
systems will determine thefluids used. 
gases  such as helium o r  nitrogen to room temperature liquids such as 
hydrazine to cryogenics such a s  LH2. The launch environment, orbit, 
orbital  maneuve ring requirements and reentry environment dete m i n e  
the conditions under which these fluids must  cperate. 
some possible subsystem operating environments is shown in Table L-1. 
As can be seen from this list,  the operating ezwironments could range 
from cryogenic temperatures to temperatures well above room temperature,  
depending upon the fluids used. Thus, if we consider the use of mateable/  
demateable connectors, the problem becomes one of designing connectors 
capable of transferring the above-mentioned types of fluids with negligible 
leakage over a wide range of temperatures and pressures .  In addition, 
the mechanisms for achieving the connection remotely in space must  be 
designed. Once the connection i s  made, a method of checking for  leaks 
must be employed. 
The configaration of the spacecraft and the type of on-board sub- 
These fluids could range from 
A partial  l ist  of 
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Reference L-3 reports  on the experience gained in 'he dcv?lopnent  
of over  1, 300 separable (but not remotely mateable/demateable) connectors 
for the Saturn IV stage. 
program were manifold and complex. After installation of the cor- 'c ' t rs  
by highly trained and skilled personnel, many leaks were uncovered a t  the 
system checkout level. ;lows the 
number of leak. founa a t  the Jystem check level. 
The problems encountered over a long development 
Table L-2, taken from Reference L-4, 
~~ ~ ~~ -~ ~ 
Approx. Number of 
Leaks c / o  
Approx. Numbe r of 
Connections 
40 
80 
Not Available 
110 
70 
70 
90 
60 
500 
800 
90 0 
900 
1,000 
1,100 
1,200 
1, 300 
It can be seen that, at  times, over 10 percent of the connectors showed 
leakage, even a f t e r  being assembled with great ca re  in clean conditions 
by trained personnel. It is reasonable to assume that the potential per- 
centage of leaks encountered in a system designed for remote coupling 
in space would be a t  least  this great and probably greater.  
To detect leaks, however, would require on-board leak check 
equipment. 
would be required. 
In all probability, more  than one type of l eak  detection system 
In a discussion of methods of static-leak detection in 
L- 13 
Reference L-5, it i s  pointed out that no singlc: method is used because 
none is completely universal. 
tion depends on a number of criteria: 
The most  suitable method for  a given situa- 
1. Fluid used for pressurization 
2. 
3. 
4. Environment of the leak; i.e., temperatures and p res su res  
5. Accuracy required 
6 .  
Magnitude of the anticipated leakage 
Configuration of the hardware to be checked 
involved 
Whether it mus t  be quantitative o r  qualitative 
7.  Time and facilities available for this effort. 
The methods of leak detection used by Rocketdyne are shown in Table L-3 
which i s  taken from Reference L-5. 
Table L- 3. 
It was also noted in Reference L-5, that the Hastings-Raydist Flowmeter, 
the only instrument listed fo r  in-flight leak detection i s  "a proposed, but 
not a proven method". 
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Reported on in Reference L-6 are a number of sensors  capable 
of detecting gas  leaks. 
sensors ,  oxygen sensors,  and non- specific sensing methods. The state- 
of-the-art, a s  wel l  as the commercial  availability of the sensors  in these 
three categories, i s  discussed in Reference L-6. The conclusions of the 
study point out that "Many methods and many instruments are available 
for the detection and location of leaks. No one instrument o r  method is 
ideal for any particular application in the space industry". It i s  further 
stated that: "It appears that further research is in o rde r  to enhance the 
s ta te  of the a r t  in the leak detection area.  
come ". 
They are divided into t h r e e  groups: hydrogen 
The ideal system is yet to 
It appears that incorporating a leak detection system in a space 
serviceable payload would be a very complicated and difficult task due 
to the lack of availability of a flight qualified leak detection system capable 
of detecting leakage of a wide range of liquids and gases. 
To date, no fluid couplings exist  which can be mated and demated 
in  space and sti l l  provide zero leakage service over  the expected wide 
range of fluids and operating environments. 
quick disconnect couplings such as a coupling assembly used for RP-1 rocket 
fuel transfer,  manufactured by Snap-Tite, Inc. (Ref. L-3). However, this  
i s  intended fo r  ground use,and,as noted in Reference L-6, i t  i s  very 
difficult to assemble. 
fluids or air  but none of these are for space use and furthermore there are 
none which are designed f o r  unamnned operation. 
There are availablc some 
There are also others  intended for use with hydraulic 
In the design studies in which s p a c e  serviceable spacecraft were 
configured for the DSP, LST, and EOSmissons, it  was shown that all  
subsystems requiring fluids could be designed such that they were self- 
contained within a module. Thus, no fluid interfaces were required. This 
approach i s  felt to be a much more  reliable, cost-effective, and simpler 
eolution than that of trying to design and develop a fluid coupling capable 
of in-space connection. 
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The types of subsystems which require fluid couplings, for  example 
attitude control propulsion, refrigeration systems, etc. a r e  of such a 
nature that they can be designed to be contained within a single module. 
If, for  example, in the case of a propulsion system, more volume i s  re- 
quired for expendables in o rde r  to  increase the time between expendables 
replacement or to  provide enough expendables for the life of the mission, 
then one could consider a hybrid system in which extra tanks are mounted 
on a non-replaceable portion of the payload and connected to the module 
via plumbing and a joint d i c h  could be cut and sealed in a one-time-only 
operation. 
tanks would be sealed off with a c t - t te r / sea le r  and the tanks on the space- 
craf t  would be tied into the system through an existing factory-installed 
plumbing system.. The valves, thrusters ,  and control electronics would 
be designed with enough reliability to las t  the life of the payload. In the 
event of a failure of a valve o r  thruster  o r  other component on  the module 
which would require module replacement, the module could be replaced 
with one which would operate only a s  a self-contained system that would 
then be replaced at  regular intervals as expendpbles were exhausted. 
replace the module would require that the non- replaceable tank on the 
payload f i r s t  be sealed off, thus breaking the connection between the module 
and the spacecraft  mounted tank. 
would no longer be available for  use. 
After the fuel in the tanks on the module i s  exhausted, the 
To 
The remaining fuel in the payload tank 
D. REPLACEABLE MODULE/PAYLOAD ELECTRICAL INTERFACE 
Design studies in which the DSP, EOS, and the LST were con- 
figured for on-orbit servicing via a remote service module have utilized 
an electrical  interface consisting of a single 1. 5 in. diameter pin. This 
pin, shown in Figure L-1, se rves  three purposes: it  provides mechanical 
alignment between the module and the spacecraft and c a r r i e s  flight loads, 
i t  t ransmits  data and commands through a single coaxial connector in the 
center  of the pin, and i t  provides a DC power and ground connection to 
each module via the two terminals on the shoulder of the pin, 
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While the design studies performed and reported used this single 
pin concept, it  i s  not immediately obvious that a single pin connector i s  
the most  advantageous design to utilize for  the module/payload electrical  
interface. 
Ground- refurbishable o r  expendable spacecraft which have no 
replaceable modules would not need to utilize an electrical  interface con- 
cept such a s  the one described herein. 
separable connectors could be used a s  i s  common practice on existing 
expendable spacecraft design. 
Conventional flight-quality, multi-pin, 
Design studies of payloads configured for on-orbit servicing re- 
sulted in definition of an electrical  interface between the module and the 
spacecraft which might be typical of that required for the in-orbit main- 
tainable type of payload. 
pr imary feature of the module/spacecraft interface shown in  the figure i s  
that it relies on only one mechanical motion to lock t h e  module to the 
spacecraft which also establishes the electrical  and data interface. 
This interface is shown in Figure L-1. The 
The concept of using a data bus for  data transmission allowed 
the use of a single coaxial connector for  data transmission. 
pin had to be large enough to help c a r r y  flight loads, it was also large 
enough to c a r r y  electrical  power transmission wires (separate DC power 
and ground wires) in addition to the coaxial cable for data transmission. 
However, to accomplish data transmission to and from a module via a 
single coaxial connector required a considerable amount of data bus 
equipment in each module. 
111, no tradeoff studies were performed in which overall  payload complexity, 
complexity of the module/ spacecraft interfaces, and complexity of the data 
bus 
data transmission. 
in  an expendable payload would bound one end of a tradeoff study and the 
single pin concept used in the SSDSP, EOS, and LST studies would bound 
Because the 
In the study reported on in Section 3 of Volume 
were compared with the number of electrical  connections chosen for 
The number of electrical  connections normally made 
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the other  end. 
bus system for those payloads already s:udied by increasing the number 
of pin connections at the module/spacec raft interface. In addition, the 
number of pins i s  a function of the quantity of modules the payload contains, 
the manner  in which the subsystems a r e  divided between these modules, 
and the amount of redundancy required. 
It m a y  be possible to reduce the complexity of the data 
Assuming the number of electrical  connections a t  the interface 
a r e  increased over  the single connector design, it is conceivable that 
the same single connector concept could be designed to house more than 
one coaxial connector mere ly  by changing i t s  diameter o r  i ts  shape; possible 
pin configurations a r e  shown in Figure L-3. 
use of a single pin to locate, align, and lock a module in place, in addition 
to providing electrical  power al l  with movement of a single pin only. 
However, these concepts contain m o r e  than one coaxial connector for  data 
transmission. 
These concepts st i l l  allow 
Addition of another pin would sti l l  allow the same type of locking 
motion, actuated by the service module mechanism, to lock the module in 
place and to provide the power and data transmission. 
problem of providing close tolerances on the dimensions between the pin 
holes and the pins from module-to-module and payload-to-payload i s  intro- 
duced. This mismatch in spacing between pins could result in poor contact 
between the module and spacecraft, misalignment f the module relative to 
the spacecraft, excess  s t ra in  on the mating parts,  o r  - t  the worst, result 
in failure to achieve a mate. In any case,  a dimensional tolerance problem 
i s  introduced with the addition of an extra  pin which doesn't exist with a 
single pin. 
However, the 
Another possibility would be the use of a separate multi-pin 
connector, contained in  the module, which would be mated to the space- 
craf t  after mating of the module to the spacecraft. 
separate  mechanism to  achieve connector mate .  
This would require a 
This mechanism would 
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MlLTIiLE MlWS AIS0 POSSIBLE7 
DIA. INCREASE ALLOWS INCREASE 
IN NUbDER OF PINS 
MODIFICATION OF BASELINE CONCEPT 
FOR SSDSP 
Figure L-3. Modification of Single Pin to Provide 
for Multiple Electrical Contacts 
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have to be operated remotely from the se rv ice  module since the payload 
is shutdown during the serv ic ing  operation. 
but at the expense of additional complicatio:i, weight and a reduction in  
reliabil i ty.  
A design could be developed, 
In each  of the above discussions,  use of a sliding type of connector  
This  is necessa ry  in o r d e r  t o  for  da ta  t ransmiss ion  has  been assumed.  
achieve a c lean  contact. 
produces a self-cleaning action to a s s u r e  clean contact. 
button contacts  maintained by spr ing  action are not sa t i s fac tory  for da ta  
t r ansmiss ion  duc to the possibil i ty of contamination on the contacts .  
e l ec t r i ca l  power t ransmiss ion ,  t he re  is not enough cu r ren t  t ransmi t ted  
across the da ta  contact to cause  a r c i n g  and thus self-cleaning. 
a sl iding type oi data  connector  is required.  
The sliding action of the pin in  its receptacle  
Butt-type o r  
Unlike 
Therefore ,  
E. NON-REPLACEABLE EQUIPMENT IN AN ON-ORBIT MAINTAINABLE 
PAY LOAD 
In designing a payload for on-orbit s t rv ic ing ,  i t  is not necessa r i ly  
des i rab le  t o  require  that  all subsys tems or  compcnents be replaceable.  
Consideration of the mis s ion  life, orb i ta l  pa rame te r s ,  type of s e n s o r s  and 
equipment, operat ing requi rements  of the var ious subsys tems,  and packaging 
requi rements  for the payload under  s tudy m a y  indicate that cer ta in  of the 
subsys t ems  should be designed f o r  the life of the mis s ion  and therefore  
are not to be replaceable.  
The most obvious example is the basic  spacecraf t  s t ruc tu re  which 
should be designed for non-replacement.  
the s t ruc tu re  and it can eas i ly  be designed to  withstand the flight loads.  
The l a rges t  flight load fac tor  for the Shuttle i s  3.3 g's and is 6 to  7 . 5  g'e 
for expendable boos te r  load fac tors .  
s sve  re loading conditions on the s t ruc tu re .  
There  a r e  no wear  out i t e m s  in 
These load f ac to r s  do not impose 
Solar  a r r a y s  are another  i t em which should be considered for 
permanent  installation. For a typical  se rv iceable  payload mis s ion  life 
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of ten years,  i t  has been shown that so la r  arrays for  spacecraft i i r  orbits 
ranging from low-earth to geosynchronous (Ref. L-1) can be sized to 
operate satisfactorily for the entire ten-year period. F rom a design stand- 
point, increased flexibility can be gained by using a solar  a r r a y  which does 
not have to be replaced. The array no longer has to be packaged within the 
module itself which permits greater  latitude in selection of the type of 
a r r a y  to be used, i. e. , roll out, rigid panel, etc. Replacement of the 
solar a r r a y  drives, i f  an oriented a r r a y  is used, can still be accomplished 
with a non-replacerble a r r a y  by means of a technique such as that shown 
in Figure L-4. 
Antennas quite often require special viewing angles or are so large 
that they present design problems i f  they a r e  required to  be replaced. Con- 
sideration should be given to mounting the antenna to the spacecraft  structure, 
and mounting only the associated electronics within the module. 
problems which may  a r i se  with this approach include the following: 
The 
1. If +he antenna i s  steerable, then the dr ives  will probably 
have to  be replaced; methods for replacing drives,  but not 
the antenna, would have to be developed. 
High operating frequencies (in the RF range) require 
waveguide connections between the antenna feeds and 
electronics. 
example, 60 GHz), then the pointing accuracy requirements 
may  place such s t r ic t  anti-backlaah requirements on the 
drive a s  to preclude the possibility of designing a 
replaceable drive. 
is not replaceable and the high frequency electronics a r e  in 
the module: 
a. 
2. 
If the operating frequency i s  high (for 
'l'wo problems could arise if the antenna 
The waveguides must  have a separable joint which 
muot be mated to high tolerances (on the o rde r  of 
f 0.0005 in. for a 60 GHe operating frequency) 
Power losses  increase as the length of the waveguide 
increases .  
be mounted directly on the back of the antenna 
if the antenna is small enough, packaginq of the 
ent i re  assembly as a module for  removal/replacement. 
b. 
This may require that the electronics 
and, 
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Optical sys t ems  a r e  another  candidate f o r  non- replacemeqt.  Quite 
often +he optics a r e  ve ry  l a rge ,  as is the case with the LST and DSP sa t -  
e l i tes .  
sys t ems  can be designed to las t  for the life of the miss ion .  
o ther  problems could be introduced. For example,  i f  focal plane de tec tors  
are  subject to degradation o r  failur? and m u s t  be replaced, thf ! some type 
of focus detection and a l jus tment  system woi:ld be required t or ien t  the 
new focal plane detector .  
F. MODULE REMOVAL/REFLACEMENT USING MANIPULATOR 
With the exception of drives and focal plane de tec tc rs ,  optical  
However, 
One of the t a sks  of the ope ra to r  of the Shuttle attached manipulator  
sys tem (AMs) is to effect  the removal  of a module of an on-orbit  main-  
tainable satel l i te  and to replace this (failed) module with a newmoau le  
of thz same type by m e a n s  of the manipulator .  
more s imply and effectively i f  the module sys tem i the module and i t s  g rasp-  
ing points, handles,  latches,  e tc . )  i s  designed Lo minimize the number  of 
different movements  required of the AMS and i t s  opera tor .  
This t ask  m a y  be accomplished 
It is not anticipated that the withdrawai/replacement  of a module 
will r ep r r sen t  a s imple task.  
into the system that will facil i tate the operation w i l l  s implify the task  of 
the manipulator  ope ra to r  and speed the satel l i te  refurbishment  cycle.  
will be par t icular ly  important  in the c a s e  of a payload containing a la rge  
number of modules  where equipment i s  being replaced down to the "black 
box:" level. 
Any design fea tures  that can be incorporated 
This  
The t ime required to r epa i r / r e fu rb i sh  the module complement  
of a low-earth-orbit,on-orbit maintainable satel l i te  can be reduced i f  the 
modules  a r e  designed so as to minimize the number of motions required 
of the attached manipulator  sys tem.  
A design analysis  that is presented in Section 3 of Volume I11 was 
made  in the form of a pre l iminary  d e s i p  (Iayclut drawing) to identify a 
L-23 
feahible means  of designing a space replaceable module, i .e. ,  satellite 
module that could be readily removed and replaced by means of the 
ope rator-controlled attached manipulator system. 
Several  perturbations were made to the drawing. One desig.1 
(Figure L-5) was made wherein the latch handles and module carrying 
point were designed in the form of simple rods. 
were located symmetrically on either side of the central  grasping (carrying) 
point. 
l a tor  to f i rs t  release the f i r s t  (one) latch via a grasp, release,  and pull 
operation. Then i t  would be necessary to translate the end effector of the 
manipulator to the opposite side of the front face of the module and repeat 
the above operation a t  the second latch. Finally, a translation could then 
be required back to the central  grasping (carrying) point to grasp the 
module handle and withdraw the module from i t s  s t ructural  housing. 
complete reversal  of these operations would be required to insert  and 
latch the replacement module. 
The latch release handles 
In o r d e r  to  remove a module, this design would require the manipu- 
A 
Fur ther  examination of the design led to the identification of a 
means  whereby latch release (or engagement) and module extraction (or 
insertion) can be accomplished at one single grasping point thus eliminating 
the numerous translational motions previously described. 
This simplification can be effected (Figure L-6) by designing 
the module grasping point as an integral par i  of a slide assembly which 
is a mechanism containing a ball-lock-type detent o r  spring-loaded plunger 
that is seated in a suitably shaped groove. 
the grasping handle is attached to a toggle arrangement that directs  
(electrical) power via switches to l inear actuators controlling closing/open- 
ing of the module latches. Movement of the slide from one detent to another 
opens (or closes) the latches. 
a l'pullll to unlatch) results in extraction of the module. 
only one straightline motion (no rotations o r  lateral  translations) a t  one 
point i s  required to extract or replace a module. 
The end of the slide opposite 
Continuation of the movement (for example, 
With this design, 
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It i s  recommended that the modular elements of on-orbit main- 
tainable payloads be designed to reduce the number of motions and the 
number of points at which the required motions are ca r r i ed  out to  a minimum 
in o rde r  to facilitate module withdrawal/inspection and minimize the t ime 
in which this function m a y  be car r ied  out. 
G. MODULE BACKUP HANDLING PROVISIONS 
A primary module handling system i s  required for satellite module 
replacement by the orb i te r  attached manipulator system. 
would consist of the latches, grasping points, handles, etc. required to 
t ransfer  modules between orbi ter-carr ied spares and the attached satellite 
via employment of the manipulator system. A backup module handling 
system would ensure completion of this task in the event of pr imary  system 
failure. 
This system 
The cost effectiveness of the Shuttle depends to a great extent on 
the ability to repair  and/or  refurbish the modular components of low-earth 
orbit  satellites. 
would permit the successful accomplishment of this task in the event of 
pr imary module handling system functional failure. 
backup system can be provided with little or  no addition of hardware 
elements to the basic system. The versatility of this system can be 
enhanced by the addition of a backup system that would be operable by the 
manipulatcr i f  a failure occurs  in any of the elements (mechanical o r  
electrical)  comprising the pr imary system. 
A secondary o r  backup mode of module replacement 
A supplementary 
The pr imary system described a s  an automatic system is de- 
signed to minimize the number of operations required to  effect module 
change-out by means of the manipulator. 
controlled l inear actuators that are used to operate the latches securing 
the module(s) to the satellite structure.  If the actuators were equipped 
with an over-ride device (e. g., a slip clutch) and the latches designed to 
The system contains electrically 
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furnish integral external handles (grasping points), as shown in Figure L-7, 
the latches could always be released and/or engaged by the remote manipulator 
thus making i t  always possible to mechanically replace a module in the 
event of a mechanical or electr ical  failure in any element of the pr imary 
module handling system. 
H. RECOMMENDED TRADEOFF STUDIES 
1. DOCKING SYSTEMS 
F o r  the design studies performed a s  an aid in developing design 
guidelines, a modified Apollo probe and drogue docking system was selected 
for use with the service vehicle concept. 
unmanned use by removing those components normally used fo r  the manned 
removal of the probe from the Apollo c rew transfer  tunnel. In addition, 
an indexing latching system, consisting of three latches on the nose of the 
probe which would engage in three slots in the bottom of the cone once the 
service module was indexed property relative to the spacecraft, was 
inco rpo rated. 
rhe  system was modified fo r  
The Apollo docking system was selected for the design studies 
because i t  is a proven workable system and because it was eas i ly  adaptable 
to the concept gene rated for the space serviceable spacecraft. 
no  tradeoff studies were performed to determine the impact of the type 
of docking system chosen on the design of the spacecraft, service module, 
replaceable module, or module t ransfer  techniques. 
However, 
Other docking systems have been studied and designs generated. 
For example, described in Reference L-7 is a docking frame with capture 
latches and guide arms which may offer some advantages over the Apollo 
system, depending on the type of spacecraft configuration chosen, 
2. SINGLE VS. MULTIPLE LAUNCHES 
Tradeoff studies should be performed to  determine if there is any 
advantage in designing the spacecraft (ground refurbishable and expendable 
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as well as on-orbit maintainable) such that more than one can be launched 
with the Shuttle. 
Some spacecraft operational schemes will probably require more 
than one payload of the same type spaced apart  within the same orbit o r  
perhaps in different orbits.  
could be advantageous to launch more than one payload with a single Shuttle. 
The weight and geometry of the given payload must, of course, be such 
that the Shuttle payload bay can accommodate more  than one payload. 
Assuming this requirement is satisfied, the impacts on the design of 
spacecraft for  multiple launch should be determined. 
determination of extra attach s t ructure  required, increased loads on the 
basic structure,  release mechanisms, and associated failure modes, etc. 
To satisfy requirements of this nature, i t  
This would include 
Multiple launches should not be limited to payloads of the same 
design. It may also be advantageous to consider launch of two completely 
different types with a single Shuttle launch. 
I .  
L-1. 
L-2. 
L- 3. 
L- 4. 
L- 5. 
L-6. 
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APPENDIX M. RELIABILITY 
To achieve cos t  savings with on-orbit  r epa i r ,  fa i lure  modes  leading 
to loss of payload o r  preventing on-orbit  r epa i r  m u s t  be identified and t h e i r  
e f fec t  minimized.  
s imple  design changes are general ly  a l l  that is required.  
success  and reduce rev is i t  frequeqcy, sufficient t e l eme t ry  and instrumen- 
tation a r e  required to identify the failed module and o the r  modules  with such 
extensive degradation that they will l ikely fai l  before t h e  next scheduled re- 
visit. The abil i ty to re t r ieve  failed modules  f rom orb i t  will al low rea l i s t ic  
co r rec t ive  action to  be taken on future payload designs.  
Addition of select ive redundancy to c r i t i ca l  a r e a s  o r  
To insure  repair 
A. EXPENDABLE PAY LOADS 
Although modularization i s  not inherently required for expendable 
payloads, it can  lead t o  e a r l y  s tandardizat icn and to  dec rease  t e s t  problems.  
For example,  if three different payloads each  requi re  a 12-volt regula tor  
a l l  with the same requi rements  except c u r r e n t  output, a separa te  regulato- 
would be built for each  program.  It might  be des i rab le  to use  the one with 
the maximum c u r r e n t  output fo r  a l l  th ree ,  but this  is usually prevented by 
weight, s ize ,  configuration, and interface res t r ic t ions .  In the Shuttle era, 
a modular ized s tandard regulator  could be used in a l l  c a s e s ,  since these  
res t r ic t ions  can  be removed by standardization. 
Curve A of Figure  M- 1 is a typical re l iabi l i ty  growth curve  using 
today's methods,  while Curve B is a hypothetical growth curve  fo r  a 
s i m i l a r  p rogram in  the Shuttle e r a .  
should resu l t  from usage of s tandardized modules .  
will  a l ready  have had considerable  reliabil i ty growth. s ince  they m a y  
have been used in a var ie ty  of previous program.  
of the advantages of standardization and how they affect the program relia- 
bllity, design, cost ,  and schedule.  
probably s t i l l  be required for the s a m e  reasons  as  today. 
The l a rge  improvement  in  reliabil i ty 
Some of these  modules  
Table M- 1 lists some 
High reliabil i ty (hi- rel) p a r t s  will 
M-  1 
100% 
Reliability 
0 
A - Today 
B - Hypothetical curve 
for the Shuttle era  
-- 
Production (Number Built) 
Figure M -  1 .  Reliability Growth of a Typical Payload 
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Table M- 1. Advantages of Standardization 
YO. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
Advantage 
Electr ical  Design 
Manufacturing 
Testing 
Inspection Procedure 
More data on weak areas 
More reliability data 
Improved TLM 
Higher availability of 
s p a r e s  
Fewer errors in 
servicing 
More complete servicine 
Improved test equipment 
availability 
Improved jig and fixture 
availability 
Main Effects 
Improve 
Reliab. 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
-
X 
X 
Improve 
X 
X 
X 
X 
Reduce 
cost 
X 
X 
X 
X 
- 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
x 
Reduce 
Repair Time 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
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B. ON-ORBIT MAINTAINABLE 
For on-orbit maintainable payloads, most  failures a r e  corrected by 
replacement of modules on orbit. The cost of on-orbit repair  includes the 
cost  of the module to be repaired plus the shared cost  of the Shuttle flight. 
If ground repair  is required, the cost includes the repair  cost  plus the cost 
to bring the payload to ear th  and after repair, to replace it in orbit. If a 
spare payhad is available on the graund, it can be used to replace the failed 
payload (on orbit). Cost savings should result, since the failed payload can 
be returned to ear th  on the same trip. 
retrieved, a new payload mus t  be built and placed in orbit. 
cost  and cost ratios for  various str-.tegies a r e  shown below for  a $30M unit 
cost  payload and $10.3M launch cost: 
If a payload is "lost" and cinnot be 
An approximate 
On - o rbi t Re pai r 
Gi*ound Repair 
The cost of an on-orbit maintainable payload is greatly reduced, 
e.g., from $+U. 3M to $4.58M; however, some change should be expected 
in the part  quality requirements area. 
and MIL STD parts,  then hi-re1 par ts  would sti l l  generally be selected 
since MIL STD parts  failure ra tes  are about five to ten t imes higher than 
high reliability parts.  
in cost, but parte represent only 10% of the payload unit cost. 
previous example, the payload unit cost  will be l e s s  for MIL STD parts  by: 
If the choice were between hi-re1 
The MIL STD par t s  are two to three t imes lower 
Using the 
A par t s  cost = ($30M) (10'7'0) (3-1) = $2M 
However, the operating cost  will increase due to the increase in payload 
replacement rate. As an example, if a five t imes increase in par ts  failure 
M-4 
increases  payload failures by  two t imes to ac  ount f o r  nominal redundancy, 
the operations cost will increase by: 
A operations cost = ($4.58M) (2-1) = $4.58M 
or a total increase of $2.58M ($4.58M - $2.OM) using MIL ST1:parts. 
reliability of a MIL STD unit can be increased by increasing redundancy to 
reduce the payload failures. 
in cost  for parts,  testing, and refurbishment. Rather than using MIL STD 
par t s  which have high failure rates, intermediate quality par ts  m a y  be more 
appropriate, since high reliability par t s  a r e  basically established from the 
rigorous screening test of MIL STD parts. 
The 
This approach must  be traded against increases  
Figure M - 2  shows the effect of failure rate f rom putting m 3 r e  
money into screening. 
ments,  while Table M-3 shows relative cost, failure rates,  and lead times 
for  the devices. Although data showiiig the effectiveness of individual screen- 
ing tes ts  i s  generally not available, it  i s  suspected that certain tes ts  have not 
been optimized for  screening effectiveness. 
Table M- 2 shows these different screening require- 
1. Test Th.c - The burn-in time for Class  B par ts  (Table M-2) 
i s  168 hours (one week). 
2. Obsolescence - When centrifuge testing was f i r s t  performed 
(on t ransis tors  in the 1950ts), it  was an effective method of 
checking poor lead bonding. However, today, integrated 
circuit  leads a r e  much lighter, and this test rarely generates 
enough force to show a weak bond (that would not show in 
another test). 
Although screening tes t s  will be maintained, reduction may be 
It may  not have been optimized. 
advisable in certain areas. 
whose cost  was not less than the savings resulting from the decrease in 
repair  flights costs  (because of failure rate reduction), should not be incor- 
porated." In some caws, redundancy may be m o r e  cost-effective than 
adding a screening test, although this may lead to more  extensive on-orbit 
repairs.  
The c r i te r ia  generally would be that any test, 
- 
8 All cor t r  connected with the higher failure rate must  be considered; e.  g., 
additional ground tert ing and repair, more  exteneive on-orbit repair, and 
longer periods of outage. 
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40 0 
300 
Part Failure 
(per hour 
Rate 200 
x 10-9) 
100 
0 I I 1 
Cost per Part (in dollars) 
Figure M-2. Reduction in Failure Rate Resdt ing  From 
Addition of Screening Tests (IC’s per MIL-STD-883) 
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Table M-2. Screening per Method 5004-MIL-STD-583 
TEST 
Precap Visual 
Bake (Stab.) 
Thermal Shock 
'. empe rs ture  Cycling 
Mechanical Shock 
Centrifuge 
He nneticity 
Electrical 
Bum-In 
Reverse Bias (bum-in) 
Radiograph 
Y e s  
Y e  a 
Yes 
Y e s  
Y e s  
Y e s  (High) 
Y e s  
Y e s  
240 h r  
Y e s  
Y e s  
CLASS B 
Y e s  
Y e s  
No 
Y e s  
No 
Y e s  (Medium) 
Y e s  
Y e s  (Less) 
168 h r  
No 
No 
Y e s  
Y e s  
No 
Y e s  
No 
Y e s  (Low) 
Y e s  
No 
No 
No 
No 
Table M-3. Failure  and Cost Information on 
MIL-M- 38510 IC's (T2L-Construction) 
I CLASSA I CLASSB CLASS c 
Failures per h r  I 20.4 
Cost* pe r  Device 
Procurement Lead Time 
(in Dollars) 12 
20 weeks 
I 
F o r  procurement lots at 1000 devices. 
40.7 
8.5 
4 weeks 
107.9 
2 .5  
In Stock 
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One area in which MIL STD par t s  might be considered is in the 
expe riements under the foilowing conditions: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Data are not urgently required. 
The experiment is a small par t  of the mission. 
Many other more important experiments are carr ied.  
Failure of the experiment doesn't affect other  areas 
of the payload. 
Then, i f  one of this type experiment fails, i t  will not be repaired until 
the payload is visited for sane other reason. 
Today, i f  a payload fails, the only information on the cause of 
failure comes from telemetry (TLM! data. 
really explaining what has  happened. 
Often this is not effective in 
Because of this: 
1. Extra design time and effort are used before flight. 
2. Extra testing is performed before flight. 
3. b t r a  TLM and instrumentationare required even in non- 
cr i t ical  areas in o rde r  to pinpoint causes  of failure. 
4. When faiiures actually occur, extensive and expensive tes t  
and design evaluation programs are conducted (on the ground). 
5.  Since the problem sti l l  cannot be pinpointed in some cases;. 
e. g., low frequency, intermittent-tyFe failures, extra  
redundancy and other expensive and cautious design approaches 
a r e  ased on succeeding flights. 
In the Shuttle era, the failed module can be returned to  ground and 
a complete failure analysis performed. 
being changed, together with experimental data, could also be returned and 
analyzed. 
Degraded modules that were also 
The general concept of degraded or paybad survival state is im- 
portant in preventing payload loss. Although requirements vary from payload 
to payload, this concept of degraded state is illustrated for the following sub- 
systems. 
1. Attitude Control - For many experiments very fine control 
of attitude is required to provide proper pointing, platform 
stability and position determination. However, to prevent 
tumbling and insure safe pickup a less complex attitude 
2. 
control system can be used. 
by using a low cost completely redundant attitude control 
system or by using selective redundancy in the present system. 
F o r  example, a lower gain feedback amplifier might be used as 
backup for the high gain amplifier now required for high 
stability . 
Thermal Control - Thermal control i s  required for stability 
of operation and to prevent damage from excess heat or  cold. 
Module thermal  independence i s  generally desirable. 
failure, while awaiting payload repair ,  it i s  mainly required 
to supply sufficient heat to prevent damage by cold. 
achieve this objective one  change might be to always use two 
smal le r  heaters,  rather than one large one,  so that e i ther  
could supply enough heat to prevent widespread damage in  a 
module, if the other heater failed. 
This can be accomplished ei ther  
After 
Thus, to 
3. Part ia l  Ope ration of the Computer - During n o r m d l  operation 
the computer i s  the brains of the mission. After failure it is 
still required to provide control of functions such as attitude 
control, thermal  control, and the power distribution (to 
cri t ical  areas) .  The computer could ei ther  be made partially 
redimdant in  these a reas ,  o r  be programmed, af ter  failure, 
to use other areas that usually control non-critical functions. 
4. Communications - After failure, sufficient up and down link 
capacity must  be maintained to insure ope ration of those 
housekeeping functions, required for  suivival, which a r e  con- 
trolled from the ground. 
payload to payload, i. e., the grea te r  the on-board computer 
capacity the less the requirement. 
high requirements would be a "fly by wire" mission. 
less control is required and a degraded system capabll: of 
detecting safety related items, e.g., leaking fuel, and pro- 
viding some backup for the on-board computer would be 
sufficient. 
Power - The payload dosign should be such that a lower level 
ofboth regulated and unregulated power necessary to insure 
survival i s  provided af ter  single point failures of the power 
system. 
that, except for thermal co~i t rol ,  it  does not require power for 
survival while awaiting repair .  
Table M-4 shows how a single string power supply might be changed 
They will vary considerably from 
An extreme example of 
Usually 
5 .  
The desrgn of the experimental a r e a  should be such 
to prevent loss of the payload a f t e r  a failure. 
present FMEA procedures could be extended to verify this type of effort 
had been accomplished throughout the payload. 
Appendix N shows how the 
In this example, it i s  
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assumed that one-half of normal power i s  required for payload survival 
including one-.ifth of all regulated power. 
areas of the subsystems. 
loss of the payload a r e  the minimum power requirements fo r  the attitude 
control, thermal  system, command, and communications to insure that the 
payload survives until retrieved. 
This power i s  used in cr i t ical  
The requirements of power necessary to prevent . 
This example shows how design changes, operational change, and 
selective redundancy can be used to prevent loss of a payload. 
change, the single battery would be replaced by two batteries, each half the 
size of the original battery, so that e i ther  could supply power fo r  survival 
aCter the other had failed. 
off and on-orbit repair  would be scheduled before the batteries became de- 
pleted. 
area. 
for non-critical users .  The cr i t ical  section would be made redundant. It 
should be noted that program cost savings result  from these changes. 
For a design 
After failure, all non-critical i t ems  would be turned 
An example of selective redundancy is shown in the voltage regulator 
Each regulator is divided into two sections, one for critical and one 
If the module that contains the failure is totally unknown, the payload 
must  be returned to the ground for  refurbishment. 
isolated to a small number of modules, replacement modules can be ca r r i ed  
in  the Shuttle and changed on the payload. 
If the failure can be 
The impact of failure identification on the required number of 
launches per yea r  i s  shown in Figure M-3. 
the reliability function3 of the various modules, including a truncated 
module. 
reliabilities together. 
The top se t  of curves  shows 
The system reliability i s  determined by multiplying all the module 
The bottom set  of curves i s  a plot of number of launches p e r  year  
against the number of modules changed during each on-orbit repair  visit 
including the failed module. 
that a specific module has failed, to some information on the status of 
other modules. If perfect inforriation were available, the launch rate would 
be even lower. 
The curves range from no infomation,  except 
Reliability 
Expected 
No. of 
launc he s 
per year 
time 
Module reliabilitie s 
Repairs based on no information 
- 
Repairs based on some information 
1 1 1  
1 2  3 4  m 
Modules replaced in orbit per launch 
Figure M -  3 .  Impact of Failure Identification 
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A few of the indicators of module status that may  foretell early 
failure are:  
1. 
2 .  
3. 
Redundancy - The module failure rate will increase a f t e r  
redundant circuit(s)  in a module fail. 
High Temperature - A module operating above i t s  predicted 
temperature may  be approaching failure 
Experiments - Immediate repair  of a failed experiment m a y  
not be necessary; however, it would be repai--ed the next time 
the payload was visited for some other  reason. 
Wearout - Several components give signals indicating the 
approach of wearout. 
voltage recovery af ter  discharge during an eclipse, TWT's 
with low emission, and electromechanical devices indicating 
noise and sluggish operation. 
5. Fuel  Depletion - The fuel reserve is usually measured today 
and should be continued on these types of payloads. 
Using standardized modules on this type of payload is an advantage, 
4. 
These include batteries giving poor 
since almost all failure modes that lead to loss  of payload or prevent on- 
orbit  repair  will have been identified and appropriate corrective action will 
have been taken through maturity. Also, the TLM-instrumentation will be 
developed to monitor mor -le degradation information. 
C .  GROUND REFURBISHABLE 
Much of the above analysis holds true for  ground- refurbishable pay- 
loads; however, the economic advantages of eliminating failure modes which 
can cause loss  of the payload are expected to be smaller.  
and instrumentation are not required for this type of payload. 
only be sufficient to show that the payload is safe for  retrieval, to show 
when major failure modes a r e  approaching (on-orbit), and to aid in trouble- 
shooting during ground repair. 
Detailed TLM 
They need 
Standardization is important for  the same reasons as with on-orbit 
repair  type payloads. Also, modularization will allow design improvement 
to be added during refurbishment. Only rarely will other than hi-re1 par ts  
be cost-effective, e. g. , elimination of very expensive screening tes t s  that 
M- 13 
provide little reduction in failure rate. 
and failure analysis performed in the same manner as with on-orbit maintain- 
able type payloads. 
Payload can be returned from orbit 
D. SORTIE 
In Sortie flights, all failures result in loss of the mission except for 
those that can be repaired during flight. 
failures do not affect Shuttle housekeeping equipment and the crew environ- 
ment must be preserved. This mission type has low TLM and instrumentation 
requirements. Instead, test points may be available for use by crew members 
(using hand instrumentation). Since many payload (experiments) use the same 
function repeatedly, e. g. , amplifier in a solid-state antenna, a few of these 
could be carried and repairs made by the crew, i f  necessary. This repre- 
sents another reason for modularization, standardization, and interchange- 
ability requirements on this type of mission. MIL STD parts can be used 
in areas where repairs can be made on orbit. Not only can failed modules 
be returned to earth, but tests can be conducted on orbit for even better 
failure information. 
The only requirements are that 
E. CONCLUSIONS 
System engineering must consider major failure modes so that 
requirements can be placed on the subsystems during early design stages to 
minimize the effects of such failure modes. 
System engineering must specify the TLM instrumentation require- 
ments necessary to identify failed modules and major degradation of modules. 
The subsystem designers should consider approaches that will use 
features provided by the E'iuttle, e. g. , splitting the battery into two parts 
and low level redundancy in critical areas.  
A method must be developed to insure that the above tasks have 
Present FMEA procedures should be been satisfactorily accomplished. 
extended to cover these tasks. 
M- 14 
Standardized modules should be used, where possible, for  all  
housekeeping payload functions. 
The effectiveness of individual par t  screening tes t s  should be 
reviewed to  determine the i r  effectiveness in reducing payload costs. 
Redundancy should be considered in lieu of expensive screening 
tes ts ,  expecially on on-orbit repairable and sortie payloads. 
The ability to perform failure analyses on hardware returned from 
space will decrease design complexity and R&D, testing time and cost, 
and increase reliability on future flights. 
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APPENDIX N. FMEA PROCEDURE 
This is an example Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) 
to illustrate how the FMEA may be extended to the Shuttle payload. 
1. PAYLOAD TYPES 
These procedures a r e  intended to be used for on-orbit maintain- 
able and, where applicable, with ground refurbishable payloads. 
2. PURPOSES 
The purpose of this procedure is to extend the present FMEA 
procedures so that following additional information can be obtained. 
(1) 
(2) 
Identify a reas  where failure(s) lead to the loss of the payload. 
Identify areas  where failure(s) prevent repair of a payload 
on orbit. 
(3) Identify areas  where failure(s) may require more than one 
re-visit to repair  a payload on-orbit. 
(4) Identify TLM indicators that will aid in the selection of 
modules to be changed during on-orbit repair ,  in addition to the failed 
module. 
(5) Identify a reas  where new instrumentation and TLM should 
be considered. 
3. ASSUMPTIONS 
The following activities must be performed before this procedure 
can be used. 
(1) The payload requirements relative to Shuttle safety must 
be established. 
(2) The requirements for payload survival both at  the system and 
subsystem levels must be established. (See Attachment 1)  
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(3) The requirements for identification of failed modules must 
be establi-hed at  the system and subsystem level. (See Attachment 2 ) .  
(4) An FMEA analysis of the type presently performed for NASA 
payloads must be accomplished and the following information must be avail- 
able (for each failure mode). 
(a) The effect that the failure mode has at the subsystem 
level. 
(b) The effect that the failure mode has a t  the system level. 
(In addition the effect, must be shown, a s  i f  redundancy were not present, 
if applicable. 
( c )  The TLM or other indication that shows where the 
failure has occur red. 
(d) An identification number. 
4. PROCEDURE 
4.1 Failure Classification 
The following procedure shall be followed to classify failures, 
reduce the likelihood of serious modes and identify those that remain. 
(1) Insure that a FMEA has been performed and the type of 
information supplied in Attachment 1 and Attachment 2 ( i f  applicable) is 
available. 
(2) Classify each of the failure modes per the table and according 
to insiructions given in  Attachment 3. 
(3) Determine that all Class 1 (single point safety) failures 
have been eliminated, i f  possible, by design change o r  with redundancy. 
(It seems likely that a Shuttle safety organization will be required to approve 
any  exception^). 
2 and Class 3 failures (e. g., selective redundancy). Where the corrective 
action seems expeneive, o r  otherwise undesirable, a cost analysis shall bs 
pe r fo rm ed. 
(4) Recommend corrective action to reduce the effects of Class 
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( 5 )  Prepare a list showing all  remaining Class 1, 2 and 3 
failure and an explanation of why they had not been eliminated. 
4.2 Indicator Classification 
r Failure Failure Mode 
Class Identification Number 
L 
Example ID 
Numbers 
4 7, 9, 11 
5 
6 10, 9 
The failure indicators shall be reviewed (for each failure mode), 
to insure that they comply with the requirements of Attachment 4. 
deficiencies are noted new instrumentation and TLM channels shall be 
recommended. 
Where 
4.3 Module Selection 
For  each space repairable module, a list shall be prepared cross  
referencing the failure motqe identification number to the failure classes a s  
shown in  Attachment per the example in Table I. This list shall be used a s  
a guide for selecting modules to be changed, in addition to the  failed module, 
during on-orbit repair, e.g., a Class 4 oc 5 failure has top priority, since 
either indicates a SPF that could lead to loss of the payload. 
Table I Failure Mode Classification Example 
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APPENDIX N, ATTACHMY ' 1 
SAMPLE OF PAYLOAD SURVIVAL PROCEDURE 
1. PURPOSE 
This Attachment is the procedure that would Le followed by design 
engineering to identify conditions required for payload survival. 
2. REQUIREMENT 
The payload Ehall be analyzed to determine the minimum type(s) 
and level(s) of outputs required for its survival until repaired on-orbit 03 
returned to earth, for repair. 
subsystem level (or lower if  required). 
The information shall be obtained at  tho 
3. DEFINITION 
A payload is considered "lost" under the fol!.owing cocditions. 
(1) 
(2) 
It cannot be recovered o r  is unsafe to recovt .. 
It has extensive damage ana repairs a r e  uneconomical. 
4. CONDITION LEADING TO PAYLOAD LOSS 
Listed below a r e  conditions that can lead to loss of payload 
together with the subsystems that can affect these areas. 
4.1 Payload Tumbling 
The payload can tumble (or be in an unrecoverable orbit). 
This can result from selective failure of the attitude control, power,  
computer or communications subsystem. 
4.2 Payload Unsafe 
The payload may be unsafe to dock with due to failures of 
docking mechanism o r  leakage of dangerous substances. 
hydrogen, chemicals or radioactive material. Also the instrumentation 
- TLM (and power) necessary to determine the status of these dangers 
must be operational. 
They include 
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4.3 Failure I solation 
~ 
A failure may cause secondary failure(s) which make the payload 
unrecoverable or  too expensive to fix. 
mode must be considered. Anv subsystem has the potential to cause this 
type of problem, e.g., hedt from a short  before removal from the line. 
Also the shock from a violent A/C maneuver, upon failure, must be 
considered. 
The transient effect of each failure 
4.4 Thermal 
~- 
After failure, the payload must be able to stand the thermal 
envirfi-ment of space. This requires thermal control, heaters a heat shields, 
power and possibly A/C and communications. 
4.5 Capturt  o r  Storage Damage 
The payload can bc lost  .+iring capture if the docking rsechanism 
is defective o r  if sudden fa i lwes  occur in the A/C and related areas.  
problems dzting stored reentry have been identified. 
No 
5 .  OUTPUTS 
The result0 shall  be used as a guide for subsyscem designers 
and FMEA evaluation personnel. 
mation to be provided on some of the subsystems. 
The following is typical of the  iyfor- 
5 . 1  Power Subsys tern 
(1) Unregulated power 
(2) Regulated power 
(3) Time dependence of power 
5.2 
5 .3  
TLM 
(1 ) Critical channels 
-
Compute r (Con t r olle r ) 
(1) Required action and channels 
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5 . 4  Attitude Control 
(1) Transients allowable 
5 .5  Thermal 
(1 )  Minimum heaters 
(2) Heater controls 
5.6 Communications 
( 1 )  Which transmitter and receivers are needed 
5 .7  Safety 
( 1 )  Any safety areas 
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APPENDIX N, ATTACHMENT 2 
SAMPLE OF FAILED MODULE IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURE 
1. PURPOSE 
This Attachment is a sample of the type of procedure that would 
be followed by design engineering to identifying conditions preventing on- 
orbit repair. 
2. REQUIREMENT 
The payload shall be analyzed to determine the minimum type(s) 
and level(s) of outputs required to insure identification of the module that 
has failed. This information shall be obtained at the subsystem level (or 
lower if required). 
3. DEFINITION 
A payload is considered unrepairable if any of the following 
occur. 
(1) 
(2) 
Communication is lost with the payload 
The TLM information is insufficient to isolate the failure 
to three replaceable modules. 
(3) The module cax not be changed on-orbit. 
4. NON-REPAIRABILITY 
The following condition can lead to the payload not being 
repairable omorbit (in one trip). 
4.1 Communications 
Communications necessary to identify the failed channel may be 
This can be caused by critical failures of TLM channels, communl- lost. 
cations, power, and certain failures of the A/C and i ts  contrcll which make 
communications impossible, e. g., the antenna(s) a r e  out of position. 
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4.2 TLM Information 
Insufficient TLM information usually results from limitations 
on TLM channels and/or instrumentation. Sometimes the failure can 
be isolated to two (three) replaceable modules and all can be changed. but 
at a cost penalty. 
4 .3  Module ReDlacement 
- ~~~ 
The module may not be replaceable (on-orbit) if the exchange 
mechanism is jammed or  i f  an output of the module, to be replaced, is 
required during the replacement period. 
5. OUTPUT 
The results shall  be used as a guide for the subsystem designers 
and FMEA evaluation personnel. The following is typical of the information 
to be provided on some of the subsystems. 
5.1 Power Subsystem 
(1) Regulated power 
5.2 TLM Channels 
(1) Critical channels (e.g., some may be lost and failed 
module still can be identified). 
5.3 Computer 
(1) Control in TLM area. 
5.4 Instrumentation 
(1) Critical areas 
5.5 Attitude Control 
(1) If applicable to communications 
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APPENDIX N, ATTACHMENT 3 
SAMPLE OF FAILURE CLASSIFICATION PROCEDURE 
1. PUR-€ 
This procedures provides information to the FMEA evaluation 
personnel for grading the effect of failures. This information is necessary 
for design change recommendations and to aid in selection of modules, other 
than the failed module, to be changed during on-orbit repair. 
2. REFERENCES 
(1) Attachment 1 
(2) Attachment 2 
3. PROCEDURE 
Using the outputs of References 1 and 2 and other design 
information, the effect of each failure shall be classified as shown in 
Paragraph 4 below. 
4. METHOD 
(1) Table 1 is a list of classification versus condition of the 
payload after a failure has occurred. (Example - Class 4) 
(2) If a failure is time sensitive then it shall  be listed a s  
follows: 
Class - (#I) - T ( 
# l  - class until tirr. t 
1 2  - class after time t 
[t] 
t - time (in days) to change class 
(Example A 4 becomes a 2 in 2 weeks) Class 4 - T2 (14) 
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Class No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
Table 1. Failure Classification 
(Condition After Failure Occurs) 
Remarks 
Safety hazard (is a safety problem in Shuttle bay; or ,  i f  
in space, will  be if captured by the Shuttle. ) 
Payload lost 
Payload required ground refurbishment 
Payload requires ground refurbishment 
Payload has a SPF leading to 1 
Payload has a SPF leading to 2 
Payload has a SPF leading to 3 
Payload has a SPF leading to 4 
Experiment failure (25-5070 data lost) 
Experiment failure (10-25% data lost) 
Experiment failure ( < 10% data lost) 
Major module degradation 
Minor module degradation 
Negligible module degradation 
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APPENDIX N, ATTACHMENT 4 
SAMPLE OF FAILURE INDICATOR REQUIREMENT PROCEDURE 
1. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this Attachment is to recommend requirements of TLM 
information for various classes of failures. 
2. PROCEDURE 
The FMEA evaluation personnel shall determine i f  the Instrumentation 
Recom- 
with 
and TLM requirement of Table 1 a r e  met  for each class  of failure. 
mentations shall be made for additional TLM and Instrumentations, 
cost tradeoff, a s  necessary. Also recommendations for reductions should 
also be made, where applicable. 
3. REFERENCE 
Table 1 of Attachment 3. 
Table 1. Failure Indicator Requirements Chart 
Class (See Table 1 of 
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Attachment 3) 
Requirement 
(See code below) 
A 
N/A 
A 
B 
A 
A 
A 
C 
D depends on cost of instrumentation 
D depends on cost of instrumentation 
D depends on cost of instrumentation 
E 
C 
E (not required) 
E (not required) 
Code 
A - Positive "fail safe" indicator, i. e, , failure indication of indicator failure 
B - Positive indicator - Isolated to 1 module 
C - Positive indicator - Isolated to 2 modules 
D - 50% chance of isolating experiment 
E - Indicator, i f  economically justified 
-
also required. 
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